Chinese President Xi Jinping with U.S. President Donald Trump at Zhongnanhai Garden in Beijing, on May 15, 2026.
| Photo Credit: AP

Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump shake hands at a state banquet at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, on May 14, 2026
| Photo Credit: Reuters

It’s not a thaw yet, but there are certainly signs of some warming in the India-China relationship. Of late, there has been an uptick in dialogue to resolve outstanding issues along two friction points in Eastern Ladakh. At the same time, there is a fresh debate underway within India on economic engagement with China.

 July witnessed two meetings between the Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and China’s top diplomat Wang Yi. The first of these had indicated a softening of tone from Beijing. While eschewing remarks about putting the border issue in the “appropriate position”, Wang called for “properly handling and controlling the situation in the border areas, while actively resuming normal exchanges”. Following the second one, the Chinese statement talked about the need to “work for new progress in consultations on borderaffairs.” Since then, within a month, there have been two meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs. The most recent of these took place last week.

“Agreed To Turn Over A New Leaf”

 The Chinese readout following the conversation was rather positive. It said that both sides had “agreed to work together to turn over a new leaf in the border situation at an early date”. It further added: “The two sides exchanged in-depth views on relevant issues in border areas, further narrowed differences, expanded consensus, and agreed to strengthen dialogue and consultation, accommodate each other’s legitimate concerns, and reach a mutually acceptable solution at an early date.”

The Indian readout was much more contained. It said that “the two sides had a frank, constructive and forward-looking exchange of views on the situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to narrow down the differences and find early resolution of the outstanding issues”. The impact of these meetings on actual resolution of the issues in Depsang and Demchok remains to be seen.

The Question Of Chinese Investments

Meanwhile, the Economic Survey released before the new NDA government’s budget in July indicated that India could be more open to Chinese investments in the future. Investments from China have had to face government scrutiny since the issuance of Press Note 3 in April 2020. The notification was seen as an effort by the government to direct Chinese capital in desirable domains. However, the standoff in Ladakh and the subsequent killing of Indian soldiers during the clashes in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 extinguished any appetite for Chinese investments. That situation seems to be changing now.

Earlier this year, it was reported that since April 2020, the Indian government has approved 124 investment proposals from bordering countries and rejected 201. Around 200 proposals are said to be pending with the government. A large number of these proposals were from China. While the scrutiny under Press Note 3 remains active, there has been some easing.

The MG Motor-JSW Deal

For instance, in March, the long-discussed joint venture between MG Motor India and JSW Group was finally sealed. It entailed Chinese auto giant SAIC Motor divesting a 51% stake.

Subsequently, in May, reports emerged that the government had begun moving on approving Chinese investment proposals with Indian firms on a case-by-case basis. In July, it was reported that the government had notified electronics and automobile manufacturers about plans to establish an inter-ministerial panel to accelerate the approval process for investment proposals from Chinese firms in Indian companies. The assessment would require the proposals to meet certain conditions, such as the significance of investment and technology for enhancing the local manufacturing supply chain, exclusion of Chinese nationals from the management and board of the investee firm and the Indian entity holding a majority stake in any joint venture.

At the same time, reports indicated that the Indian government was looking to fast-track visas for Chinese technicians and engineers, given that delays were hurting Indian industry. Then in late August, the Economic Times reported that the inter-ministerial panel had approved five to six investment proposals involving Chinese entities in the electronics manufacturing sector.

A Good Approach, But Not Without Perils

Being open to Chinese capital and talent, particularly those that aid the development of India’s manufacturing sector and deepen linkages with global value chains, is a pragmatic and prudent approach. It is, in fact, in India’s larger strategic interest to do so. This is not to argue that there isn’t any need for scrutiny. The External Affairs Minister is right to argue, as he did at a public forum last week, that given the current geopolitical scenario and India’s peculiar challenges with China, it is “common sense that investments from China should be scrutinised”. However, this should not be an ad hoc process. It is imperative to establish a new investment review mechanism with clear guidelines, conditions and timelines. This will engender greater predictability for industry, and ensure adequate democratic oversight. Such a process should also entail delineating a narrow set of sub-sectors as critical from a national security perspective and therefore walled off from Chinese entities. This list can evolve dynamically following periodic reviews.

That said, from the perspective of Indian industry, working with Chinese entities and being reliant on Chinese capital is likely to always remain a perilous endeavour. Politics and security have always come first in the India-China dynamic. Events over the past seven years since the Doklam stand-off have only further entrenched this trend. In addition, given the structural fault lines between the two sides, volatility is likely to remain a feature of the India-China relationship. The risks for industry, therefore, are always likely to remain high.

India Must Know What It Wants

Finally, while we are in a moment of policy churn, it is imperative for India’s political elite and strategic affairs community to deliberate on what it is that we desire in our relationship with China. Many have talked about the need for a new modus vivendi. But what are the contours of this new, desirable state of affairs that we wish to arrive at? And what does India need to do to get there? These are questions that need deeper yet urgent reflection, for policy to proceed with purpose and pragmatism rather than being reactive.

(Manoj Kewalramani is the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

The week gone by has been a busy period for India in the Indo-Pacific. India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, attended the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Laos and the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Japan. Jaishankar’s visit to Laos also featured a bilateral meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, following their last meeting at Astana earlier this year. The context for Jaishankar’s visit was set by India’s enduring pushback against China in key arenas of its interest. Arguably, China remains the pre-eminent concern for India’s national security planners. India’s China challenge is multipronged, with unresolved border conflict along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), as well as Beijing’s expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean. China’s more recent overtures in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea region, have also compelled India’s Quad partners and several Southeast Asian countries to intensify measures to counterbalance Beijing. Thus, the China question was a natural focal point for Jaishankar during both Laos and Japan visits.

China, A Critical Cog In The Quad

At the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting, the four member countries of the grouping released a joint statement which amply addressed their common concerns with regard to China’s belligerent posturing in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad members have long resisted the notion that the formulation of the grouping is directed at countering Beijing, instead emphasising that it seeks to harness the emerging opportunities of collective cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. There is no denying, however, that the China factor is a critical cog in the Quad wheel. The latest joint statement released by the Quad countries evidently suggests that concerns regarding China’s overtures in the Indo-Pacific appear to be taking centre-stage in the thinking of the grouping. The joint statement expressed concerns over the evolving situation in the East and South China Seas, alluding to China’s unilateral actions by use of force and coercion. The statement decried, without naming, Beijing’s use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea attributing it to ‘dangerous manoeuvres’ in the region. 

Jaishankar’s individual remarks about the state of India-China relations have further garnered attention. Upon being questioned about India’s relations with China, Jaishankar unequivocally stated that the bilateral ties between the two neighbours are ‘not doing very well’. This admission appears to present continuity in India’s enduring pushback against China in light of border skirmishes and conflict since 2020. However, in the Indo-Pacific context, a shift appears to be underway in India’s approach towards China. In the past, India’s response to China’s aggressive overtures in the Indo-Pacific had remained relatively subdued. In its stead, Jaishankar’s recent comments at the Quad summit and the joint statement demonstrate India’s willingness to push back against China in the Indo-Pacific context as well. 

An Eye On Distant Seas

The question arises, what explains India’s pushback against China’s unilateral actions in the South China Sea? Even though the South China Sea geography does not fall under India’s primary maritime area of interest, it remains vital for India’s myriad strategic interests, such as the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), energy security, etc. Moreover, India’s sustained advocacy for a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based order at sea, emphasising the need for adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), makes it imperative for New Delhi to respond critically against Chinese attempts to change the status quo in the region.

Within the wider Indo-Pacific, China’s continued attempts to foray into the Indian Ocean region, more recently by way of sending survey and surveillance vessels into the region, have prompted an enduring security dilemma in New Delhi, of People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) imminent launch of carrier task force patrols in the Indian Ocean by 2025. Thus, upping the ante against China in the Indo-Pacific appears to be a logical progression in India’s continued efforts to counter Beijing’s advances in geographies of India’s core interests at sea. 

India’s Message

Notably, Jaishankar has displayed nuance and complex thinking in India’s plans to counter the multipronged challenge that China poses. While on the Indo-Pacific front, India has sought to actively engage in minilateral groupings to counter China, upon being asked if New Delhi would encourage third-party intervention for the resolution of the India-China territorial border conflict along the LAC, Jaishankar reiterated that only bilateral engagement based on ‘mutual respect, mutual interest, and mutual sensitivity’ can restore normalcy.

The message is very clear: New Delhi will not relent in pressing ahead with its pushback against Beijing even as the door is open for China to recalibrate its anti-India positioning.

(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at ORF. Sayantan Haldar works with the Maritime Initiative at ORF)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Chinese security monitors a checkpoint as the Communist Party’s Central Committee holds its third plenum meeting in Beijing, China, on July 15, 2024.
| Photo Credit: AP

China posted lower than expected growth in the second quarter on July 15, with all eyes on how top officials gathering for a key meeting in Beijing might seek to tackle the country’s deepening economic malaise.

The world’s second-largest economy is grappling with a real estate debt crisis, weakening consumption, and an ageing population.

Trade tensions with the United States and the European Union, which have sought to limit Beijing’s access to sensitive technology as well as putting up tariffs to protect their markets from cheap, subsidised Chinese goods, are also dragging growth down.

And on Monday, official statistics showed the economy grew by only 4.7% in the second quarter of the year. It represents the slowest rate of expansion since early 2023, when China was emerging from a crippling zero-COVID policy that strangled growth. Analysts polled by Bloomberg had expected 5.1%.

Retail sales — a key gauge of consumption — rose just two percent in June, down from 3.7% growth in May. “The external environment is intertwined and complex,” the National Bureau of Statistics said.

“Domestic effective demand remains insufficient and the foundation for sound economic recovery and growth still needs to be strengthened,” it added.

Party is planning “major” reforms: Xi

The figures came the same day that China’s ruling Communist Party kicked off a key meeting led by President Xi Jinping focussed on the economy, known as the ‘Third Plenum.’

The Chinese leader delivered a “work report” at the opening of the meeting, state news agency Xinhua said. He also “expounded on a draft decision of the CPC Central Committee on further comprehensively deepening reform and advancing Chinese modernisation”, it added. Beijing has offered few hints about what might be on the table.

Mr. Xi has said the party is planning “major” reforms. Analysts are hoping those pledges will result in badly needed support for the economy. “The four-day meeting of the country’s top governing body couldn’t come soon enough,” Harry Murphy Cruise, an economist at Moody’s Analytics, said in a note. But, he said, “while the case for reform is high, it’s unlikely to be a particularly exciting affair”.

“Instead, we expect a modest policy tweak that expands high-tech manufacturing and delivers a sprinkling of support to housing and households,” he added.

Meeting intended to long-term ideas and structural reforms

The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s official newspaper, appeared to confirm lower expectations when it warned last week that “reform is not about changing direction and transformation is not about changing colour”.

Ting Lu, chief China economist at Nomura, said the meeting was “intended to generate and discuss big, long-term ideas and structural reforms instead of making short-term policy adjustments”.

The Third Plenum has previously been an occasion for the party’s top leadership to unveil major economic policy shifts.

In 1978, then-leader Deng Xiaoping used the meeting to announce market reforms that would put China on the path to dazzling economic growth by opening it to the world.

And more recently following the closed-door meeting in 2013, the leadership pledged to give the free market a “decisive” role in resource allocation, as well as other sweeping changes to economic and social policy.

Beijing aims for five percent growth this year

Beijing has said it is aiming for five percent growth this year — enviable for many Western countries but a far cry from the double-digit expansion that for years drove the Chinese economy.

But the economic uncertainty is also fuelling a vicious cycle that has kept consumption stubbornly low.

Among the most urgent issues facing the economy is the beleaguered property sector, which long served as a key engine for growth but is now mired in debt, with several top firms facing liquidation.

Authorities have moved in recent months to ease pressure on developers and restore confidence, including by encouraging local governments to buy up unsold homes.

Analysts say much more is required for a full rebound, as the country’s economy has yet to bounce back more than 18 months after damaging COVID-19 restrictions ended.

London is known for its open intellectual climate, where no idea is off-limits. But even in this dynamic city – and indeed in Washington too – it’s almost blasphemous to suggest that Russia and the West can be partners, or that the US and China can coexist as global powers. Recently, Nigel Farage, the Reform Party leader in the UK, faced a storm for urging the West to negotiate sensibly with Russia over Ukraine, calling the war a ‘complete stalemate’. People accused him of “echoing Russian propaganda”.

In India, we often hear that we don’t cultivate a society where all ideas are welcome. But let’s hope that suggesting a new chapter of “Hindi-Cheeni bhai-bhai” (India-China brotherhood) isn’t seen as blasphemy. The strong anti-China sentiment after the Galwan Valley clash in 2020 seems to have subsided. We’re buying more Chinese goods now than ever. In 2023, our bilateral trade hit over $136 billion. Hopefully, even those who burnt Chinese products in Gujarat and Delhi following the border skirmishes are more open to the idea now.

Sure, it might sound crazy to suggest that India and China should become trusted partners like the US and India, or Russia and China. But, it’s not entirely out of the question.

Sure, it might sound crazy to suggest that India and China should become trusted partners like the US and India, or Russia and China. But, it’s not entirely out of the question.

Major Geopolitical Shifts

India’s rise to become a global power is unstoppable; even China knows that. Talking to Chinese academics and journalists, you get the sense that they’re open to establishing long-term ties based on mutual respect. They like India, they want more people-to-people interactions, and one of them even wondered recently why India does not try to cast its spell over the dragon through its soft power of Bollywood  

Both countries have the responsibility to lift millions of their combined 2.8 billion people out of poverty. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has pledged to make India a developed country by 2047, which is a huge task. There are challenges, but if India and China team up and leverage each other’s strengths, it could be a major geopolitical shift, with far-reaching implications for global politics. 

Read | Modi-Hasina Should Worry About China, But Not Too Much

The US and its allies might be shocked and deeply concerned by a close India-China partnership. The West has benefited from the rivalry between the two countries as it aligns with their strategy of counterbalancing China’s rise. A partnership between these two Asian giants could undermine the West’s strategic interests in the region. Kishore Mahbubani, former Singaporean ambassador to the UN, has often said that most of Asia would cheer if this were to happen.

So, can India and China find common ground despite tensions over their disputed border? Prof. Mahbubani believes that while the two may never be best friends, they can have a good working relationship. He even says the 21st century belongs to the CIA (China, India, and ASEAN) countries. With US power on the decline, these countries will drive the world’s economic growth.

A Rollercoaster Ride

The idea of India and China being close friends isn’t new. Historically, they’ve acted like quarrelsome neighbours who fight and make up repeatedly. They share a long history of cultural and economic exchange dating back over two millennia. The Silk Road facilitated trade, and Buddhism, which started in India, found a significant following in China. These ancient ties laid a foundation of mutual respect and cultural affinity. During the colonial era, both countries faced subjugation by Western powers, fostering a sense of shared struggle. 

After gaining independence from the British, India faced border issues with China, and they continue to strain their relationship. In the early 1950s, the relationship was marked by camaraderie, epitomised by the slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai“. However, this period of cooperation was short-lived. The border dispute escalated into a full-scale war in 1962, leaving a lasting scar on bilateral relations. The disputed borders, particularly in the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions, remain contentious issues.

The rivalry between the US and China will continue, and India will remain under US pressure in its effort to manage China. However, India’s strategic positioning between the US and China can work to its advantage.

Before the Galwan incident, Prime Minister Narendra Modi naturally leaned towards engaging with China. As Gujarat’s Chief Minister, he made four trips to the country to attract investment. As Prime Minister, he has visited China twice, and President Xi Jinping reciprocated with two visits to India. Both countries have emerged as major global economic powers, engaging in significant economic competition and areas of cooperation within multilateral frameworks like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Strategic Rivalry

Strategically, India and China view each other with suspicion. The latter’s close ties with Pakistan, its infrastructure projects in South Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and its military presence in the Indian Ocean have heightened India’s security concerns.

Conversely, India’s growing partnership with the US and its participation in the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is viewed warily by China. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash exacerbated tensions and highlighted the fragility of the relationship. Despite several rounds of military and diplomatic talks, a comprehensive resolution to the border disputes remains elusive.

Mumbai’s Shanghai Dreams

Many youth in India might not know that not too long ago, India used to compare itself with Pakistan in all spheres. This attitude changed around the turn of the millennium, when the Maharashtra government launched a mega project to revamp Mumbai in 2004, based on the “Vision Mumbai” report by Bombay First, an organisation comprising some of Mumbai’s super-rich stakeholders. The report outlined strategies for transforming Mumbai into “another Shanghai”. While the project to transform Mumbai is still a “work in progress”, it marked the beginning of India’s comparisons with China. Today, China sees India as its great rival, at least in Asia.

Read | China Is Revamping Its Military, And India Must Not Take It Lightly

Projections show that the Indian economy will surpass Germany and Japan’s to become the world’s third-largest one by 2027. Currently, however, India’s economy is only 19% the size of China’s, even though it feeds nearly the same number of people. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), India’s nominal GDP in 2023 stood at $3.5 trillion, compared to China’s $18.2 trillion. India’s per capita income was $2,411, while China’s was $12,720. China’s exports last year exceeded $3.38 trillion, while India’s exports were $778 billion.

Collaboration Possibilities

Since China opened its economy in 1978, it has lifted 800 million people out of poverty – a feat that hasn’t been matched by any regime in history. India has also succeeded in reducing poverty significantly. Both nations have many more millions to help. Collaborating in economic development, technology, infrastructure, environmental initiatives, healthcare, cultural exchange, and geopolitical stability can benefit both countries and the world. Overcoming historical tensions and building trust through consistent dialogue will be crucial.

The intense rivalry between the US and China will continue, and India will remain under pressure from the US to stay a reliable partner in its effort to manage China. However, India’s strategic positioning between the US and China can work to its advantage. Ultimately, New Delhi’s strategic interests are best served by a balanced approach that navigates the complex dynamics of US-China relations while advancing its own national objectives. 

India knows that neighbours with shared borders may fight at times, but they can still continue to believe in the ‘love thy neighbour’ dictum.

(Syed Zubair Ahmed is a London-based senior Indian journalist with three decades of experience with the Western media)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Dinesh Gunawardena. File
| Photo Credit: AP

Sri Lankan Prime Minister Dinesh Gunawardena arrived at Beijing on March 25 for a six-day official visit during which he will hold talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang on ways to further deepen bilateral ties.

“Mr. Gunawardena was received on his arrival by Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister and former Ambassador to India Sun Weidong,” Chinese official media reported.

This will be the first visit by a Sri Lankan leader to Beijing after Colombo put a moratorium on recurring visits by Chinese research ships to Hambantota port, reportedly due to India’s security concerns. Colombo’s move had drawn angry reactions from China.

Earlier this month, however, Sri Lanka said it would allow foreign offshore research ships for replenishments at its ports despite a one-year ban on such vessels.

Some of China’s infrastructure investments in Sri Lanka drew global concerns over Beijing’s debt diplomacy especially after China took over Hambantota port on a 99-year debt swap.

Mr. Gunawardena’s visit also comes days after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reached a staff-level agreement with Sri Lanka for the next phase that would enable it access to $337 million from the nearly $3 billion bailout approved in 2023 for the cash-strapped country.

In 2022, Sri Lanka announced a default on over $51 billion foreign loans, following which India pitched in with about $4 billion in assistance to enable the island nation to recover from a deep economic crisis.

According to Sri Lanka’s official data, China tops the list of its creditors with 43% followed by Japan with 23% and India with 15%.

The image of Chinese President Xi Jinping is displayed on a big screen during the closing session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, held in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, in Beijing, on March 10, 2024.
| Photo Credit: AP

China’s national congress is wrapping up its annual session on March 11 with the usual show of near-unanimous support for plans designed to carry out ruling Communist Party leader Xi Jinping’s vision for the nation.

This year’s weeklong event, replete with meetings carefully scripted to allow no surprises, has highlighted how China’s politics have become ever more calibrated to elevate Xi Jinping.

Monday’s [March 11] agenda is lacking the usual closing news conference by the premier, who in the past was responsible for economic affairs as the party’s No. 2 leader — the one time each year when journalists could directly question a top leader.

The annual news conferences have been held most years since 1988, and the decision to scrap the event emphasises Li Qiang’s relatively weak status. Past premiers have played a much larger role in leading key economic policies such as modernising state enterprises, coping with economic crises and leading housing reforms that transformed China into a nation of homeowners.

A key item due to be put for a ritual vote on Monday are revisions of the “Organic Law of the State Council,” China’s version of a Cabinet, that direct it to follow Mr. Xi’s vision.

“The Communist Party always called the shots but the party leaders who ran the State Council used to have a much freer hand in setting economic policy,” Neil Thomas, a Chinese politics fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, said in an emailed comment.

“Xi has been astonishingly successful in consolidating his personal hold over the party, which has allowed him to become the key decisionmaker in all policy domains,” Mr. Thomas said.

In foreign policy, China appears to be sticking with Wang Yi as Foreign Minister who stepped back into the post last summer after his successor Qin Gang was abruptly dismissed without explanation after a half year on the job.

Analysts thought that the Communist Party might use the annual congress to appoint a new Foreign Minister and close the book on an unusual spate of political mishaps last year that also saw the firing of a new Defence Minister after a few months on the job.

The Organic Law of the State Council is being revised for the first time since it was adopted in 1982. The revision calls for the State Council, above all, to “uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China.” It also adds the governor of China’s Central bank as a Ministerial post.

Echoing words seen in just about every proposal, law or speech made in China these days, it spells out that China’s highest governing officials must adhere to the party’s guiding ideology, which refers back to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and culminates in Mr. Xi’s philosophy on “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” As Mr. Xi’s government champions innovation and self-reliance in technology as ways to build a modern, wealthy economy, it is leaning heavily on more overtly communist ideology that harkens back to past eras.

Mr. Xi has fortified the party’s role across the spectrum, from culture and education to corporate management and economic planning, a potentially risky strategy. The “benefits may be outweighed by the costs of stifling political discussion, disincentivising local innovation and more policy shifts,” Mr. Thomas said.

During this year’s congress, many provincial meetings were opened to the media for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic, though they were carefully scripted with speeches and other prepared remarks and none of the spontaneity once glimpsed in real group discussions on the sidelines of the meetings in decades past.

“The contrast with polarised politics in the U.S. and robust debate in other democracies could not be more stark: China’s political rituals, void of any overt dissent, put unity of opinion above all.”

Marching orders endorsed by the congress include calls to ensure national security and social stability, at a time when job losses and underpayment of wages have sparked rising numbers of protests.

Along with following “the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought” and other party directives, developing “new quality productive forces” — a term coined by Mr. Xi last September — emerged as a new catchphrase at this year’s congress.

The term suggests prioritising building self-reliance in science and technology as China confronts trade sanctions and curbs on access to advanced know-how in computer chips and other areas the U.S. and other countries deem to be national security risks.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. File
| Photo Credit: AP

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said on November 1 he will raise the plight of a detained democracy blogger with Chinese leaders during a state visit to China.

Mr. Albanese said he had approved a draft letter to the sons of Yang Hengjun, who has been detained in China since 2019.

“We’re very sympathetic and understand the concerns that they would have for their father and for this Australian who has been detained now for a long period of time,” Mr. Albanese told reporters.

The sons have made public a letter to Mr. Albanese, dated October 28, that said there was a “narrow window of opportunity” before Mr. Albanese left for China to secure their father’s freedom.

“We ask that you make it clear that it is not possible to stabilise the bilateral relationship with a government that is holding an Australian citizen just a few kilometres south of where you will be hosted,” the brothers added, referring to Beijing.

They said they had just last week received the first letter Yang had been allowed to send from detention. Yang wrote: “I’m sick, I’m weak, I’m dying.” Yang, who once worked for China’s Ministry of State Security, is still awaiting a verdict from his closed-door trial on espionage charges in May 2021.

His sons are 24 and 31 years old. Family friend Feng Chongyi said the sons had not been publicly identified because they feared Chinese retaliation for their father’s activities. Feng said Mr. Albanese becoming the first Australian Prime Minister in seven years to visit China created an opportunity for Yang.

“It’s not the last chance, but it’s the best chance,” Feng said. “The visit symbolises the complete normalisation of relations between the two countries.” Mr. Albanese’s visit that begins on Saturday is a sign that bilateral relations have improved since his centre-left government was elected last year following nine years of conservative rule.

Mr. Albanese will meet with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang in Beijing and attend the China International Import Expo in Shanghai during the three-day visit.

Mr. Albanese raised the plights of Yang and another detained Australian, journalist Cheng Lei, in his first meeting with Xi on the sidelines of a Group of 20 summit in Indonesia a year ago. Cheng was deported last month in what many saw as Beijing clearing the way for Mr. Albanese’s visit.

Yang’s sons wrote that said they had been “inspired by the wonderful news” of Cheng’s release. They hoped Australian authorities could “achieve a second miracle by saving our father”. Asked about Cheng’s case, Mr. Albanese told reporters: “Every case is … different.”