The Afghans are understandably furious. After more than two decades of unleashing terror on them from the mujahideen era through the Taliban times, Pakistan decided to bomb Afghan villages on Tuesday, killing some 46 people, including women and children. The villages allegedly sheltered the cadres of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
That’s ironic. The TTP is hardly an Afghan product. It is, in effect, the final result of Pakistan’s own disastrous policy of backing and sheltering a variety of terrorists. Remember Hillary Clinton’s famous jibe in 2011 about the dangers of Pakistan keeping snakes in its backyard that would inevitably turn around and strike its benefactor? This seems to be it.
Why The Attack
Pakistan’s diplomacy seems a little quixotic, though one can never tell with regard to Islamabad. Veteran diplomat Mohammad Sadiq, who has served six years as an ambassador and is now a reappointed special representative to Afghanistan, was in Kabul recently. By his own account, he received a gracious welcome, especially by the Foreign Ministry led by Amir Khan Muttaqi. The latter has been a frequent guest of Pakistan, both in the past and in recent years, and was once seen strolling with Foreign Minister Bilawal. According to a formal statement, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan declared its determination to maintain good relations and encourage trade and transit.
All very encouraging. Hours later though, Pakistani fighter aircraft were bombing and strafing Barmal in Paktika, a province that is the hometown of Muttaqi. According to reports, some 46 people were killed in Barmal; the strikes also apparently hit a refugee camp. Pakistan claimed that it had targeted TTP leaders, including Akhtar Muhammad, the head of the TTP’s Umar Media.
An apparently furious Kabul summoned the Pakistani charge d’ affairs and issued a strong protest, calling the strikes a “deliberate attempt by certain circles in Pakistan aimed at undermining trust and causing friction in the relations of the two nations” (meaning, with the Pakistan army) and declaring that “the Pakistani side has been clearly informed that protecting Afghanistan’s national sovereignty is a red line for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and such actions are viewed highly irresponsible and will inevitably bear repercussions”. Quite a statement. Afghanistan doesn’t have an army in the conventional sense, but a threat from a country that has exhausted empires and superpowers needs to be taken seriously. True, a large part of the government has a ‘Made in Pakistan’ stamp, but Afghans have rarely ever taken attacks lying down.
The Homemade Threat
Meanwhile, the reason for the attacks are clear in one respect. The Pakistanis have endured a lot. According to available data, Pakistan faced as many as 785 attacks in just this year, with 55 security forces lost in the first weeks of November alone. Just a week ago, a most brutal attack in Makeen reportedly killed 35 soldiers. This was probably the immediate trigger for the air attacks even as Pakistani security forces launched a so-called IBO (Intelligence based operation) in the areas opposite Paktia to flush out terrorists.
However, if anything, such operations have had a more deleterious effect than success. Earlier, policemen would rebel against Pakistan army operations in Lakki Marwat, demanding that the military quit ‘meddling’ in the area, even as hundreds blocked the Indus Highway in protest. Further north is the unending conflict in Kurram, where a Shia majority is battling the state’s attempts to settle in more Sunnis. Kurram, being the shortest route to reach Kabul, has long been a major ingress point for operations into Afghanistan. That such operations continue is a given. The locals are tired of being pawns in a game played by Rawalpindi.
Pashtuns Are Unhappy
Add to all this unhappiness in the tribal areas after the arrests of leaders of the peaceful Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (Pashtun Protection Force, or PTM), including the charismatic Manzur Pashteen. After half a century of exploitation and violence, all they were asking for was peace, removal of all mines, an end to humiliating check posts, and free movement into Afghanistan. In December, Islamabad also chose to ban the PTM and followed that up with arresting the leaders of the movement. That is hardly likely to improve matters given that Pashtuns, the second-largest ethnic group in the country, will only end up feeling even more alienated, and might be pushed further towards jihadi groups. In short, with the whole border on fire, any group will face little difficulty in getting recruits.
Declarations Of Retribution
Kabul has promised retribution. Attacks on security personnel have gone up hugely. Kabul can upscale these and perhaps even take on a larger target. But here’s the thing: the Taliban are heavily divided, with leaders like Sirajuddin Haqqani and Muttaqi, among others, being more Pakistani than Afghan. The assassination of Siraj’s powerful uncle Khalil Haqqani, claimed by the IS-K, could not have happened without some insider support. Khalil was at odds with the Kandahar leadership, which, apart from being heavily conservative, has a faction of clerics who have studied in Pakistan and are affiliated to major madrassas there. Add to this the fact that Haqqani and others have their support bases in areas bombed both recently as well as earlier in March. In sum, it seems that the airstrikes were a warning by Rawalpindi to get greater control of decision-making in Kabul, as well as an attempt to push for action against those TTP factions that are attacking Pakistan. Rawalpindi, as is its practice, has its own factions that it can use for its ‘strategic’ play.
Meanwhile, the Taliban are in a cleft stick. Action against the TTP may just lead to more recruits for the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K), Kabul’s biggest threat. For the Taliban, support from China and Russia depends heavily on its actions against IS-K, something UN reports acknowledge. UN reports also observe that the IS-K is strengthening with about 6,000 fighters. More worryingly, they note cooperation between it, the TTP and al Qaeda, which could transform the TTP into a ‘regional threat’ against India, Myanmar and Bangladesh. That’s a new development, though there is no evidence to support that the TTP or its affiliates have any interest in India. The IS-K, however, has released a barrage of propaganda material, such as the Sawt al Hind (Voice of Hind) and other publications, to highlight Hindu-Muslim divisions in India. Delhi will be keeping a close eye on such developments keeping in mind Pakistan’s continued ability to influence multiple factions in Afghanistan.
India needs to engage more strongly with Kabul and Kandahar and keep a close eye on the multiple players now active along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, including a new al Qaeda presence in Nangarhar. There is a puzzling mix of motives here, including individual ambitions of Taliban leaders, Pashtun nationalism, and, most significant of all, the continuing Pakistani determination to dominate Afghanistan. That has never died, nor is it likely to in the foreseeable future. This is the one constant for Afghanistan, and that is the prism through which all actions by Pakistan need to be viewed.
Meanwhile, wait for it. A huge backlash can be expected, as local Taliban leaders react in anger, and if this is encouraged by Kabul, a large incursion into the tribal areas can’t be ruled out. Never has the Durand Line been more danger, but the real threat would emerge if the anger along the border both within and outside coalesces into one mighty backlash. Watch that space.
(Tara Kartha is a former Director in the NSCS)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
