Locals look at the remains of charred vehicles following violent clashes between police personnel and protesters from the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) party in Muridke, Pakistan on October 13.
| Photo Credit: AFP
The story so far: On October 23, for the second time in five years, Pakistan has proscribed the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a political party, supported by the Barelvis in the Punjab province.
Who are the TLP?
The TLP is a far-right Islamist party founded in 2017 by Bareli cleric Khadim Hussain Rizvi, drawing support from Pakistan’s Sunni Barelvi community. The party started by organising around the conviction of Mumtaz Qadri. Qadri had assassinated Punjab governor Salman Taseer over opposing blasphemy laws. Qadri’s supporters, mostly Barelvis, hailed him as a martyr for defending Islam. The TLP gained prominence demanding his release and leading protests after his execution. The party rose with its hardline defence of blasphemy laws, demand for Sharia-based governance, and opposition to Western influence and minority rights.
In the 2018 elections, the TLP won 2.2 million votes, becoming the fifth-largest party. Later that year, it led nationwide protests against Asia Bibi’s (who was arrested on blasphemy charges) acquittal, challenging the verdict and reinforcing its image as a staunch defender of religious causes. In 2020, the TLP led large-scale protests against France over blasphemous caricatures and secured a government deal to expel the French ambassador and boycott French products.
How did the TLP rise to fame?
The TLP’s rhetoric on populist issues has centred on blasphemy. Following Mumtaz Qadri’s execution, the party mobilised around widespread outrage caused by the execution. Leveraging mosque networks, social media outreach, and street mobilisation, it rapidly consolidated support among Punjab’s Barelvi populace, and urban, middle and lower-middle classes in Sindh. Financial backing from Barelvi businessmen and clerics strengthened its organisational capacity. Even though there were efforts earlier as well to politically mobilise Barelvi support, the TLP focussed its mobilisation on emotionally charged issues like blasphemy. This approach resonated strongly among lower-and middle-income Barelvi mosque-goers especially in Punjab, enabling the group to achieve wider grassroots appeal and durable mass mobilisation. Thus, TLP transformed into a dominant politico-religious force capable of pressuring governments.
One of the TLP’s greatest strengths lies in grassroot organisation and the ability to sustain large, disruptive protests that paralyse urban centres, pressure state institutions, and amplify its religious agenda. The party’s ability to sustain protests for prolonged periods stems from its dedicated cadre, financial support from followers, and exploitation of public sentiment on sensitive religious issues. TLP’s street power thus remains a persistent challenge to curbing their impact, compelling state negotiations while amplifying religious extremism.
Moreover, the government’s position on the TLP has never been consistent; it has swung between coercion, including arrests and bans, and compromise through policy concessions and lifting restrictions. Neither approach has sustainably weakened the TLP — coercion often escalates violence, while compromise signals state vulnerability.
What next?
For Pakistan, a ban may provide immediate containment but is unlikely to yield long-term results. Sustained enforcement and political commitment are critical to prevent cycles of unrest. Given the TLP’s popular and electoral support, an outright ban risks alienating constituents and complicating monitoring. A calibrated, law-based approach rather than reactive suppression is thus necessary.
Brighty Ann Sarah and Preetha. R are post graduate students at Stella Maris College, Chennai, and interned at NIAS, Bengaluru.
Published – November 05, 2025 08:30 am IST
