The BRICS grouping, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, is a globally significant collective defined by its substantial contributions to global GDP, scientific and technological capacity, natural resources, and total population. Since its formation, the group has evolved into a prominent international voice, representing countries that seek to challenge and provide an alternative to Western hegemony. BRICS functions as a collaborative force aimed at establishing a multipolar world system. While the group’s positions on global finance and macro-economic issues are widely recognised, the depth of cooperation among member states regarding science, technology, and innovation (STI) remains less publicised.

At a time in which global scientific collaboration is increasingly dictated by geopolitical tensions, techno-nationalism, and strategic competition, often manifesting as sanctions and export controls, BRICS assumes a critical role in the global STI landscape. Through this platform, member nations coordinate their strategies, amplify their collective voice in global economic governance, and influence development finance through institutions like the New Development Bank.

These members are also vital contributors to global trade, energy production, and the supply of essential natural resources. The 2022 launch of BRICS+ signaled a move towards a more inclusive forum, fostering development and political cooperation across the Global South to reduce technological dependencies. This collaboration is now a concrete effort to build shared capacities through various framework programmes. The group’s current membership has expanded to include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Iran.

Cooperation in STI

Cooperation in STI has been a part of the BRICS agenda since its early years. It was formally recognised in 2011 and later consolidated in meetings between senior officials and the BRICS Ministers of Science, Technology, and Innovation. A pivotal 2015 memorandum of understanding established STI as a core strategic pillar, providing the necessary institutional framework and operational signals for collaborative research and capacity-building. This framework has since expanded the scope of cooperation, allowing members to leverage their complementary strengths to address shared development challenges and advance frontier sciences.

The first BRICS Action Plan for Innovation Cooperation (2017-2020) tasked the Science, Technology, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship Partnership (STIEP) Working Group with implementing various programmes. These initiatives focused on entrepreneurship networks, the role of youth and women in STI, and collaborations regarding technology transfer and business incubators. Over time, BRICS has moved from early joint research calls focused on fundamental science toward prioritising innovation and technology transfer.

These priorities are formally identified in annual ministerial declarations. The BRICS Ministers of Science, Technology, and Innovation meet once a year to approve and sign strategic documents. Within each member country, one or two lead agencies coordinate these activities, issue calls for proposals, and prepare project lists for approval during the respective country’s presidency. For example, during India’s chairmanship, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) serve as the lead agencies.

A clear emphasis on innovation-driven and technology-enabled ecosystems is evident in recent summit themes and initiatives such as iBRICs and the BRICS Technology Transfer Centre (TTC). The TTC has made notable progress in creating policy frameworks and institutional links for cross-border technology commercialisation. However, despite this progress, large-scale commercialisation of these technologies remains limited.

The focus of BRICS joint research calls has transitioned from basic science and enabling technologies to include more socially relevant areas such as energy, water, health, and the environment. The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated this shift, placing a premium on public health, vaccine research, biosecurity, and digital health. Recent calls have integrated high-performance computing (HPC), advanced materials, information and communication technology (ICT), and space-related applications. Scientific collaboration has strengthened over time, with a growing focus on artificial intelligence and data-intensive science.

While working groups reflect these shared development priorities, their progress varies across different fields. Significant progress is visible in ICT and HPC, highlighted by the establishment of the BRICS Institute of Future Networks, as well as in space cooperation following a 2021 intergovernmental agreement. Conversely, areas that require heavy infrastructure or are more exploratory, such as mega-science projects and ocean or polar research, have developed slower.

The expansion of BRICS has positioned it as a more inclusive platform for knowledge exchange and collaborative research. The 2025 Declaration on AI, elevated artificial intelligence from a sub-theme, to a central pillar of multilateral governance. This declaration outlines a vision for AI governance that is equitable, inclusive, and development-oriented, moving the partnership towards a strategic collaboration with direct economic and societal relevance. While the 2021-24 Action Plan focused on networking and thematic frameworks, subsequent plans aim to scale projects for greater impact, focusing on biotechnology, climate tech, industrial innovation, and AI.

Under India’s 2026 Presidency, with the theme ‘Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability’, the group is positioned to deepen its scientific partnerships. The goal is to leverage expanded membership to strengthen capacities and address challenges like digital divides, public health crises, and climate resilience. However, participation from new members remains uneven; among the most recent additions, only Egypt and Iran joined the call for proposals issued last December. Additionally, the China-BRICS Research Centre on New Quality Productive Forces was recently inaugurated in Beijing. This center serves as an international platform for academic exchange and technological research.

Consequences and concerns

When compared to nations like South Korea, the National Innovation Systems (NIS) of BRICS countries exhibit various strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) is relatively lower across the group, with the exception of China. Research suggests that the gap between BRICS nations and South Korea is wide, and member countries excluding China have significant catching up to do according to various innovation indicators. With the expansion into BRICS+, the innovation systems of new members also require assessment and strengthening. This strengthening could be a priority for BRICS over the next decade, with the potential to eventually replicate these improvements across the broader Global South.

As noted by Stanford University visiting scholar Irina Dezhina, the heterogeneity of new members in terms of both economic development and scientific capacity makes it difficult to reconcile differing interests. Consequently, BRICS+ may need to focus on catalysing new “paired links” between specific members. Comparisons to the European Union (EU) suggest that BRICS could learn from the EU’s wide variety of STI programs, as BRICS currently offers more limited options. Further, although competition for funding is intense, the total funding available remains modest.

Experts suggest that these programmes must reach a new qualitative level to effectively respond to major global challenges. Currently, however, research into STI cooperation among BRICS nations is limited, and the existing mechanism lacks a framework for regular study to provide data-driven inputs to member countries.

A way forward

While BRICS countries have achieved significant collaboration, there are questions regarding whether the current framework is sufficient for future needs. A primary concern is the lack of a permanent mechanism to manage STI cooperation. The current system, where the lead role rotates annually with the presidency, is not ideally suited for long-term requirements. BRICS could potentially model a central mechanism after the EU’s Horizon Program, establishing a Secretariat to manage funds, issue calls for proposals, monitor progress, and review outcomes.

Developing a few long-term Mega-science Projects could also foster deeper cooperation. The framework for STI cooperation should eventually expand beyond just funding science and technology projects; it should promote research into the governance of STI and the impact of emerging technologies on BRICS+ nations. This would facilitate greater coherence in international treaty negotiations and help build capacity for STI governance.

In conclusion, while STI cooperation within BRICS has progressed significantly since 2015 despite various constraints, there is substantial room for improvement. Making the framework more effective, agile, and credible will enhance the group’s legitimacy in the global arena. As the chair of BRICS+ in 2026, India has the opportunity to lead this transition.

Krishna Ravi Srinivas is Adjunct Professor of Law, Director CoE in AI & Law, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad. Sneha Sinha is Consultant, Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), New Delhi

The handover of the BRICS presidency is steeped in symbolism. In 2024, Brazil had received from Russia a steel gavel — a symbol of industrial strength. As Brazil passed the presidency to India last Friday, it handed over a gavel made of recycled wood from the Amazon rainforest. The gesture, according to Brazil’s BRICS sherpa Mauricio Lyrio, was meant to carry forward the ethos that defined his country’s presidency. “The gavel represents both sustainability and the deep roots of cooperation that unite the countries of the group. Through this gesture, confidence in India’s upcoming presidency is reaffirmed, along with the commitment to support its efforts to advance the BRICS agenda,” said Lyrio, as he handed over the gavel to Sudhakar Dalela, India’s sherpa to BRICS.

The BRICS sherpas’ meeting in Brasilia on December 11 and 12 went beyond symbolism as it assessed the outcomes of Brazil’s presidency, which formally ends on December 31. Bringing together negotiators from all 11 members, the meeting was a stock-taking exercise of achievements through 2025. Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira described the process as an effort that moved well beyond BRICS’ traditional agenda as he emphasised that the grouping’s relevance would increasingly be measured by its impact on the everyday life of people. “Major international issues will remain central to our work, but our societies also expect us to deliver concrete results from our initiatives,” Mr. Vieira said.

Challenges aplenty

Brazil framed its BRICS presidency around sustainability and inclusive development, with emphasis on deliverables. This translated into three declarations at the Rio de Janeiro summit in July — on the governance of artificial intelligence, a climate financing framework and a partnership to eliminate socially determined diseases. Mr. Lyrio acknowledged that Brazil’s presidency unfolded amid growing mistrust of multilateralism, but this only enhanced BRICS’ relevance. “These trends underscored the centrality of BRICS as a platform for dialogue, bridge-building and the articulation of perspectives that could not be ignored,” Mr. Lyrio said, adding that the final declaration of the summit reaffirmed a shared commitment to multilateralism.

A direct challenge to multilateralism — and BRICS — emerged in June, just days before the Rio de Janeiro summit, when U.S. President Donald Trump warned of “punitive consequences” if the grouping sought to “weaken the U.S. dollar”. Mr. Trump threatened 100% tariffs against countries he accused of undermining the American currency. Days later, in a barely veiled message to India, U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said New Delhi’s purchase of Russian military equipment and its alignment with BRICS had “rubbed the United States the wrong way”.

The pressure notwithstanding, India participated in the Rio summit wholeheartedly and helped in making the meeting a defining moment for the grouping. The Rio summit, on July 6-7, became the first BRICS meeting that brought together all 11 full members alongside 10 partner countries, eight invited nations and representatives of all major multilateral institutions as leaders endorsed key declarations on finance, climate action and technology. Speaking after the summit, Mr. Vieira had said BRICS was “the cradle of a new development model”, and the Global South was “no longer peripheral but central to defending multilateralism”.

Brazil’s BRICS presidency leaves behind a clear roadmap, articulated at the summit by President Lula da Silva through a critique of the global financial architecture. “The structures of the World Bank and the IMF reflect a reversed Marshall Plan, wherein emerging and developing economies finance the more developed world,” Mr. Lula said, urging systemic reform. In addition, health cooperation and global governance were reinforced during Brazil’s tenure, while artificial intelligence emerged as a BRICS priority. “Emerging technologies must operate within a governance framework that is fair, inclusive and equitable,” Lula said at the summit, warning that AI must not become “the exclusive privilege of a handful of nations, nor a tool for manipulation concentrated in the hands of billionaires”.

Economic autonomy forms another important pillar of Brazil’s legacy. New Development Bank (NDB) president Dilma Rousseff said at the Rio summit that the NDB’s mandate is to finance infrastructure, innovation and sustainability “by promoting social justice, sovereignty and sustainable growth”, reaffirming BRICS’s ambition to shape its own development path.

Now, as Brazil passed the BRICS gavel to India, the transition is being framed as one of continuity. At the handover ceremony at Brazil’s Foreign Ministry in Brasilia, Mr. Dalela acknowledged the depth of Brazil’s stewardship, noting that progress across political and security cooperation, economic and financial coordination, and people-to-people exchanges reflected a presidency taken seriously at every level. “This year was especially significant as it coincided with the consolidation phase of the expanded membership,” he said, adding that integrating new partners required a careful balance between preserving BRICS’s founding principles and responding to shifts in global governance. “Brazil’s leadership has been exemplary,” he concluded, setting the tone for an Indian presidency.

Trying times

The year 2025 has been a particularly testy one for BRICS in its 17th year. With Mr. Trump back in the White House, almost all major international institutions have been rattled and global trade unsettled by a wave of unilateral sanctions. Brazil and India, both founding members of BRICS, have found themselves at the receiving end of Mr. Trump’s trade war — facing tariffs of nearly 50%, although most of the measures against Brazil have been rolled back. Rather than yield to pressure, Brazil used its BRICS presidency to steer the grouping through a complex phase with no real damage — a possible template for future presidencies.

Taking charge of the grouping for 2026, Mr. Dalela, Secretary (Economic Relations) in India’s Ministry of External Affairs, said New Delhi would carry forward the collectively endorsed agenda. India’s presidency will rest on four pillars of resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, with ongoing initiatives on climate change, artificial intelligence and scientific cooperation set to continue.

As the BRICS presidency passes from Brazil to India, the next chapter will most likely be based on continuity and consolidation.

Published – December 18, 2025 09:07 am IST

The Iranian government wants to use cryptocurrencies to pay for trade — including with India and the other BRICS nations — and bypass the various sanctions that have been levied on it by the United States of America and the United Nations, according to various Iranian government officials and businessmen.

In August 2025, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany initiated a ‘snapback mechanism’ through which international sanctions were levied once again on Iran following a brief pause, as a response to Iran’s alleged increased uranium enrichment activities and curbs on access by International Atomic Energy Agency officials. 

The U.S. has been levying varying levels of sanctions on Iran since about 1979. One major impact of the sanctions is that Iran is cut off from the U.S.’ international SWIFT payment system.

Adapting cryptos to bypass sanctions

“Cryptocurrencies provide new ways to do business and to pay for trade,” Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament said while speaking at the deBlock Summit, Iran’s first international blockchain conference, which is also backed by the Iranian government. “So, they can support independent nations. We want Iran to become a regional, and even global hub in blockchain technology and digital trade.”

“We want to do trade with other countries where we pay in digital currencies,” Mr. Ghalibaf asserted. “It is a necessity for us.”

The Speaker said that incorporating cryptocurrencies requires the appropriate technology, which the Iranian government is working on. 

“The Iranian Parliament hereby declares its readiness to work with academics, researchers, and businesses in this area,” Mr. Ghalibaf said. “We want to attract as much investment as possible in digital currencies.”

A push for de-dollarisation

Pooria Asteraky, chairman of the deBlock Summit, said that cryptocurrencies, being a decentralised form of money, are a technological tool to achieve de-dollarisation, or a move away from the U.S. dollar as the primary international currency.

“Cryptocurrencies are a decentralised form of money, not to be run by any particular government or political block,” Mr. Asteraky said. “It is the first technological tool for de-dollarisation. BRICS is meant to get rid of centralisation by reducing the role of the dollar, and reduce the amount of dollars held in countries’ assets.”

U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly warned the BRICS countries to desist from forming a ‘BRICS currency’ and move away from the dollar, saying he would impose punitive tariffs on these countries if they do so.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs has made its stance on the matter clear. “De-dollarisation is not part of India’s financial agenda,” the Ministry’s spokesperson said in August 2025.

Need for better regulations

However, despite Mr. Ghalibaf’s assertions, the private sector participants in the Summit said that Iranian regulations on cryptocurrencies and blockchain left a lot to be desired.

“There is not a proper transparent regulatory environment for blockchain or cryptocurrencies to prosper in Iran,” Ehsan Mehdizadeh, CEO and founder of Wallex Iran, the country’s largest cryptocurrency exchanges said during a panel discussion. “You can’t say you are a country under sanctions and yet you don’t want to use new financial systems. The regulator has not arrived at a good understanding of blockchain technology.”

“The SWIFT payment system has been cut off for us, so perhaps cryptocurrencies and blockchain can help,” Mr. Mehdizadeh said. “Digital and crypto currencies are one way to get around sanctions.”

State of Iranian regulations

Currently, the Central Bank of Iran is the sole regulator for the crypto market in the country. It has introduced several restrictions, including blocking gateways that allow the Iranian Rial to be converted into cryptocurrencies. Crypto mining — the energy-intensive act of creating cryptocurrencies — has been allowed, but policymakers are raising questions on how to regulate those activities as well. 

“The council set up to prevent money laundering had banned cryptocurrencies, but the head of the Iranian Parliament questioned this,” Shamseddin Hosseini, chairman of the Economic Committee of the Iranian Parliament noted. “These currencies do have risks. One question to be asked is how much should you pay for crypto mining. Should these activities be entitled to the same rates of electricity that are charged to normal residents?”

Ali Hakim Javadi, the chairman of the Iranian Information Technology Organization, the industry body representing the country’s IT companies, said that trust is the bedrock for encouraging investments. 

“To encourage more investments, there is a need to build trust,” Mr. Javadi said. “A major driver of this is transparency, which you can get through blockchain technology. If you are speaking about contracts on paper, kept in safes, then there used to be problems with these on a legal and technical basis. With blockchain, we are working on smart contracts which are transparent and dynamic.”

(The reporter was in Tehran at the invitation of the deBlock Summit organisers)

Published – November 16, 2025 04:56 am IST

New Delhi:

India’s diplomacy stands out globally for its ability to balance ties between adversaries. The latest example of this is happening this week. As foreign minister S Jaishankar touches down in New Delhi after a five-day visit to the US for Donald Trump’s inauguration, foreign secretary Vikram Misri heads to China to foster ties with Beijing.

Just ten days ago, during a visit to Spain, foreign minister S Jaishankar had said India is one of the very few countries in the world that can engage both Russia and Ukraine, as well as Israel and Iran. “This is something very, very unique. And it is unique because if you look at the world today, it is a very polarised world,” he said.

Donald Trump has threatened to impose hefty tariffs on China and even the BRICS+ countries, which India is a member of as well. China, the world’s second-largest economy, has warned that it will retaliate, should Washington actually follow through. President Trump has also targeted China over its presence in the Panama Canal and said the US will take control of the waterway even if it means involving the military. China, on the other hand, has warned Washington over its involvement with Taiwan. Both nations have sanctioned each other.

ENGAGING ALL SIDES

Amid all this, India, which according to PM Modi, has “always chosen the side of peace”, aims to engage all sides for positive and constructive outcomes. Earlier this week, S Jaishankar strengthened India-US bilateral ties when he met the US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser for their first foreign engagements after the Trump administration took over. As PM Modi’s special envoy, Dr Jaishankar was also given the first seat at the US President’s inauguration.

As he returned after concluding “a very positive” visit to Washington, India’s foreign secretary heads to Beijing to build the momentum in India-China ties following a meeting between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Russia late-last year. Foreign Secretary Misri’s visit was preceded by a visit by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval last month when he met Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi.

REBUILDING AFTER THE STORM

India and China, two of Asia’s leading economies and the world’s most populous nations, are working to boost bilateral ties after a four-and-a-half-year-long military standoff along the Line of Actual Control or LAC brought ties to a grinding halt. After dozens of rounds of talks – both diplomatically and militarily – an agreement was reached and troops on both sides pulled back from the buffer zones, returning the status quo-ante. This happened within a week of PM Modi and Xi Jinping announcing it during a meeting in Russia late last year. Following this, Chinese and Indian foreign and defence ministers also met each other on multilateral occasions.

After Ajit Doval, foreign secretary Vikram Misri’s will be the second high-level visit by an Indian official to Beijing in a month.

A WELCOME FROM BEIJING

China has welcomed Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit this weekend and sounded positive about its outcome. “We welcome Foreign Secretary Shri Vikram Misri’s travel to China for the meeting of the Foreign Secretary-Vice Minister mechanism between China and India,” Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning said.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs also said that “Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri will be visiting Beijing on January 26 and 27 for a meeting of the Foreign Secretary-Vice Minister mechanism between India and China. The resumption of this bilateral mechanism flows from the agreement at the leadership level to discuss the next steps for India-China relations, including in the political, economic, and people-to-people domains.”

THE AGENDA

Besides bilateral issues such as boundary talks, maintaining peace along the LAC, the building of the world’s largest dam on the Brahmaputra, resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, people-to-people ties, resuming direct flights between the two countries, and facilitate the issuance of visas to Chinese citizens, the two sides are also likely to touch upon issues of mutual global interest.

“All matters of mutual interest will be discussed,” the foreign ministry said at a press briefing in New Delhi ahead of the foreign secretary’s visit.

The BRICS+, where both countries are threatened with massive tariffs, might figure in talks as well, as would the latest sanctions threat to countries dealing with Russia and buying Russian oil – again a common threat to both countries. Regional issues such as the situation in the Middle East and in Syria are likely to be discussed too.

US backing out of the Paris Climate agreement and the WHO, as well as the much-needed reform of the United Nations and the Security Council are likely to be discussed as well.

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Washington DC:

Donald Trump has sniffed trouble brewing afar against the United States – one that may topple the US’s position as a dominant global power and end Washington’s ability to impose economic sanctions against those it deems fit for the case. The storm in question is the steadily-expanding BRICS+ grouping.

Within hours of taking office as President of the United States, Donald Trump went after the BRICS+, threatening to impose 100 per cent tariffs on member countries. The reason Washington feels threatened by the grouping is because it makes the US dollar, America’s greatest weapon – one it can actually use, vulnerable.

In recent times there have been reports of a possibility of the BRICS+ nations working on a common currency which would replace the US dollar for international trade. The founding members of the BRICS are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – the acronym of which is BRICS. Over the years, several other countries have become members of the bloc, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Indonesia. Saudi Arabia has accepted the membership, but has not formally joined yet, saying that the matter is under consideration.

BRICS+, which is shaping up to be the developing world’s alternative to the West-led G7, has set up its own financial structure and institutions, and is cooperating economically and diplomatically to reduce its dependence on the US Dollar – the default currency for international trade.

Donald Trump has now said his administration will impose 100 per cent tariffs against countries of the BRICS+ bloc, should they take any steps to replace the US dollar. “If the BRICS nations want to do that (replace the US dollar), that’s okay, but we’re going to put at least a 100 per cent tariff on the business they do with the United States,” President Trump told the international media shortly after his presidential inauguration.

“They will have a 100 per cent tariff if they so much as even think about reducing the use of the US Dollar in global trade,” he threatened.

Less than a month before he took office, Mr Trump had made a similar reference warning the BRICS+ countries. “We require a commitment from these countries that they will neither create a new BRICS currency, nor back any other currency to replace the mighty US dollar or, they will face 100 per cent tariffs and should expect to say goodbye to selling into the wonderful US economy,” Donald Trump, then President-elect, had warned in December.

HOW THE US DOLLAR IS WEAPONISED IN SANCTIONS

The US Dollar, has for decades, been the world’s principal reserve currency. It has been the case since the Second World War, following which global institutions like the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, among many others were set up. All these institutions were set up in the United States – And America being the largest trading country of the world at that time led to US Dollar becoming the default currency for global trade.

In 1973, a new system was set up to moderate international transactions. This system is known as SWIFT, which is short for Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. Since then, this has become the world’s commonly accepted and standardised model for international money transfers.

According to its website, SWIFT is a member-owned cooperative connecting more than 11,000 banks, financial institutions and corporations in more than 200 countries and territories. SWIFT is neither a payment nor a settlement system, and is therefore is not regulated as such by any of the world’s central banks.

SWIFT is overseen by the central banks of G10 nations – namely, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Switzerland, and Sweden.

Since the US Dollar is the default currency of trade globally, and SWIFT is the method or channel of settlement, sanctions are imposed by controlling these two. Sanctions are imposed via SWIFT by restricting access to the network or completely prohibiting individuals, institutions, and countries from using its services. When sanctions are imposed, it completely freezes an account and restricts any further transactions from it.

SWIFT sanctions can freeze any bank’s ability to transact with the rest of the world. Under an international rules-based order, much of the global financial governance is dominated by the US-led West.

MULTI-POLAR WORLD

In the 21st Century, with the rise of Asia, and economies like China, India, Russia, Indonesia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and others, the world has become much more multi-polar, instead of being bipolar – which was the case during the Cold War between the US and USSR through much of the 20th Century, post the two world wars in the first half of the century.

Brazil in South America and South Africa in Africa were also rising global economies.

With time, emerging economies became increasingly disgruntled with the dominance of the US Dollar being the default in almost all global transactions. This also kept them under a constant threat of Western sanctions, should they not two the line. To deal with this, BRICS leaders have for long reportedly advocated for de-dollarisation, and been in favor of increased trade in local currencies and even reportedly explored the possibility of a potential common BRICS currency.

The BRICS members have even set up the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement or CRA – which act and function exactly like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund or IMF, respectively.

The so-far 10-member BRICS+ grouping already comprises nearly half of the world’s population and over a third of the global economy. It also has more than 25 per cent of the world’s landmass, produces more than 30 per cent of the world’s oil output and is on track to surge ahead of the G7 economies in less than 20 years.
 

Brasilia:

Brazil on Monday announced that Indonesia had become a full member of BRICS, a bloc of developing economies increasingly seen as a counterweight to the West.

Brazil’s foreign ministry said in a statement that Southeast Asia’s most populous country “shares with the other members the will to reform the institutions of global governance and contribute positively to cooperation within the Global South.”

Brazil, which holds the rotating presidency of the grouping in 2025, said Indonesia’s bid to join the bloc had been approved during a summit in 2023 in Johannesburg.

BRICS was created in 2009 by founding members Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa joined the following year.

Last year, the grouping expanded with Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates becoming full members.

During its presidency, Brazil aims to boost cooperation between countries of the “Global South” and reform multilateral institutions.

One of the objectives, according to the government of left-wing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, is the “development of means of payment” to facilitate trade between member countries.

During the last BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia in November 2024, member nations discussed boosting non-dollar transactions and strengthening local currencies.

This raised the ire of US President-elect Donald Trump, who threatened the group’s members with “100 percent tariffs” if they undercut the US dollar.

This year’s BRICS summit will take place in Rio de Janeiro in July.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

The BRICS summit in Kazan chaired by Russia has drawn great international attention because it conveys many messages in the current geopolitical context and that of the future.

The West has tried to isolate Russia internationally, defeat it militarily, and, through an array of draconian sanctions, cause its economic collapse. None of these objectives have been met.

Russia’s ties with China have deepened strategically. India has preserved its strategic ties with Moscow despite western pressure. Russia’s ties with several African countries also have a new momentum. Moscow is strongly present in the West Asia region and has a close relationship with key Arab countries. Its partnership with some ASEAN countries is gathering steam too.

The Expansion Of BRICS

The expansion of BRICS in 2023, with Egypt, UAE, Iran, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia, had already signalled how major countries in the Global South viewed Russia very differently from how the West saw it. The Global South sees Russia as a friendly country, not an adversary. That almost 40 countries have shown interest in joining BRICS, a forum in which Moscow plays a key role, signifies that for them, Russia is an attractive partner.

The countries of the Global South seek a reformed international system that would reflect the shifts in power equations away from the West, both economic and political, that have occurred over the years. They want more attention to be paid to their concerns and priorities.

The hypocrisy and double standards of the West’s “values-based” policies, its military interventions and the use of various means to bring about regime changes, the use of sanctions as a policy tool, the weaponisation of the dollar and the global financial system by the US, have increasingly pushed non-Western countries to hedge themselves against western pressures by joining forums such as BRICS. If Russia earlier looked westwards, the West has turned its back on Russia, and now Russia is much more focused on its Eurasian identity and is looking eastwards.

Non-western countries cannot opt out of the existing international system or create one of their own. What they hope to do is to change the balance of power within the existing system and reform it to ensure more equality and equity in its functioning. The Global South countries, which also have close relations with the West, are being attracted to join BRICS or associate with it in order to increase their political, economic and security options.

With 24 world leaders having attended the Kazan summit, including those of five founding members and the four new permanent members, the West’s already failing efforts to isolate President Putin and Russia have been strongly rebuffed.

More Members May Bring Complications

With so much interest in BRICS in the Global South, the question of expanding its membership and the criteria for that have posed difficulties. BRICS is a consensus-based forum. With the expansion, building a consensus on issues would become more difficult, and that would affect the working and credibility of the forum. 

Already, the meeting of the BRICS Foreign Ministers in June 2024 at Nizhny Novgorod in Russia, also attended by the four new members, could not issue a joint communiqué because of differences on certain points.

President Putin has himself publicly recognised the downside to any further expansion when he noted that the existing members have now worked together for years and know how the forum functions, and that the process of absorbing the new members into the methods and spirit of the forum will be the immediate focus, not its expansion.

The decision, therefore, has been not to broaden the BRICS membership for the moment but to enlarge its base by accepting new countries as partners. Developing a consensus within BRICS on which countries should be admitted as partners was presumably not an easy exercise, as all the BRICS members, old and new, had effective veto rights. It had to be ensured that no member country was particularly advantaged by the choice of partners and that the final list reflected a balance between the preferences of the forum’s members.

A Wide Spread

Thirteen new BRICS partners have been accepted at Kazan—Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. That four members of the ASEAN are also among these is significant. Algeria, much to its disappointment, could not become a member when BRICS was expanded last year, but has now obtained partner status. Two key Central Asia countries have become partners too. Other Central Asian countries could obviously not be included as that would have weighed too much in the favour of Russia’s interests. Already, the inclusion of Belarus is a clear Russian preference. The geographical spread of the new partner countries is noteworthy.

Russia’s obvious preference for Turkey has also been accommodated given the latter’s geopolitical importance for Russia, even though giving a partner status to a NATO country might not seem to fit into any normal criteria for deciding BRICS partnerships. Should NATO get a foothold in BRICS? From the Russian point of view, this would be a welcome political development in NATO’s eastern flank. The US, which sees BRICS as an organisation created to rival the West in the global system, would be obviously perturbed by Turkey’s decision.

Why Pakistan Was Kept Away

It would seem that China has not exercised its own special geopolitical preferences too visibly. If it was interested in Pakistan’s inclusion, as it could well have been—if one would recall, it had linked India’s SCO membership with that of Pakistan—it would have run into India’s strong opposition. In September 2024, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Alexey Overchuk, while visiting Pakistan, had supported its inclusion in BRICS while also stating that such a decision would have to be based on a consensus. India clearly scotched any move to reach out to Pakistan, to the point that Pakistan does not seem to have been invited to the summit.

India had reservations about Turkey becoming a partner because of its anti-Indian positions on Kashmir in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), as well as its role in blocking India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Eventually, India did not stand in the way of Turkey becoming a BRICS partner.

The last BRICS summit had approved the membership of Saudi Arabia, but it has not formally conveyed its acceptance. It was represented at the Kazan summit by its Foreign Minister. The Saudi Crown Prince received US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Riyadh while the summit was being held in Kazan, which tells its own story.

Do Not Overestimate

The importance of BRICS’ expanded partnerships across Asia, Africa and Latin America should not be underestimated. It shows dissatisfaction with the current international system. Non-western countries want an end to the West’s hegemony. They suffer from the West’s self-centred and arbitrary policies. Strengthened multilateralism reflected in multipolarity is seen as the key to change.

At the same time, the pace at which BRICS can bring about this change should not be exaggerated. The goals of BRICS in forging alternatives to the dollar-dominated financial system are not easy to achieve. Within the BRICS countries, there are rivalries and divisions. Their political systems differ. Some are deeply anti-West, while others have friendly ties with the West even when they seek more space for themselves in a West-dominated global system. The economic disparities within the group are large. The policies of some both help and hurt the interests of the Global South.

All said and done, BRICS expansion, with all its challenges, is a vehicle for a much-needed re-balancing within the global system, which India also seeks.

(Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia, and Deputy Chief Of Mission in Washington.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Officials, including Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira, attend the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia October 23, 2024.
| Photo Credit: Reuters

The share of BRICS+ grouping in global merchandise exports can overtake the G7 bloc by 2026, EY India said on Wednesday (October 30, 2024).

The October edition of EY Economy Watch reveals a significant shift in global trade dynamics, with the BRICS+ group rapidly increasing its share in merchandise exports and imports.

Also Read | Brazil becomes second BRICS country after India not to join China’s BRI

From 2000 to 2023, the BRICS+ group’s share of global merchandise exports has risen from 10.7% to 23.3%, marking an impressive increase of 12.6 percentage points.

In contrast, the G7’s share has seen a notable decline, dropping from 45.1% to 28.9%. Meanwhile, the rest of the world has maintained a relatively stable share, increasing slightly from 44.2% to 47.9%.

G7 is a grouping of advanced economies — the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

This trend highlights the growing prominence of the BRICS+ group in the global trade arena, suggesting a potential shift towards a multipolar global economic landscape, EY India said.

“Given the present trends and the likelihood of several new members joining the BRICS+ group being strong, the share of BRICS+ in global merchandise exports can overtake that of the G7 group by 2026,” EY India Chief Policy Advisor D.K. Srivastava said.

BRICS, consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, has now expanded with five additional members — Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Central to this transformation are India and China, two key members of the BRICS+ alliance. In 2023, they ranked third and first, respectively, globally in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), both countries are projected to retain these positions by 2030.

China’s contribution to BRICS+ exports has surged dramatically, increasing from 36.1% in 2000 to 62.5% in 2023. India has also made significant strides, contributing 7.9% to BRICS+ exports in 2023.

EY’s analysis further underscores the increasing importance of high-tech exports from BRICS+ countries.

The group’s share of global high-tech exports has risen significantly, from just 5% in 2000 to 32.8% in 2022.

This shift reflects a strategic move toward technology-intensive products, positioning BRICS+ nations as vital players in the global high-tech market, it added.

In addition to trade dynamics, the currencies of BRICS+ nations are gaining traction in the global economy. The Yuan has remained stable, with slight appreciation, while the Indian rupee has faced depreciation, particularly since 2018.

Notably, the share of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency has declined from 71.5% in 2000 to 58.2% in 2024, signalling a potential shift toward a more multipolar currency framework.

Also Read | BRICS summit a ‘total success’: Russian Ambassador Denis Alipov

“As geopolitical tensions continue, the coordinated policies among BRICS+ members may challenge the established dominance of the G7 and the U.S. dollar, paving the way for a new multipolar global economic landscape,” Mr. Srivastava said.

The BRICS+ group is establishing a platform for conducting international trade and investment transactions, which could become a low-cost alternative to the existing SWIFT platform.

The group is also developing a trade and reserve currency, backed by gold and other select commodities, Mr. Srivastava added.

Venezuela reacted furiously to Brazil’s veto at a summit in the Russian city of Kazan earlier this week, calling the decision “hostile” and “immoral” act. File
| Photo Credit: Reuters

Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro vowed on Saturday (October 26, 2024) that his country would not be silenced after Brazil vetoed its bid to join the BRICS group of emerging economies.

The South American country is in the throes of an unprecedented economic crisis, which the Government says is a result of US sanctions, and has long sought to join the BRICS group.

Editorial : ​One-man rule: On Venezuela’s disputed presidential election

Venezuela reacted furiously to Brazil’s veto at a summit in the Russian city of Kazan earlier this week, calling the decision “hostile” and “immoral” act.

Returning home from Kazan, Mr. Maduro said on state television that “no one will block or silence Venezuela, not today, not tomorrow, not ever”, without mentioning Brazil.

Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is a long-time ally of Mr. Maduro. But relations between them have been strained since Mr. Maduro’s disputed re-election following the July 28 ballot, which the Opposition claims to have won.

An advisor to Mr. Lula, former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, attributed the veto to a “breach of confidence” by Venezuela.

He said Mr. Maduro had promised Mr. Lula he would publish detailed results from the July 28 election but had yet to do so.

The Venezuelan Opposition has said those results would show that Mr. Maduro was handily defeated by Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, who fled to Spain in September after a warrant was issued for his arrest on what the Opposition calls trumped-up charges.

Mr. Maduro said he had met officials from “nearly 30 governments” in Kazan and that “all” had hailed his “great electoral victory”.

The BRICS, which already included Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa and China as members, were joined in 2024 by Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

The BRICS summit in Russia set the stage for an ice breaker between PM Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping.

The MEA announced: “An agreement has been arrived at on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020.”

Why was this meeting important?

This was their first since 2019, when they had held a 2 day retreat in Mamallapuram and then in Brasilia at the BRICS Summit there.

Prior to the 2020 standoff that followed China’s transgressions at the LAC and India’s counter mobilisation, Modi and and Xi had met 18 times in 5 years- so the fact that they hadn’t met formally in the past 5 years is significant.

During the standoff they spoke twice, informally on the side-lines of summits in Indonesia and South Africa.

India has consistently held that “normal” ties including summit meetings can only begin once the LAC standoff is resolved.

At the end of their meeting here’s what India and China have announced:

Patrolling will restart in the last two friction points of Depsang and Demchok (Maps), back to 2020 levels

Disengagement at the other 5 friction points had taken place already:
1. Galwan Valley June 2020.

2. Pangong Tso February 2021- Disengagement- with buffer zone created

3, Kailash Ridge heights February 2021- Indian troops climbed down

4. Gogra Post August 2021: PP 17A-Disengagement- with buffer zone

5. Hot Springs September 2022: PP 15- Disengagement- with buffer zone

They agreed that this ends the disengagement process and they would now work on the next steps of de-escalation (thinning of troops) and de-induction (pulling back) to peace-time levels

Xi and Modi directed the Special Representatives NSA Doval and Wang Yi, who is also a senior politburo member of the CCP to meet and discuss the broader boundary dispute at an “early date”

They directed Foreign Ministers Jaishankar and Wang Yi to meet soon to discuss restarting other mechanisms of dialogue, and to “rebuild ties”

The next steps towards normalisation of ties- will also be taken up by the two sides.

What are those steps, that have been slowed or suspended in the past 4 years?

Travel links- direct flights were suspended due to Covid but never resumed due to the border

Visas- slowdown in issuance of visas for businesspersons, students, etc

Tourism has been virtually suspended between the two countries

Journalists have been sent back from Delhi and Beijing, with only one Indian agency remaining in China

Investment restrictions and special scrutiny of any Chinese investment above 25%

Is peace breaking out between the world’s two most populous nations? There are still some unanswered questions-

1. What steps or CBMs will the two armies take to ensure the disengagement is permanent? For India the terrain and infrastructure means it would take longer to re-induct troops if needed in the future

2. Will buffer zones, that were created in order to stabilize the border situation be dismantled or maintained? And if the buffer zones remain, how can the government claim they have restored pre-2020 levels?

3. How would India ensure there isn’t a repeat of the Doklam disengagement, where after an agreement to disengage from the friction point, the PLA doubled down on infrastructure on the Doklam plateau, turning grasslands into settled villages, bunkers and helicopter bases

4. Does India have clarity on what could have prompted the Chinese PLA’s aggressive actions in April 2020 ? If not, how can India be sure these will not create a new situation in the future?

The détente rushed to deadline for the BRICS summit certainly proved that groupings like the BRICS are an important forum as they provide the venue for bilateral resolutions- what were some of the other important takeaways from the Summit in Kazan:

With 10 BRICS leaders, 13 countries joining as BRICS Partners and about 40 others attending the outreach with the global south, the Summit proved that Russia and Mr. Putin are not isolated

134 Para joint statement that included a strong criticism of Israel’s military offensive on Gaza and civilian casualties, while separate national positions on Russia’s war in Ukraine

BRICS focussed on economic integration, including use of BRICS nation currencies, BRICS Bank NDB, BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism (ICM), BRICS Grain Exchange, BRICS Cross-Border Payment System and BRICS Insurance Company

A push for Reform of Financial architecture like IMF and World Bank and global governance of UN and Security Council
Bilateral opportunities including the introduction of Iran’s new President Pezeshkian amidst the west Asian crisis, and India-China talks.

Worldview Take: 

The announcement that a resolution to the India-China military standoff since 2020 is in sight, is no doubt a positive development and a win for diplomats negotiating the outcome. What’s important from this point on is to see some transparency in the implementation of that resolution, and complete vigilance and verification of actions on the ground. India has been burnt in the past before- trust between two countries is the only guarantor of successful bilateral relations between them.

Reading Recommendations:

 
1.Understanding The India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in the High Himalayas by Manoj Joshi

 
2. India and China at Odds in the Asian Century: A Diplomatic and Strategic History by Vappala Balachandran

 
3. Contested Lands: India, China and the Boundary Dispute by Maroof Raza

 
4. INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY PROBLEM, 1846-1947 by A.G. Noorani

 
5.The Fractured Himalaya: India Tibet China 1949-62 by Nirupama Rao

 
6.The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate: How the Chinese Negotiate with India by Vijay Gokhale

Presentation and production: Suhasini Haidar

Editing: Shibu Narayan and Sabika Syed