Nepali Army soldiers patrol on a street in Damak. Image used for representation purpose only.
| Photo Credit: Reuters

Nepal’s Prime Minister Balendra Shah, popular as ‘Balen’, was himself a YouTuber before joining politics. File
| Photo Credit: AP

The Rastriya Swatantra Party’s stunning sweep in the March  2026 elections, securing an absolute majority in the House of  Representatives and a majority of votes in the proportional  representation system as well, marks a new rupture in Nepali politics.  Rapper-turned-politician Balendra Shah, who resigned as Kathmandu’s  mayor to lead the RSP’s campaign since January 2026, defeated former  Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli of the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified  Marxist Leninist in the latter’s own constituency of Jhapa-5, a result  symbolising the defeat and rejection of the political old guard in the  country. 

The RSP, founded only in 2022 by television personality Rabi Lamichhane, had ridden a wave of anti-establishment sentiment,  fuelled by the Gen Z uprising of September 2025, to deliver Nepal’s first  parliamentary majority in 27 years. The three parties that had dominated  Nepali politics since the 1990s — the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and CPN  (Maoist Centre) — were reduced to 38, 25, and 17 seats respectively, their  worst-ever collective performance. At just 35, Shah is poised to become  Nepal’s youngest Prime Minister, set to govern a country that is still  counted among the world’s least developed. 

This article is a part of The Hindu’s e-book: Nepal’s new political moment

The scale of the RSP’s victory, in a way, matched the depth of the anger  that produced it. Six months before the election, Nepal had witnessed its  most violent popular upheaval since the civil war of the 1990s/2000s – an  uprising that lasted barely a couple of days but destroyed government  buildings, toppled the Oli government, and left dozens dead. 

The Run-Up: The Gen Z protests 

What began on September 8, 2025 as a youth-led protest against the Oli  government’s ban on 26 social media platforms rapidly metamorphosed  into a nationwide uprising. The government’s argument that the platforms  failed to comply with registration requirements following a Supreme  Court ruling on content monitoring was not accepted by young internet connected Nepalis who saw it as an attempt to suppress dissent against a  political class of the elite.  

But the anger went well beyond the social media ban. It extended to  opposing corruption, political instability, and economic mismanagement.  This is borne out by Nepal’s numbers that tell a stark story. It has had 30  changes of government since 1990 with no Prime Minister completing a  full term, unemployment among 15-24 year-olds reached 22.7% in 2022-23,  personal remittances account for over 33% of GDP, and roughly one in four  males is a migrant working in another country.  

The security forces’ killing of at least 19 demonstrators on the very  first day transformed what was initially Kathmandu-based dissent into  a nationwide outrage. On September 9, demonstrators defied an army imposed curfew and attacked multiple government buildings such as the  Federal Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the Prime Minister’s office complex. Politicians’ homes were targeted: five-time former PM Sher  Bahadur Deuba and his wife were assaulted, former PM Jhala Nath Khanal’s  home was set ablaze, with his wife suffering severe burns. Prisons were  raided, freeing among others, the RSP’s Rabi Lamichhane. By the time the  dust settled, close to 76 people were dead and over 2,000 had been injured. 

Following Oli’s resignation and a three-day power vacuum, former  Chief Justice Sushila Karki was appointed interim PM on September 12. She  dissolved Parliament and announced elections for March 5, 2026. The major  parties condemned this as unconstitutional, but their protests carried no  weight. The momentum of the uprising and the thorough discrediting of  the established political class had seen to that. 

Other upheavals in Nepal’s history 

A student of Nepal’s modern political history would recognise the  September 2025 uprising and what followed in March 2026 as the latest  in a series of decisive moments that have reshaped the country’s political  order. Three earlier pivotal periods, 1950, 1990, and 2005-07, each brought  about fundamental breaks from the governing order that preceded them.  The question that needs asking is whether 2025-26 represents a similar  structural transformation or is merely a generational changing of the guard  within an unreformed system. 

The End of Ranacracy, 1950-51 

The Rana oligarchy, which had reduced the monarchy to a titular role  since 1846, was among South Asia’s most long-lasting feudal regimes. As  the historian M.C. Regmi noted in his many works on the country, the  Rana political system was essentially a military despotism in which the  government functioned as an instrument for the enrichment of the prime  minister and his family. The regime survived through a system of patrilineal  succession and an elaborate hierarchy – the A, B, and C class system based  on birth and marital status – designed to manage internal power struggles.  But it ultimately bred resentment and constant intrigue within the ruling  elite itself. 

The Ranas presided over what was a stagnant, extractive political  economy. Land grants under various tenurial systems created layers of rent-receiving intermediaries between the actual cultivator and the state,  consolidating what Baburam Bhattarai, writing as a PhD scholar and who  later went on to become the country’s Prime Minister, characterised  as incipient feudalism. While cultivable land did expand, particularly  through the massive clearance of Terai forests for commercial farming  from the late 19th century onward, there was virtually no investment in  improving agricultural productivity or in industrial development. The  Ranas were ideologically opposed to modernisation and their deliberate  isolationism, permitting trade and outside linkages only to the extent they  benefitted the ruling elite, kept the economy overwhelmingly agrarian and  underdeveloped. 

Central to the perpetuation of this order was the Muluki Ain, the civil  code promulgated by Jang Bahadur Rana in 1854, which codified a caste hierarchical structure across all of Nepali society. The Ain accorded  primacy to the hill castes and especially to the Bahun (Brahmin)-Chhetri  elite, to whom the hill tribes and the Madhesis of the plains were rendered  formally subservient. It is important to note that this was not merely a social  code but also an economic instrument: the combination of caste-based  privileges with a system of agrarian dues and land grants provided the  legal architecture for the feudal order. The otherwise powerless monarchy  served to sanctify this structure through religious legitimacy, lending the  weight of Hindu tradition to what was, at bottom, an extractive oligarchic  regime. 

The contradictions that undermined this system were both internal and  external. The exposure of educated Nepalis, particularly those involved in  trade and those who studied abroad, to the Indian nationalist movement  created a class of discontents who sought to organise against feudal rule.  The Nepali National Congress, formed in 1947 in Benares, merged with the  Nepal Democratic Congress (itself an organisation of discontented C-Class  Ranas) in 1950 to form the Nepali Congress, led by the socialist B.P. Koirala. 

The Nepali Congress represented a qualitatively different kind of  threat to the Ranas: it sought not just to end Ranacracy but to change the  political system along modern parliamentary lines. This was enabled by the  weakening of the Ranas’ chief external patron, the British colonial state,  and the tacit support of the newly independent Indian government for the  Nepali Congress’s armed volunteers. 

Yet as author Martin Whelpton noted, the final collapse of the Rana  regime resulted not from a broadly based popular movement but from  divisions within the political elite and the policy adopted by newly  independent India. The lack of substantive mass mobilisation meant that  the deposing of the Ranas did not bring about definitive changes in the  political economy. 

The Brahmin-Chhetri elite remained dominant and the Muluki Ain’s  caste structure persisted in practice even after it was formally replaced only  in 1963. Nepal moved from Ranacracy back to absolute monarchy, and the  constituent assembly that the democracy movement had promised never  materialised. It would take nearly six decades and two more upheavals  before that promise was fulfilled.

The Panchayat Era and the First Jan Andolan 

King Mahendra’s usurpation of full powers in 1960, which ended the  brief Nepali Congress government, inaugurated nearly three decades of  absolute monarchy disguised as “Panchayat democracy.” The Rashtriya  Panchayat, a quasi-legislative body with nominated members and no  real power, was dominated by elites from the earlier regimes, including  various members of the Rana aristocracy. Political parties were banned.  The king, for his part, sought legitimacy through a combination of abstract  nationalism (counterbalancing India with China, diversifying foreign aid  relationships), symbolic appeals to Hindu divine kingship, and minimal  reforms that changed land tenure forms without altering underlying  patterns of ownership. 

The slow unravelling of this system was driven by structural changes that  the monarchy simply could not contain. By the late 1960s, roads, radio, and  cinema were penetrating Nepal. More significantly, the steady expansion  of secondary and higher education was creating a population that began  to question the existing order and that had expectations the economy  could not fulfill. As Hoftun, Raeper, and Whelpton (1999) observed, the  monarchy’s traditional legitimacy and powers of patronage provided some protection but could not sustain a “Panchayat ideology which few even  amongst its own nominal adherents really believed in.”  

The decisive catalyst for the 1990 Jan Andolan, however, was external:  the Indian trade embargo imposed in March 1989 following the expiry of  trade and transit treaties. The blockade choked the movement of goods into  landlocked Nepal, triggering a crisis of availability in essential commodities  that turned public anger, initially directed at the Indian establishment,  toward the Panchayat regime itself. 

What followed was unprecedented. The Nepali Congress and various  communist factions forged an alliance, and mass rallies beginning in  January 1990 escalated in February and March into violent confrontations  across the Kathmandu valley and the Terai. By April, the monarch, King  Birendra (Mahendra’s son), relented, lifting the ban on political parties and  dismantling the entire Panchayat system by the 16th. An interim coalition  government of the Nepali Congress and the United Left Front was formed,  with the NC’s Krishna Prasad Bhattarai at the helm. 

The Maoist Insurgency, the Second Jan Andolan 

The post-1990 democratic order, however, failed to resolve the  fundamental contradictions that had sustained monarchic rule. Property  relations in the largely agrarian country remained essentially intact. Land  reform went unfulfilled. The constitutional monarchy’s parliamentary  system produced the same instability that would later characterise the  republic: governments formed and fell with swift frequency, driven by the  same pattern of opportunistic coalition-making and falling that the Gen Z  protesters would later decry. 

More critically, the 1990 Constitution, while guaranteeing fundamental  rights and expanding political freedoms, made no provision whatsoever for  affirmative action or meaningful representation of the many marginalised  sections of Nepali society. The Bahun-Chhetri hill elite, accounting for  roughly 31% of the population but dominating virtually all state organs,  continued to set the terms of political and cultural life. They promoted the  Hindu religion, the Nepali language, and hill-caste norms as the default  national identity.

Indigenous nationalities (janajatis), who comprised around 36% of  the population, faced pervasive linguistic, religious and socio-cultural  discrimination along with unequal access to resources. The Madhesis of  the Terai plains, sharing cultural and linguistic ties with North India and  comprising over 30% of the population when all sub-groups are included,  were similarly marginalised. Now, ethnic organisations had existed since  the 1950s, but it was only after 1990 that ethnic mobilisation became  institutionalised, even as the democratic parties remained apathetic to  these aspirations. The constitution did not allow parties to be formed on  ethnic or caste lines. Languages such as Maithili and Newari were barred  from use in municipalities.  

It was in this context of unreformed social structures and unmet  aspirations that the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched its  “People’s War” in 1996. The Maoists’ 40-point demand charter combined  calls to end stark economic inequality with demands for ethnic and linguistic  self-determination, framed as a “nationality question.” Their guerrilla  campaign, focused on building base areas in the janajati-dominated hilly  districts of western and mid-western Nepal, drew its social base precisely  from the communities that the post-1990 democratic order had failed. The  Maoists made the demands of these marginalised groups their own, calling  for the right of self-determination, ethnic autonomy, and even forming  ethnic fronts and declaring autonomous regions during the course of the  insurgency. The People’s War lasted a decade, claimed over 13,000 lives,  and created a three-way conflict between the Maoists, the parliamentary  parties, and the monarchy. 

The royal massacre at Narayanhiti palace in 2001, where Crown Prince  Dipendra shot dead his father, King Birendra, mother, Queen Aishwarya,  and several other members of the royal family before turning the gun  on himself, led to King Birendra’s brother Gyanendra ascending to the  throne. The massacre and its aftermath saw a major drop in support for the  monarchy among the Nepali people, a decline that was only exacerbated  when King Gyanendra seized absolute power in 2005, justifying his actions  as necessitated by the failure of democratic parties to contain the Maoist  insurgency. But this proved to be the catalyst for the second Jan Andolan in  2006. The Maoists and the mainstream democratic parties, later backed by the Indian establishment, forged a comprehensive peace agreement that  ended the insurgency and ultimately led to the fall of monarchy. 

Following this were massive protests in and around Kathmandu valley  and in other parts of the country against the monarchy resulting in the  demand for a constituent assembly (CA) and a republican constitution.  The king was forced to restore the Parliament he had dismissed. The  Maoists gave up armed struggle and a popularly elected CA, with the  Maoists emerging as the single largest party in elections held in 2008, was  constituted. The CA declared Nepal a republic in its very first sitting, and  did so with near-consensus across all political parties. 

Yet even as the peace process brought the Maoists into the mainstream,  the Madhesis led fresh protests in the Terai demanding regional autonomy  and non-discrimination, angered that the seven-party-Maoist alliance had inadequately addressed their aspirations. Meanwhile, the forces of the  status quo across parties – the UML, the Nepali Congress, and even factions  within the Maoists – were powerful enough to prevent the comprehensive  state restructuring that was promised. The first CA broke down in 2012,  unable to reach consensus on federalism.  

In the elections to a second CA, the “status quoists” led by the  CPN(UML)’s K.P. Oli and the Nepali Congress’s Sher Bahadur Deuba fared  much better than the Maoists. This new CA promulgated a Constitution  in 2015 that had watered-down provisions for federalism, to the strong displeasure of the Madhesis and janajatis, who launched fresh agitations in  which over 50 people died. But the new Constitution retained substantial  features such as secularism and proportional representation. 

So while a popularly written constitution was finally realised in Nepal,  something that had been denied since the 1950s, the structure of political  power, dominated as it was by status quoists, resulted in no significant  socio-economic change of the kind that the agitations leading up to the  CAs had promised. What followed was a three-way rotation of power  between Oli, Deuba, and the Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal. It was this  dysfunctional carousel that set the stage for the Gen Z uprising a decade  later. 

Continuities and Differences 

Each of Nepal’s previous upheavals produced a clear institutional break.  The tumult in 1950 ended feudal aristocratic rule. Jan Andolan 1 in 1990  ended absolute monarchy and Jan Andolan II 2006-08 ended the monarchy  altogether and established a republic through a constituent assembly. 

In a way, the Gen Z protests and the RSP’s 2026 landslide represent  a decisive popular verdict against the post-2015 political leadership— the  Oli, Deuba, and Dahal triumvirate who rotated power among themselves  through changing alliances while presiding over economic stagnation and  mass out-migration. In this sense, the 2026 verdict is a more democratically  expressed one than the transition of 1950 (which was largely elite-driven),  and carries a clearer popular mandate than the Jan Andolans (which, being  agitations, did not end up favouring any one political formation once the old  order was removed). Nepal has, for the first time in its history, produced a  parliamentary majority through a genuine multi-party election held in the  wake of a popular uprising, something that none of its earlier transitions  achieved so cleanly. 

Yet the limitations of this moment are also apparent, and they need to  be acknowledged. The Gen Z movement that catalysed it was largely an  urban phenomenon concentrated in Kathmandu, led by a cohort that has  remained largely silent on or was actively hostile to the federalism agenda  that was central to the 2006 movement and the peace process. Some Gen Z activists and RSP-aligned leaders had spoken openly about rolling back  federal provisions, threatening to negate hard-earned gains for Madhesi  and Janajati communities. In the run-up to the elections, they appeared to  realise the irreversibility of the federalism process in the country and toned  down their rhetoric. 

The deeper structural question is whether the RSP government,  inheriting as it does a poor country where productive forces remain  unreleased for want of investment, an economy dependent on remittances,  and economic losses from the September destruction running into billions  of dollars, can break from the pattern of reform falling short of promises  that has characterised every previous transition in Nepal’s modern history. 

From the Rana era through the Panchayat period to the post-1990  democratic dispensation, each new political order left the fundamental  constraints relatively untouched. An agrarian economy with negligible  industrialisation. This, despite the country possessing enormous  hydropower potential that has been discussed for decades but remains  largely undeveloped. A domestic market that is limited and has lacked  sustained private investment. A state apparatus whose key economic  function has been the distribution of foreign aid and development contracts  rather than promoting productive enterprise. These constraints have  remained even as education has expanded and exposure to the outside  world has raised Nepali aspirations, producing mass out-migration as the  primary economic strategy of the young, with remittance dependence  deepening in the absence of domestic opportunity. 

Whether Balendra Shah and the RSP can deliver on what the democratic  polity since 1990 could not is the central question. There are reasons for  caution about the kind of change the RSP represents. Shah’s record as  Kathmandu mayor was problematic. During his tenure, there was a distinctly  anti-poor posturing with forcible evictions of landless people from the  Bagmati riverbank without providing alternative housing and a crackdown  on street vendors. These drew criticism from human rights activists. His  tenure and working style also featured a confrontational, social-media driven approach that prioritised dramatic gestures over structural solutions. 

His appeal rests on charisma, on grievance, and on a non-ideological  anti-establishment posture, rather than on any programme for addressing  the inequalities in Nepali society. The parallels with the Aam Aadmi Party in  Delhi are worth noting here. It was also a movement born of anti-corruption  anger that rode popular frustration and a leader’s charisma to power but  was unable to offer structural change.  

The RSP’s record between 2022 and 2024 only adds weight to scepticism.  Despite positioning itself as an alternative to Nepal’s corrupt political class,  the party twice joined coalition governments, first under the Maoists, then  briefly under the CPN-UML. This tendency to seek power even without full  mandate is a structural problem in Nepali politics. In an underdeveloped  economy with an overdeveloped state apparatus, political power becomes  the primary way to access foreign aid and contracts that help sustain  the elite. Controlling ministries is necessary for controlling the flow of development funds, construction tenders, and foreign aid disbursements,  which, in an economy with little private sector activity, constitute the most  reliable source of accumulation.  

This is precisely the reason why Nepal saw 30 changes of government  since 1990. The stakes of holding office are extraordinarily high because  the state is, in effect, the economy’s principal allocator of resources. Unless  reforms generate economic activity beyond this governmentalism by freeing  productive forces, by attracting investment, by creating employment that  reduces the crushing dependence on remittances, the incentive structure  that drives patronage politics will remain regardless of which party holds  office. 

The RSP does, however, hold one decisive advantage that no government  since the 1990s has enjoyed, and it is one worth noting. It has a strong  majority that guarantees stability without the need for coalition partners,  freeing it from the dynamic of opportunistic alliances that has been  Nepal’s bane. It must use this advantage for the structural reforms that  every previous dispensation has promised but could not deliver. If the RSP  ends up governing in the same manner it did as a junior coalition partner  between 2022 and 2024, the result will not be transformation but a fresh  cycle of disenchantment. And Nepal’s long struggle between democratic  aspiration and structural change will continue unresolved. 

Srinivasan Ramani is deputy national editor/ senior associate editor with The Hindu

The story so far:

On September 4, 2025 in Nepal, the (then) ruling Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)’s K.P. Sharma Oli-led government banned 26 major social media platforms, citing non-compliance with registration requirements. This triggered widespread Gen Z-led protests from September 8, with demonstrators viewing it as an attempt to silence dissent. The protests quickly escalated from peaceful gatherings in Kathmandu to violent confrontations as demonstrators marched toward Parliament. At least 34 people have died and over 1,000 were hospitalised. The next day, multiple government buildings were attacked, including Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the Prime Minister’s office complex. Politicians’ homes were burnt down and prisoners freed from jails, including arrested politician and ex-minister Rabi Lamichhane of the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP).

Prime Minister Oli also resigned on September 9. After three days of negotiations involving the President, Army Chief General Ashokraj Sigdel, and Gen Z leaders, former Supreme Court Chief Justice Sushila Karki was appointed as interim Prime Minister with a mandate to conduct elections by March 2026. She immediately recommended dissolving Parliament.

Also read | ‘Unconstitutional’, ‘arbitrary’: Nepal parties slam House dissolution move

What are the reasons for the protest beyond the social media ban?

In recent years, many youngsters of Nepal have migrated out of the country for better job opportunities. Social media outlets are used by a bulk of such people and others, not just for venting about concerns on the nature of governance but also for communication and business. Shutting down these outlets, therefore, was seen as a major inconvenience. The youth, however, did not term the protests as something targeted at the social media ban, but as an agitation against corruption in governance.

Ever since the 2015 Constitution, power has alternated between three veteran leaders – Mr. Oli, Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist-Centre), and Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress. Despite the relatively progressive Constitution, governments have been perceived as corrupt and unable to improve economic conditions, providing unstable governance through constantly changing alliances.

What makes this uprising different from other Jan Andolans?

The 2025 Gen Z uprising differs fundamentally from Jan Andolan 1 (1990) and Jan Andolan 2 (2006) in leadership, triggers, and objectives.

Unlike previous movements led by established political parties like the Nepali Congress and UML in 1990, and the Seven Party Alliance with Maoists in 2006, the 2025 protests were driven by Gen Z activists with no traditional party affiliations. The movement was largely coordinated through social media platforms like Instagram and Discord rather than formal political structures.

Jan Andolan 1 was triggered by an Indian trade embargo and aimed at ending the Panchayat system to establish constitutional monarchy. Jan Andolan 2 sought to end absolute monarchy and establish a republic through a Constituent Assembly. The 2025 uprising occurred within an existing democratic republic but challenged the entire political class, demanding dissolution of Parliament and establishment of a new leadership outside traditional party structures.

The previous movements operated within or sought to create new constitutional frameworks. The 2025 protests represent a rejection of the post-2015 political settlement rather than seeking systemic constitutional change.

Were monarchist forces behind the violence?

In the violence on September 9, multiple government buildings were targeted, including Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the Singha Durbar office complex, which houses the Prime Minister’s office and other ministries. Politicians’ homes were also attacked and burnt. The buildings of Nepal’s largest media house, Kantipur, were also burnt, but the group’s flagship English-language newspaper, The Kathmandu Post, managed to bring out its print edition, even as its internet servers were down.

Gen Z activists claimed that vandalism and arson were not done by them but by miscreants who infiltrated the protests. The protests evolved beyond the original movement’s peaceful intentions into widespread destruction of state infrastructure, suggesting involvement of other elements beyond the core Gen Z organisers.

While it is too early to say that pro-monarchy activists were responsible for the September 2025 violence, there has been a pattern of pro-monarchist activity in recent months. In March 2025, pro-monarchy rallies turned violent, resulting in casualties when royalist forces clashed with security personnel. Former king Gyanendra’s arrival in Kathmandu that same month sparked rallies calling for monarchy’s return, supported by the Rastriya Prajatantra Party.

How was the interim government formed?

Following Mr. Oli’s resignation, Nepal entered a three-day power vacuum with intense negotiations among key stakeholders. The selection process involved the President’s Office, the Nepal Army, Gen Z leaders, and major political parties, with the Army Chief playing a crucial mediating role.

Hami Nepal, a non-profit organisation led by 36-year-old Sudan Gurung, originally established for earthquake relief in 2015, emerged as a key voice. The organisation had gained credibility through transparent disaster relief work during COVID-19. Gen Z youth conducted extensive online discussions through social media before collectively endorsing Sushila Karki, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Several prominent figures were considered, including Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah (who ultimately endorsed Ms. Karki), former Nepal Electricity Authority chief Kulman Ghising, ex-education minister Sumana Shrestha of the RSP, and Dharan Mayor Harka Sampang.

President Ram Chandra Poudel appointed Ms. Karki under Article 61 of the Constitution after extended consultations, citing “extraordinary circumstances.”

Is the dissolution of Parliament constitutional?

The dissolution could likely be unconstitutional. Article 76(7) of Nepal’s 2015 Constitution allows dissolution only after failed Prime Minister appointments and requires the PM’s recommendation. Article 66(2) mandates Presidential actions must occur “on [the] recommendation of the Council of Ministers.” No constitutional provision permits dissolution based on public protests alone.

The fact that dissolution occurred immediately after the interim PM’s appointment makes it constitutionally questionable, as it bypassed prescribed procedures and violated separation of powers principles. This could constitute grounds for judicial review by the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Bench.

Major political parties including the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and CPN (Maoist Centre), along with the Nepal Bar Association, have condemned the dissolution as “unconstitutional” and “arbitrary,” with lawyers warning that it undermines constitutional supremacy and contradicts previous Supreme Court rulings on parliamentary reinstatement.

What challenges do this crisis pose for Nepal’s democratic future?

The 2025 uprising highlights fundamental flaws in Nepal’s post-2015 political settlement. While the 2015 Constitution established a progressive federal democratic republic with provisions for inclusive representation, its implementation has been marked by chronic political instability.

Since 2015, power has rotated among the same three leaders through constantly shifting alliances rather than ideological differences. This “musical chairs” approach to governance has prevented consistent policy implementation and economic development, fuelling public disillusionment.

Besides, the Constitution’s federal structure remains incomplete, with disputes over provincial boundaries and resource distribution unresolved. The Gen Z movement’s success in forcing extra-constitutional change was an outcome of its impatience with traditional democratic processes.

The interim government’s ability to conduct credible elections by March 2026 and whether new political forces can emerge to challenge the established triumvirate will be crucial tests.

Nepal’s democratic future depends on whether a newly reconstituted political class can move beyond patronage-based politics toward genuine policy competition, complete the federal transition envisioned in the Constitution, and address youth unemployment and migration.

However, if anti-democratic forces exploit this moment to reverse the gains of the previous Jan Andolans, then Nepal will undergo a democratic regression – in line with what has transpired in Bangladesh following its own anti-government, student-driven protests last year.

To sign or not to sign. This is the question Nepal’s Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli faces as he prepares for his visit to China, which has been largely overshadowed by a debate whether he should sign an implementation plan for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The current ruling coalition, comprising Mr. Oli’s Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) [CPN-UML] and the Nepali Congress (NC), is sharply divided over the Chinese scheme and its possible implications for Nepal. While the CPN-UML views Mr. Oli’s December 2-5 visit as an opportune moment for moving the BRI implementation plan ahead, NC is wary of potential debt traps. 

After joining the BRI in 2017, Nepal had initially proposed 35 projects under the initiative, but the number was later brought down to nine. However, not even a single project under the scheme has started in the last seven years and the funding modality still remains unclear. 

Bone of contention

In Nepal, the common understanding of the BRI is that it entails loan assistance for infrastructure development projects. 

Ajaya Bhadra Khanal, a research director at the Centre for Social Innovation and Foreign Policy, a Kathmandu-based think tank, says for China, the BRI is more than just an infrastructure initiative.

“The BRI is Beijing’s strategic vision to deepen economic integration and enhance global connectivity,” he said. “The BRI implementation plan that is under discussion now goes beyond project agreements; rather China’s overall diplomatic strategy with Nepal rests on it.”

Beijing has broadly aligned its ties — be it development initiatives or diplomatic engagements — with Nepal under the BRI, particularly since it proposed the BRI implementation plan in 2020. This was evident when Chinese Ambassador Chen Song labelled the Pokhara International Airport, a project that began long before Nepal signed up for BRI, as one under the scheme.

Amid debates over whether Mr. Oli should sign the BRI implementation plan or not, Mr. Chen held a series of talks with multiple leaders, including those from NC, with discussions largely focused on the BRI.

The Pokhara airport was built with a $26 billion loan assistance from China, but with no commercial international flights operating since its inauguration in January last year, it risks becoming a white elephant. During his visit, Mr. Oli is expected to seek a waiver on the loan or its conversion into a grant. This has led to questions as to how Nepal will be able to pay back if it secures more loans at a time when it is requesting a waiver for an earlier loan.

Dr. Prakash Sharan Mahat, a spokesperson for the NC and former Foreign Minister during whose tenure Nepal joined the BRI in 2017, said at a programme in Kathmandu on Wednesday that Nepal must be cautious while taking additional loans from any country, at a time when Nepal’s public debt-to-GDP ratio is already hovering around 44%. 

Geopolitical gambit

Those opposed to BRI, including NC, say while Nepal could benefit from the Chinese scheme in terms of infrastructure projects, they are cautious about China’s possible increased leverage in Nepal.

India, which has in recent times deepened economic ties with Beijing, is wary of growing Chinese influence in its northern neighbour. New Delhi’s refusal to import goods and electricity from Nepal with Chinese components has emerged as a cause for concern of late. The United States, Nepal’s long-time development partner, is concerned about growing Chinese footprint in Nepal. Two years ago, China calling the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a $500 million American grant to Nepal, “coercive diplomacy” had raised fears of Nepal becoming a geopolitical battleground.

Observers say Mr. Oli’s coalition partner NC, which is traditionally aligned with India and the U.S., may have some kind of indirect pressure from New Delhi and Washington against signing the BRI implementation plan, given its geopolitical overtones.

“The best thing to do for Oli is taking forward the past agreements reached with China, rather than signing any new deals,” said Jhalak Subedi, a Left-leaning writer and analyst. “Oli should try to negotiate the implementation of some small projects that have been previously agreed upon and agreements that were signed during (Chinese) President Xi (Jinping)’s visit to Nepal in 2019.”

According to Mr. Subedi, since the BRI is China’s overall foreign policy tool, it presents both challenges and opportunities for Nepal.

“Nepal’s geopolitical predicaments have grown as its economy stutters. So the imminent visit should be an exercise aimed at securing goodwill from the north, while maintaining strong ties with India,” said Mr. Subedi.

Oli and Delhi

Mr. Oli’s visit to China marks a departure from the tradition of Nepali Prime Ministers flying to New Delhi first — a shift that reflects the complex dynamics of his ties with India. His perceived failure to secure an invite from New Delhi — neither during a sideline meeting in New York with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in September nor during Foreign Minister Arzu Deuba Rana’s official visit in August — has further strained an already tenuous relationship.

With New Delhi giving a cold shoulder to Mr. Oli’s rapprochement efforts, the lack of warmth is apparent. Mr. Oli has displayed a confrontational approach towards India, particularly since 2015 when India imposed a border blockade. In 2020, the decision to publish a new Nepal map, including the Kalapani region, which India claims as its own, led to further dipping of his ties with India. 

Analysts say Mr. Oli in India has earned an image of a China-leaning leader, a perception that stems from his tendency to whip up anti-Indian sentiments and a host of deals he signed with Beijing in 2016, including a trade and transit agreement. The deal granted Nepal access to seven Chinese ports, a move aimed at reducing Nepal’s over-reliance on the southern neighbour for third-country trade.

“But the problem is, it was not reflected in practical cooperation,” said Mr. Khanal. “On top of that, Mr. Oli’s diplomatic approach is flawed; while he offends the southern neighbour, he has managed to offend the northern neighbour too.”

According to him, Mr. Oli does not seem too obliging to Beijing in its search for a trusted ally in Nepal ever since its experiment of installing a strong Left government in Kathmandu failed. With his trust-building effort with New Delhi also coming a cropper, Mr. Oli appears to have fallen between two stools.

On Monday, Mr. Oli, during his consultative meeting with former Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, laid stress on the importance of Nepal’s equal ties with India and China and underscored the need to take benefit from cordial relations with both the neighbours for Nepal’s economic development. 

Domestic politics

Differences in the current coalition over BRI signing have caused unease, potentially threatening the government’s stability. In an apparent attempt to assuage NC’s concerns, Mr. Oli on Monday clarified that no new loan agreements would be signed with China during his visit. 

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Rana on Thursday left for China, carrying Nepal’s revised position on the BRI implementation plan, which has been renamed “framework for cooperation on jointly building the BRI” — in an apparent message that Nepal is committed to the BRI but presently its focus is on current needs.

Amid speculations in Kathmandu that the BRI could trigger a fallout between the CPN-UML and NC, analysts say the Nepali leadership will do well not to mix foreign policy with domestic politics. According to Mr. Khanal, Mr. Oli should put Nepal and Nepali peoples’ interests at the front and leave his partisan interest behind.

“For Mr. Oli, stakes are high. How he navigates both geopolitical and domestic intricacies will be crucial,” said Mr. Khanal. “Whether he succeeds in striking a balance or exacerbates existing complexities will be key to shaping Nepal’s path.”

(Sanjeev Satgainya is an independent journalist based in Kathmandu)

Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Oli arrived to ask for a vote of confidence in parliament in Kathmandu, Nepal, on July 21, 2024.
| Photo Credit: AP

Nepal’s newly appointed Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli comfortably won a vote of confidence in Parliament on July 22, nearly a week after he was sworn in to lead a coalition government in the Himalayan nation.

Mr. Oli secured 188 votes in favour of the Vote of Confidence motion tabled by him while 74 votes were cast against the motion. Out of a total of 263 members of the House of Representatives, who were present, one member abstained.

Mr. Oli, 72, required 138 votes out of a total of 275 votes to pass the floor test in the House of Representatives (HoR).

Prime Minister Oli has won the vote of confidence in the Lower House, Speaker of the HoR Dev Raj Ghimire announced after the counting of votes.

As the Parliament meeting started, Prime Minister Oli tabled the motion seeking a vote of confidence from the House.

Speaker Ghimire gave around two hours for HoR members and representatives from ruling and Opposition parties to discuss the motion. He then allotted time for the Prime Minister to give his response to the issues raised by HoR members.

The voting process started after the Prime Minister concluded his deliberations.

Responding to issues raised by the HoR members Mr. Oli said, “I was not and will not get involved in corruption neither will tolerate if any one practices so.”

He said that the two larger parties “Nepali Congress and CPN-UML came together to maintain political stability, checking corruption and bring good governance.”

“This coalition government will create a reliable eco-system for stability, development and good governance,” asserted Mr. Oli.

House of Representatives members belonging to the ruling alliance Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, Lokatantrik Samajwadi Party and Janata Samajwadi Party Nepal were among those who voted in favour of Oli’s Vote of Confidence motion.

Opposition parties CPN-Maoist Centre, CPN-Unified Socialist, Rashtriya Swotantra Party and Rastriya Prajatantra Party among others voted against Mr. Oli during the floor test.

The veteran Communist leader was sworn in on Monday as the Himalayan nation’s prime minister for the fourth time. He was administered the oath of office and secrecy along with 21 other members of the Cabinet.

According to Nepal’s Constitution, Mr. Oli needed to secure a vote of confidence from Parliament within 30 days of appointment.

The Chairman of the CPN-UML, Nepal’s largest communist party was appointed as prime minister on Sunday by President Ram Chandra Paudel to lead the coalition government with the Nepali Congress (NC), the largest party in Parliament, apart from other smaller parties.

Mr. Oli succeeded Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda,’ who lost the vote of confidence in the House of Representatives on July 12.

It is Mr. Oli’s fourth term as Prime Minister.

The CPN-UML Chairman now leads the new coalition government that faces the daunting challenge of providing political stability in the Himalayan nation.

Nepal has faced frequent political turmoil as the country has seen 14 governments in the past 16 years after the introduction of the Republican system.

Newly elected Prime Minister K.P. Oli is being sworn in by President Ram Prasad Poudel, unseen, at the Presidential residence in Kathmandu, Nepal on July 15, 2024.
| Photo Credit: AP

Newly-appointed Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli on July 18 said that Nepal’s future is “bright”, but its current scenario needs to be changed, amidst frequent political turmoil in the Himalayan nation.

Mr. Oli, who was sworn in on Monday as the Himalayan nation’s Prime Minister for the fourth time, said the country’s current scenario is not good, The Rising Nepal newspaper reported.

Addressing the Engineer Day event, the 72-year-old veteran Communist leader said that though the country is praiseworthy, its situation does not match it.

Nepal has faced frequent political turmoil as the country has seen 14 governments in the past 16 years after the Republican system was introduced.

“There is an issue in the country. If a body is unwell, then it cannot be said that hands are fine. Just like when the fever comes, the whole body suffers; the situation of the country is not good overall, at least not praiseworthy,” Mr. Oli was quoted as saying.

Opinion | ​Unprincipled alliances: On politics in Nepal

“The history of our country is glorious and worth praising, just like the country is. There is no doubt that the future of our country is good, but it is, at present, not in a place of satisfaction. Therefore, it needs to be changed,” he said.

He underscored that the need of the hour was to take the country towards betterment from the present deteriorated condition, Nepal’s state-run RSS news agency reported.

Asserting that the government was involved in resolving the country’s existing problems, Mr. Oli said, “There is no condition of being satisfied. We have to change this condition. There is no doubt that the future of the country is bright.” He expressed commitment that the government would advance, resolving problems surfacing in every sector.

Mr. Oli, who needs to secure a vote of confidence from Parliament within 30 days of appointment, will take a vote of confidence on Sunday.

Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli was sworn in as Prime Minister of Nepal on July 15, 2024. File
| Photo Credit: AP

K.P. Sharma Oli on July 15 was sworn in as Nepal’s Prime Minister for the fourth time.

The leader of Nepal’s largest communist party was appointed Nepal’s Prime Minister on Sunday by President Ram Chandra Paudel to lead a new coalition government that faces the daunting challenge of providing political stability in the Himalayan nation.

Mr. Oli, 72, succeeds Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ who lost the vote of confidence in the House of Representatives on Friday, leading to the formation of the new government headed by Mr. Oli.

He became the Prime Minister with the support of the Nepali Congress, the largest party in Parliament.

Mr. Oli was sworn in by President Paudel at Shital Niwas, the main building of Rashtrapati Bhawan.

Editorial | ​Unprincipled alliances: On politics in Nepal

Mr. Oli now needs to secure a vote of confidence from Parliament within 30 days of appointment according to the constitutional mandate. Mr. Oli will need a minimum of 138 votes in the 275-seat House of Representatives (HoR).

Modi, Kharge congratulate Oli

Earlier today, Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated Mr. Oli on his appointment as Prime Minister of Nepal and said he looked forward to working closely with him to further strengthen the friendship between the two countries.

Congratulating Mr. Oli, Mr. Modi said on X, “Look forward to working closely to further strengthen the deep bonds of friendship between our two countries and to further expand our mutually beneficial cooperation for the progress and prosperity of our peoples.”

The Congress also extended its wishes to Mr. Oli on his appointment and said that every Indian looks forward to further strengthening the bonds of cooperation between the two countries for a brighter future.

In a post on X, Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge said, “On the behalf of Indian National Congress, we extend our best wishes to Shree K.P. Sharma Oli, on his appointment as the Prime Minister of Nepal.”

As close neighbours, India and Nepal share unique ties of friendship and partnership characterised by deep-rooted people-to-people contacts of kinship and culture, he said.

“Every Indian looks forward to further strengthening the bonds of mutual cooperation for a brighter future,” Mr. Kharge said.

A view of the Supreme Court of India, in New Delhi.
| Photo Credit: PTI

Stay on bail should only be granted in rare cases: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court on July 12 said an inclination seen among higher courts to stall bail creates a real and present danger to the rights of personal liberty and due process. A Bench of Justices A.S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan said the propensity to stay reasoned bail orders passed by trial courts was “shocking”.

Oli set to return to power in Nepal as Maoist leader Prachanda weighs his options

A political drama triggered 10 days ago by the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) capped off with the ouster of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ on Friday. Prachanda, the chairman of the CPN (Maoist Centre), failed his vote of confidence, fifth in one and a half years since he was elected Prime Minister in December 2022, leading to the fall of his government. Of the 258 parliamentarians present in the 275-member Parliament, 63 voted in favour of Prachanda, while 194 voted against. One lawmaker abstained.

Centralised hiring leads to language, cultural barriers in Eklavya schools

The recent centralisation of recruitment for tribal residential schools across the country, which introduced Hindi competency as a mandatory requirement, has resulted in a flood of requests for transfers. The large numbers of staff recruited from Hindi-speaking States are protesting postings to the Eklavya Model Residential Schools (EMRS) located in southern States, where the language, food and culture is unfamiliar to them.

Doval and Sullivan hold talks amid strain in ties over Russia

Amidst a strain over Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow this week, National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval spoke to U.S. NSA Jake Sullivan on Friday evening, where they agreed to “work closely” to further advance bilateral ties. They also discussed the upcoming Quad Foreign Ministers meeting to be held later this month, and a leaders’ summit that may possibly be held later this year.

West Bengal moves Supreme Court against Governor for sitting on Bills

The State of West Bengal has moved the Supreme Court against the Governor for sitting on eight crucial Bills without giving any reasons for the delay. The petition was mentioned before Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud by State counsel Astha Sharma for an early hearing.

ED cannot make arrests under PMLA on a whim, says SC

The Supreme Court on July 12 held that the power to arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) cannot be exercised on the “whims and fancies” of Directorate of Enforcement (ED) officers. The court wondered if the ED even had a consistent, uniform and ”one-rule-for-all” policy on when they should arrest people. It said the ED’s power to arrest must be based on objective and fair consideration of material against a person.

Bishops meet PM Modi, urge him to ensure peace in Manipur

A delegation of bishops, representing the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of India (CBCI), met Prime Minister Narendra Modi here on Friday and urged him to ensure peace in Manipur. The bishops conveyed their apprehensions on the “rumours” that the reservation for Dalit tribals will be stopped and expressed concerns about the “increasing attacks” against Christians for alleged forced conversions. They also asked Mr. Modi to expedite the process for bringing Pope Francis to India and appreciated Mr. Modi’s continued efforts to invite the Pope to India.

Net tax receipts up 19.5%, corporate tax share at 36.6%

Growth in India’s net direct tax collections slowed slightly to 19.54% by July 11, relative to a 21% rise recorded by June 17, with revenues hitting ₹5.74 lakh crore, the Income Tax department said on Friday. Personal income tax (PIT) receipts constituted 60.2% of the net collections at ₹3.46 lakh crore, rising 21.4% year-on-year, while corporate taxes yielded 36.6% of net revenues at ₹2.1 lakh crore, reflecting a 12.5% growth.

MHA amends Rules to widen the administrative role of J&K L-G

The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) on Friday widened the ambit of the administrative role of the Lieutenant Governor of Jammu and Kashmir by amending the Transaction of Business Rules. The amendment gives the L-G more say in matters pertaining to police, public order, All India Service (AIS) which require prior concurrence of the Finance Department and also their transfers and postings.

Oppn. flags video from Gujarat, slams Modi government over ‘disease of unemployment’

Flagging a viral video of a stampede-like situation at Bharuch district in Gujarat, where over 800 people turned up for a walk-in interview held by a firm for 40 vacancies, the Opposition renewed its attack on the government over high unemployment in the country.

‘Urban Naxal’ bill is bogey to smother opposition before Maharashtra polls, say Congress, CPI(M)

Opposition parties condemned the “authoritarian” Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill, 2024, on Friday and demanded its withdrawal. It has been introduced with the objective of curbing Naxalism in urban and rural areas. The Bill was tabled in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly on Thursday by Deputy Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, who is also the Minister of Law and Judiciary.

Kanchanjunga accident: Three employees suspended, Commissioner of Railway Safety inquiry almost complete

The inquiry by the Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) into the accident involving Kanchanjunga Express and a goods train on June 17 in West Bengal’s Darjeeling district that claimed 10 lives has reached completion and a final report is being awaited.

Wimbledon | Alcaraz overcomes initial jitters, powers past Medvedev

Successful sporting careers depend on three things — talent, hard work and luck. That Carlos Alcaraz was talented was never in doubt. No one who doesn’t work hard wins three Majors in a jiffy. And these last 10 days at Wimbledon have shown that he has some luck on his side too.

Nepal’s Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal delivers a speech before a confidence vote at the parliament in Kathmandu, Nepal, July 12, 2024.
| Photo Credit: REUTERS

Nepal Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ lost a vote of confidence in Parliament on July 12 after the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) withdrew its support for his government.

Prachanda received only 63 votes in the 275-member House of Representatives (HoR) and there were 194 votes against the motion. At least 138 votes are needed to win the vote of trust. A total of 258 HoR members participated in the voting while one member abstained.

Mr. Dahal, 69, chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC), had survived four trust votes since he assumed the prime minister’s post on December 25, 2022.

He faced the same predicament yet another time because ex-premier K.P. Sharma Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) withdrew support from the Prachanda-led government last week after inking a power-sharing deal with the largest party in the House — the Nepali Congress (NC).

Earlier, Speaker of the HoR Dev Raj Ghimire put Prachanda’s Vote of Trust for voting according to Article 100 Clause 2 of the Constitution. After voting was completed, he announced that the Vote of Trust was defeated with a majority vote.

Speaker Ghimire will now inform President Ram Chandra Paudel, who will invite two or more political parties to stake a claim for the new government, according to Article 76 Clause 2 of the Constitution. This paves the way for the NC and the CPN-UML to form a new coalition government.

NC, CPN-UML power sharing deal

The NC has 89 seats in the HoR, while CPN-UML has 78. Their combined strength of 167 is more than the 138 required for a majority in the lower house.

Nepali Congress (NC) President Sher Bahadur Deuba has already endorsed Mr. Oli as the next prime minister.

Mr. Deuba and Mr. Oli inked a 7-point deal on Monday to form a new coalition government.

According to the agreement, they will share the premiership during the remaining period of the House of Representatives — Mr. Oli will become the Prime Minister for one and a half years and then Mr. Deuba will take the seat for the rest of the period.

Prachanda, whose party had 32 seats in the HoR, was elected the Prime Minister for the third time on December 25, 2022, with the backing of CPN-UML.

Prachanda was elected the Prime Minister as per Article 76 Clause 2 of the Constitution of Nepal, which has a provision for electing a Prime Minister with the support of two or more parties.

As the HoR session began in the early afternoon, embattled Prachanda sharply criticised the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML for striking an alliance “out of fear” rather than shared principles and accused them of pushing the nation toward regression.

Prachanda voiced concerns about potential regression and autocracy, asserting that the NC and the CPN-UML had joined forces as good governance began to take root in the country.