At the interbank foreign exchange market, the rupee opened at 96.19, then fell further to 96.39 against the U.S. dollar, registering a fall of 58 paise from its previous close. Representational image.
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Standing over the dry bed of the Karaj River, all that remains are twisted steel beams, shattered concrete slabs, dust, and silence. What lies here is not the aftermath of an attack. Iranian officials and witnesses describe it as a deliberate and calculated strike — one they say was designed not just to destroy infrastructure, but to break Iran’s industrial and social backbone.

On the night of April 2, 2026, the B1 Bridge in Karaj — the tallest bridge in the Gulf region — was hit during American and Israeli military strikes, according to Iranian authorities. The attack destroyed a key section of the bridge and turned what was once considered a symbol of Iranian engineering into a field of rubble.

In Iran, however, the bridge has quickly become something larger than a construction project. It is now being presented as a symbol of national resistance and self-reliance.

The B1 Bridge, also known as Bilqan 1, connected the Bilqan region of Karaj with Tehran and formed part of one of Iran’s most important transport corridors. Karaj, located west of Tehran, functions as Iran’s largest industrial suburb, filled with factories, logistics hubs, warehouses, and manufacturing centres. Nearly 200,000 vehicles travel daily between Karaj and Tehran, and the bridge had been designed to divert almost one-third of the traffic from heavily congested older routes.

Its strategic importance extended far beyond urban traffic management.

The corridor links Tehran to Qazvin, Tabriz, the Caspian region, and onward trade routes connecting Iran with Russia and Central Asia. Large volumes of industrial goods and commercial cargo pass through this network, making it one of the country’s most critical economic arteries.

Project Engineer of this bridge has also emphasised another aspect of the bridge — that it was built almost entirely with domestic technology and materials. Officials and engineers involved in the project say Iranian steel, Iranian cement, and locally trained engineers were used in the construction despite years of international sanctions and technological restrictions.

The bridge had not yet been formally inaugurated, though traffic had already started moving across it.

According to local accounts, civilians had gathered near the Karaj riverbed on the evening of April 2 when the strikes began. The first missile hit the central span of the bridge, causing a section to collapse and vehicles to fall into the dry riverbed below.

Emergency responders rushed to the scene soon afterward.

Witnesses and Iranian officials state that additional strikes followed after rescue teams arrived. The sequence of attacks has been described by Iranian commentators as a “triple-tap strike,” a military tactic in which an initial strike is followed by subsequent attacks targeting rescuers and emergency personnel arriving at the scene.

Iranian authorities have described the attack as a violation of international humanitarian law, arguing that the bridge was civilian infrastructure rather than a military target. Iranian media also pointed to discussions within the U.S. following congressional hearings involving Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, where concerns were reportedly raised by lawmakers regarding the legality of attacks on rescue operations.

Beyond the destruction itself, Iranian analysts believe the strikes reflected a broader geopolitical strategy aimed at destabilising Iran internally.

The B1 corridor connects Tehran with northern and northwestern regions that have large Azeri populations. Karaj itself has a substantial Azeri community, while cities further northwest such as Tabriz are overwhelmingly Azeri.

Iranian political commentators argue that the destruction of the bridge was intended to isolate Tehran from those regions and create internal pressure or instability along ethnic lines — a strategy they claim resembles approaches previously seen in Syria and Lebanon.

However, Iranian officials insist that such assumptions misread the structure of Iranian society. Ali Khamenei is of Azeri origin, as is President Masoud Pezeshkian. Azeris are deeply integrated into Iran’s political, military, and economic institutions and constitute one of the country’s most influential communities.

Iranian analysts say this social integration prevented the emergence of the kind of ethnic fragmentation that external actors may have expected.

The attacks also intensified debate within Iran over technological independence and industrial self-sufficiency.

In recent years, Tehran has invested heavily in domestic engineering and manufacturing capabilities as sanctions limited access to foreign suppliers and international cooperation. Iranian officials point to projects such as the B1 Bridge as examples of the country’s ability to sustain major infrastructure development independently.

Alongside the bridge strike, Iranian media reports indicate that steel plants, cement facilities, and scientific institutions were also targeted during the broader military campaign. Particular attention has focused on Sharif University of Technology in Tehran, widely regarded as one of West Asia’s leading engineering universities.

Iranian commentators argue that the attacks were aimed not only at physical infrastructure but also at weakening the country’s long-term scientific and technological capacity.

Despite sanctions, Iran continues to produce a large number of engineering graduates annually, and officials frequently portray technical education as central to the country’s economic resilience.

Following the bridge strike, Iran carried out what officials described as a symbolic retaliatory operation near the King Fahd Causeway connecting Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Iranian state-linked media framed the move as a warning that critical infrastructure throughout the Gulf region remains vulnerable.

Inside Iran, the public response to the attack became a major political and symbolic moment.

After statements attributed to U.S. President Donald Trump warning of further destruction of Iranian infrastructure, crowds gathered near bridges and public structures across several cities. In Karaj, thousands reportedly assembled near the damaged B1 Bridge.

The gatherings were widely portrayed in Iranian media as demonstrations of civilian resolve and national unity.

Reconstruction efforts began almost immediately after the strikes. Engineering crews and heavy machinery reportedly arrived at the site within hours, and officials now say the bridge could be rebuilt within six weeks.

At the site today, cranes move continuously above shattered concrete while workers weld new steel structures into place. Iranian authorities say the rebuilt bridge will rely once again on domestic materials, local industry, and Iranian engineers.

— Saurabh Shukla and Saurabh Shahi are senior editors with The Red Mike

Published – May 08, 2026 06:55 pm IST

Image for representative purposes only. File
| Photo Credit: AP

The Iranians “not yet willing to actually acknowledge and work through the President’s demands”, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said in an interview last week. On Sunday (February 22, 2026), Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump’s special envoy for West Asia and his chief negotiator with Iran, said the President was “curious” on why Iran had not capitulated under American pressure. Mr. Trump is wondering “why, under this pressure, with the amount of sea power and naval power over there, why haven’t they come to us and said, ‘we profess we don’t want a weapon, so here’s what we’re prepared to do?’” said Mr. Witkoff.

These remarks underscore growing frustration within the Trump administration over its inability to extract significant concessions from Tehran, despite substantial U.S. military build-up near Iran’s shores, including the deployment of two aircraft carrier strike groups.

The U.S. and Iran have held two rounds of talks since tensions escalated in January, but no breakthrough has been achieved. Oman, which is mediating indirect negotiations between the two sides, has confirmed that a third round will take place in Geneva on February 26.

Also Read | Witkoff reiterates U.S. red lines; Pezeshkian signals optimism

Mixed signals

Mr. Trump has repeatedly warned that he could resort to force if Iran fails to reach a deal. Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi have said Iran is for a “fair and equitable” agreement on its nuclear programme, but have rejected Washington’s coercive tactics. The U.S. has sent mixed signals about its objectives. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said earlier this month that the U.S. wanted discussions to cover not just Iran’s nuclear programme, but also its missile programme, its support for non-state actors in West Asia and its “treatment” of its own people. According to Mr. Witkoff, the President has given him and Jared Kushner, Mr. Trump’s son-in-law who is also part of the negotiating team, a clear direction that Iran should stop enrichment and agree to transfer its stockpile of highly enriched uranium out of the country.

The Iranians have so far, at least publicly, resisted both sets of demands. They say they are ready to talk about the nuclear programme, but only about the nuclear programme. Even on the nuclear programme, Iran says it would not give up its “right” to peaceful enrichment, and top officials, including Ali Larijani, have resisted calls for transferring its enriched uranium stockpile.

Also Read | U.S. envoy says Trump questioning why Iran has not ‘capitulated’

Last deterrent

“Iran will not be ready to abandon its nuclear programme,” said a security analyst based in Tehran, who did not want to be named. “Even if Iran reaches a deal with the U.S. over its nuclear programme, Israel would still call it a threat. If Iran agrees to surrender its ballistic missiles today to avert war with the U.S., Israel will bomb Iran anyway a few months down the line. So the question Iranians ask themselves is why should they give up their last deterrent?” he said.

In 2015, Iran agreed to place limits on its nuclear programme and open its facilities for inspection as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran remained in compliance with the agreement until Donald Trump, in his first term as President, unilaterally withdrew the U.S. out of it in May 2018 and reimposed sanctions on Tehran. In 2020, the U.S. assassinated Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force and one of the most prominent military figures in the Islamic Republic. In 2025, Iran was technically in talks with the U.S. over its nuclear programme when Israel bombed the country on June 13. A few days later, the U.S. joined Israel’s war and struck Iran’s nuclear facilities. Mr. Trump then claimed that the U.S. attacks had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear programme.

“These back-to-back setbacks to the diplomatic option seems to have convinced the leader that diplomacy doesn’t work,” a Tehran-based diplomat told The Hindu, referring to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “ There is some tension within the system, though the state is holding firm, for now. Reformists (led by President Pezeshkian and Mr. Aragchi) still believes a deal could be possible if it averts war and the U.S. agrees to lift at least some sanctions. The Iranians might be open to making concessions on enrichment and enriched uranium. But it also depends on what the White House has to offer. The hardliners are watching when the talks are unfolding.”

Also Read | President Donald Trump denies top U.S. officer warned of Iran strike risks

Iran’s leverage

A war, by most accounts, would be disastrous for Iran, which is already grappling with internal strain amid a deepening economic crisis. The U.S. wields overwhelming firepower, with dozens of fighter jets and warships deployed to the region. Yet, Iran has its own leverage. It possesses thousands of ballistic missiles capable of striking American bases and assets across the region, as well as Israel. Iran could also disrupt or block cargo traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a critical international maritime chokepoint.

In his second term, Mr. Trump has attacked several countries, but he was also shown caution about getting entangled in a long-drawn conflicts. There is no guarantee he could swiftly conclude a war with Iran, particularly as Tehran has repeatedly vowed to retaliate forcefully against any attack. Nor can Washington sustain en elevated troop presence in West Asia indefinitely, particularly as the U.S. is preparing to hold midterm elections later this year.

“Iran wants to avoid war, but not at any cost,” said the Tehran-based security analyst. “If the U.S. is pursuing gunboat diplomacy through a military build-up along with talks, Iran is responding in kind —talking while preparing for war.”

Published – February 24, 2026 06:20 pm IST

Mike Huckabee, former Republican Governor of Arkansas, was appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Israel by the Trump administration. Credit: X/@GovMikeHuckabee

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (center) heads to venue for talks between Iran and the U.S., in Muscat, Oman on February 6, 2026.
| Photo Credit: AP

A map showing the Strait of Hormuz and Iran is seen behind a 3D printed miniature of U.S. President Donald Trump in this illustration. File
| Photo Credit: Reuters

Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, once compared Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to Hitler, and warned that if Tehran acquired a nuclear bomb, his kingdom would do the same.

For years, rivalry between Saudi Arabia, a Sunni monarchy, and Iran, a Shia theocracy, had been a defining feature of West Asian geopolitics. From Lebanon and Syria to Iraq and Yemen, the two backed opposing sides, with Iran supporting Shia militias and Saudi Arabia Sunni factions.

Yet, when Iran was rocked by mass protests over the past two weeks, Riyadh was conspicuously silent. And when U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to bomb Iran over its crackdown on demonstrators, Riyadh told Tehran it would not allow its air space or territory to be used for such an attack, AFP reported.

According to Gulf and American officials, Saudi Arabia, along with Qatar, Oman and Turkey, lobbied the Trump administration against military action.

Why did Riyadh oppose an American strike on a country it had, until recently, regarded as its principal rival in West Asia?

Editorial The great reckoning: On the crises in Iran

Fear of instability

Three broad reasons stand out.

First, the Saudis appear wary of the narrative that external military punishment is justified as a response to internal repression. Despite their sectarian divide and geopolitical rivalry, both Saudi Arabia and Iran are governed by authoritarian systems.

In the case of Iran, at least there are national and parliamentary elections in which millions of people participate. Saudi Arabia holds managed elections only at the municipal level. If Iran can be “liberated” through an external attack, critics could invoke the same logic against the kingdom should it ever drift away from the U.S. orbit in West Asia.

What makes Iran a target and Saudi Arabia is not is not a qualitative difference in governance models, but two other factors. One, Saudi Arabia can trade, invest, accept investments freely and broadly meet the economic needs of its population, while Iran faces a severe economic crisis largely due to sanctions. Two, Saudi Arabia is an American ally that hosts U.S. troops; Ira, by contrast, is viewed as an adversary in Washington and Tel Aviv.

Second, having seen the chaos external interventions brought to countries like Iraq and Libya, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries are wary of an invasion in Iran, which they fear could plunge the country of over 90 million into anarchy and instability. It could send tens of thousands of refugees to neighbouring countries.

Instability could spread across the Persian Gulf waters and reignite the Houthis’ war with Gulf monarchies, endangering Crown Prince Mohammed’s plan to turn the kingdom into an economic power house that is less dependent on oil.

The Israel factor

Lastly, and more important, geopolitics.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies have grown increasingly alarmed by Israel’s behaviour over the past two years. Since October 7, 2023, Israel has bombed at least six countries. Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Lebanese Shia militia, has been degraded. In Syria, the pro-Iran regime of President Bashar al-Assad collapsed.

Emboldened by these developments, Israel, with the backing of the U.S., bombed Iran in June. In September, Israel struck Qatar, another American ally, in a failed bid to assassinate Hamas’s political leadership –which was seen as a breach of the red line by Arab kingdoms.

If the Islamic Republic of Iran were to fall, the regional balance of power would decisively shift in favour of Israel, enabling it to pursue dominance across West Asia.

Saudi Arabia, concerned about the U.S.’s shrinking security umbrella and Israel’s aggression, has already started diversifying its strategic options. Last year, it forged a security partnership with nuclear-armed Pakistan. It is also seeking to build closer strategic ties with Turkey, a former adversary, Qatar, on which Riyadh imposed a blockade in 2017, and Egypt.

So the kingdom doesn’t want a violent collapse of Iran’s republic—an outcome that could plunge the country into chaos, deepen regional instability which could have domestic consequences and leave Israel more powerful which could pose long-term security threats.

Published – January 16, 2026 05:50 pm IST