(This article is part of the View From India newsletter curated by The Hindu’s foreign affairs experts. To get the newsletter in your inbox every Monday, subscribe here.)

Over 8 million people are estimated to have gathered in protest, at the ‘No Kings’ rallies held across the United States and in over a dozen other countries, against the Trump administration. American commentators point to a notable departure in the third ‘No Kings’ protest, where a majority — over 70 % — cited peace and anti-war positions as reason for their participation.  View the protest photos here for an idea of how opposition to Mr. Trump is gaining momentum within the U.S.  

But history has repeatedly shown us that tyrants and bullies are seldom good listeners.  That is also perhaps why Mr. Trump finds himself trapped in a war he cannot sustain. After miscalculating Iran’s ability to respond, he is unable to find the exit route he desperately wants. Mr. Trump is also unable to rein in Israel, which is determined to persist with the ongoing war on Iran, despite Iran decidedly standing up to the two powers.  Amid reports of the Pentagon preparing for weeks of ground operations in Iran, the threat of a prolonged war continues, even as the rest of the world struggles to cope with its impact, especially with shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz — through which 20 % of the world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas passes every day — being brought to a near-standstill.  

Speaking to Stanly Johny, Trita Parsi, co-founder and executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, tells us why this war is unsustainable, regardless of what the U.S. or Israel might believe. A month since the U.S. and Israel launched their war on Iran, President Trump doesn’t have any easy exit options, he says, adding that Israel and the U.S. have different objectives in the war. If the U.S. launches a ground offensive in Iran, it would be more difficult for Mr. Trump to declare victory and exit, he noted. Contrary to Mr. Trump’s frequent claims, “the United States is not winning the war,” Mr. Parsi asserts.  Read the full interview here

You can also watch the conversation here

One month of Israel-U.S. war on Iran – our desk compiled a timeline from February 28, 2026, to March 28, 2026.  Have a look to understand how the conflict, which began with joint Israel-U.S. strikes on February 28, spread throughout West Asia and sent ripples through the global economy. 

Mediating between warring sides  

As global headlines spotlighted Pakistan as a mediator between the two warring sides, India was quick to dismiss Pakistan’s role. Parrying the questions raised by the Opposition regarding the reported central role played by Pakistan in mediating between the U.S. and Iran, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar termed the neighbouring country a “dalal” or broker, often used in a derogatory manner, Sobhana K. Nair and Suhasini Haidar report. Further, responding to criticism over India’s “silence”, Mr. Jaishankar asserted that with nearly one crore Indians living in West Asian countries, it was crucial for India’s strategic and economic interests to maintain a balanced position. Whether in Gaza in the case of Iran, where there is little ambiguity over who the aggressor is, “balance” or “neutrality” appear woefully weak choices, especially for a country that commands attention on the global stage.   

However, Washington’s decision to engage Pakistan as a facilitator for talks may also be rooted in history, given Islamabad, and a different General’s role in facilitating U.S. talks with China 55 years ago, at the height of the Cold War, writes Suhasini Haidar in this flashback piece. At that time, U.S. President Richard Nixon had begun to work on his plan to open up relations with Beijing (U.S. still formally recognised Taiwan as the Republic of China (ROC)), but direct Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial talks had floundered. Pakistan was not the first option, as he and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger considered others, including Poland, France and Romania. 

Meanwhile, following The New York Times’s recent report on U.S. businessman Elon Musk being present during a call between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Trump, India said that the conversation was only between the two leaders. However, the government did not deny or confirm Mr. Musk’s presence during the call, in which the two leaders discussed the West Asia conflict, reports Suhasini Haidar. New Delhi’s response did not answer the many questions that have risen since, such as why Mr. Musk was present while the two leaders were speaking, presumably on the Iran war; whether India knew of and was comfortable with his presence, and what influence that leaves India with.  

Watch: War in West Asia: Is India’s energy diplomacy holding up? Suhasini Haidar examines where New Delhi stands, in the latest episode of Worldview

Top 5 stories we are reading this week   

1. Mohammad Bagher Zolqadr | Ascent of the Guardsman – Stanly Johny writes on the rise of the former IRGC commander as the Secretary of Iran’s National Security Council, that suggests the Guards are tightening their grip on Iran’s state machinery  

2. Situating Nepal’s current political moment in the long history of feudalism to republican democracy – by Srinivasan Ramani  

3. The Hindu editorial on India-Nepal ties in the new context  

4. Writing on world affairs from the Global South – Srinivasan Ramani urges editorial writers depending on the West for reports to critically reject their imperial frame of reference  

5. G. Sampath profiles Pedro Sanchez, Europe’s only anti-war Prime Minister   

Published – March 30, 2026 02:08 pm IST

A file image of the aftermath of a airstrike on Syria.
| Photo Credit: Getty Images

Praneeth Kumar Usiripalli

Former President Joe Biden speaks after receiving the Lifetime Achievement Award at the Edward M. Kennedy Institute’s 10th Anniversary Celebration, on October 26, 2025, in Boston.
| Photo Credit: AP

Work begins on the demolition of a part of the East Wing of the White House, on October 20, 2025, in Washington, before construction of a new ballroom.
| Photo Credit: AP

On a chilly evening in January 2006, enroute from Islamabad to Muzaffarabad in my host’s hatchback car, we passed through a small town called Abbottabad which is part of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Abbottabad for all practical reasons is an extension of Pothwari-speaking area of Pakistan, which includes Islamabad-Rawalpindi area and northern Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. He stopped the car briefly to buy its famously sweet oranges, and I thought nothing of it.

That fleeting roadside moment was my first and last encounter with a place that five-years-later, would dominate global headlines. On May 2, 2011, while travelling from the United States to India, I switched on my seat-back television mid-flight and heard President Obama announce that the world’s most wanted man, Osama bin Laden, had been killed there bringing to an end a decade-long, meticulously executed search. Instantly, I was reminded of that journey.

Also read | U.S. CENTCOM chief Gen. Michael Kurilla terms Pakistan a ‘phenomenal partner’ in counter-terrorism

That the U.S. Operation Neptune Spear to hunt down Osama took place deep inside Pakistan, far from the Afghan border, was a telling reminder that in future relations between Washington and Islamabad would always be shadowed by a measure of mistrust. The facts of the preceding and following decade also hinted that. As the United States waged its war in Afghanistan and pursued Osama Bin Laden (OBL), a complex partnership emerged between the two countries. Karachi, Pakistan’s key port city, became the hub through which American logistics were landed before making their way to Afghanistan.

Misunderstandings frequently arose, with the U.S. questioning Pakistan’s sincerity and, on several occasions, American personnel and supplies were looted or ambushed, highlighting the fragile and often tense nature of the alliance.

Pentagon and the Pakistani military’s enduring relationship

After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan under the Biden administration, it was widely assumed that Pakistan’s strategic as well as tactical importance to the U.S. had ended for long apart from the mistrust owing to OBL killing. Economically, it offered little leverage, and with Afghanistan no longer a priority for counterterrorism, Washington’s focus appeared to shift elsewhere. In this context, the renewed U.S.–Pakistan engagement, epitomized by visits of General Asim Munir to the U.S., including a luncheon meeting with President Trump has surprised many and become a subject of global discussion, including here and elsewhere with numerous popular Western publications also covering the development.

Several factors have been cited for the recent turnaround in U.S.–Pakistan relations: the discovery of rare earth minerals, the potential deployment of Pakistani troops in Middle East to serve the U.S. interests, Pakistan-centric developments in cryptocurrency, which reportedly may involve one of the U.S. President’s sons or Pakistani diplomatic corps ability to charm President Trump. While all of these factors may or may not have some relevance, a less discussed but enduring element is the relationship between the Pentagon and the Pakistani military, which never fully disappeared and often comes to the surface during Republican-led administrations in the U.S. This dynamic requires a detailed unpacking as this is critical to the understanding of some of the present developments.

Also read | India, Pakistan both partners of U.S. with different points of emphasis: Biden administration

In international affairs, our analyses are often shaped by our own conditioning — the lens formed by the place and perspective from which a piece is written. When one tries to step into the shoes of the U.S. establishment and its own canvas, the picture gains clarity. Pakistan is not merely viewed as a South Asian country by the U.S. establishment, even if culturally it is. Geographically, it occupies a critical position, sharing borders with Iran and Afghanistan, and its religious dimension adds strategic significance.

In the U.S. government’s institutional architecture, Pakistan is frequently grouped with the Middle East and North Africa across several major bureaucratic structures, particularly within the State Department and the Department of Defense. The Pentagon’s U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) includes Pakistan in its area of responsibility (AOR) alongside the Middle East and most of Central and South Asia, excluding India. This deliberate arrangement places Pakistan in the same strategic “theater” as Middle Eastern states, reflecting shared military logistics routes, forward basing considerations, and overlapping security challenges.

At the U.S. State Department, Pakistan falls under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA). However, at higher strategic levels, especially within National Security Council (NSC) planning and in earlier regional constructs, Pakistan has often been treated as part of the “Near East” (the State Department’s term for the Middle East). Functional groupings in areas such as counterterrorism and energy security have reinforced this alignment, linking Pakistan with Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) countries due to its Islamic world connections and strong Gulf ties.

Historically, during the Cold War and into the early 2000s, Pakistan appeared on “Afghanistan–Pakistan” desks that overlapped with Middle East policy portfolios, reflecting its pivotal role in the U.S. engagements involving Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Afghanistan. Mirroring the U.S. institutional structures, many multilateral organizations, particularly in the realms of peace and security, mirror similar framework in their daily work.

Now coming to broader political domain, one has to go with the empirical evidence. The Republican Party-led U.S. administrations have traditionally had a soft corner for the Pakistani military. The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was established in 1955 during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Republican and a celebrated former World War II general. In Pakistan, the agreement came into effect shortly after the military took power in 1958 under General Muhammad Ayub Khan, who replaced President Iskander Mirza in a coup. Unpacking the tenures of President Richard Nixon and President Ronald Reagan, both Republicans, one will find that under both administrations Pakistan’s accessibility to the U.S. aid, both financial as well as military, expanded exponentially. For instance, during President Nixon’s tenure, the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger famously made a secret trip to Beijing via Pakistan in July 1971, even faking a bout of diarrhea to explain his temporary disappearance from the public eye.

Pakistan played a role in this process, alongside other channels, including the U.S. State Department officials in Vietnam and France who were actively working toward the same objective. There were also indications from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) that it sought the UNSC membership, and the U.S., as a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power, wielded significant leverage in this matter. The PRC did become a UNSC permanent member on October 25, 1971 as a result of the U.S.-PRC détente. In any case, Pakistan’s geographic position appears to have been a decisive factor, as evidenced by Kissinger’s visit.

Pakistan’s role in pushing back Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan administration saw a strategic opportunity to bleed the Soviet Union, a policy that would ultimately define the conflict. The United States funnelled billions of dollars in covert aid to the Afghan mujahideen. This assistance was not provided directly, but was instead channelled through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI, under its then chief, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, and later Hamid Gul, acted as the primary conduit for the U.S. arms and funds, which were then distributed to various mujahideen factions. This arrangement gave Pakistan significant control over the insurgency, a dynamic that would have long-term consequences for the region. The extensive record of this partnership, including interviews with key figures like Hamid Gul and the U.S. officials, highlights how the U.S. and Pakistan’s shared goal of expelling the Soviets laid the foundation for a complex and often contradictory alliance. This period further cemented the Republican administration’s distinctive association with Pakista. A symbolic moment of this alliance was the infamous Reagan meeting with the Afghan mujahideen leaders, who were officially referred to as freedom fighters.

Then came the tenure of President George H. W. Bush , another Republican, who largely continued his predecessor’s policies in Afghanistan and toward Pakistan, even as the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the end of the Cold War reshaped the geopolitical landscape. His administration not only maintained security cooperation with Islamabad but also confronted new tensions, particularly over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which led to the imposition of Pressler Amendment sanctions in 1990. This period also coincided with the return of Benazir Bhutto as Pakistan’s Prime Minister (PM), introducing a new political dimension to the U.S.–Pakistan relations. Her civilian leadership represented a potential counterbalance to the traditionally dominant military establishment, creating a delicate and often tenuous equilibrium between the political executive and the uniformed hierarchy. While PM Bhutto sought to assert civilian authority and pursue her own foreign policy priorities, the military continued to wield significant influence over strategic decisions, particularly regarding Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. This duality added layers of complexity to bilateral relations: Washington had to navigate not only Islamabad’s official policies but also the entrenched strategic perspectives of the military, whose historical experiences were shaped by partition, regional conflicts, and Cold War alliances.

Eight-years-later, under President George W. Bush , a Republican, the U.S. policy in the region was profoundly shaped by the seismic events of 9/11 terrorist attack, which redefined both priorities and perceptions. During this time, Pakistani military once again returned to the center stage of the U.S.–Pakistan engagement.

While accidents of history do play a role, coincidences hold true only to a limited extent. The reasons are many. Since the mid-20th century, a general pattern in the U.S. foreign policy has emerged, wherein Republican administrations have tended to favor a pragmatic, security-focused alliance with Pakistan’s military establishment. This approach has often involved a de-emphasis on the promotion of civilian rule and democratic reforms. In contrast, many Democratic party-led administrations have historically been more inclined to condition U.S. assistance on human rights and the strengthening of Pakistan’s civilian government. This distinction was particularly evident during periods of shared security interests, such as the Soviet-Afghan War under President Ronald Reagan and the post-9/11 “War on Terror” under President George W. Bush, both of whom relied heavily on their military counterparts in Pakistan.

Interestingly, this strategic alignment was coupled with a certain ideological compatibility. The Reagan administration’s emphasis on Christian values and a religiously framed worldview found an unlikely resonance with Pakistan — a state created in the name of Islam. While seemingly paradoxical, this has often allowed the two nations to reinforce strategic ties through a shared opposition to Soviet communism and atheism in the past, creating a strange and powerful irony in their alliance.

This Republican party tilt towards the Pentagon is not unique to the U.S.–Pakistan relations; in other parts of the Middle East too, the contest between the Pentagon’s strategic priorities and the State Department’s more liberal, diplomacy-driven approach has often shaped policy outcomes. During the Arab Spring in January 2011, particularly at the height of the protests in Tahrir Square , there was a notable tension between the Pentagon and the U.S. State Department over the appropriate stance of the U.S. government in Egypt. While the U.S. State Department briefly prevailed, the unfolding events revealed the enduring strength of the Egyptian military, which retained both institutional cohesion and firepower. This allowed it to reassert control after the Muslim Brotherhood governance experiment failed, demonstrating the limits of popular uprisings against entrenched military structures in the region.

In sum, the current U.S.–Pakistan dynamic is best understood not as an abrupt policy shift but as the latest expression of a long-standing, security-driven relationship embedded in Washington’s institutional design. The Pentagon’s enduring rapport with Pakistan’s military, shaped by geography, strategic utility, and decades of operational cooperation, continues to operate as a constant, regardless of changes in civilian leadership on either side.

While public narratives may frame such engagements as sudden realignments or transactional bargains, they are in fact rooted in structural and historical realities: Pakistan’s placement within the U.S. strategic “Middle East” theater, the Republican Party’s historical comfort with military-to-military channels, and the mutual familiarity cultivated over generations between the Army leaderships. In this light, the renewed warmth under President Trump and General Asim Munir is less an anomaly and remind us that in the U.S.–Pakistan relations, the past is never truly past. Abbottabad itself captures this truth: what began for me as a roadside pause in 2006, became a symbol of global counterterrorism in 2011, and now endures as a reminder that Pakistan’s role in Washington’s strategic, particularly security calculus, never really disappears.

(The author has 25 years of experience as a practitioner, researcher, and analyst on conflict zones and violent extremism. His work has been published by Columbia University Press, Penguin, and Hurst.)

Washington, United States:

US President Donald Trump took a slap shot at Canada on Thursday, again suggesting a US takeover of the northern neighbor as a “fifty first state” and urging the US hockey team to prevail in a closely watched grudge match. Tensions have soared in the run-up to a tournament final in the US city of Boston following Trump’s ordering of tariffs on Canadian imports — and his repeated verbal assaults on the sovereignty of the longtime close ally.

Brawls between players and booing by Canadian fans of the US national anthem marked the teams’ previous meeting in Montreal on Saturday in the Four Nations Face-Off tournament, a round-robin featuring the NHL’s top players from Canada, Finland, Sweden and the United States.

The US president called Team USA after their morning practice to wish them luck, the White House said, and he will be watching the game on television when the puck drops at 8:00 pm (0100 GMT Friday).

Trump posted on social media that his message to the team was “to spur them on towards victory tonight against Canada, which with FAR LOWER TAXES AND MUCH STRONGER SECURITY, will someday, maybe soon, become our cherished, and very important, Fifty First State.”

Trump said a previous commitment — addressing a gathering of US governors in Washington — will “sadly” prevent him from attending the game in person.

“But we will all be watching, and if Governor Trudeau would like to join us, he would be most welcome,” Trump said on his own platform, Truth Social.

The US president has repeatedly made disparaging references to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau as a mere US governor. Trudeau was at the Montreal game.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt echoed the jib, saying, “We look forward to the United States beating our soon to be 51st state.”

Despite the snark, Trump did offer a sporting remark: “Good luck to everybody, and have a GREAT game tonight. So exciting!”

Both teams advanced to the final after eliminating Finland and Sweden.

In the first US-Canada clash, there were three fights between players in the first nine seconds, an emotionally charged opening that many linked to the ugly politics.

Canadians have a long history of taking their national team hockey seriously. But with Trump repeatedly insulting their country, the temperature ahead of Thursday’s final is decidedly icy.

The Toronto Star newspaper on Thursday said Canadian national pride would “surge” should their team prevail in the rematch.

The paper cited a Rogers survey which said more than three-quarters of citizens believe hockey is core to Canada’s national identity, and a similar amount say Canada’s national pride is deeply intertwined with the sport.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

If an alien were to gain insights into the immigrant ‘situation’ currently playing out in the US, the Netflix show Mo would act as a good gateway. Except, it might lead the alien to believe that there are no Indian immigrants, legal or illegal, in the US.

Mo, the semi-autobiographical comedy created by Palestinian-American comic Mo Amer, along with Egyptian-American Ramy Youssef, traces the life of Mohammad ‘Mo’ Najjar, whose family arrived in Houston two decades ago as Palestinian asylum seekers from Kuwait. Through two seasons, the series has captured the hopes, dreams, despair, deceit, dehumanisation, discriminatory cultural practices, etc., that define the immigrant experience. Mo’s family is the vehicle through which the heated ongoing debate on immigration in the US is carried to different parts of the world in an airy, easy manner. Quite in contrast with military aircrafts full of deported illegal immigrants.

Where Are The Indians?

Mo grew up in Houston, speaking Arabic, Spanish, and English, and has hustled all his life to take care of his family after his father’s death. His struggles are everyone’s struggles, only exacerbated by the undocumented status of his family. His social circle is full of other immigrants to the US—Africans, Hispanics, Arabs, and everyone else in between. 

But, what about Indians? 

It is interesting that despite living in Houston, a city with the largest South Asian population in the US, Mo has managed to steer clear of them in both seasons. Just like Mo has managed to steer clear of October 7, 2023. According to the 2020 census, Houston is home to about 165,000 Indians, the seventh-largest in the US. 

On Culture And Divide

After Hispanic and Vietnamese immigrants, Indians account for the single largest immigrant community in Houston. So why does Mo never interact with one? He grew up in Alief, a working-class suburb in southwest Houston, which was the most culturally and ethnically diverse school district in the US in 1996. A news report on Alief in 2006 sums it up succinctly in one sentence: “The district’s 47,000 students speak nearly 70 tongues.” Yet, we do not see a single Indian in Mo’s immigrant universe. 

Could it be owing to the cultural insularity that Indian immigrants are (in)famous for? A Carnegie survey from 2021 found, “Indian Americans—especially members of the first generation—tend to socialise with other Indian Americans. Internally, the social networks of Indian Americans are more homogenous in terms of religion than either Indian region (state) of origin or caste”. Another relevant finding is that “divisions in India are being reproduced within the Indian American community”. 

Is it, then, possible that Indian immigrants, primarily Hindus, choose to have minimal consociational engagement with Mo’s community? Maybe, therefore, Indians are not even a footnote in Mo’s story. 

Mo is not entirely blameless, either. Devout Muslims, the Najjars are uncomfortable with the idea of embracing non-Muslims in the family’s fold. Religion dictates their worldview as much as their regional identity as “stateless” Palestinians. Yusra, Mo’s mother, disapproves of his relationship with Mexican Maria, who wears her Catholicism on her sleeve as a tattoo. When Maria starts a rebound relationship with an Israeli-Jewish guy called Guy, she does so knowing that Mo won’t be able to forgive that, thus making it easier for her to move on.

An ‘Elite’ Immigrant

Or, maybe there’s another explanation for the absence of Indian immigrants in this beloved story of the immigrant realities in the US. A 2023 Pew survey shows that the median income of the immigrant Indian households is “greater than the median household income among Asian Americans overall”. So, Mo’s tattoo artist friend, who is also doubling as an emergency surgeon suturing his bullet graze, and his codeine dealer, a fellow hustler, is a man of Southeast Asian/Chinese origin. It is the underbelly of the immigrant American society that makes up Mo’s universe. 

Mo, however, is an ‘elite’ immigrant. He realises this when he spends time first in a cartel’s and later in a “coyote’s” dungeon in Mexico, holding prospective illegals with an American dream. Even though Mo’s family is struggling financially, they didn’t have to undertake a life-threatening journey to the US. However, many of those currently being deported to India had to. After paying a hefty sum—almost as much as the Rolling Stone figure of $10,000 quoted by Nick, Mo’s childhood friend. Yet, upon landing in the US territory, is the shared misery of the mule “dunki” route forgotten in the race to realise the American dream? 

As per the World Bank, India received $125 billion in remittances, a much more significant sum than the $71.92 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2023-24. Undocumented immigrants, living and working under deportation fears, send a bigger chunk of their earnings back home. Maybe this is why Indians do not frequent gaming arcades and clubs that Mo and his friends often haunt. And those who can afford doing so prefer to socialise among their own.

Whatever the reasons are, Indians’ absence from this saga of immigration is conspicuous and demands a think about the home and the world. 

(The author is a Delhi-based author and academic.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

As world leaders gathered in Munich, Germany, for Europe’s top annual security conference, placating, pleasing, and managing US President Donald Trump stood as a top agenda. Trump’s phone call to Russia’s Vladimir Putin, US Vice-President J.D. Vance’s disruptive speech challenging Europe, and, by association, the very nature of trans-Atlantic alliances, and demands to end the Ukraine conflict, has led to a mad rush to host such a process, in the Gulf. The question that perhaps comes immediately to mind, even though the conflict in Gaza remains a major global flashpoint, is, why?

The Meeting Between Rubio And Lavrov

Russia and the US are preparing to start initial consultations on Ukraine following an ice-breaking meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh. For Saudi Arabia and its powerful heir-apparent, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, this is a moment of both regional and global reckoning. Gulf powers in the Middle East have now been for a while re-positioning and re-posturing their geopolitics. This process started much before Trump’s return to the White House—arguably, prior to even the Russian war against Ukraine. The roots of this shift lie in two main realities. First, a change in the construct of global power contestation, that is, a bi-polar competition between the US and China and a demand for multipolarity by a host of middle powers looking to secure their own interests and not get caught in the Washington-Beijing dynamics. The second reality relates to a general idea of the US becoming increasingly unwilling to mobilise militarily power to protect its allies.

Reconsidering America’s Role

Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are evaluating the very fundamentals of the decades-long American hegemony, which has provided security blankets in the region. This also provides them with an opportunity to build their own geopolitical repertoire as middle powers with their own agency, instead of being viewed as client states, a tag that has plagued many of them for decades. The UAE as well has thrown its hat into the ring, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy landed in Abu Dhabi, mere hours after both Russia and the US eluded to excluding Kyiv from talks regarding Ukraine’s own future (Zelenskyy later cancelled a planned visit to Saudi). While this position by the Trump administration delivered tremors across European capitals, it has also played into an increasingly constrained space between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for regional influence. And peace diplomacy, or mediation, is the flavour of the day.

However, the proverbial gold-rush to host Ukraine talks has more solid foundations in regional competition than an international one. For long, Oman has been the state that has consistently pitched itself as the main mediator, playing the role of ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’, where Muscat seemingly prioritises neutrality and offers a common ground for warring parties, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthi militia, or even the US and Iran, to talk.

The Qatar Question

Saudi Arabia and the UAE installed a blockade against Qatar between 2017 and 2021 for what they saw as Doha not aligning and punching above its weight, and, more specifically, for its support for Political Islam. But the Qatari leadership had another trick up its sleeve to ratchet its power quotient. In February 2020, under Trump’s first tenure, the Taliban in Afghanistan and the US signed a historic agreement for the latter’s exit from a two-decade long war in the country. Doha hosted the political office for the Taliban, and managed Kabul, to deliver this outcome to a president who, more than anything else, adores deals. This “success” gained Qatar the title of becoming America’s first and preferred ‘major non-NATO ally’ in the region. Today, Qatar also hosts America’s largest military base in the Middle East. For others, such as the UAE, the meteoric rise of Qatar’s influence in Washington was seen as a challenge. Within Abu Dhabi, questions were raised with Emirati diplomats in the US on why the Taliban’s office was not hosted in either Abu Dhabi or Dubai.

Saudi And UAE Have Bigger Goals

For Saudi Arabia, despite its functional relations with Russia and China alike, a security relationship with the US remains paramount. The same strategic aim is consistent for the UAE as well, one of the few Arab states that normalised relations with Israel as part of the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords and which continues to have functional relations with Iran. Despite continuing pressures on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to help deliver lasting solutions to the Israel-Palestine crisis and the Israel-Hamas war, both have broader, long-term aims with regard to their positions as poles-of-power within a multipolar framework. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi share this world view with the likes of India, but American power projection is infinitely more critical to political structures in the Middle East. This is truer today after the experience of the Arab Spring, and, more recently, the collapse of the Bashar Al Assad regime in Syria at the hands of a self-styled ‘lapsed’ jihadist group, the Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS).

Is This The Future Of Mediation?

The Saudis are not stopping just at giving space to the US and Russia to debate Ukraine. As per reports, Riyadh is also open to hosting talks between Iran and the US over the former’s nuclear programme. The Saudi-Iran détente was achieved in March 2023 with the help of China, the main competitor to the US, and a state that has unreservedly supported Arab positions in Gaza. Beijing, meanwhile, also remains open to mediating and helping to bridge political gaps across the region. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visits to the region have been welcomed with gusto by Saudi Arabia and the UAE alike, both as a function of being the world’s second-largest economic power and using this position to hedge risk with Western partners. The future of mediation between the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi-Doha trifecta is a cat and mouse game within the Arab construct. External powers such as the US, Russia, and China, are part of the utility kit. This push for one-upmanship will have a tremendous impact on regional politics where in the coming years economic and political competition is only expected to increase.

(Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Ryadh:

Russia and the United States on Tuesday agreed to establish teams to negotiate a path to ending the war in Ukraine after talks that drew a strong rebuke from Kyiv over its exclusion.

Washington noted European nations would have to have a seat at the negotiating table “at some point”, following the first high-level official Washington-Moscow talks since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Some European leaders, alarmed by President Donald Trump’s overhaul of US policy on Russia, fear Washington will make serious concessions to Moscow and re-write the continent’s security arrangement in a Cold War-style deal.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky slammed his nation’s exclusion from the Riyadh gathering, which lasted for more than four hours.

He said that any talks aimed at ending the war should be “fair” and involve European countries, including Turkey — which offered to host negotiations.

“This will only be feeding Putin’s appetite,” a Ukrainian senior official requesting anonymity told AFP, referring to the launch of talks without Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov agreed to “appoint respective high-level teams to begin working on a path to ending the conflict in Ukraine as soon as possible”, the US State Department said.

Washington added that the sides had also agreed to “establish a consultation mechanism” to address “irritants” to Russia and America’s relationship, noting the sides would lay the groundwork for future cooperation.

Yuri Ushakov, President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy aide, confirmed the negotiating teams’ appointment but said it was “difficult” to discuss a date for a potential Trump-Putin meeting.

– ‘Heard each other’ –

The meeting marks a major diplomatic coup for Moscow, which had been isolated for three years under the previous US administration of then-president Joe Biden.

Moscow’s economic negotiator, Kirill Dmitriev, said Western attempts to isolate Russia had “obviously failed”, revelling in the talks.

“We did not just listen but heard each other, and I have reason to believe the American side has better understood our position,” Lavrov told reporters.

The veteran diplomat noted that Russia opposed any deployment of NATO-nation troops to Ukraine as part of an eventual ceasefire.

European allies publicly diverged this week over the question of whether they would be open to sending truce peacekeepers to Ukraine.

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer said he was prepared to consider committing British soldiers.

French President Emmanuel Macron on Tuesday told a regional newspaper that while Paris was not “preparing to send ground troops, which are belligerent to the conflict, to the front”, it was considering, sending “experts or even troops in limited terms, outside any conflict zone”.

Meanwhile German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that any debate on the matter was “completely premature”.

Macron said he would host another round of talks with European and non-European nations on Wednesday, after an emergency meeting on Monday in Paris which brought together a small number of key European countries.

Russia sketched out some of its perspectives on future talks, arguing that settling the war required a reorganisation of Europe’s defence agreements.

Moscow has long called for the withdrawal of NATO forces from eastern Europe, viewing the alliance as an existential threat on its flank.

Before invading Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow had demanded NATO pull out of central and eastern Europe.

Rubio had briefed key European ministers on the Riyadh talks on Tuesday, acknowledging that Europe would need to be involved at some point.

“There are other parties that have sanctions (on Russia), the European Union is going to have to be at the table at some point because they have sanctions as well,” Rubio told them.

– ‘How to start negotiations’ –

The negotiations at Riyadh’s Diriyah Palace in Riyadh began without visible handshakes.

Both Russia and the United States had cast Tuesday’s meeting as the beginning of a potentially lengthy process and downplayed the prospects of a breakthrough.  

Trump has said he wants to end the war in Ukraine, but has thus far presented no concrete plan.

The United States has told both sides that concessions will have to be made if any talks materialise.

Russia on the eve of the summit said there cannot be even a “thought” on it giving up territory seized from Ukraine.

The Kremlin on Tuesday said that Ukraine had the “right” to join the European Union, but not the NATO military alliance.

It also said Putin was “ready” to negotiate with Zelensky “if necessary”,

But it again questioned his “legitimacy” — a reference to his five-year term expiring last year, despite Ukrainian law not requiring elections during wartime.

The Ukrainian leader was in Turkey on Tuesday for discussions on the conflict with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)