India’s Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, was recently in China on a two-day trip to discuss the future course of bilateral relations between the two countries, following an initiative by both nations to normalise ties after a military standoff spanning nearly four years.
A Host Of Measures
Relations between the two nations were fraught after Beijing unilaterally tried to change the status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2020, which resulted in the deaths of soldiers on both sides. As a response to China’s military coercion and amassing troops along the border, New Delhi responded by adopting a stringent position, that peace and tranquillity along the boundary would decide the overall relationship. This approach necessitated viewing trade, technology, and civil society interactions from a national security lens.
Consequently, nearly 300 Chinese mobile applications were banned, direct flights between India and China were halted, strict curbs were imposed on visas for Chinese nationals, and educational cooperation between universities was reviewed. In October 2024, both nations finalised patrolling arrangements for friction points in Eastern Ladakh, following which Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at the BRICS summit in Russia. This resumption of top-level engagement has been followed by regular meetings down the hierarchy to chart the future direction.
Focus On Trade, Economy, And People
With disengagement having been completed and the resumption of patrolling as per the respective perceptions of the border, the focus has shifted to aspects like economic engagement and people-to-people ties, which had been in a deep freeze.
The restarting of the Special Representatives (SRs) mechanism, which was tasked with ways to settle the boundary question from a political perspective under an agreement in 2003, is a welcome move. Besides, the Indian readout of Misri’s trip states that the pilgrimage to Kailash Mansarovar in Tibet will resume this year. The meeting of the expert panel to confer on the resumption of sharing of hydrological data and cooperation on transnational rivers has been advanced. Interactions between media outlets and think tanks are set to resume. The pathway to restart direct air services between the two countries is also being cleared. There is also an impetus to address issues related to the economy and trade.
Not All Is Well
However, several challenges remain and overshadow the relationship.
First, while disengagement has been completed, the weaponry assembled along the border during the standoff remains in place. This raises the possibility that the disengagement has been a tactical move for the Chinese. Ahead of the Indian Army Day, Chief of Army Staff General Upendra Dwivedi cautioned that while the conditions in Eastern Ladakh were stable but sensitive, both armies were locked in a “degree of standoff”.
Second, in earlier rounds in 2022, disengagement was achieved at some points after creating no-patrol zones. While that was supposed to be a temporary measure, there is no clarity on how long these no-go areas for both militaries will continue.
Lastly, while military tensions are down, the strategy of cartographic warfare and weaponising of natural resources continues. Beijing recently announced plans to carve out two counties, which subsume a part of the territory of Ladakh, in Xinjiang province’s Hotan prefecture. It is also constructing the world’s biggest hydroelectric project on the Yarlung Zangbo river in Tibet (referred to as Brahmaputra after it enters Arunachal Pradesh). New Delhi has conveyed its concerns to Beijing on both these developments through diplomatic channels.
Narrative Games
This brings us to the issue of trust and peace. Going further, China’s use of non-conventional means to gain leverage over India is likely to queer the pitch in the pursuit of a settlement. New Delhi needs to pay close attention to the narratives emanating from Beijing’s strategic class. Their notion is that India is conciliating with China from a position of vulnerability. Second, they believe that India’s relenting in imposing restrictions on Chinese corporations was hurting the Indian economy more. This sentiment has been buttressed ever since the Finance Ministry’s Economic Survey 2023-24 made a case for inviting Chinese capital and integrating into Chinese-led international value chains. Lastly, there are assumptions in Beijing that there is a degree of strategic mistrust between the US and India in light of recent standoffs over the Pannun and Nijjar cases, and that this could force New Delhi to look towards China.
While Xi’s bid to redraw boundaries may have failed, China is unlikely to stop poking around on sensitive issues through all such non-conventional means, and this can test New Delhi’s cautious normalisation.
(Harsh V Pant is Vice President, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Kalpit Mankikar is Fellow, China Studies, at ORF.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
