Today, the global nuclear order offers a curious contradiction — since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used during the last 80 years. The global nuclear arsenals have come down from a high of 65,000 bombs in late 1970s to less than 12,500 today. And, despite concerns in the 1960s that by 1980, there may be at least two dozen states with nuclear weapons, the total today remains nine — five (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China) are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council who had tested before the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into being while four more developed their nuclear arsenals later (Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea).
Looking back, these would seem to be impressive achievements but nobody is celebrating. In fact, the prevailing sentiment is that the global nuclear order is under strain and the recent announcements by U.S. President Donald Trump may weaken all three elements of the global nuclear order.
Resumption of ‘nuclear tests’
On October 30, 2025, on his way to a meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping in Busan, Mr. Trump announced on Truth Social, “Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately.” He added, “Russia is second, China is a distant third, but will be even within 5 years.”
While it was clear that the message was directed at Russia and China, it was unclear whether Mr. Trump was referring to ‘nuclear explosive testing’ or the testing of nuclear weapon systems. Second, the nuclear labs (Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia) and the Nevada testing facilities fall under the Department of Energy and not the Department of War.
It is no secret that China, Russia, and the U.S. are designing and developing new nuclear weapons. In late October, Russia tested a nuclear-powered cruise missile (Burevestnik) that travelled 14,000 kilometres, following a week later, with a test of an underwater nuclear-powered torpedo (Poseidon). China has been testing hypersonic missiles and, in 2021, tested a nuclear capable hypersonic glide vehicle carried on a rocket, capable of orbiting the earth before approaching its target from an unexpected direction that was passed off as a satellite launcher.
The U.S. is producing new warheads — a variable yield B61-13 gravity bomb, a low yield W76-2 warhead for the Trident II D-5 missile, while working on a new nuclear armed submarine launched cruise missile.
Yet, they have refrained from explosive testing. Russia’s last explosive test was in 1990 while the U.S. declared a moratorium on tests in 1992. In 1993, the U.S. created a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programme under the National Nuclear Security Administration to work on warhead modernisation, life extension and development of new safety protocols in warhead design. U.S. President Bill Clinton also took the lead in pushing negotiations in Geneva for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China and France concluded their tests in 1996, six months before the negotiations ended.
Why the CTBT lacks a definition
Twenty-nine years later, the CTBT has not entered into force despite 187 countries signing it. Among the necessary ratifications, the U.S., China, Israel, Egypt, and Iran have not done so, Russia did and withdrew its ratification in 2023, and India, Pakistan and North Korea have neither signed nor ratified it. India and Pakistan tested in 1998 and have since observed a voluntary moratorium, and North Korea conducted six tests between 2006 and 2017. Given today’s geopolitics, the prospects for the CTBT entering into force appear bleak.
Second, the CTBT obliges states “not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion”. The U.S. was opposed to defining the terms, and instead, worked out private understandings with Russia and China on ‘zero-yield-tests’; this permitted hydro-nuclear tests that do not produce a self-sustaining supercritical chain reaction.
The U.S. had conducted over a thousand nuclear tests and Russia 727 tests, giving them an adequate data base. China, with only 47 tests, also went along with this understanding. Thus, the CTBT delegitimised only nuclear-explosive testing, not nuclear weapons, the reason why India never joined it.
In 2019-20, the U.S. State Department assessed that Russia and China “may have conducted low yield nuclear tests in a manner inconsistent with the U.S. zero-yield standard” though this was negated by the CTBT organisation that declared that their monitoring network with over 300 monitoring stations spread over 89 countries had not detected any inconsistent activity.
In a TV interview on November 2, Mr. Trump doubled down on resuming nuclear testing, this time including Pakistan and North Korea among the countries testing. A clarification came the same day from U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright on Fox News, calling the U.S. tests ‘systems-tests’. “These are not nuclear explosions. These are what we call noncritical explosions,” he said. However, Mr. Trump’s intention remains unclear.
The new low-yield warheads being designed make them more usable and the new systems (hypersonics, cruise and unmanned systems) are dual capable systems, leading to renewed research for missile defences such as the U.S. ‘golden dome’. Meanwhile, doctrinal changes are being considered to cope with new technological developments in cyber and space domains. This raises doubts about the nuclear taboo in the coming decades.
The sole surviving U.S.-Russia arms control agreement, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that limits the U.S. and Russian strategic forces to 700 launchers and 1,550 warheads is due to expire on February 4, 2026 with no prospects of any talks on the horizon. China is not a party to any arms control and its nuclear arsenal that had remained below 300, is undergoing a rapid expansion, estimated at 600 today, and likely to exceed 1,000 by 2030. An incipient nuclear arms race was already underway; a resumption of explosive testing will just take the lid off.
Russia and China have denied Mr. Trump’s allegations regarding clandestine tests, but will follow if the U.S. resumes explosive testing. China will be the biggest beneficiary because with only 47 tests (compared to over 1,000 by the U.S.), resumed tests will help it to validate new designs and accumulate data.
India has been observing a voluntary moratorium. But if explosive testing resumes, India will certainly resume testing to validate its boosted fission and thermonuclear designs, tested only once in 1998. Undoubtedly, Pakistan will follow but given its growing strategic linkages with China witnessed during Operation Sindoor, this need hardly adds to India’s concerns.
Though the CTBT is not in force, it did create a norm. But a resumption of explosive testing will lead to its demise. It will also tempt the nuclear wannabes to follow and mark the unravelling of the NPT led non-proliferation regime.
The taboo against use must remain intact
The U.S. has been the most significant player in shaping the global nuclear order. It would be ironic if Mr. Trump’s actions now become the catalyst for its demise. The reality is that the present global nuclear order was shaped by the geopolitics of the 20th century. The challenge today is to craft a new nuclear order that reflects the fractured geopolitics of the 21st century while ensuring that the taboo against their use remains intact.
The United Nations Secretary General has cautioned that “current nuclear risks are already alarmingly high” and urged nations “to avoid all actions that could lead to miscalculation or escalation with catastrophic consequences.” But is anyone listening?
Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and is currently Distinguished Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR)
