U.S.-Iran conflict – Artifex.News

Breaching the target: On India’s retail inflation

admin — Thu, 16 Jul 2026 19:53:00 +0000

India’s retail inflation breached the RBI’s 4% target for the first time under the new CPI series, rising to 4.38% in June from 3.93% in May and about 2.7% a year earlier. The latest print reflects a broader pass-through of price pressures that had, until recently, remained concentrated at the producer level, largely driven by spiralling transport and fuel costs since the U.S.-Iran conflict in late February. Consequently, the gap between wholesale and retail inflation has only marginally narrowed. Wholesale inflation (WPI), now based on 2022-23, remained elevated at 9.87% in June, up from 9.68% in May. Fuel and power continued to exert the greatest pressure on producers, recording inflation of 27.41%, only marginally lower than May’s 28.18%. As India imports nearly 90% of its crude oil requirements, the value of merchandise imports surged to $70.8 billion in June from about $54.1 billion a year earlier, even though import volumes did not rise proportionately. This underscores how imported inflation, amplified by crude prices that briefly crossed $110 a barrel, has driven systemic price pressures across the economy. The rupee’s sharp depreciation during the conflict added to these pressures, although RBI intervention in the foreign exchange market helped cushion the fall.

The transport category merits closer examination. Transport inflation more than doubled to 4.31% in June from 1.75% in May, while the sub-group, “transport services for goods”, remained elevated, rising to 7.70% from 7.63%. Another notable pressure point has been restaurants and hotels. Although the government announced a modest reduction in commercial LPG prices earlier this month, it has done little to offset the steep increases through May and June, when the price of a 19.2 kg commercial cylinder in Delhi climbed to around ₹2,930 before easing marginally. The system-wide impact is also evident in food prices, with the Consumer Food Price Index (CFPI) rising to 5.32% from 4.78% in May. Another significant price pressure on the CFPI that must be factored in is the projection of a deficient southwest monsoon and its impact on agriculture, though the extent will become clearer in the weeks ahead. Meanwhile, despite the Centre more than doubling import duties on gold and silver from 6% to 15% in May, Commerce Ministry data suggest that bullion imports have remained robust amid global uncertainty, contributing to higher jewellery prices and household inflation. Although the ceasefire announced in late June briefly eased crude prices, they have begun rising again. Given continuing geopolitical uncertainty and persistent upstream price pressures, inflation is unlikely to return to the RBI’s 4% target soon, leaving no room for a rate cut at the Monetary Policy Committee’s August meeting.

Published – July 17, 2026 12:10 am IST

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Why Iran insists on controlling the Strait of Hormuz

admin — Mon, 13 Jul 2026 08:23:00 +0000

Vessels sail through the Strait of Hormuz, Musandam, Oman. File
| Photo Credit: Reuters

The memorandum of understanding (MoU), signed by the U.S. and Iran on June 17, promising to extend the ceasefire and launch talks on Iran’s nuclear programme and Western sanctions, is falling apart. U.S. President Donald Trump has declared that the “ceasefire is over”. According to Tehran, parts of the MoU have been rendered “ineffective” by American actions. Both sides have accused each other of violating the MoU.

Also Read: West Asia conflict LIVE updates on July 13, 2026

The U.S. has carried out air strikes on hundreds of targets across Iran, while Tehran has retaliated by attacking U.S. bases in several Persian Gulf countries as well as Jordan. At the heart of the renewed violence lies a dispute over Article 5 of the MoU, which requires Iran to “make arrangements” for the “safe passage of commercial vessels” through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has designated a new shipping route along its coast, while the U.S. Navy has cleared an alternative route along Oman’s coast. Iran sees this move as a violation of the clause by the U.S.

Last week, three tankers using the U.S.-backed route came under Iranian attacks. The U.S. says the attacks constituted a violation of the MoU by Iran. It launched air strikes in Iran, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has since announced the temporary closure of the strait.

In the MoU, the U.S. has made several concessions to Iran. It lifted its maritime blockade, issued a sanctions waiver for Iranian crude and other petroleum products and also promised that Iran would get access to some of its frozen funds. After last week’s escalation, the U.S. has revoked the waiver and reimposed some sanctions on Iran. But Tehran seems determined to retain its grip over the strait, one of the world’s most important commercial chokepoints, even at the risk of an all-out war and reversal of the purported gains of the MoU. Why?

A battlefield at sea

Both the U.S. and Iran see the Strait of Hormuz as critical to shaping the future balance of power in the Persian Gulf. While Gulf countries are exploring ways to reduce their dependence on the strait through alternative pipelines and trade corridors, such efforts are unlikely to significantly diminish its importance any time soon. In 2025, about 20 million barrels of oil a day passed through the strait, along with more than 112 billion cubic metres of LNG. It also handled one-third of global seaborne urea trade, one-third of global seaborne ammonia trade, and 40% of global seaborne sulphur exports — together accounting for roughly 30% of global fertiliser trade. The Strait of Hormuz will therefore remain a critical artery linking the Persian Gulf to the global economy. Control over the waterway would give any regional power enormous strategic and economic leverage. Whoever controls the strait could emerge as a regional great power.

Iran believes, as articulated by several of its leaders, that it has inflicted a strategic defeat on the U.S. and Israel as both sides failed to achieve their declared objectives. A closer analysis of the Iranian position suggests that Iran knew that its ability to shut down the strait played a critical part in this “victory”, forcing the U.S. to agree to a ceasefire and later to an MoU which largely favoured Tehran. So Tehran doesn’t want to give up this leverage. If the U.S. Navy institutionalises an alternative crossing along Oman’s coast, Iran fears it would lose this leverage.

With little trust between the two sides, Iran wants to establish credible deterrence by asserting control over the strait rather than relying on American promises in the MoU, including sanctions relief. Tehran calculates that if it can absorb the short-term costs and institutionalise its control over the strait, it would fundamentally transform the country’s regional position, and sanctions relief could follow. The U.S., for the same reason, wants to deny Iran that leverage. It doesn’t want Tehran to emerge as the sole custodian of the strait and the dominant power in the Persian Gulf.

New reality

Iran also has a long-term strategic reason to fight this war over the strait. When the U.S. and Israel launched the war on February 28, it was about Iran’s nuclear programme, its offensive capabilities and its support for non-state actors. Both Israel and the U.S. sought regime change through air strikes to meet their objectives. Today, four and a half months since the war started, even the Americans are not talking about Iran’s missiles or its ties with Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis and Hashad. The U.S. wants to resolve the nuclear question, but Iran has tactfully shelved talks on the nuclear programme to the next round.

The first round – the MoU phase – was about ending the war and removing the bottlenecks in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. Now that the MoU is falling apart and Iran and the U.S. are fighting over the status of the strait, the nuclear issue, America’s principal strategic objective, has receded further into the background. In effect, Iran has tied its adversary to a problem that did not exist before the war (The strait was open and uncontested until February 28), while the original problem, the nuclear programme, has moved beyond the immediate focus of the conflict.

For Mr. Trump, the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz should be resolved first – either through force or through talks — before negotiations on the nuclear programme can even begin.

Published – July 13, 2026 01:25 pm IST

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The long-term implications of the U.S.-Iran deal

admin — Tue, 16 Jun 2026 18:55:00 +0000

The world is holding its breath with respect to the June 14 adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Iran and the United States for a cessation of hostilities and a 60-day period of negotiation to iron out their thorny differences. The scepticism stems from at least two scores of premature claims by U.S. President Donald Trump. Moreover, this is only the beginning of a meandering journey pebbled with numerous obstacles. Vicious bloodletting in two wars during the past year has exacerbated instinctual mutual distrust. Hence, even this vaguely worded framework is no mean feat.

Can the world now hope for a durable resolution to this multifaceted crisis, or does the MoU merely kick the can down the road? Some contextual developments create a space for cautious optimism. The respective announcements by both Tehran and Washington are factual and measured, eschewing trenchant triumphalism and demonisation. They have emphasised the complexity of negotiations; both realise that their asymmetric wars were militarily unwinnable, and a sustainable solution would require political negotiations with the recalcitrant enemy. The twin Hormuz blockades morphed into economic attrition, and Iran’s threat of expanding the next war beyond the region, with the Houthis choking the Bab el-Mandeb strait again, was foreboding. Both sides were also facing growing domestic discontent, with their respective erratic conduct alienating supporters and neighbours. In front of the international community, both nations have lost their moral high ground, each appearing as irresponsible and vindictive.

A long road

The scope and complexity of the current issues are daunting. These include the question of U.S. sanctions, a release of over $100 billion of frozen Iranian assets, regional issues such as the crisis in Lebanon and the problem of U.S. military bases, and the demand for reparations. However, Iran’s nuclear enrichment and its assertion of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz are deal breakers. Since President Trump tore down the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, he now insists on a “better” deal, requiring Iran to export enriched uranium. However, Iranian hardliners are steadfastly opposed to this diktat. Moreover, Iran’s closure of the Hormuz chokepoint has caused the “biggest energy disruption in human history”, creating havoc for the global economy. A resolution of these two contentious issues would require protracted negotiations and creativity, allowing both sides to claim victories. A $300 billion fund to reconstruct Iran with U.S. companies, a typically bizarre Trumpian transactional diplomacy, is also reportedly on the table. Here, one must also mention the various other influences in the negotiation chamber — Israel and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) significantly influence the thinking at the White House, while China and Russia each have an inside track in Tehran. Pakistan, the official mediator, also has its own multiple axes to grind.

Discernible undercurrents

Irrespective of largely unaltered borders and an endgame that has barely commenced, the past three years of hostilities have triggered seismic geopolitical changes in West Asia and beyond, irretrievably unhinging its longstanding strategic paradigms. While the situation is still evolving, some basic medium-to-long-term undercurrents are discernible.

First, the two Iran wars have dramatically overturned numerous basic global assumptions. It has shown the limits of American hyperpower with its penchant for military solutions, high-tech battlefield dominance, air superiority doctrine, social media-provoked mass uprising etc. Iran was able to counter this with incipient strategies; careful planning for asymmetric warfare; smart and cost-effective tactics; a resilient and coherent command structure; leveraging of geostrategic assets; resolute supply chains and defence production among others. American MAGA (Make America Great Again) hotheads and Chinese wolf-warriors may need to pull in their claws, hopefully, making the world a safer place.

Moreover, the failure of ad-hoc coercive diplomacy may bring back multilateralism. Nations are now going to fret more about choke points, preventive diplomacy, robust supply lines, and adequate strategic reserves for essential inputs. Physical security and the succession of command of the political leadership would be prioritised and ruggedised.

Second, the hobbled return to regional peace may be catastrophic for global hydrocarbon supplies as depleting strategic reserves compete with demand destruction. In the long-term, high prices and volatility would destroy demand and hasten us towards the ‘peak oil’ scenario (a hypothetical point where global crude oil demand reaches its maximum rate and begins to decline). The disruptions have underscored the indispensability of higher strategic oil reserves and clean energy.

Third, there are two regional shifts which are currently underway. While U.S.-Israel relations remain strategic, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s mesmerisation of Mr. Trump has waned. The GCC states were traumatised by the U.S.-Israel coalition’s “wars of choice”. Apart from the collateral damage from Iranian attacks on their vital infrastructure, their exports via Hormuz also suffered. To add insult to injury, Washington neither consulted the GCC nor adequately protected them from Iranian retaliation. Moreover, the Pentagon’s failure to anticipate the Iranian regime’s staying power, Hormuz closure, or a plausible exit strategy has raised doubts about its war planning. This unsavoury experience has seriously undermined America’s credibility as a security provider for the GCC. They are likely to reassess their geostrategic alignments as they contend with a weakened but defiant Iran. Their sub-optimal past experiences with external defence tie-ups may leave them with a Hobson’s choice to shore up their defences, either individually or collectively. Given the GCC disunity, especially the Saudi-Emirati rivalry, burying their hatchets may not be easy, forcing them to accommodate and appease Iran individually. Alternatively, the Iranian grip on the Arab world’s Shia militias, particularly in Iraq, may loosen, allowing a reassertion of their Arab and tribal identities.

A more defiant Iran

Fourth, while the Iranian state has defied existential threats, it has now convulsed and radicalised. Regionally friendless, the theocratic regime is in suspended apprehension amidst escalating foreign pressure and a brewing domestic blowback. Left to themselves, the Iranian leadership would insist on a strategic deterrence based on both nuclear latency and control of the Strait of Hormuz. But they also realise that this maximalism may scupper the forthcoming negotiations. A small but significant minority of Iran’s leadership now believes that the Iranian capacity to block the Strait of Hormuz is the new and more potent deterrence than nuclear ambiguity. Instead of ensuring the Islamic Republic’s survival, Iran’s nuclear fixation has attained the opposite: entrenching Israel-U.S. enmity against it. Its direct cumulative costs are estimated at $100 billion, and if Western sanctions are factored in, costs will rise manifold. They argue that the nuclear strategy can be replaced by Iran’s real or presumptive control over Hormuz, already proven to be an effective ‘weapon of mass disruption’.

Tellingly, while Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s statements have frequently asserted national sovereignty over Hormuz, he has not specifically referred to the indispensability of the nuclear programme. If this incipient shift in deterrence gets traction in Tehran, it could upend Iranian and regional geopolitics.

Tehran’s control over Hormuz would be legally questionable and problematic for the global economy, especially for other littoral states. However, an innovative architecture can improve the optics, say, by creating a littoral inter-governmental Hormuz management framework, with Iran as primus inter pares.

And finally, in West Asia, those defeated on the battlefield often resort to terrorism to redeem their “lost honour”. Israel’s single-minded drive for a military solution against the ‘axis of resistance’ and the simultaneous weakening of Iran create such ‘opportunities’. The pro-Iranian militias, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon, may go deeper underground to wage their mini-wars against perceived enemies. The decline of Iran and its proxies may give a second wind to the region’s Sunni non-state actors such as the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Kurds, IS-Khorasan, and Jaish al-Adl.

Even if only a few of these forebodings are realised, one could ask if the botched surgery to decapitate Iran has not plunged the entire world into intensive care.

Mahesh Sachdev is a former Indian Ambassador with an interest in West Asia and oil matters

Published – June 17, 2026 12:25 am IST

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Trump says agreement with Iran ‘largely negotiated,’ includes opening strait

admin — Sat, 23 May 2026 23:07:00 +0000

U.S. President Donald Trump said on Saturday (May 23, 2026) a deal with Iran had been “largely negotiated,” with the proposal including opening the crucial Strait of Hormuz, though the agreement was “subject to finalisation.”

“An Agreement has been largely negotiated, subject to finalisation between the United States of America, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the various other Countries,” Mr. Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform, listing a number of West Asia powers along with Turkey and mediator Pakistan.

Also Read: Iran-Israel war LIVE

“In addition to many other elements of the Agreement, the Strait of Hormuz will be opened,” he said.

Among the West Asia countries whose leaders joined a call on Saturday (May 23, 2026) to discuss the deal were Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain, Mr. Trump said.

He added that he had a separate call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying it “likewise went very well.”

“Final aspects and details of the Deal are currently being discussed, and will be announced shortly,” Mr. Trump said.

His optimistic post came after Iranian officials said gaps remained between the parties, and that the dispute over its nuclear program would not be part of the initial talks. Tehran said it was finalising a 14-point framework for a deal.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei noted what he called “a trend towards rapprochement,” but said, “it does not necessarily mean that we and the United States will reach an agreement on the important issues.”

“Our intention was first to draft a memorandum of understanding, a kind of framework agreement composed of 14 clauses,” he said on State television.

Mr. Baghaei added that he hoped the details of a final agreement could be worked out “within a reasonable timeframe between 30 to 60 days” after the framework is finalised.

‘Another act of folly’

Iran’s chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had warned earlier that Washington would face a tough response if it resumed hostilities, after U.S. media reports raised the prospect of new strikes and Iranian officials accused the U.S. side of making “excessive demands.”

“Our armed forces have rebuilt themselves during the ceasefire period in such a way that if Mr. Trump commits another act of folly and restarts the war, it will certainly be more crushing and bitter for the United States than on the first day of the war,” Mr. Ghalibaf said.

He issued the warning after meeting in Tehran with Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, a leading figure in international efforts to negotiate an end to the war, which broke out after the United States and Israel attacked the Islamic republic on February 28.

Weeks of negotiations, including historic face-to-face talks hosted by Islamabad, have still not produced a permanent resolution or restored full access to the Strait of Hormuz, choking vast quantities of global oil supply.

‘Neither war nor peace’

The impasse has left ordinary Iranians in limbo.

“The state of ‘neither war nor peace’ is far filthier than war itself,” 39-year-old Tehran resident Shahrzad told AFP.

“I’m about to start a new job, and I’m scared war might break out again, that I’ll end up leaving the job like before, running off to another city out of fear,” she said.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in a call with UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres that Tehran was engaged despite “repeated betrayals of diplomacy and military aggression against Iran, along with contradictory positions and repeated excessive demands” by Washington.

Mr. Araghchi held a bevvy of diplomatic calls, speaking with counterparts from Turkey, Iraq, Qatar and Oman, Iran’s official IRNA news agency said.

Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani also spoke with Mr. Trump on Saturday (May 23, 2026), as well as with the UAE president and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

An official Qatari statement said Sheikh Tamim and the Saudi prince discussed efforts “aimed at calming the situation and promoting political solutions.”

On another front in the war, Lebanese state media said Israel struck the country’s south on Saturday (May 23, 2026), as fighting has not stopped despite an April 17 ceasefire.

Lebanon’s military said one strike targeted a Lebanese army barracks in the south and wounded a soldier.

Israel said one of its soldiers was killed on Friday (May 22, 2026) near the border with Lebanon.

Iran-backed Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the war on March 2 with rocket fire at Israel after U.S.-Israeli strikes killed Iran’s supreme leader.

Hezbollah said on Saturday (May 23, 2026) its chief Naim Qassem had received a message from Mr. Araghchi indicating that Iran “will not give up its support” for the Lebanese group.

Published – May 24, 2026 04:37 am IST

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Rubio cites some progress on Iran talks but ‘we’re not there yet’

admin — Fri, 22 May 2026 16:34:00 +0000

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaks with journalists during a meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Helsingborg, Sweden, on May 22, 2026.
| Photo Credit: AP

The United States has seen some progress in talks with Iran and ‌is in constant communication with the Pakistani mediators, but there is more work ⁠to be done, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Friday (May 22, 2026).

“There’s been some progress. I wouldn’t ‌exaggerate it. I wouldn’t diminish it,” Mr. Rubio told reporters after a NATO ministers ‌meeting in Sweden.

“There’s more work ‌to ⁠be done,” he added. “We’re not there yet. ⁠I hope we get there.”

President Donald Trump would prefer to do a good deal, Mr. Rubio said. The core concern remains ‌that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon and the issue of future uranium enrichment needs to be discussed, as well as ‌reopening the Strait of Hormuz, he said.

“We’re dealing with a very difficult group of people, and if it ⁠doesn’t change, then the president’s been clear he has other options,” Mr. Rubio said.

“He prefers ‌the negotiated option and having a good deal, but he himself has expressed concern that maybe that’s not possible. But we’re going to keep trying.”

Mr. Rubio said the United States was in constant communication with the ‌Pakistanis, who are facilitating the talks with Iran.

There was no specific ask from the U.S. on Friday (May 22, 2026) for help from ⁠NATO on the Strait of Hormuz, but ⁠there needs to be a Plan B if Iran refuses to reopen the ‌supply route, Mr. Rubio said after the close of the NATO meeting.

Published – May 22, 2026 09:04 pm IST

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Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi meets Pakistan Army chief Munir

admin — Sat, 25 Apr 2026 11:14:00 +0000

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (left) meets with Pakistan’s Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir (right) in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 25, 2026. Photo: Iranian Foreign Ministry via AP

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on Saturday (April 25, 2026) met Pakistan Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir in Islamabad, as Islamabad continued its efforts to facilitate engagement between the U.S. and Iran.

The meeting, according to a short video posted by the Iranian embassy on social media, was also attended by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei, and ambassador Reza Amiri Moghadam.

Published – April 25, 2026 04:44 pm IST

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Trump says U.S. in no rush but ‘clock is ticking’ for Iran

admin — Fri, 24 Apr 2026 08:11:00 +0000

“I have all the time in the World, but Iran doesn’t — The clock is ticking!” President Donald Trump said. File
| Photo Credit: AP

President Donald Trump said on Thursday (April 24, 2026) the United States is in no rush to end the war with Iran but “the clock is ticking” for the Islamic Country, as a third American aircraft carrier arrived in West Asia.

Iranian media reported blasts over the capital Tehran, a first since an increasingly tenuous ceasefire in the West Asia war came into effect two weeks ago.

Published – April 24, 2026 01:39 pm IST

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Trump says U.S. will help with ‘traffic buildup’ in Hormuz Strait

admin — Wed, 08 Apr 2026 06:59:00 +0000

“Just like we are experiencing in the U.S., this could be the Golden Age of the Middle East!!!” U.S. President Donald Trump said. File
| Photo Credit: Reuters

U.S. President Donald Trump said on Wednesday (April 8, 2026) that the United States will help with traffic buildup in the Strait of Hormuz, hours after Washington and Tehran agreed to a truce.

The countries agreed to a two-week ceasefire barely an hour before Mr. Trump’s Wednesday (April 8) deadline to obliterate Iran was set to expire.

Published – April 08, 2026 12:08 pm IST

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Trump says Iran wants deal, U.S. ‘armada’ larger than in Venezuela raid

admin — Fri, 30 Jan 2026 23:29:00 +0000

“I can say this, they do want to make a deal,” President Donald Trump said. File
| Photo Credit: AP

President Donald Trump said on Thursday (January 29, 2026) he believed Tehran wanted to make a deal to avoid military action, adding that the U.S. “armada” near Iran was bigger than the one he dispatched to topple Venezuela’s leader.

“We have a large armada, flotilla, call it whatever you want, heading toward Iran right now, even larger than what we had in Venezuela,” the Republican President told reporters in the Oval Office.

“Hopefully, we’ll make a deal. If we do make a deal, that’s good. If we don’t make a deal, we’ll see what happens,” he said.

When asked if he had given Iran a deadline to make a deal on its nuclear program, ballistic missiles and other issues, Mr. Trump said “yeah I have” but added that “only they know for sure” what it was.

Mr. Trump, however, cited what he said was Iran’s decision to halt executions of protesters – after a crackdown in which rights groups say more than 6,000 people were killed – as evidence to show Tehran was ready to comply.

“I can say this, they do want to make a deal,” Mr. Trump said.

Mr. Trump declined to say whether, if Iran did not reach a deal, he planned a repeat of the dramatic operation in Venezuela in which U.S. forces captured President Nicolas Maduro.

“I don’t want to talk about anything having to do with what I’m doing militarily,” he said.

Published – January 31, 2026 03:55 am IST

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