Union Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas Hardeep Singh Puri
| Photo Credit: ANI

The first shuttle talks between the United States and Iran for months raised hopes on Wednesday (September 23, 2026) that the ‌adversaries could make some progress towards ending the West Asia war, although neither side spelled out any ​change in their positions.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner communicated ⁠through mediators on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, the first such contacts since an interim ceasefire agreement collapsed in July.

“Steve and Jared had a very productive meeting today with mediators of Iran, merely mediators. Let’s see what happens with that,” U.S. President Donald ‌Trump said. “They’ve been mediated for a while, but I think there’s a lot of momentum for them to make a deal. It’s what we’re hearing from everybody.”

Earlier, Mr. Trump had told the UN General Assembly in ‌a speech that he had to decide whether to make a deal with Iran or “annihilate” the country. Iran’s President ‌Masoud ⁠Pezeshkian was due to address the gathering on Wednesday (September 23, 2026).

Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said Tehran had engaged ⁠with the United States through a Qatari mediator in New York and conveyed conditions, including an end to the war on all fronts and a halt to U.S. “acts of aggression”.

Some Iranian state media had earlier reported that Mr. Araghchi and Mr. Witkoff had met, but Iranian officials clarified to Reuters that this was not ​face-to-face. Mr. Araghchi met the Prime Minister of Qatar, Sheikh ‌Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, who has been one of the main mediators at previous talks.

Oil prices hold at two-week low

The diplomatic opening helped keep oil prices near two-week lows, with Brent crude now holding just below the $100-a-barrel threshold it had shot through this month, after Houthi fighters in Yemen launched a major offensive and fired into Saudi Arabia.

The war, ‌launched by Mr. Trump in February alongside Israel as “Operation Epic Fury”, has lasted nearly seven months, killing thousands of ​people, disrupting global energy supplies and spreading to other countries in the region — first to Lebanon and more recently to Yemen.

Mr. Trump repeated previous assertions that the war could end around the time of November’s ⁠U.S. midterm elections, though he has not explained why.

Since diplomacy broke off in July, the sides have repeatedly exchanged fire, although Mr. Trump has held back from a full-blown resumption of strikes after receiving advice from his military commanders that munitions were running low.

An interim agreement ‌reached in June and signed by Mr. Trump and Mr. Pezeshkian would have given Iran its main demands — lifting financial sanctions and unfreezing assets in return for talks on limiting its nuclear programme.

But that deal unravelled within weeks over shipping rules in the Strait of Hormuz, conduit for a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas before the war. Iran wants to exert greater control of the strait and collect fees from ships that use it, which Washington rejects.

Despite near-daily attacks on tankers, traffic through the strait has gradually increased in recent weeks. Oil producers have paid shipping companies fees worth as much as a quarter of a cargo’s ‌value to switch off transponders, navigate the route and transfer crude to other vessels beyond the strait.

Exports from the United Arab Emirates have already ​recovered to pre-war levels, and Saudi Arabia has sold 60 million barrels of Gulf oil for both this month and next, to be delivered beyond the strait off the coast of Oman, a big increase from ⁠August.

Even so, disruption continues to squeeze global energy markets. About a third of Gulf oil is estimated to be missing from global ⁠supplies. Shortages have particularly hit refined products such as diesel, causing inflation, pushing up interest rates and hurting Mr. Trump’s Republicans ahead of the elections.

The risk of further disruption has increased since the Iran-backed Houthis advanced in Yemen this ‌month, threatening traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, an alternative export route used by Saudi Arabia.

Washington, for its part, has imposed a blockade on Iranian ports, deepening Iran’s economic crisis. Iranian officials say they ​are willing to endure the blockade to achieve their goals, and will not reopen the Strait of Hormuz until it is lifted.

Published – September 23, 2026 04:52 pm IST

World leaders gather in New York this ​week for the UN General Assembly, bracing for President Donald Trump’s return to the rostrum for a second year running, with talks centering on the widening conflicts in ‌the West Asia and Ukraine and the risks of artificial intelligence.

Nearly 130 heads of state meet with the post-World War ​Two order under strain and with the UN itself struggling to remain relevant and weathering attacks from Mr. Trump, who has slashed America’s contributions ⁠and withdrawn from dozens of UN bodies.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who last addressed the diplomatic jamboree via video in 2021, will skip New York in favour of one-on-one talks with Mr. Trump in Washington on Thursday (September 20, 2026), fuelling debate about the UN’s relevance in addressing global crises.

Compounding the crisis of morale and finance are questions about the next ‌leader of the 80-year-old organisation. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres completes his term at the end of 2026, with no clear frontrunner in the race to replace him.

The 15-member UN Security Council may hold high-level meetings on Ukraine, AI and the West Asia, including talks with Arab ‌leaders, diplomats said.

More than a year into Mr. Trump’s second term, “we would no longer say that the UN is in freefall, but we ‌would ⁠say that it’s stuck in an open-ended crisis,” said Richard Gowan of the International Crisis Group.

“The UN may not be in emergency ⁠care like it was last year, but it seems to be trapped in a trauma centre for the foreseeable future,” Mr. Gowan said.

The U.S. avoided losing its vote at the assembly by paying $725 million in contributions to the regular budget this week, but it still owes the organisation more than a billion dollars and makes ongoing demands for cuts and reforms.

Growing AI risks

The assembly meets shortly after several artificial intelligence industry leaders called ‌for a coordinated slowdown of the development of the technology, warning that it could soon improve on its own and escape human control.

Mr. Guterres has said that AI will be a major topic, adding that countries pushing its frontiers should set up “common guardrails in order to avoid this race to the bottom that could lead one day to a gigantic disaster at the global level”.

The Secretary-General has long proposed global governance of AI. In ‌2023, the UN created an advisory body on the technology, with members including tech executives, government officials and academics.

The warning has put ​Mr. Guterres at odds with Mr. Trump, who dismissed AI risks as a “hoax,” saying there is a “sick conspiracy” against it and that China would benefit from the doubt being cast on its development.

West Asia escalation

The West Asia will again be a focus of ⁠discussions, as the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran continues to drive global inflation and destabilise the region. Recent gains by Houthi militants threaten shipping in the vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait and could further spike energy prices.

“It’s very difficult to have a military solution for that problem, and the experience of fighting in Yemen demonstrated how complicated ‌it is to have successful interventions,” said Mr. Guterres, adding that the UN’s envoy on Yemen was making a “huge effort” to advance talks.

Peace talks remain stalled, however, as Iran and the U.S. continue to exchange strikes and Mr. Trump threatens a major escalation of the war.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is scheduled to address the assembly on Wednesday (September 23, 2026).

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — wanted by the International Criminal Court over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza that Israel denies — is to speak on Thursday (September 24, 2026).

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will for the second year running not be at the gathering in person. The U.S., a close Israeli ally, again denied him a visa. On Thursday (September 17, 2026), the General Assembly voted to allow Abbas to appear via video.

There is likely to be a high-level meeting ‌on the conflict in Sudan on the sidelines, diplomats said, although a diplomatic breakthrough is unlikely.

Ukraine, food security

Also on the agenda is Russia’s more than four-year-old war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr ​Zelenskyy and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will address the General Assembly. Mr. Zelenskyy will likely seek to shore up Ukraine’s position ahead of what is expected to be another tough winter, diplomats said.

The Security Council has been unable to take action ⁠to end the conflict because permanent member Russia holds a veto.

Mr. Trump has at times appeared frustrated that he has been unable to broker an end to the ⁠war, a goal he declared a priority when he began his second term in January last year. The U.S. president spoke with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin earlier this month, but it was unclear whether he plans to meet Mr. Zelenskyy in New York.

Mr. Guterres highlighted the impact ‌the war was having on civilians but also on food security and energy prices.

“The effective blockade existing in the Black Sea is creating enormous problems that add to the problems generated by the West Asian crisis, and I think it would be very important to find a way to ​allow Ukrainian exports and Russian exports of food, fertilisers and energy to take place in a safe way through the Black Sea,” he said.

Published – September 20, 2026 01:14 pm IST

“They want to make a deal. We’ll see how that works ‌out,” ⁠U.S. President Donald Trump said, referring to Iran, reiterating past comments. File
| Photo Credit: AP

Image used for representational purposes only.
| Photo Credit: Getty Images/iStockphoto

The government has for the first time fixed maximum cooking gas LPG production targets for individual public- and private-sector refineries and upstream companies, as it seeks to build a domestic supply buffer after the West Asia conflict exposed the country’s vulnerability to disruptions in imported cooking gas.

The Petroleum and Natural Gas Ministry, in an order issued on August 13, has specified maximum LPG production levels for 21 refineries and upstream companies, with combined production potential set at 63,810 tonnes a day — more than double the domestic LPG output in the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026 and about 70% of the country’s daily consumption.

The production limits will kick in whenever there is a supply constraint.

The lion’s share of the planned output has been set from Reliance Industries Ltd’s older refinery, which would have to produce up to 18,000 tonnes a day of LPG, according to the order.

India consumed 33.2 million tonnes of LPG in the 2025-26 fiscal year (about 91,000 tonnes per day). Of this, 13.1 million tonnes a year was produced locally (about 35,900 tonnes per day), while the remaining 21.3 million tonnes per annum (about 58,400 tonnes a day) was imported.

This high import dependence of over 64% left the country exposed when the start of the Iran war effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow sea lane through which India got 90% of its imports from nations like Saudi Arabia.

With supplies impacted, the government in March ordered refineries to divert streams used for petrochemical production to maximise LPG output.

It also initially stopped sales to industrial and commercial users and thereafter gradually scaled it up. For domestic households, the frequency of booking a refill was increased, and they were encouraged to shift to piped natural gas, whose supplies were not so severely impacted due to the war.

Domestic production was ramped up to about 55,000 tonnes a day at the height of the crisis. Still, the emergency orders asking refiners to maximise output were gradually withdrawn after supplies eased from mid-June.

The new order goes further than the emergency one issued during the West Asia crisis by establishing facility-specific production benchmarks and requiring refiners and upstream companies to maintain adequate infrastructure for LPG storage, evacuation, and transportation. Companies must also pursue technically and economically feasible upgrades to maximise output.

The government has empowered itself to order refiners, oil marketing companies and upstream producers to ramp up LPG production for specified quantities and periods whenever it considers such action necessary to ensure adequate domestic availability, equitable distribution and supply at fair prices.

The production schedule will be reviewed every six months, allowing the government to add output from new refineries and upstream fields and account for additional capacity created through technology and infrastructure upgrades.

The order also requires refiners to consider measures such as converting naphtha into LPG and upgrading fluid catalytic cracking units where technically and economically viable, underscoring the government’s push to extract more LPG from existing refining infrastructure.

The government had introduced several emergency measures during the West Asia crisis, including prioritising household LPG supplies and restricting supplies to some commercial and industrial users as imports were disrupted.

The new production framework is aimed at ensuring that a future disruption to overseas LPG supplies does not translate into the shortages and rationing seen during the recent crisis.

Taking lessons from the crisis, the government has now put the country’s refineries and upstream producers under a standing framework to maintain and, when necessary, increase LPG output.

Eighteen refineries owned and operated by public sector oil companies have been ordered to produce a total of 31,470 tonnes a day.

In the private sector, Reliance’s 33 million tonnes-a-year domestic tariff area (DTA) refinery at Jamnagar in Gujarat, products from which are sold locally, has been ordered to produce 18,000 tonnes. No target has been set for Reliance’s 35.2 million tonnes a year only-for-exports refinery at the same site.

Russia’s Rosneft-backed Nayara Energy’s 20 million tonnes-a-year Vadinar refinery has been asked to produce 4,480 tonnes a day, according to the order.

Upstream gas producers and processors like ONGC and GAIL, which make LPG from natural gas, have been given a target of 6,460 tonnes a day.

“It is hereby ordered that all public sector, joint venture and private sector oil refining companies, and upstream oil companies shall develop, augment and at all times maintain adequate infrastructure for storage, evacuation and transport of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) either by itself or through other entities, viz railways or road tankers adequate for the specified quantities,” the order said.

They were also ordered to “implement all technically and economically feasible measures and technologies such as naphtha-to-LPG conversion, gasoline-based fluid catalytic cracking unit to petro-fluid catalytic cracking unit, or other upgrades, to maximise LPG production beyond current minimum producible quantities as specified in the Schedule, with intimation to Centre for High Technology or any other authorised agency, whenever such an upgrade is undertaken.” The ministry further said “if central government is of the opinion that it is necessary in public interest to ensure adequate availability, equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of domestic LPG, it may by itself or through Centre for High Technology or any other authorised agency, by order in writing, issue direction to oil refining companies, oil marketing companies and upstream oil companies to ramp up the LPG production levels for such quantity and period specified therein, including compliance with any restrictions on alternative uses of input streams required to produce the LPG.” Whenever directions are issued, the companies will have to ramp-up LPG production levels within the stipulated time frame.

The central government, the order said, shall update the production schedule on January 1 and July 1 of every year, including updates to LPG production from new refineries and upstream oil companies or additional LPG quantities from existing refineries and upstream companies due to changes to associated infrastructure and production technology, evacuation, supply, transport or distribution of LPG.

Published – August 16, 2026 11:14 am IST

The Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Mr Hardeep Singh Puri, said last week that 67% of India’s liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) came from the U.S.

Although he didn’t mention the timeframe for when energy-hungry India “achieved” this, it is clearly a drastic shift from an earlier government decision to source about 10% of cooking gas from the U.S.

As part of crisis management, India, the world’s second-largest importer of LPG, started buying cooking gas from the U.S., backed by a long-term deal signed for 2.2 million tonnes for 2026 by state-run oil refiners, even as finer details on exact contracted $/tonne or landed cargo price have not been publicly disclosed.

India’s reliance on the U.S. for two-thirds of its LPG assumes significance, signalling prudent diversification of sources amid the crisis in the narrow Strait of Hormuz, which suggests that the country’s LPG security cannot be anchored to a single geography.

As per Vortexa, India’s LPG imports from West Asia fell almost 85% between February 2026 and June. However, India partially offset the lost flows by increasing LPG imports from other countries, including the U.S., from where India’s imports in June reached 0.77 million metric tonnes, up 19.4% from May.

As per the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC), total imports of LPG in the first quarter of 2026 stood at 2.85 million tonnes, valued at $2,328 million.

Frying pan to fire

Overdependence on any market is risky, but relying more on a nation which keeps amorphous relations and sees partners through the lens of national interest could prove costly, as it may wield energy as a bargaining tool in bilateral trade talks. Energy-import dependence also makes monetary policy more complicated.

The U.S. has historically used financial sanctions, export controls and technology as foreign policy tools, going by the episodes in Iran, Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, Russia, Venezuela, Myanmar, Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan.

Even when commercial ties are extant, the U.S. can influence third-country transactions. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, proposing tariffs of up to 100% on the top five buyers of Russian oil and natural gas, is a non-tariff trade barrier.

Some analysts are of the view that Washington reaped pecuniary benefits from Europe’s shift to U.S. LNG after the Russia-Ukraine war, and its energy exports have always made stronger inroads during periods of geopolitical instability.

“The pivot away from Russian gas has increased the EU’s strategic dependency on US LNG, the most expensive LNG for EU buyers,” said the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.

Proximity pricing

Unlike the West Asian supplies, largely based on long-term SPAs, U.S. energy exports could potentially be swayed by trade and other agendas, enhancing dependence risks. Traditionally leaning towards the Gulf region, India, which imports about 60% of the LPG (a mix of propane and butane) it consumes, with nearly 90% of which passing through the Strait of Hormuz, could lose the advantage of proximity pricing as the voyage time is generally 25-35 days for the U.S. shipments against 5-10 days from the Gulf.

Although the U.S. LPG (Mont Belvieu propane-based) claims a competitive edge over West Asian supplies; the reality is that the former could be cheap at the point of production, but the West Asian LPG (Saudi Aramco CP) is usually cheaper at the disembarking point because of the much shorter shipping distance although the arithmetic has changed now due to geopolitical risk temporarily inflating the West Asian supply costs.

Political fuel

For India, cooking gas is not merely a good but a politically volatile fuel, the shortages of which would have social and political consequences; and so the priority is making it available rather than cost optimisation.

The Strait of Hormuz disruptions have led to Gulf LPG prices surging sharply, with Saudi CP rising from about $543 a tonne in February to around $790 in June — an increase of about 46%. Under such conditions, even costlier US cargoes would become attractive because they were available and has reduced supply risk.

Higher Gulf benchmark, shipping disruptions and risk premia can make the U.S. LPG competitive despite its longer voyage.

India may have cut Hormuz risk, but remains exposed to risks associated with commodity-price, dollar and freight.

If U.S. inflation remains elevated, the Federal Reserve may have to keep interest rates higher for longer. Tighter U.S. monetary policy can simultaneously strengthen the dollar, raising the rupee cost of each imported cargo.

If domestic LPG prices are held down when the global price rises amid rupee depreciation, then oil companies’ under-recoveries expand, leading to more fiscal and external-sector issues.

The government recently informed the Parliament that the accumulated under-recoveries of public sector OMCs scaled to more than ₹59,000 crore as of July 31 this year.

Domestic scene

The PPAC data suggests that as of July 1, 2026, the PSU OMCs (Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum and Hindustan Petroleum) together have 33.14 crore active domestic LPG customers, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7.6% during 2015–2026. The original LPG consumption estimate is 34,692 TMT for 2026-27.

India’s LPG production, which remained nearly stagnant over the past several years, has not been keeping pace with consumption growth. While LPG production was 4.3 MMT (million metric tonnes), consumption was 6.5 MMT in the first quarter of FY27.

Refineries were directed to maximise the LPG output by diverting propane, butane and other streams into the LPG pool. As per Q1FY27, LPG production saw 35.73% year-on-year increase to a total of 4.26 MMT.

At the peak of the crisis, India’s OMCs ramped up their cumulative daily production of LPG from 34,000 metric tonnes (MT) to 55,000 MT, which helped the country absorb some impact of lower imports.

Steps needed

Australia offers strategic advantages as it is in the Indo-Pacific, outside Hormuz, and has a shorter route than the U.S., but export volumes are much smaller.

Argentina, Nigeria and Angola can be probable markets that can offer strategic agility, though they cannot replace the Gulf volumes.

Energy security is not about replacing one with another; it is about ensuring that no single player holds all the cards. Instead, India must strengthen local production, bolster multiple supply chains, enhance forex hedging tools (for the OMCs) and build more strategic reserves.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait has returned to the geopolitical spotlight after Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi movement announced on July 20 a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, warning that Saudi-linked vessels transiting the strategic waterway would be targeted. Shortly afterwards, the group reinforced the warning by emailing shipping companies, directing them not to load or unload cargo at Saudi ports or risk being attacked “in any location” within its operational reach. This is a major escalation of the latest simmering regional conflict to be reignited by the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran.

The warning has revived concerns over the security of one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors. Even without a complete closure, the threat of attacks was enough to influence commercial decisions, because disruption in this narrow waterway can have consequences that extend far beyond West Asia.

The announcement came days after an attack on Sanaa International Airport on July 13. The Yemeni government claimed it carried out the strike to prevent an Iranian plane from landing; the Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia and responded with retaliatory missile attacks. In a statement, the group said the maritime embargo was an “eye for an eye” response both to that recent incident and to what they describe as a nearly 12-year Saudi-led blockade of Yemen’s ports and airports during the country’s civil war.

The timing of the latest escalation is significant. For months, the Houthis largely confined their operations to attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, even as the United States and Israel carried out military operations against Iran. They avoided opening a direct front against Saudi Arabia, which had spent recent years trying to reduce tensions with the group after years of war in Yemen.

What is the Bab el-Mandeb and why is it so important?

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, whose Arabic name means “Gate of Tears”, separates Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula from Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa. At its narrowest point, it is only about 30 km wide. Yet this relatively small stretch of water forms the southern gateway to the Suez Canal, linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and, ultimately, the Indian Ocean. Every vessel travelling between Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal must first pass through the Bab el-Mandeb, making it one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), around 9.3 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products transited the Bab el-Mandeb each day in 2023. The volumes eventually dropped, following the start of Houthi attacks, by more than half, averaging roughly 4.1 million barrels per day in 2024 and remaining near 4.2 million barrels per day by 2025.

The Strait’s importance stems from geography rather than size. Commercial ships transporting crude oil, liquefied natural gas, manufactured goods, food products, automobiles, and industrial equipment use the route because it offers the shortest maritime connection between Europe and Asia. Instead of sailing around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa, vessels can transit the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, saving both time and fuel.

The difference is substantial. A diversion around the Cape of Good Hope typically adds 10 to 15 days to a voyage, depending on the destination. For shipping companies operating on tight schedules, longer voyages reduce the availability of vessels, disrupt logistics networks, and raise freight charges. Industries dependent on just-in-time deliveries can quickly feel the impact of delayed shipments.

This is why the Bab el-Mandeb is often grouped with other strategic maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and the Panama Canal. Each serve as a narrow passage through which a disproportionate share of global commerce flows. Hence, any disruption, whether caused by conflict or natural disasters, can ripple across international markets.

How are the Houthis using the Strait as a weapon?

For the Houthis, the Bab el-Mandeb represents more than a commercial shipping lane. It is a strategic lever. Unlike conventional military powers, the Houthis do not possess a large navy capable of controlling regional waters. Instead, they have relied on asymmetric tactics, including drones, ballistic missiles and attacks on commercial shipping, to project influence beyond Yemen. By threatening vessels transiting one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors, the group can impose economic costs on regional rivals while ensuring that the conflict remains an international concern.

The strategy has evolved. Following the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Houthis repeatedly targeted vessels they claimed were linked to Israel and its allies, arguing that the attacks were intended to pressure Israel over its military operations in Gaza. Several international shipping companies responded by diverting vessels around southern Africa, while naval coalitions led by the United States and its partners increased patrols in the Red Sea to protect commercial traffic.

The latest warning directed at Saudi-linked shipping suggests that the Houthis are expanding the use of maritime pressure as a geopolitical tool. Rather than confronting larger military powers directly, the group is seeking to take advantage of geography by threatening a route that the global economy depends upon.

The consequences of prolonged disruption would extend well beyond the immediate conflict zone. Delayed shipments can disrupt supply chains, affecting manufacturers, retailers and ultimately consumers through higher costs.

Why does this matter for India?

This is huge for India. India has significant economic and strategic interests in maintaining stability around the Bab el-Mandeb. A substantial share of India’s trade with Europe passes through the Red Sea corridor, making the route important for exporters of pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, textiles, chemicals, and machinery. India imports more than 85% of the crude oil it consumes. Longer voyages increase freight costs and delivery times, reducing the competitiveness of Indian products in overseas markets.

The country is also one of the world’s largest importers of crude oil. Although India’s energy supplies arrive through multiple routes, higher global oil prices resulting from instability in major maritime corridors increase the country’s import bill and can eventually feed into domestic fuel prices and inflation.

The Bab el-Mandeb may be only 30 km wide at its narrowest point, but it has become one of the world’s most consequential waterways. As long as global trade continues to rely on the Red Sea-Suez Canal corridor, instability in the strait will remain a concern not only for countries in West Asia but also for governments and consumers across the world.

Published – July 28, 2026 06:05 am IST

Rupee depreciated for the fourth straight day, shedding 8 paise to settle at 96.33 against the U.S. dollar. File
| Photo Credit: Reuters