2024 was a year in which the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) skills in managing coalitions and addressing multiple challenges—some with finesse and others through subtle manipulation—clearly came to the forefront. The year began with the party fresh from victories in the assembly elections of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Rajasthan. The primary focus, however, was on the Lok Sabha elections.
For the BJP, the Lok Sabha election was about expanding its political footprint wherever possible while relying on its coalition partners when necessary. In Haryana, the BJP went alone, ending its alliance with the JJP. In Bihar, the BJP brought Nitish Kumar back into the NDA fold and drew the JD(S) in Karnataka into an alliance to put up a united fight against Congress, the ruling party in the state. In Odisha, after prolonged negotiations with the BJD, the BJP decided to contest alone. In Tamil Nadu and Punjab, the BJP formed new alliances to challenge the bi-polar political competition in these states. In Andhra Pradesh, it became the junior partner to the TDP-Jana Sena combination by bringing them into the NDA to challenge both Congress and the YSR Congress. In Uttar Pradesh, it included minor partners with strong local influence into the NDA. In Maharashtra, the BJP succeeded in ensuring splits among the two major regional players, the Shiv Sena and the NCP, and brought factions of both parties into the NDA. The party hoped that these efforts to expand its reach across the country’s electoral map would yield political dividends. The slogan “400+” was a by-product of the confidence the BJP had gained from its coalition-building.
The results of the 2024 elections indicated that while most of the coalition partners (except in Tamil Nadu and Punjab) managed to put up a creditable performance, the BJP’s own performance left much to be desired. The BJP’s allies won 53 seats in 2024, compared to 50 in 2019. The BJP’s own seat tally fell from 303 in 2019 to 240 in 2024—a difference of 63 seats. As a result, the BJP was compelled to declare a victory for the NDA coalition, as it fell short of the majority mark on its own. With the return of a genuine coalition era, many anticipated visible changes in the formation of the new government. It was expected that notional representation for partners would be a thing of the past.
When the ministry took oath, coalition partners received representation in the cabinet. The portfolio distribution mirrored what was seen in 2014 and 2019. The BJP leadership skilfully managed to accommodate the coalition partners. Key players—such as the JDU and TDP—were more focused on securing special attention for their states, where they were in power, rather than simply cabinet berths. The agreement seemed to be that key coalition partners would have a say in state politics, while the BJP would manage the national government. The Ajit Pawar faction of the NCP had insisted on a cabinet berth, but the BJP was unwilling to accede to the demand, resulting in the party having no representation in the ministry.
The second test of the BJP’s coalition skills was evident in the Maharashtra and Jharkhand elections. The party succeeded in Maharashtra but did not reap electoral dividends in Jharkhand. Jharkhand deserves attention first. The BJP managed to secure a lion’s share of seats within the NDA when distributing assembly tickets in the state. It fielded most of the candidates in the non-tribal seats, leaving many of the tribal seats to its alliance partners. However, the inability of the alliance to hold on to the non-tribal-dominated seats and make inroads into tribal areas led to the JMM-led coalition returning to power.
The situation in Maharashtra was quite different. In the three-party NDA alliance (called the Mahayuti in Maharashtra), the BJP negotiated for a majority of the seats, leaving the Shinde Sena and Ajit Pawar-led NCP to divide the remaining seats. When the Shiv Sena split and the Shinde faction backed the BJP to form the government, the chief ministership was given to Eknath Shinde, the leader of the breakaway Shiv Sena. Although the Mahayuti had a sitting chief minister, it did not formally declare him as the chief ministerial candidate. Both the manner of seat distribution and the silence on the chief ministerial candidate were clearly part of the BJP’s coalition management strategy.
When the results came in, it was clear that the Mahayuti had achieved a historic victory, with the BJP itself recording its best-ever performance. Soon after the trends in Maharashtra became clear, by the afternoon of November 23, the focus shifted to the choice of chief minister. Would the incumbent, Eknath Shinde, be given another term, or would the BJP claim the chief ministership, given its spectacular performance? This became the central point of debate. The suspense continued for more than 10 days after the results were declared. Over these ten days, the partners and their leaders were gradually brought around. Ajit Pawar of the NCP was the easiest to convince, while Eknath Shinde held out for longer but ultimately gave in. This showcased the negotiation skills of the BJP leadership.
The party also convinced Shinde to accept the position of deputy chief minister, which he finally agreed to. The final two rounds of negotiations focused on the distribution of seats in the council of ministers and the allocation of portfolios. The more difficult negotiation seemed to be on portfolios, particularly the one for the deputy chief minister. Shinde was believed to be insisting on the home portfolio but ultimately had to settle for urban development and a few other ministries. A review of the portfolios shows that the BJP ministers secured a better deal.
This year demonstrated the BJP’s capacity to drive negotiations with its coalition partners in its favour. With crucial state elections in 2025, it will be closely watched whether this trend continues or if there is a reversal.
(Dr. Sandeep Shastri is the National Coordinator of the Lokniti Network)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
