In November 2022, a peace agreement put an end to two years of brutal conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. Almost four years later, the conflict has resurfaced, with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) having formed an alliance with other armed opposition factions, and the Ethiopian government forces managing to reclaim control of Mekelle, the capital of the region. At the same time, the conflict has raised the threat of direct military confrontation between Ethiopia and its neighbour, Eritrea.
Ethiopian forces, along with their allies, have marched into several towns in the Tigray region towards the Eritrean border. Meanwhile, reports on Eritrean forces being present in Ethiopia’s territory are still disputed, and there are no diplomatic relations left between the two countries anymore.
The reasons for this conflict go back to the political transformation in Ethiopia and the old rivalry between the regions.
For almost three decades, the TPLF dominated the ruling coalition of Ethiopia. That ended in 2018, when Abiy Ahmed became Prime Minister. He made peace with Eritrea’s President, Isaias Afwerki, closing the stand-off left by the 1998–2000 border war, and won the Nobel Peace Prize for it.
The government started centralising political powers, and at the same time, the relationship between the government and the TPLF worsened. The TPLF, with a strong influence in Tigray, perceived the government as a danger to the region’s sovereignty and refused to join the coalition.
Tension between the TPLF and the government increased in 2020 as the TPLF conducted regional elections in Tigray despite the decision by the federal government to postpone national elections due to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. The former claimed that the federal government deliberately postponed conducting the elections and that the pandemic was not the only reason for it.
The Tigray regional government claimed that their elections were not unconstitutional while Addis Ababa declared them illegal, further deepening the dispute.
The situation worsened in November 2020 when federal forces deployed military to fight in Tigray.
Troops from the Ethiopian government, Amhara forces, and Eritrea fought against the TPLF and its military wing, TDF, or Tigray Defence Forces.
During the war, many people were internally displaced and suffered food shortages. Cases of mass killings and rapes were also reported. Although there are many estimates, the total number of casualties are not certain. There are reports from Ghent University that the war led to about 5,00,000 deaths, including those due to starvation and the disruption of health care services.
A cessation-of-hostilities agreement that was signed in Pretoria, South Africa, brokered by the African Union (AU) in November 2022 put an end to the large-scale violence. The agreement covered such items as disarmament, restoration of the government’s control over the area, provision of humanitarian assistance, and repatriation of the displaced people.
However, Eritrea, which fought together with Ethiopia, did not sign the agreement, which later mattered a great deal.
The deal also left hard questions open like who disarms Tigrayan forces, who controls territory held by Amhara militias, and where Tigray fits in the federal system. The demobilisation and re-integration of the Tigrayan forces was among other issues that still needed addressing.
Then the TPLF began to fracture.
Why has the fighting resumed?
The collapse of the peace process went hand in hand with deep divisions emerging in the TPLF ranks.
Leadership disagreements in the TPLF emerged regarding the party’s relations with the federal government and the Pretoria agreement.
In March 2025, Getachew Reda, who headed the transitional administration in the region, was ousted because of differences with the hardline elements in the party. By 2026, the faction led by Debretsion Gebremichael took control of the political machine in the region.
The relations between the Tigray and the federal government deteriorated into a military conflict because of political disputes.
On September 20, seven armed groups announced an alliance with a stated aim of overthrowing Mr. Abiy’s government and installing a transitional administration.
Three days later the TPLF-led alliance attacked government forces across Tigray, Amhara and Afar. The rebels took Mekelle, the Tigrayan capital, and its airport. They did not hold it long. The army leaned on drones and airpower, and a pro-government Tigrayan militia, the Tigray Peace Force, fought alongside it. The rebels announced their withdrawal from Mekelle on October 3, and government-allied forces moved in. The TPLF said its regional government would operate from somewhere else.
What is happening now?
While the takeover of Mekelle has put the federal forces in charge of Tigray’s regional capital city, it is far from the end of the insurgency.
After entering Mekelle, government-backed forces moved north along main roads toward the Eritrean border in early October.
In accordance with a Reuters report on October 13, the Ethiopian forces have since moved further to a border town, which was under the control of the TDF before.
The conflict has spilled beyond Tigray. The Amhara insurgency has impacted the transportation routes of the federal forces, while the fighting in Afar poses a threat to the corridor connecting Addis Ababa and Djibouti. This corridor serves the vast majority of Ethiopia’s maritime trade.
Complicated battlefield
The situation on the battlefield is, therefore, much more complicated than the simple winning of the government. The control of big cities provides the government with an advantage, but does not mean that the TPLF was defeated and that the government can restore order in the region.
With regard to the human cost, although most of the evidence is still thin because of communications disruption, Human Rights Watch says it has received reports of civilians killed and wounded by shelling in southern Tigray, and that some health facilities had to shut. The group wants independent monitoring, restored communications and safe humanitarian access.
Is Eritrea fighting?
One of the most dangerous consequences of the renewed conflict in Tigray may be the direct war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
These two countries have a history of bad relations. From 1998 to 2000, they were engaged in a border war, and their relationship did not improve for many years afterward.
During the 2020-2022 war in Tigray, Eritrean troops were fighting along with the troops of the Ethiopian federal government against the TPLF. However, their relations deteriorated due to Eritrea’s exclusion from the Pretoria negotiations, and the two states started to mistrust one another.
On October 9, Ethiopia informed the UN Security Council about the intrusion of Eritrean troops into its territory up to 60 km deep into Tigray and invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter. Eritrea, however, denies invading Ethiopia.
Its Foreign Minister, Osman Saleh, wrote to the council that Ethiopia had made a “deplorable declaration of war” and he called upon the Security Council to take action against Ethiopia.
According to Eritrea, Ethiopia’s desire for access to the Red Sea poses a threat to the sovereignty of Eritrea.
The deterioration of relations is evident from the fact that the Ethiopian government shut down its mission in Asmara, while Eritrea ended its diplomatic ties with Ethiopia. Both parties gave contradictory statements at the UN.
Why does access to the red sea matter?
Ethiopia lost its coastline when Eritrea became independent in 1993 and now relies on Djibouti for most of its sea trade. After being sworn in for a new five-year term on October 5, Mr. Abiy told Parliament that Ethiopia’s modernisation cannot be realised without sea access.
Ethiopian officials say they want it through dialogue. Ethiopia has pointed out the country’s historical links with the sea, but the Ethiopian government states that they seek access through peaceful means.
In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum with Somaliland that offered a naval base in return for possible recognition, which angered Somalia. Eritrea fears that the real target is its port of Assab.
What happens next?
The immediate question is whether the Ethiopian Army will be able to solidify their territorial gains without risking a full-scale military confrontation with Eritrea. The remaining military capabilities of the TPLF, the stance of the Eritrean forces along the border, and the cohesion of the opposition alliance will define the future course of the conflict.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres has appealed to both sides to stop hostilities and resume negotiations in accordance with the Pretoria agreement. The AU, which mediated the negotiations in 2022, is also expected to help the parties start talking. On October 14, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio phoned Mr. Abiy and urged all Horn of Africa states to respect their neighbours’ borders.
However, a sustainable settlement would be more complex than just stopping hostilities. It would have to discuss the political standing of Tigray, contested territories, disarmament, displaced people, and accountability of the violations. Moreover, Ethiopia and Eritrea would have to resolve their security issues without violence.
