U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent speaks during a press conference to outline further sanctions against Iran, at the Treasury Department in Washington, D.C., U.S., on August 24, 2026.
| Photo Credit: Reuters

In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the country out of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), labeling former President Barack Obama’s landmark nuclear deal as one of the worst agreements made in the history of international negotiations. Eight years later, following military threats, crippling economic sanctions, and renewed hostilities in West Asia, the United States is back exploring talks with Iran.

It may come off as a paradox.

How could the President, who recently abandoned the deal by former President Obama, even consider making negotiations of his own?

That is because there has been a recurring trend in America’s foreign policy throughout the last couple of decades. Despite any difference in ideologies, political affiliations or strategies, every U.S. administration comes to the realisation that Iran cannot be bullied with airstrikes, sanctions or diplomatic isolation.

Starting from George W. Bush to Mr. Obama, and then from Mr. Trump to Joe Biden and Mr. Trump yet again, the administration in Washington has experimented with various approaches to coercion. However, the final outcome seems to be rather predictable: diplomacy. What is noteworthy is that this trend is more indicative of structural realities of power in the contemporary international system rather than of Iran alone.

‘Axis of evil’

In 2002, when former President George W. Bush designated Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil”, many believed that Iran would be the next target of America’s military intervention following Afghanistan and Iraq.

This, however, did not occur, and there were straightforward explanations for this.

In contrast to Iraq, Iran is not a small Arab nation with weak forces. It is an example of a civilisation-state with a dense population, a huge area that stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, and a strategically positioned nation connecting West Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia.

Most importantly, Iran lies across the Strait of Hormuz, which is one of the most important oil chokepoints in the world, with a significant share of internationally shipped barrels of oil passing through it. Like we witnessed in the recent conflict in West Asia, any large scale conflict involving Iran will have instant repercussions for the international oil market.

The American policy makers were well aware of this truth. In spite of being at the pinnacle of their military superiority, the cost of occupying or invading Iran was considered prohibitive. Their experience in Iraq made this realisation stronger. If the stabilisation of Iraq itself was not an easy task, handling a crisis in Iran would have been an even bigger challenge.

This was the point where the choice was made and the first lesson was learned: Iran was too important to be neglected, but too expensive to be conquered.

Under Obama’s aegis

When Mr. Obama became the President, he inherited the Iran dilemma, a problem that previous administrations had failed to solve despite years of trying.

By the late 2000s, Iran continued to develop its nuclear programme at a steady pace. Sanctions had harmed the country’s economy significantly, yet they had not stopped Iran from enriching uranium. The belief that sanctions would automatically make Iran change its stance proved incorrect.

On the contrary, the Obama administration saw sanctions as tools that could be used to get Iran to negotiate. This insight is what eventually shaped the JCPOA.

It aimed neither to change Iran’s regime nor settle all the issues between the two countries. Instead, the agreement was intended to put verifiable limits on Iran’s nuclear programme, increase the period necessary to build a nuclear weapon and create a completely new inspection regime.

Advocates viewed the agreement as an achievement while critics argued that it settled too few things, especially with regards to Iran’s missile programme and actions in the region. However, both supporters and opponents recognised that sanctions alone were unable to stop Iran’s nuclear development. The agreement was not a perfect solution, but a recognition of the failure of coercion in achieving what was intended.

Trump’s stance

Mr. Trump entered office intending to prove that Mr. Obama had conceded too much, and eventually withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. His central argument for leaving the deal was quite simple. The deal involved temporary limitations, sanction relief and ignored the rest of Iran’s behavior. Mr. Trump believed that he could achieve a better deal through maximum economic pressure.

The resulting sanctions regime was unprecedented as Iran saw its oil export industry devastated. Its banking sector was restricted. The country was forced into even greater economic distress.

Yet the administration still hoped that such a level of pressure would make Iranian leadership return to the negotiations. But the effects were less decisive than they anticipated.

The sanctions have indeed impacted the Iranian economy negatively. However, they did not manage to achieve the desired results for Washington.

On the contrary, the JCPOA compliance became more difficult for Tehran. The country has increased the enrichment rate and nuclear stockpiles. The nuclear programme has made significant strides compared to the times of the original deal.

Thus, one of the major paradoxes of the maximum pressure strategy revealed itself.

While Mr. Trump’s sanctions were intended to limit the country’s advance towards a nuclear status, in fact, after the JCPOA’s demise, the Iranian nuclear programme progressed significantly.

This mainly highlighted that economic sanctions may impose penalties on another country, but they may not necessarily dictate the outcome politically.

One of the reasons why successive U.S. governments have had to engage in diplomacy once again is because of the fact that military intervention alone will not solve their problems. Such intervention is capable of destroying facilities, of destroying infrastructure, and of postponing programmes, but cannot obliterate knowledge.

Once a nation state has gained the kind of knowledge, technical capacity, and industry needed to develop nuclear capability, they cannot be destroyed by military intervention.

This is the main reason why nuclear crises have existed all over the world. While policymakers might differ on strategy, ultimately they all recognise that negotiated agreements are required to sustain nuclear restraints.

Recent crisis

This latest crisis between the United States, Israel and Iran is just another iteration of the same old narrative.

While the conflict has evolved from a sequence of military strikes and Iranian responses to a ceasefire and renewed attempts to negotiate sanctions, maritime security and Iran’s nuclear programme, the situation reveals a strange twist. President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 arguing that diplomacy gave Iran too much and demanded too little from the country. However, the recent developments have shown the world that military pressure alone will never achieve a long-term resolution.

This new ceasefire reflects such considerations. Instead of solving all the conflicts at once, it focuses on addressing the most pressing dangers, including the possibility of escalation, disruptions in the energy market, and the threat of a wider regional war. The most controversial topics, like Iran’s long-term nuclear programme, its missiles, and regional role, are left for future discussions.

This way, the current accord is more of a return to an old balance rather than an attempt at breaking one. As time passes, both sides understand that there are higher stakes involved in escalating this conflict further than continuing to talk about it.

As tough as the rhetoric of maximum pressure or military engagement may sound, the latest clash has reaffirmed what has been clear in the United States’ relationship with Iran for more than two decades: Washington can pressure Tehran, weaken it, and even threaten it, but it cannot avoid negotiations with it.

The Iran dispute can also be seen as an ongoing struggle between competing Presidents and rival schools of thought.

Was Mr. Obama correct to engage? Was Mr. Trump correct to disengage? Was maximum pressure better than engagement? While these are valid concerns, they are not the most valid ones. The real question here involves the limitations of power.

Each administration assumes that it can alter the strategic environment by employing some mixture of pressure, deterrence, and diplomacy. However, they eventually find themselves running into those same limitations.

Iran still remains too big, too strategically situated, and too resilient to be neglected. It cannot be defeated easily and it cannot be isolated permanently. Neither can it be eliminated from the wider geostrategic equation of West Asia. This is the reason why Washington ends up back at the negotiation table time and again.

The U.S. Military is preparing for the possibility of sustained, weeks-long operations against Iran if President Donald Trump orders an attack, two U.S. officials told Reuters, in ‌what could become a far more serious conflict than previously seen between the countries.

The disclosure by the officials, who ​spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the planning, raises the stakes for the diplomacy underway ⁠between the United States and Iran. U.S. Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will hold negotiations with Iran on Tuesday (February 17, 2026) in Geneva, with representatives from Oman acting as mediators. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio cautioned on Saturday (February 14, 2026) that while Trump’s preference was to reach a deal with Tehran, “that’s very hard to do.”

Meanwhile, Mr. Trump has amassed military ‌forces in the region, raising fears of new military action. U.S. officials said on Friday (February 13, 2026) the Pentagon was sending an additional aircraft carrier to the Middle East, adding thousands more troops along with fighter aircraft, guided-missile destroyers and other firepower capable of ‌waging attacks and defending against them. Mr. Trump, speaking on Friday (February 13, 2026) after a military event at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, openly floated ‌the ⁠possibility of changing the government in Iran, saying it “seems like that would be the best thing that could happen.” He ⁠declined to share who he wanted to take over Iran, but said, “there are people.”

Also Read | War clouds hovering around Iran despite U.S. talks

“For 47 years, they’ve been talking and talking and talking,” Mr. Trump said. Mr. Trump has long voiced skepticism about sending ground troops into Iran, saying last year, “the last thing you want to do is ground forces,” and the kinds of U.S. firepower arrayed in the Middle East so ​far suggest options for strikes primarily by air and naval ‌forces. In Venezuela, Mr. Trump demonstrated a willingness to rely also on special operations forces to seize that country’s president, Nicolas Maduro, in a raid last month.

Asked for comment on the preparations for a potentially sustained U.S. military operation, White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said: “President Trump has all options on the table with regard to Iran.”

“He listens to a variety of perspectives on any given issue, but makes the ‌final decision based on what is best for our country and national security,” Ms. Kelly said.

The Pentagon declined to comment.

The United ​States sent two aircraft carriers to the region last year, when it carried out strikes against Iranian nuclear sites. However, June’s “Midnight Hammer” operation was essentially a one-off U.S. attack, with stealth bombers flying from the United States to strike Iranian nuclear ⁠facilities. Iran staged a very limited retaliatory strike on a U.S. base in Qatar.

Risks increasing

The planning under way this time is more complex, the officials said.

In a sustained campaign, the U.S. military could hit Iranian state and security facilities, not just nuclear infrastructure, one of the officials said. The ‌official declined to provide specific details.

Experts say the risks to U.S. forces would be far greater in such an operation against Iran, which boasts a formidable arsenal of missiles. Retaliatory Iranian strikes also increase the risk of a regional conflict.

The same official said the United States fully expected Iran to retaliate, leading to back-and-forth strikes and reprisals over time.

The White House and Pentagon did not respond to questions about the risks of retaliation or regional conflict. Mr. Trump has repeatedly threatened to bomb Iran over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and crushing of internal dissent. On Thursday, he warned the alternative to a diplomatic solution would “be very traumatic, very traumatic.”

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has warned that in case of strikes on Iranian territory, it ‌could retaliate against any U.S. Military base.

The U.S. maintains bases throughout the Middle East, including in Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. Israeli Prime ​Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met Mr. Trump for talks in Washington on Wednesday (February 11, 2026), saying that if an agreement with Iran were reached, “it must include the elements that are vital to Israel.”

Iran has said it is prepared to discuss curbs on its ⁠nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions, but has ruled out linking the issue to missiles.

On Saturday (February 14, 2026), Iranian opposition figure Reza Pahlavi said U.S. military intervention ⁠in Iran could save lives and urged Washington not to spend too long negotiating with Tehran’s clerical rulers on a nuclear deal.

The exiled son of Iran’s toppled shah told Reuters in an interview there were signs that the Iranian government was on the brink ‌of collapse and that an attack could weaken it or accelerate its fall.

“We are hoping that this attack will expedite the process and the people can be finally back in the streets and take it all the way to the ultimate regime’s downfall,” said Mr. ​Pahlavi, who is based in the United States and has lived outside Iran since before his father was toppled in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 

Published – February 15, 2026 07:14 am IST

President Donald Trump speaks with reporters before boarding Marine One on South Lawn of the White House in Washington. File.
| Photo Credit: AP

President Donald Trump speaks at the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, on October 13, 2025, in Jerusalem.
| Photo Credit: AP

Iran on Thursday called Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election an opportunity for the United States to reassess past “wrong policies”.

Trump, who is set to return to the White House in January after defeating US Vice President Kamala Harris in Tuesday’s election, had pursued a “maximum pressure” strategy on Iran during his first term.

“We have very bitter experiences with the policies and approaches of different US governments in the past,” foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei was quoted as saying by state news agency IRNA.

Trump’s win, he added, was a chance “to review previous wrong policies”.

Iran and the United States have been adversaries since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the Western-backed shah, but tensions peaked during Trump’s first term from 2017 to 2021.

Before Trump was declared the winner on Wednesday, Iran had dismissed the US election as irrelevant.

“The general policies of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran are fixed,” said government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani.

“It doesn’t matter who becomes president. Plans have already been set so that there is no change in people’s livelihood,” she added.

During his first term, Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and imposed harsh sanctions on the Islamic republic.

In 2020, under Trump’s presidency, the United States killed revered Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps general Qasem Soleimani in an air strike on Baghdad airport.