By the time Argentina’s players emerged from the tunnel on Wednesday evening, familiar songs had already begun rolling around the Mercedes-Benz Stadium. The crowd came from Buenos Aires and Cordoba, from Rosario and Mendoza.

But they also came with unmistakably different accents from Kolkata and Dhaka, from Kochi and Varanasi, from South Asian immigrant neighbourhoods across the United States.

Every World Cup creates adopted nations. Few have ever been adopted with the devotion that Argentina inspires in South Asia.

The relationship has always seemed improbable. Nearly 16,000 kilometres separate Buenos Aires from Dhaka or Thiruvananthapuram. There is little shared history, little common language and few cultural overlaps.

Yet every four years, countless homes across India and Bangladesh become temporary Argentine territory. Streets fill with blue-and-white flags, children paint their faces, neighbourhoods get together to pray for Diego Maradona and now Lionel Messi.

The connection has outlived generations.

For many, it began with Diego weaving through England in the summer of 1986, turning football into folklore. For another generation, it arrived through Messi, whose genius travelled effortlessly through the television screens into homes where sleep was willingly sacrificed for matches played in distant time zones.

Among those inside the stadium were a father and son from Varanasi. Vipul, who runs an export business, was a young man when Maradona conquered Mexico.

Like millions across the subcontinent, He found himself bewitched by the No. 10 in the sky-blue shirt and four decades back he had to go on a hunt in Delhi’s Sarojini Market to get a cheap replica of the famous jersey. The shirt has now faded, the hair greyed, but the affection remains.

“Television was still a novelty in India back then and the 1986 World Cup was perhaps the first time when all of us watched live international football. It almost felt like Maradona was fighting against the entire world and winning. You had to be bewitched by his genius,” Vipul said.

For son Anmol, his Argentina is Messi’s Argentina. The tears in 2014, the Copa America disappointments, the redemption in 2021 and, finally, Qatar in 2022 are his footballing memories.

Now working in the United States, he persuaded his father to make the journey to Atlanta to support the team they love. Together they watched Argentina overturn England to reach another World Cup final.

They are now heading north to New Jersey, hoping to witness Messi lifting another World Cup trophy.

Football offers opportunities for fathers and sons to discover the same love through different heroes. There are many from Dhaka, Chittagong, Kolkata, Thiruvananthapuram, Kochi, who have made the same journey to follow the blue-and-white in the United States.

Rupak Saha, sporting the blue-and-gold of his beloved East Bengal, was in Atlanta shouting for Messi. “We want Messi to give us another World Cup. We are all here for him,” he said.

The scale of that affection even surprises those inside the dressing room. On the eve of the semifinal, a Bangladeshi journalist asked Lionel Scaloni about the extraordinary support Argentina receives in Bangladesh.

He admitted that his players remain astonished that people on the other side of the world celebrate victories with the same emotion as families in Argentina.

“They are surprised,” Scaloni said. “Thrilled that a country on the other end of the world supports us, loves us and feels proud wearing our blue-and-white stripes.”

Perhaps that is the greatest compliment any national team can receive.

Argentina has also attracted criticism throughout this tournament. Opponents have questioned refereeing decisions, social media has filled with accusations of favourable treatment, the unfurling of a Falklands banner, repeated confrontation with the referees and opponents have ignited arguments.

Yet those debates have barely dented Argentina’s global appeal.

Inside stadiums across this World Cup, the neutral support often seems to tilt unmistakably towards Argentina. Every Messi touch still draws a collective gasp. Every comeback is celebrated by supporters with no Argentine passport. And among those neutrals, South Asians remain remarkably visible.

Perhaps it is because Argentina has always offered more than victories. Its football has carried romance and suffering in equal measure.

It has produced flawed heroes, impossible dribbles, glorious failures and unforgettable redemption. Maradona gave millions permission to believe that genius could overcome power. Messi showed that perseverance could eventually overcome heartbreak.

For countless supporters in India and Bangladesh, those stories are deeply personal, untouched by the oceans that lie between them.

As Atlanta emptied into the humid Georgia night, Argentine songs once again echoed through the streets. Some voices belonged to people returning home to Buenos Aires. Others would soon begin journeys back to Dhaka, Kolkata, Kochi, Chennai, Delhi or Varanasi.

This combination picture shows Paraguay’s midfielder Julio Enciso at the Los Angeles Stadium in Inglewood on June 12, 2026, and France’s forward Kylian Mbappe at the Philadelphia Stadium in Philadelphia on June 22, 2026. Paraguay and France will meet in a 2026 World Cup round of 16 football match at the Philadelphia Stadium in Philadelphia on July 4, 2026.
| Photo Credit: AFP

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth speaks to enlistees after they swear an oath to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces, during an Enlistee Recognition Ceremony at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington, D.C., U.S. June 4, 2026. REUTERS/Elizabeth Frantz
| Photo Credit: ELIZABETH FRANTZ

(This article is part of the View From India newsletter curated by The Hindu’s foreign affairs experts. To get the newsletter in your inbox every Monday, subscribe here.)

Over 8 million people are estimated to have gathered in protest, at the ‘No Kings’ rallies held across the United States and in over a dozen other countries, against the Trump administration. American commentators point to a notable departure in the third ‘No Kings’ protest, where a majority — over 70 % — cited peace and anti-war positions as reason for their participation.  View the protest photos here for an idea of how opposition to Mr. Trump is gaining momentum within the U.S.  

But history has repeatedly shown us that tyrants and bullies are seldom good listeners.  That is also perhaps why Mr. Trump finds himself trapped in a war he cannot sustain. After miscalculating Iran’s ability to respond, he is unable to find the exit route he desperately wants. Mr. Trump is also unable to rein in Israel, which is determined to persist with the ongoing war on Iran, despite Iran decidedly standing up to the two powers.  Amid reports of the Pentagon preparing for weeks of ground operations in Iran, the threat of a prolonged war continues, even as the rest of the world struggles to cope with its impact, especially with shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz — through which 20 % of the world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas passes every day — being brought to a near-standstill.  

Speaking to Stanly Johny, Trita Parsi, co-founder and executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, tells us why this war is unsustainable, regardless of what the U.S. or Israel might believe. A month since the U.S. and Israel launched their war on Iran, President Trump doesn’t have any easy exit options, he says, adding that Israel and the U.S. have different objectives in the war. If the U.S. launches a ground offensive in Iran, it would be more difficult for Mr. Trump to declare victory and exit, he noted. Contrary to Mr. Trump’s frequent claims, “the United States is not winning the war,” Mr. Parsi asserts.  Read the full interview here

You can also watch the conversation here

One month of Israel-U.S. war on Iran – our desk compiled a timeline from February 28, 2026, to March 28, 2026.  Have a look to understand how the conflict, which began with joint Israel-U.S. strikes on February 28, spread throughout West Asia and sent ripples through the global economy. 

Mediating between warring sides  

As global headlines spotlighted Pakistan as a mediator between the two warring sides, India was quick to dismiss Pakistan’s role. Parrying the questions raised by the Opposition regarding the reported central role played by Pakistan in mediating between the U.S. and Iran, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar termed the neighbouring country a “dalal” or broker, often used in a derogatory manner, Sobhana K. Nair and Suhasini Haidar report. Further, responding to criticism over India’s “silence”, Mr. Jaishankar asserted that with nearly one crore Indians living in West Asian countries, it was crucial for India’s strategic and economic interests to maintain a balanced position. Whether in Gaza in the case of Iran, where there is little ambiguity over who the aggressor is, “balance” or “neutrality” appear woefully weak choices, especially for a country that commands attention on the global stage.   

However, Washington’s decision to engage Pakistan as a facilitator for talks may also be rooted in history, given Islamabad, and a different General’s role in facilitating U.S. talks with China 55 years ago, at the height of the Cold War, writes Suhasini Haidar in this flashback piece. At that time, U.S. President Richard Nixon had begun to work on his plan to open up relations with Beijing (U.S. still formally recognised Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC)), but direct Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks had floundered. Pakistan was not the first option, as he and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered others, including Poland, France and Romania. 

Meanwhile, following The New York Times’s recent report on U.S. businessman Elon Musk being present during a call between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Trump, India said that the conversation was only between the two leaders. However, the government did not deny or confirm Mr. Musk’s presence during the call, in which the two leaders discussed the West Asia conflict, reports Suhasini Haidar. New Delhi’s response did not answer the many questions that have risen since, such as why Mr. Musk was present while the two leaders were speaking, presumably on the Iran war; whether India knew of and was comfortable with his presence, and what influence that leaves India with.  

Watch: War in West Asia: Is India’s energy diplomacy holding up? Suhasini Haidar examines where New Delhi stands, in the latest episode of Worldview

Top 5 stories we are reading this week   

1. Mohammad Bagher Zolqadr | Ascent of the Guardsman – Stanly Johny writes on the rise of the former IRGC commander as the Secretary of Iran’s National Security Council, that suggests the Guards are tightening their grip on Iran’s state machinery  

2. Situating Nepal’s current political moment in the long history of feudalism to republican democracy – by Srinivasan Ramani  

3. The Hindu editorial on India-Nepal ties in the new context  

4. Writing on world affairs from the Global South – Srinivasan Ramani urges editorial writers depending on the West for reports to critically reject their imperial frame of reference  

5. G. Sampath profiles Pedro Sanchez, Europe’s only anti-war Prime Minister   

Published – March 30, 2026 02:08 pm IST

A file image of the aftermath of a airstrike on Syria.
| Photo Credit: Getty Images

Praneeth Kumar Usiripalli

Former President Joe Biden speaks after receiving the Lifetime Achievement Award at the Edward M. Kennedy Institute’s 10th Anniversary Celebration, on October 26, 2025, in Boston.
| Photo Credit: AP

Work begins on the demolition of a part of the East Wing of the White House, on October 20, 2025, in Washington, before construction of a new ballroom.
| Photo Credit: AP

On a chilly evening in January 2006, enroute from Islamabad to Muzaffarabad in my host’s hatchback car, we passed through a small town called Abbottabad which is part of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Abbottabad for all practical reasons is an extension of Pothwari-speaking area of Pakistan, which includes Islamabad-Rawalpindi area and northern Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. He stopped the car briefly to buy its famously sweet oranges, and I thought nothing of it.

That fleeting roadside moment was my first and last encounter with a place that five-years-later, would dominate global headlines. On May 2, 2011, while travelling from the United States to India, I switched on my seat-back television mid-flight and heard President Obama announce that the world’s most wanted man, Osama bin Laden, had been killed there bringing to an end a decade-long, meticulously executed search. Instantly, I was reminded of that journey.

Also read | U.S. CENTCOM chief Gen. Michael Kurilla terms Pakistan a ‘phenomenal partner’ in counter-terrorism

That the U.S. Operation Neptune Spear to hunt down Osama took place deep inside Pakistan, far from the Afghan border, was a telling reminder that in future relations between Washington and Islamabad would always be shadowed by a measure of mistrust. The facts of the preceding and following decade also hinted that. As the United States waged its war in Afghanistan and pursued Osama Bin Laden (OBL), a complex partnership emerged between the two countries. Karachi, Pakistan’s key port city, became the hub through which American logistics were landed before making their way to Afghanistan.

Misunderstandings frequently arose, with the U.S. questioning Pakistan’s sincerity and, on several occasions, American personnel and supplies were looted or ambushed, highlighting the fragile and often tense nature of the alliance.

Pentagon and the Pakistani military’s enduring relationship

After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan under the Biden administration, it was widely assumed that Pakistan’s strategic as well as tactical importance to the U.S. had ended for long apart from the mistrust owing to OBL killing. Economically, it offered little leverage, and with Afghanistan no longer a priority for counterterrorism, Washington’s focus appeared to shift elsewhere. In this context, the renewed U.S.–Pakistan engagement, epitomized by visits of General Asim Munir to the U.S., including a luncheon meeting with President Trump has surprised many and become a subject of global discussion, including here and elsewhere with numerous popular Western publications also covering the development.

Several factors have been cited for the recent turnaround in U.S.–Pakistan relations: the discovery of rare earth minerals, the potential deployment of Pakistani troops in Middle East to serve the U.S. interests, Pakistan-centric developments in cryptocurrency, which reportedly may involve one of the U.S. President’s sons or Pakistani diplomatic corps ability to charm President Trump. While all of these factors may or may not have some relevance, a less discussed but enduring element is the relationship between the Pentagon and the Pakistani military, which never fully disappeared and often comes to the surface during Republican-led administrations in the U.S. This dynamic requires a detailed unpacking as this is critical to the understanding of some of the present developments.

Also read | India, Pakistan both partners of U.S. with different points of emphasis: Biden administration

In international affairs, our analyses are often shaped by our own conditioning — the lens formed by the place and perspective from which a piece is written. When one tries to step into the shoes of the U.S. establishment and its own canvas, the picture gains clarity. Pakistan is not merely viewed as a South Asian country by the U.S. establishment, even if culturally it is. Geographically, it occupies a critical position, sharing borders with Iran and Afghanistan, and its religious dimension adds strategic significance.

In the U.S. government’s institutional architecture, Pakistan is frequently grouped with the Middle East and North Africa across several major bureaucratic structures, particularly within the State Department and the Department of Defense. The Pentagon’s U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) includes Pakistan in its area of responsibility (AOR) alongside the Middle East and most of Central and South Asia, excluding India. This deliberate arrangement places Pakistan in the same strategic “theater” as Middle Eastern states, reflecting shared military logistics routes, forward basing considerations, and overlapping security challenges.

At the U.S. State Department, Pakistan falls under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA). However, at higher strategic levels, especially within National Security Council (NSC) planning and in earlier regional constructs, Pakistan has often been treated as part of the “Near East” (the State Department’s term for the Middle East). Functional groupings in areas such as counterterrorism and energy security have reinforced this alignment, linking Pakistan with Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) countries due to its Islamic world connections and strong Gulf ties.

Historically, during the Cold War and into the early 2000s, Pakistan appeared on “Afghanistan–Pakistan” desks that overlapped with Middle East policy portfolios, reflecting its pivotal role in the U.S. engagements involving Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Afghanistan. Mirroring the U.S. institutional structures, many multilateral organizations, particularly in the realms of peace and security, mirror similar framework in their daily work.

Now coming to broader political domain, one has to go with the empirical evidence. The Republican Party-led U.S. administrations have traditionally had a soft corner for the Pakistani military. The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was established in 1955 during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Republican and a celebrated former World War II general. In Pakistan, the agreement came into effect shortly after the military took power in 1958 under General Muhammad Ayub Khan, who replaced President Iskander Mirza in a coup. Unpacking the tenures of President Richard Nixon and President Ronald Reagan, both Republicans, one will find that under both administrations Pakistan’s accessibility to the U.S. aid, both financial as well as military, expanded exponentially. For instance, during President Nixon’s tenure, the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger famously made a secret trip to Beijing via Pakistan in July 1971, even faking a bout of diarrhea to explain his temporary disappearance from the public eye.

Pakistan played a role in this process, alongside other channels, including the U.S. State Department officials in Vietnam and France who were actively working toward the same objective. There were also indications from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) that it sought the UNSC membership, and the U.S., as a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power, wielded significant leverage in this matter. The PRC did become a UNSC permanent member on October 25, 1971 as a result of the U.S.-PRC détente. In any case, Pakistan’s geographic position appears to have been a decisive factor, as evidenced by Kissinger’s visit.

Pakistan’s role in pushing back Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan administration saw a strategic opportunity to bleed the Soviet Union, a policy that would ultimately define the conflict. The United States funnelled billions of dollars in covert aid to the Afghan mujahideen. This assistance was not provided directly, but was instead channelled through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI, under its then chief, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, and later Hamid Gul, acted as the primary conduit for the U.S. arms and funds, which were then distributed to various mujahideen factions. This arrangement gave Pakistan significant control over the insurgency, a dynamic that would have long-term consequences for the region. The extensive record of this partnership, including interviews with key figures like Hamid Gul and the U.S. officials, highlights how the U.S. and Pakistan’s shared goal of expelling the Soviets laid the foundation for a complex and often contradictory alliance. This period further cemented the Republican administration’s distinctive association with Pakista. A symbolic moment of this alliance was the infamous Reagan meeting with the Afghan mujahideen leaders, who were officially referred to as freedom fighters.

Then came the tenure of President George H. W. Bush , another Republican, who largely continued his predecessor’s policies in Afghanistan and toward Pakistan, even as the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the end of the Cold War reshaped the geopolitical landscape. His administration not only maintained security cooperation with Islamabad but also confronted new tensions, particularly over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which led to the imposition of Pressler Amendment sanctions in 1990. This period also coincided with the return of Benazir Bhutto as Pakistan’s Prime Minister (PM), introducing a new political dimension to the U.S.–Pakistan relations. Her civilian leadership represented a potential counterbalance to the traditionally dominant military establishment, creating a delicate and often tenuous equilibrium between the political executive and the uniformed hierarchy. While PM Bhutto sought to assert civilian authority and pursue her own foreign policy priorities, the military continued to wield significant influence over strategic decisions, particularly regarding Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. This duality added layers of complexity to bilateral relations: Washington had to navigate not only Islamabad’s official policies but also the entrenched strategic perspectives of the military, whose historical experiences were shaped by partition, regional conflicts, and Cold War alliances.

Eight-years-later, under President George W. Bush , a Republican, the U.S. policy in the region was profoundly shaped by the seismic events of 9/11 terrorist attack, which redefined both priorities and perceptions. During this time, Pakistani military once again returned to the center stage of the U.S.–Pakistan engagement.

While accidents of history do play a role, coincidences hold true only to a limited extent. The reasons are many. Since the mid-20th century, a general pattern in the U.S. foreign policy has emerged, wherein Republican administrations have tended to favor a pragmatic, security-focused alliance with Pakistan’s military establishment. This approach has often involved a de-emphasis on the promotion of civilian rule and democratic reforms. In contrast, many Democratic party-led administrations have historically been more inclined to condition U.S. assistance on human rights and the strengthening of Pakistan’s civilian government. This distinction was particularly evident during periods of shared security interests, such as the Soviet-Afghan War under President Ronald Reagan and the post-9/11 “War on Terror” under President George W. Bush, both of whom relied heavily on their military counterparts in Pakistan.

Interestingly, this strategic alignment was coupled with a certain ideological compatibility. The Reagan administration’s emphasis on Christian values and a religiously framed worldview found an unlikely resonance with Pakistan — a state created in the name of Islam. While seemingly paradoxical, this has often allowed the two nations to reinforce strategic ties through a shared opposition to Soviet communism and atheism in the past, creating a strange and powerful irony in their alliance.

This Republican party tilt towards the Pentagon is not unique to the U.S.–Pakistan relations; in other parts of the Middle East too, the contest between the Pentagon’s strategic priorities and the State Department’s more liberal, diplomacy-driven approach has often shaped policy outcomes. During the Arab Spring in January 2011, particularly at the height of the protests in Tahrir Square , there was a notable tension between the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department over the appropriate stance of the U.S. government in Egypt. While the U.S. State Department briefly prevailed, the unfolding events revealed the enduring strength of the Egyptian military, which retained both institutional cohesion and firepower. This allowed it to reassert control after the Muslim Brotherhood governance experiment failed, demonstrating the limits of popular uprisings against entrenched military structures in the region.

In sum, the current U.S.–Pakistan dynamic is best understood not as an abrupt policy shift but as the latest expression of a long-standing, security-driven relationship embedded in Washington’s institutional design. The Pentagon’s enduring rapport with Pakistan’s military, shaped by geography, strategic utility, and decades of operational cooperation, continues to operate as a constant, regardless of changes in civilian leadership on either side.

While public narratives may frame such engagements as sudden realignments or transactional bargains, they are in fact rooted in structural and historical realities: Pakistan’s placement within the U.S. strategic “Middle East” theater, the Republican Party’s historical comfort with military-to-military channels, and the mutual familiarity cultivated over generations between the Army leaderships. In this light, the renewed warmth under President Trump and General Asim Munir is less an anomaly and remind us that in the U.S.–Pakistan relations, the past is never truly past. Abbottabad itself captures this truth: what began for me as a roadside pause in 2006, became a symbol of global counterterrorism in 2011, and now endures as a reminder that Pakistan’s role in Washington’s strategic, particularly security calculus, never really disappears.

(The author has 25 years of experience as a practitioner, researcher, and analyst on conflict zones and violent extremism. His work has been published by Columbia University Press, Penguin, and Hurst.)

Washington, United States:

US President Donald Trump took a slap shot at Canada on Thursday, again suggesting a US takeover of the northern neighbor as a “fifty first state” and urging the US hockey team to prevail in a closely watched grudge match. Tensions have soared in the run-up to a tournament final in the US city of Boston following Trump’s ordering of tariffs on Canadian imports — and his repeated verbal assaults on the sovereignty of the longtime close ally.

Brawls between players and booing by Canadian fans of the US national anthem marked the teams’ previous meeting in Montreal on Saturday in the Four Nations Face-Off tournament, a round-robin featuring the NHL’s top players from Canada, Finland, Sweden and the United States.

The US president called Team USA after their morning practice to wish them luck, the White House said, and he will be watching the game on television when the puck drops at 8:00 pm (0100 GMT Friday).

Trump posted on social media that his message to the team was “to spur them on towards victory tonight against Canada, which with FAR LOWER TAXES AND MUCH STRONGER SECURITY, will someday, maybe soon, become our cherished, and very important, Fifty First State.”

Trump said a previous commitment — addressing a gathering of US governors in Washington — will “sadly” prevent him from attending the game in person.

“But we will all be watching, and if Governor Trudeau would like to join us, he would be most welcome,” Trump said on his own platform, Truth Social.

The US president has repeatedly made disparaging references to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as a mere US governor. Trudeau was at the Montreal game.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt echoed the jib, saying, “We look forward to the United States beating our soon to be 51st state.”

Despite the snark, Trump did offer a sporting remark: “Good luck to everybody, and have a GREAT game tonight. So exciting!”

Both teams advanced to the final after eliminating Finland and Sweden.

In the first US-Canada clash, there were three fights between players in the first nine seconds, an emotionally charged opening that many linked to the ugly politics.

Canadians have a long history of taking their national team hockey seriously. But with Trump repeatedly insulting their country, the temperature ahead of Thursday’s final is decidedly icy.

The Toronto Star newspaper on Thursday said Canadian national pride would “surge” should their team prevail in the rematch.

The paper cited a Rogers survey which said more than three-quarters of citizens believe hockey is core to Canada’s national identity, and a similar amount say Canada’s national pride is deeply intertwined with the sport.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)