Myanmar’s junta signalled changes in the military’s leadership ahead of the country’s annual show of force on Friday (March 27, 2026), potentially clearing the way for defence chief Min Aung Hlaing to become President.

Tanks and military trucks laden with rocket launchers and mobile field guns trundled through the streets as thousands of soldiers marched for Armed Forces Day in the capital, Naypyidaw, where Min Aung Hlaing made his yearly speech to rally morale.

The armed forces “reaffirmed its pledge to support the government legitimately elected by the people, with the aim of strengthening and sustaining the multi-party democracy system”, he said.

Min Aung Hlaing has ruled by diktat since ousting the hugely popular government of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021 — detaining the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, dissolving her party and triggering civil war.

There will be “leadership changes” in the armed forces after the ceremony, the state-run Global New Light of Myanmar newspaper quoted Min Aung Hlaing’s deputy Soe Win as saying at an official dinner on Thursday (March 26, 2026).

Lawmakers are set to begin the process of selecting a president next week following a walkover victory by pro-military parties earlier this year in elections overseen by the junta.

Under the constitution, Min Aung Hlaing would have to step down from his military post to become President, and Soe Win’s comments reinforce expectations that he will do so.

He is already acting President, but taking the role on a permanent basis would bolster critics who say the transition to a new government is effectively the military transferring power to itself in a civilian disguise.

“Irrespective of who leads,” the armed forces “will continue to follow the guidance of successive leaders, advisors and mentors,” the newspaper cited Soe Win as saying in indirect speech.

Myanmar’s military mythologises itself as the only force protecting the restive nation from disintegration.

The newspaper devoted its front page to the military pageant, with an image of missile launchers before three huge statues of ancient kings that dominate the parade ground.

Marching bands and small submarines atop vehicles emblazoned with the words “Made in Myanmar” paraded past hundreds of spectators as the sun went down on Friday (March 27, 2026), state TV channel MRTV showed.

The Armed Forces Day events have progressively shrunk since 2021, as the military’s ranks have been sapped by the civil war against anti-coup guerrillas and long-active ethnic minority rebel factions.

But attendance appeared to be higher and the show more extravagant at Friday’s parade compared to last year’s event, which fell on the day before a devastating 7.7 magnitude earthquake hit the country, killing thousands.

Forward march

Over the past year, there have been signs the junta is back on the front foot — with a string of moderate victories thanks largely to China-backed truces with ethnic rebels along their shared border.

A Beijing-brokered deal saw the northern city of Lashio returned to the military last spring, after it and its regional command base were captured by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army in a major humiliation.

Another China-sealed ceasefire in October saw the Ta’ang National Liberation Army pull back from central Mandalay region, where it had seized the lucrative ruby mining hub of Mogok.

Both factions previously fought alongside each other and others in an offensive starting in late 2023 that represented the biggest threat to the junta since the coup.

Analysts say neighbouring China’s recent interventions to rein in rebels are a sign Beijing is backing the military establishment to provide some semblance of stability.

While the truces have proven instrumental to the past year of the conflict, violence remains endemic.

Last year witnessed the largest number of military air and drone strikes since the coup, according to monitoring group ACLED, which tallies media reports of violence.

With various armed groups embroiled in the civil war, the conflict is highly compartmentalised and there are regions where the embattled military is surrounded and making its last stand.

While there is no official toll for the conflict, ACLED estimates more than 90,000 people have been killed on all sides.

More than 3.7 million people are displaced, the United Nations has said, while about half the country’s population lives in poverty.

Published – March 27, 2026 10:16 pm IST

On 19th August 2011, a former General and Myanmar President Thein Sein’s decision to invite recently released Aung San Suu Kyi at his residence for dinner marked a quiet but consequential turning point in Myanmar’s political trajectory. The meeting, understated in form yet profound in implication, was widely interpreted as the first genuine signal from the military-backed establishment that it was willing to engage with democratic forces after decades of isolation and repression.

For a country long defined by rigid authoritarianism, this moment suggested the possibility of a negotiated transition, an opening that raised cautious optimism both within Myanmar and among international stakeholders eager to see the country step back into the global fold. Following this meeting, world leaders including U.S. President Barrack Obama visited Myanmar though the country was more or less controlled by the military establishment.

The recent Myanmar general elections, conducted in three phases between December 2025 and January 2026, reflect the long political journey of a country that in the last decade stood as an oasis of hope and democratic optimism, but now risks being seen as a lost cause.

The military coup of February 1, 2021, marked a rupture in Myanmar’s fragile democratic transition, abruptly ending a decade-long experiment with quasi-civilian rule. In the early hours of the morning, the armed forces detained State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other senior leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD), alleging electoral irregularities in the 2020 polls with the claims widely dismissed by international observers. Power was swiftly consolidated under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who declared a state of emergency and transferred authority to the military command.

What followed was not merely a political reset but a nationwide upheaval: mass protests, a brutal crackdown, and the gradual descent into a protracted civil conflict that continues to define Myanmar’s political and humanitarian landscape.

At a time when the international community’s attention remains riveted on West Asia, largely due to its far-reaching global economic implications, comparatively little notice has been taken of recent developments in Myanmar, a country of nearly 55 million people. For those in Asia, particularly, Myanmar continues to hold strategic importance for a variety of reasons. As a member of ASEAN, its internal stability carries broader implications for regional cohesion and humanitarian considerations. Over the years, prominent figures and stakeholders across Asia have invested considerable political capital in supporting Myanmar’s fragile democratic transition. At the global level, the country also commands attention as a critical arena in the evolving balance of power, particularly in how it manages its complex and often delicate ties with China.

Democracy on a leash

Official figures released by the military authorities suggest an overall voter turnout of roughly 54–55%, with phase-wise participation at around 52% in the first phase, 55% in the second, and over 56% in the final round. These numbers mark a significant drop from the approximately 70% turnout recorded in the 2015 and 2020 elections, which were held under relatively more open political conditions. However, even the reported figures have been contested, with many arguing that when large swathes of conflict-affected regions and disenfranchised populations are accounted for, the effective participation rate may be considerably lower.

While the turnout percentages have been used by the military to project a veneer of electoral legitimacy, they simultaneously underscore the shrinking democratic space in a country still gripped by civil conflict and political repression.

Myanmar’s new Parliament started its session in March 2026 after a gap of more than five years. The Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw) convened on March 16. The Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw) followed on March 18 whereas regional and State Assemblies met on March 20.

The Parliament is now expected to move toward electing a President and forming a new government structure in the weeks that follow. With the elections conducted by the military, it is important to understand how the current developments can shape the future.

Ever since 2010, I have been directly and indirectly engaged with developments in Myanmar. My interest in the country is both personal and professional. Myanmar offers a compelling case study of how internal diversity shapes political trajectories. Much like my native region of Jammu and Kashmir, this diversity is ethnic, linguistic, and religious, providing fertile ground for rich, multidisciplinary inquiry. Yet, as in J&K, such diversity also gives rise to competing political aspirations and contested visions of identity.

While no two situations are identical, the comparison offers a useful lens to understand how human interactions evolve in the debates around federalism. Myanmar has struggled to reconcile two competing imperatives: the centralising instincts of the military, and the federal aspirations of its diverse ethnic landscape. In this context, the leadership of the Bamar ethnic majority has vocally championed democratic rights and political consolidation, but has only gradually come to recognise the importance of federalism in the hope of keeping the country united and harmonious one day.

To understand the 2026 election, one must understand the logic that drives it. Myanmar’s military does not view elections in the same way that democratic systems do. Elections are not primarily about democracy; they are about instruments through which the military has sought to manage, and, where necessary, contain or even eliminate political forces. With the advantage of hindsight this was evident even during the period of quasi-civilian rule from 2010 to 2021.

The 2008-Constitution ensured that the military retained decisive power through its guaranteed parliamentary seats, control over key Ministries, and its ability to intervene at will constitutionally.

The 2025–26 election extends this logic into a far more oppressive environment. Major Opposition forces have been excluded. Large parts of the country, where the military’s authority is contested or absent, did not meaningfully participate. The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) emerged as the principal winner, reportedly securing over 231 of the 330 contested seats in the Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw) and 108 seats in Upper House(Amyotha Hluttaw), thereby consolidating the State Administration Council’s grip on political institutions. The result is a system in which elections simply endorse a predetermined outcome.

There are bigger losses after the 2021-coup.

For decades, ethnic armed organisations have operated along the country’s peripheries, fighting civil wars with the central authority and asserting varying degrees of autonomy. The political opening of the 2010s created an opportunity, however imperfect, to bring these groups into a broader national framework. That opportunity has now been lost. The post-coup conflict has transformed Myanmar’s political geography. Ethnic armed groups have expanded their control. The consequence is a country that is no longer governed through a single chain of authority. It is governed through a patchwork of arrangements. In this context, the election is detached from reality.

Patchy governance

In areas affected by conflict, basic functions of governance have either broken down. Local administrations aligned with resistance groups have taken on governance roles. Actually, this was true even before the coup as many of the areas had always remained outside the ambit of Myanmar’s central authority.

In other areas, governance has given way to survival. Healthcare systems and education has been disrupted on a scale that will have long-term consequences. Economic activity has progressively shifted into informal channels and these are structural changes.

In my earlier work on Myanmar, I have argued that the country’s stability depended not just on political reform at the Centre, but on the devolution of powers by factoring in its diversity. In this respect, The new Parliament does not represent the full spectrum of political forces, does not exercise independent authority, and operates within a constrained political space. It cannot perform the role it is meant to. Over the past two decades, the military has sought to derive legitimacy from procedure — through elections, the functioning of institutions, and the invocation of carefully crafted constitutional frameworks that have failed to reconcile the country’s wide-ranging diversity.

With varying degrees other stakeholders have a role to play in creating the present. The National League for Democracy (NLD), despite its global reputation as a pro-democracy force, faced sustained criticism for its stance on the Rohingya crisis. During its time in power after the 2015 and 2020 electoral victories, the party, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, largely defended the actions of the military against allegations of ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State. Rather than challenging the dominant nationalist narrative, the NLD leadership often echoed or remained silent on anti-Rohingya sentiment, contributing to an environment of xenophobia and Islamophobia. Its refusal to use the term “Rohingya,” preference for state-sanctioned terminology, and its legal defence of Myanmar at the International Court of Justice during the genocide case further eroded its moral standing among human rights advocates. This record complicates the Opposition’s claim to ethical legitimacy, even as it continues to resist military rule. At the same time, in its current phase in Opposition, elements within the NLD and allied pro-democracy forces have shown greater willingness to re-engage with the Rohingya issue. This was done through more inclusive rhetoric, outreach to Rohingya representatives, and an emerging acknowledgment that any future democratic settlement must address questions of citizenship, rights and dignity of the community.

Myanmar’s crisis has also exposed the limits of external engagement. In the last five-years, international responses have ranged from sanctions by the west to diplomatic initiatives in Asia, but their impact has been constrained. The military has demonstrated a capacity to absorb pressure, drawing on both internal resources and external support with their outreach to Russia apart from cementing its ties with China.

Read: Four years on, Myanmar and its continuing nightmare

With this background, Myanmar’s immediate future is likely to be shaped by the multiple ongoing conflicts that will persist. Resistance groups will continue to operate, adapting to evolving conditions. Ethnic armed organisations will maintain their positions, negotiating their own arrangements within the broader conflict. The humanitarian situation will remain severe, with long-term implications for the country’s social and economic fabric. This suggests a prolonged period of instability. In this context, the significance of Myanmar’s recent election lies not in what it has achieved, but in what it reveals. It reveals a country that remains, fundamentally, unresolved.

From the mist-laden hills that fold into India and China, to the wide Irrawaddy plains that have long sustained its civilisations, and the riverine arteries that bind distant communities into a shared, if fragile, whole, Myanmar’s geography is not merely a backdrop but a quiet argument for pluralism. Any durable political settlement must therefore echo this natural diversity, layered, negotiated, and inclusive, much like the terrain itself, where unity has never meant uniformity, and where the promise of coexistence rests on a genuinely pluralistic idea of citizenship. In that sense, Myanmar is not only a test for itself but a mirror for Asia, where many countries are grappling with their own majoritarian and nativist impulses; the lesson it offers is stark yet enduring. The stability lies not in enforced sameness, but in the patient accommodation of difference and an inclusive idea of citizenship.

(The author was a member of UN Secretary-General’s Good offices on Myanmar)

Volunteers of the Union Election Commission (UEC) set up electronic voting machines at a polling station, one day before the third election phase, in Yangon on January 24, 2026.
| Photo Credit: AFP

The Military deposed and detained Suu Kyi in a 2021 coup, claiming she secured a landslide election win over pro-military parties the previous year by means of massive voter fraud. File.
| Photo Credit: AFP

A voter casts ballot at a polling station during the second phase of general election, on January 11, 2026, in Yangon, Myanmar.
| Photo Credit: AP

Members of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) remove a campaign poster during the last day of the first phase of an election campaign in Yangon, Myanmar, on December 26, 2025.
| Photo Credit: AP

Voting began Sunday (December 28, 2025) in Myanmar’s heavily restricted polls, with the ruling junta touting the exercise as a return to democracy five years after it ousted the last elected government, triggering civil war.

Former civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi remains jailed, while her hugely popular party has been dissolved and was not taking part.

Campaigners, Western diplomats and the U.N.’s rights chief have all condemned the phased month-long vote, citing a ballot stacked with military allies and a stark crackdown on dissent.

The pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party is widely expected to emerge as the largest one, in what critics say would be a rebranding of martial rule.

The Southeast Asian nation of around 50 million is riven by civil war and there will be no voting in rebel-held areas.

In junta-controlled territory, the first of three rounds started at 6 a.m. (2330 GMT Saturday), including in constituencies in the cities of Yangon, Mandalay and the capital Naypyidaw.

“The election is very important and will bring the best for the country,” said Bo Saw, the first voter at a polling station in Yangon’s Kamayut Township near Suu Kyi’s vacant home.

“The first priority should be restoring a safe and peaceful situation,” the 63-year-old told AFP.

Slow start

Snaking queues of voters formed outside polling stations in the last election in 2020, which the military declared void when it ousted Ms. Suu Kyi and seized power in 2021.

But this time journalists and polling staff outnumbered early voters at a downtown station near the gleaming Sule Pagoda — the site of huge pro-democracy protests after the coup.

Among a trickle of early voters, 45-year-old Swe Maw dismissed international criticism. “It’s not an important matter,” he said. “There are always people who like and dislike.”

The run-up saw none of the feverish public rallies that Ms. Suu Kyi once commanded, and the junta has waged a withering pre-vote offensive to claw back territory.

“It is impossible for this election to be free and fair,” said Moe Moe Myint, who has spent the past two months “on the run” from junta air strikes. “How can we support a junta-run election when this military has destroyed our lives?” she told AFP from a village in the central Mandalay region. “We are homeless, hiding in jungles, and living between life and death,” said the 40-year-old.

Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has not responded to AFP requests for interview, but has consistently framed the polls as a path to reconciliation.

Electronic voting

The military ruled Myanmar for most of its post-independence history before a 10-year interlude saw a civilian government take the reins in a burst of optimism and reform.

But after Ms. Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party trounced pro-military opponents in the 2020 elections, Min Aung Hlaing snatched power in a coup, alleging widespread voter fraud.

Ms. Suu Kyi is serving a 27-year sentence for charges rights groups dismiss as politically motivated.

“I don’t think she would consider these elections to be meaningful in any way,” her son Kim Aris said from his home in Britain.

Most parties from the 2020 vote, including Ms. Suu Kyi’s, have since been dissolved.

The Asian Network for Free Elections says 90% of the seats in the last elections went to organisations that will not appear on Sunday’s (December 28, 2025) ballots.

New electronic voting machines will not allow write-in candidates or spoiled ballots.

‘Repression’

The junta is pursuing prosecutions against more than 200 people for violating draconian legislation forbidding “disruption” of the poll, including protest or criticism.

“These elections are clearly taking place in an environment of violence and repression,” U.N. rights chief Volker Turk said this week.

The second round of polling will take place in two weeks before the third and final round on January 25, but the junta has conceded elections cannot happen in almost one in five lower house constituencies.

When the military seized power it put down pro-democracy protests, and many activists quit the cities to fight as guerrillas alongside ethnic minority armies that have long held sway in Myanmar’s fringes.

“There are many ways to make peace in the country, but they haven’t chosen those — they’ve chosen to have an election instead,” said Zaw Tun, an officer in the pro-democracy People’s Defence Force in the northern region of Sagaing. “We will continue to fight.”

Published – December 28, 2025 06:52 am IST

Myanmar nationals living in Thailand enter the Myanmar Embassy for early voting ahead of the Myanmar general election, in Bangkok on December 6, 2025.
| Photo Credit: AFP

An official shows how to use a voting machine for future elections in Yangon on September 5, 2023. File
| Photo Credit: AFP