As China’s claims over India’s easternmost state of Arunachal Pradesh get shriller, and what the MEA calls more absurd, the US wades in, says it backs India’s territorial sovereignty in Arunachal? Is Beijing preparing for a bigger confrontation over the boundary, and how do Bhutan-China boundary talks fit in?
Hello and Welcome to WV at TH with me SH
We will look at some of the geopolitical- and also the geospatial angles of the India-China military standoff at the Line of Actual Control since 2020.
But first, here are the latest developments on the LAC :
-Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a visit to Arunachal Pradesh on March 9, to inaugurate a number of projects, including most notably, the Sela Tunnel at a height of 13,000 ft, meant to be an all-weather access to Tawang and especially for troops heading to the Line of Actual Control with China
-Within days China’s Foreign Ministry and its Defence Ministry spokespersons had issued statement, making claims on Arunachal Pradesh and even suggesting that the PM’s visit would “disrupt” India-China talks to resolve the 4-year old military standoff at the LAC
-India’s response was equally sharp, MEA calling the claims absurd, and asserting Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India
Significantly, the US State department also waded into the spat, saying it recognizes Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India. The comments are interesting, and while many in India welcomed them, it would be a double edged sword if the US began recognising individual parts of India, like Jammu Kashmir, Ladakh, PoK etc as Delhi and Washington may have differences there.
Meanwhile the big diplomacy moves this week were over India and Bhutan, as Bhutanese PM Tshering Tobgay visited India, and PM Modi headed to Thimpu in practically back-to-back visits. Mr. Modi’s visit was particularly significant as by convention, PMs do not travel abroad after elections are announced, and he went despite having to put the visit off by a day due to the weather. While the ostensible reason for the visit was to receive an award from the Bhutanese King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, the important discussions with both the King and his father, former King Jigme Singye Wangchuck is to discuss bilateral issues like hydropower, investment in infrastructure and the Gelephu Mindfulness city project, and importantly, Bhutan-China boundary talks and the direction they will take.
China’s claims over Arunachal have become shriller and more determined in the last few years:
1. China has renamed Arunachal Pradesh in its maps as Zangnan( South Tibet) and published new maps with Chinese names for Arunachal towns, despite the fact that they are firmly in Indian territory
2. China routinely protests visits by PM Modi, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to the state, and also by the US Ambassador
3. China is building border villages, which India believes are dual purpose, for military use as well, in possible preparation for operations at the LAC. China has recently passed laws that more or less allow it to claim land where it has settled populations
4. India is also speeding up border infrastructure, and improving villages along the LAC, of course, but Beijing’s intentions towards the region, given how it has made assertions in the south china sea and Taiwan, are a growing worry.
There is an important paper brought out by Takshshila where you can look at how the border villages are coming up, using geospatial imagery
A word about Bhutan-China boundary talks (Map would be great here)
1. These began in 1984, and the two sides have held 25 rounds of talks, mainly over the resolution of 2 valleys to Bhutan’s north Jakarlung and Pasamlung, and Doklam to the West of Bhutan, just above the trijunction with India.
2. Bhutan and China don’t have full diplomatic ties, don’t maintain embassies, but Bhutan and the Tibetan Autonomous Region share a contiguous border to Bhutan’s north and west of about 470 km. Bhutan is keen to demarcate this boundary, and China is keen to ensure a swap where it keeps the dominant part of Doklam plateau instead of the northern valleys.
3. Talks had come to a standstill in 2016, followed by the India-China Doklam standoff in 2017, and subsequently the Covid pandemic.
4. In 2020, China laid a new claim, on Sakteng to Bhutan’s east, which also abuts Arunachal Pradesh, effectively putting pressure on Bhutan to make progress on talks
5. Once talks restarted in 2021, Bhutan and China made quick progress, signing a 3-step roadmap to demarcate the boundary
In 2023, Bhutan and China also signed a cooperation agreement for the Joint Technical Team to carry out and mark the demarcated boundaries on the ground and on paper.
In January 2024, with a new government at the helm, reports that the MEA has declined to comment on have suggested that Bhutan has requested that India hold off on its Arunachal Road construction that goes via the Bhutanese Trashiyangste district, until its talks are completed.
Here’s what EAM Jaishankar said recently, speaking at a conference in Tokyo:
“Our own experience in the case of China is that between 1975-2020 there was no bloodshed on the border, and in 2020 it changed. We can disagree on many things but when a country does not observe written agreements, it raises concerns, both about the stability of the relationship and about intentions.”
Given all of the signs, India’s diplomatic challenges are set to multiply over the next few months on the LAC for a number of reasons:
1. China is increasingly upping its responses to India , and the worry is that during election season, there may be attempts for destabilizing operations at the LAC
2. The US too is going into election season, which could turn even more turbulent as Trump makes gains, and similar worries remain about Chinese plans at other parts of its geography
3. Bhutan has to decide how quickly to proceed with its talks on the boundary, given it has also now announced its ambitious plans for Gelephu, a 1000 sq km special administration area, and would want to stabilize its borders at the earliest
4. India’s other neighbours will be watching closely, given their own economic ties with China, like the Maldives- where the new government is getting closer to Beijing, and both Pakistan and Sri Lanka are looking for economic stability
5. Chinese tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, most recently with the Philippines could cause maritime instability as well.
WV Take: China’s growing loud responses on Arunachal Pradesh are cause for both concern and vigil, militarily and diplomatically for New Delhi. Eventually India’s 3,500 km LAC with China as a whole is going to need more resources, and the worry is that this will strain India’s other defence commitments, including in the maritime sphere. The government needs to broadly acknowledge the threat, and be more transparent about how it plans to counter China’s incursions, that it has yet to fully acknowledge since 2020.
WV Reading Recommendations
1. Understanding The India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in the High Himalayas by Manoj Joshi
2. Crosswinds: Nehru, Zhou and the Anglo-American Competition over China: Nehru, Zhou and the Anglo-American Competition over China by Vijay Gokhale
3. Beyond Binaries:The World Of India And China (2008-2022) Hardcover – 1 January 2024 by Shastri Ramachandaran
4. Four Stars of Destiny: An Autobiography Hardcover – Import, 30 April 2024 by General Manoj Mukund Naravane
5. China’s World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict by David Daokui Li
6. The Return of Great Powers: Russia, China, and the Next World War by Jim Sciutto
Script and Presentation: Suhasini Haidar
Production: Gayatri Menon and Shibu Narayan
