The story so far: In Dr Lokesh B.H. & Ors v. State of Karnataka & Anr, decided on August 3, 2026, the Supreme Court considered whether Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) could apply to a man in a live-in relationship and whether the expression “husband” under the section is confined to a legally valid marriage.
The appellant argued that since he and the complainant were never validly married, Section 498A could not apply to him. The Karnataka High Court had rejected this argument and refused to quash the criminal proceedings against him. He appealed to the Supreme Court.
Rejecting the argument, a Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh held that the protection under Section 498A is not confined to legally married women. It can also extend to women in live-in relationships that are “in the nature of marriage”, subject to certain conditions.
What is Section 498A of IPC?
The provision now corresponds to Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which replaced Section 498A of the IPC. It deals with husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. It reads that whoever — being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman — subjects such woman to cruelty, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
For the purposes of this section, “cruelty means” (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
What is the ruling?
The Supreme Court held that the protection against domestic cruelty under Section 498A of the erstwhile Indian Penal Code (now Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) is not confined to legally married women. It ruled that the provision also applies to live-in relationships that qualify as “relationships in the nature of marriage”, provided there is an intention to marry.
The court clarified that not every live-in relationship would attract Section 498A. The protection is available only to relationships between two consenting adults that meet the legal test of a relationship in the nature of marriage. It also made clear that this expanded interpretation is limited to Section 498A and does not automatically extend to other statutory provisions.
Rejecting the argument that Section 498A, being a penal provision, should apply only to legally married couples, the Bench held that the law must be interpreted in a manner that advances its object of preventing domestic cruelty.
“The interpretation given to this penal provision must be an interpretation which keeps in view the reformative objective, or else its mandate will be defeated.”
At the same time, the court recognised concerns over misuse of Section 498A. It held that the initial burden of establishing that the relationship was in the nature of marriage and carried an intention to marry would lie on the woman seeking protection.
It also directed that the safeguards against arrest laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) must be strictly followed and that no partner or relative should be arrested without complying with those safeguards.
The Bench remarked: “In all cases, A and B chose each other and decided to live life together. The only difference is that in the first case they are married and in the other two they are not. Why should there be any difference in the protection that is given to a woman if she faces cruelty at the hands of the husband/partner or his family members? The law fairly well recognises the right and freedom of an individual to choose the person they want to be with as an inextricable part of dignity and personal liberty.”
Is protection under the Domestic Violence Act enough?
The court referred to Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), wherein it was recognised that though a live-in relationship between two consenting adults is not an offence, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted “to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women” by covering couples in a relationship in the nature of marriage.
The court held that although the DV Act is a piece of comprehensive welfare legislation addressing various forms of domestic violence, its overall character is civil, whereas Section 498A creates criminal liability.
Drawing a clear distinction between civil and criminal consequences, the court held that it would be “a misstatement of law” to regard the DV Act as providing adequate protection equivalent to Section 498A IPC. While the DV Act primarily carries civil and monetary consequences, Section 498A is backed by the force of criminal deterrence. Except for punishment under Section 31 for violation of protection orders, the DV Act does not create criminal liability for acts of domestic violence themselves. Consequently, the availability of remedies under the DV Act cannot justify denying women in qualifying relationships the protection of Section 498A IPC.
Since Section 498A is penal in nature, the court narrowed the protection by requiring proof of intent to marry. It said this requirement would separate relationships protected under the DV Act from those attracting criminal liability under Section 498A.
The court underscored: “When the intent is absent, a question beckons as to why such relationship needs to be equated with marriage for the purposes of invoking penal provisions. In our view, it does not. Those relationships that are in the nature of marriage and also have the requisite intent to marry are the closest to marriage itself, and it is those relationships that shall be entitled to the protection of this Section.”
The Court concluded that “Cruelty, any which way, does not check at the door, whether the house it enters is that of a married woman or not. Once it enters, its propensity to destroy is aggravated.”
What qualifies as a relationship in the nature of marriage?
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has mentioned “relationship in the nature of marriage” in section 2(f). It says, “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family”
The court in the case of D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal(2010) observed that “relationship in the nature of marriage is akin to a common law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married, the couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses and must be of legal age to marry. They must also be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried. They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time. In our opinion, a “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the 2005 Act must also fulfil the above requirements, and in addition the parties must have lived together in a “shared household” as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act.”
The Supreme Court reiterated that there is no straightjacket formula to determine whether a live-in relationship amounts to a “relationship in the nature of marriage”. Referring to its decision in Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), it said the factors are illustrative and not exhaustive, and each case would have to be decided on its own facts.
According to the court, a qualifying relationship would ordinarily involve the couple living together for a reasonable period, sharing a common household, and demonstrating financial interdependence, such as maintaining joint bank accounts, jointly acquiring property or making long-term investments. It may also involve shared domestic responsibilities, with the partners jointly managing the household and everyday life.
The court also said that the nature of the relationship should reflect a marriage-like partnership. It includes an intimate and emotional relationship, having and raising children together, and holding themselves out to society as husband and wife. Ultimately, the common intention and conduct of the parties, including how they understood their relationship and their respective roles and responsibilities, would be a key factor in determining whether it is a “relationship in the nature of marriage”.
