(1) Madagascar military coup

The military has seized power in a coup in the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar and ousted President Andry Rajoelina, who has fled the country.

Col. Michael Randrianirina, who seized power in a military coup, was sworn in as Madagascar’s new leader on Friday (October 17, 2025) in a lightning-fast power grab that ousted the President.

Randrianirina, the commander of an elite army unit, took the oath of office to become the new President at a ceremony in the main chamber of the nation’s High Constitutional Court and in front of its nine red-robed judges.

The military takeover — which came after three weeks of anti-government protests by mainly young people — has been condemned by the United Nations and led to Madagascar being suspended from the African Union.

President Andry Rajoelina’s whereabouts are unknown after he left the country, claiming his life was in danger following the rebellion by soldiers loyal to Col. Randrianirina. He reportedly escaped on a French military plane.

Madagascar has high rates of poverty, which affect around 75% of the population, according to the World Bank. It also has a tumultuous history of political instability that has included several coups and attempted coups. Mr. Rajoelina himself came to power as a transitional leader in 2009 after a military-backed coup.

(2) US-China tit-for-tat tariffs

The United States and China on Tuesday (October 14, 2025) began charging port fees on ocean shipping firms that move everything from holiday toys to crude oil, making the high seas a key front in the trade war between the world’s two largest economies.

Early this year, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration announced plans to levy the fees on China-linked ships to loosen that country’s grip on the global maritime industry and bolster U.S. shipbuilding.

An investigation during former U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration concluded China uses unfair policies and practices to dominate the global maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors, clearing the way for those penalties.

Analysts expect China-owned container carrier COSCO to be most affected, shouldering nearly half of that segment’s expected $3.2 billion cost from those fees in 2026.

China hit back last week, saying it would impose its own port fees on U.S.-linked vessels, also starting Tuesday (October 14, 2025). Jefferies analyst Omar Nokta noted that 13% of crude tankers and 11% of container ships in the global fleet would be affected.

“This tit-for-tat symmetry locks both economies into a spiral of maritime taxation that risks distorting global freight flows,” Athens-based Xclusiv Shipbrokers Inc said in a research note.

(3) Pakistan and Afghanistan agree to ceasefire

Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to an immediate ceasefire, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry said on Sunday (October 19, 2025). This follows more than a week of fighting that has killed dozens of people and injured hundreds.

The two sides agreed to establish mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability, as well as holding follow-up talks in the coming days to ensure the ceasefire’s sustainability, the Qatari statement said.

Delegations from Afghanistan and Pakistan were in Doha for talks to resolve the deadliest crisis between them in several years, after more than a week of fighting killed dozens of people and injured hundreds on both sides.

The talks were mediated by Qatar and Turkiye. A 48-hour ceasefire intended to pause hostilities expired on Friday (Oct. 17, 2025) evening. Hours later, Pakistan struck across the border.

(4) Bihar Assembly election: NDA names all 243 candidates

The ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) on Thursday (October 16, 2025) completed the announcement of its candidates for all 243 constituencies ahead of the Bihar Assembly election.

On Thursday, Chief Minister Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal (United) announced its second and final list of 44 candidates while the Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) and Upendra Kushwaha’s Rashtriya Lok Morcha (RLM) also announced nominees for their remaining seats.

The JD(U) has fielded turncoats Chetan Anand and Vibha Devi from Nabinagar and Nawada respectively. Both Mr. Chetan Anand, son of strongman Anand Mohan, and Ms. Vibha Devi were earlier associated with the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). Besides, the JD(U) has nominated Kaladhar Mandal from Rupauli.

The JD(U) and the BJP are contesting from 101 seats each. The BJP has already announced its 101 candidates and its third and final list was released on October 15. Chirag Paswan’s LJP(RV) and RLM are contesting from 29 and six seats respectively. Union Minister Jitan Ram Manjhi’s Hindustani Awam Morcha (Secular) had released its list of all six candidates on Tuesday (October 14).

(5) Palestinian death toll in Gaza tops 68,000

The Palestinian embassy in Egypt says the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt will reopen on Monday (October 20, 2025) for people returning to Gaza. The embassy announced the development in a statement on Saturday (October 18).

“The number of people registering to return to Gaza is very big,” Naji al-Naji, cultural counsellor at the embassy, told The Associated Press without saying how many.

There was no immediate comment from Israel.

The crossing is Gaza’s only gateway to the outside world that wasn’t controlled by Israel before the war. It has been closed since May 2024, when Israel took control of the Gaza side.

Gaza’s ruins were being scoured for the dead on Saturday (October 18), over a week into a ceasefire as newly recovered bodies brought the Palestinian toll above 68,000.

Israel said the remains of a tenth hostage that Hamas handed over the day before were identified as Eliyahu Margalit.

The handover of hostages’ remains, called for under the ceasefire agreement, is among key points — along with aid deliveries into Gaza and the devastated territory’s future — in a process backed by much of the international community to help end two years of war.

Published – October 23, 2025 11:14 am IST

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz announced on Sunday (August 31, 2025) that a spokesperson for Hamas’ armed wing, Abu Obeida, was killed in Gaza over the weekend.

Obeida’s last statement was on Friday as Israel began the initial stages of a new military offensive in Gaza City, declaring the area a combat zone. Hamas has not commented on Israel’s claim.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu earlier said Israel had attacked Obeida, the longtime spokesperson for Hamas’ Qassam Brigades, but did not know whether he had been killed.

“I do notice there is no one addressing this question on the Hamas side,” Mr. Netanyahu told Ministers at a weekly Cabinet meeting.

Obeida is the latest Hamas representative targeted and killed by Israel as it attempts to dismantle the group’s military capacity and prevent an attack like October 7, 2023, when militants abducted 251 people and killed around 1,200 people, mostly civilians.

Israel has assassinated many of Hamas’ top military and political leadership.

‘A death trap’

At least 43 Palestinians were killed since Saturday, most of them in Gaza City, according to local hospitals. Shifa Hospital — the territory’s largest — said 29 bodies had been brought to its morgue, including 10 people killed while seeking aid and others struck across the city.

On Sunday morning, hospital officials reported 11 more fatalities from strikes and gunfire. Al-Awda Hospital said seven of them were civilians trying to reach aid.

Witnesses said Israeli troops opened fire on crowds in the Netzarim Corridor, an Israeli military zone that bisects Gaza.

“We were trying to get food, but we were met with the occupation’s bullets,” said Ragheb Abu Lebda, from Nuseirat, who saw at least three people bleeding from gunshot wounds. “It’s a death trap.” The corridor has become increasingly perilous, with civilians killed while approaching UN convoys overwhelmed by looters and desperate crowds, or shot on their way to sites run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, an Israeli-backed US contractor. Neither the foundation nor the Israeli military responded to questions about Sunday’s casualties.

Malnutrition and displacement Israel has for weeks been operating on the outskirts of Gaza City as well as the Jabaliya refugee camp to prepare for the initial stages of its offensive, which it announced on Friday. Its military has since intensified its air attacks in coastal areas of the city, including Rimal.

Its Arabic-language army spokersperson has urged the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians still in Gaza City to flee south, but only tens of thousands have done so. Many say they are too exhausted after repeated displacements or unconvinced that anywhere is safer.

The United Nations says roughly 65,000 Palestinians have fled their homes since August 1, including 23,199 in the past week. Many are living in temporary shelters after multiple displacements. More than 90 per cent of the 2.1 million Palestinians in Gaza have been displaced at least once during the war, and many multiple times, according to the UN.

Israel has announced new infrastructure projects in southern Gaza and signalled that aid to Gaza City could be cut — steps Palestinians say amount to forced displacement.

Israel has for weeks been operating on the outskirts of Gaza City as well as the Jabaliya refugee camp. It also intensified its air attacks in the coastal areas of the city.

Seven Palestinian adults died of causes related to malnutrition and starvation in the Gaza Strip over the last 24 hours, the territory’s health ministry reported Sunday.

That has brought the death toll from malnutrition-related causes to 215 since late June when the ministry started to count fatalities among this age category, it said.

Another 124 children died of malnutrition-related causes since the start of the war in October 2023, the ministry said.

At least 63,371 Palestinians have died in Gaza during the war, said the ministry, which does not say how many are fighters or civilians but says around half have been women and children.

The ministry is part of the Hamas-run government and staffed by medical professionals. The UN and independent experts consider it the most reliable source on war casualties. Israel disputes the figures but has not provided its own.

Published – August 31, 2025 10:16 pm IST

Jana Ayad, a malnourished Palestinian girl, during treatment at the International Medical Corps field hospital, in Deir Al-Balah in the southern Gaza Strip, June 2024. (File photo)
| Photo Credit: Mohammed Salem

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Palestinians pray over the bodies of journalists, including Al Jazeera correspondents Anas al-Sharif and Mohamed Qreiqeh, who were killed in an Israeli airstrike, during their funeral outside Gaza City’s Shifa hospital complex, Monday, Aug. 11, 2025.
| Photo Credit: Jehad Alshrafi/AP

As world leaders gathered in Munich, Germany, for Europe’s top annual security conference, placating, pleasing, and managing US President Donald Trump stood as a top agenda. Trump’s phone call to Russia’s Vladimir Putin, US Vice-President J.D. Vance’s disruptive speech challenging Europe, and, by association, the very nature of trans-Atlantic alliances, and demands to end the Ukraine conflict, has led to a mad rush to host such a process, in the Gulf. The question that perhaps comes immediately to mind, even though the conflict in Gaza remains a major global flashpoint, is, why?

The Meeting Between Rubio And Lavrov

Russia and the US are preparing to start initial consultations on Ukraine following an ice-breaking meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh. For Saudi Arabia and its powerful heir-apparent, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, this is a moment of both regional and global reckoning. Gulf powers in the Middle East have now been for a while re-positioning and re-posturing their geopolitics. This process started much before Trump’s return to the White House—arguably, prior to even the Russian war against Ukraine. The roots of this shift lie in two main realities. First, a change in the construct of global power contestation, that is, a bi-polar competition between the US and China and a demand for multipolarity by a host of middle powers looking to secure their own interests and not get caught in the Washington-Beijing dynamics. The second reality relates to a general idea of the US becoming increasingly unwilling to mobilise militarily power to protect its allies.

Reconsidering America’s Role

Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are evaluating the very fundamentals of the decades-long American hegemony, which has provided security blankets in the region. This also provides them with an opportunity to build their own geopolitical repertoire as middle powers with their own agency, instead of being viewed as client states, a tag that has plagued many of them for decades. The UAE as well has thrown its hat into the ring, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy landed in Abu Dhabi, mere hours after both Russia and the US eluded to excluding Kyiv from talks regarding Ukraine’s own future (Zelenskyy later cancelled a planned visit to Saudi). While this position by the Trump administration delivered tremors across European capitals, it has also played into an increasingly constrained space between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for regional influence. And peace diplomacy, or mediation, is the flavour of the day.

However, the proverbial gold-rush to host Ukraine talks has more solid foundations in regional competition than an international one. For long, Oman has been the state that has consistently pitched itself as the main mediator, playing the role of ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’, where Muscat seemingly prioritises neutrality and offers a common ground for warring parties, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthi militia, or even the US and Iran, to talk.

The Qatar Question

Saudi Arabia and the UAE installed a blockade against Qatar between 2017 and 2021 for what they saw as Doha not aligning and punching above its weight, and, more specifically, for its support for Political Islam. But the Qatari leadership had another trick up its sleeve to ratchet its power quotient. In February 2020, under Trump’s first tenure, the Taliban in Afghanistan and the US signed a historic agreement for the latter’s exit from a two-decade long war in the country. Doha hosted the political office for the Taliban, and managed Kabul, to deliver this outcome to a president who, more than anything else, adores deals. This “success” gained Qatar the title of becoming America’s first and preferred ‘major non-NATO ally’ in the region. Today, Qatar also hosts America’s largest military base in the Middle East. For others, such as the UAE, the meteoric rise of Qatar’s influence in Washington was seen as a challenge. Within Abu Dhabi, questions were raised with Emirati diplomats in the US on why the Taliban’s office was not hosted in either Abu Dhabi or Dubai.

Saudi And UAE Have Bigger Goals

For Saudi Arabia, despite its functional relations with Russia and China alike, a security relationship with the US remains paramount. The same strategic aim is consistent for the UAE as well, one of the few Arab states that normalised relations with Israel as part of the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords and which continues to have functional relations with Iran. Despite continuing pressures on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to help deliver lasting solutions to the Israel-Palestine crisis and the Israel-Hamas war, both have broader, long-term aims with regard to their positions as poles-of-power within a multipolar framework. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi share this world view with the likes of India, but American power projection is infinitely more critical to political structures in the Middle East. This is truer today after the experience of the Arab Spring, and, more recently, the collapse of the Bashar Al Assad regime in Syria at the hands of a self-styled ‘lapsed’ jihadist group, the Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS).

Is This The Future Of Mediation?

The Saudis are not stopping just at giving space to the US and Russia to debate Ukraine. As per reports, Riyadh is also open to hosting talks between Iran and the US over the former’s nuclear programme. The Saudi-Iran détente was achieved in March 2023 with the help of China, the main competitor to the US, and a state that has unreservedly supported Arab positions in Gaza. Beijing, meanwhile, also remains open to mediating and helping to bridge political gaps across the region. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visits to the region have been welcomed with gusto by Saudi Arabia and the UAE alike, both as a function of being the world’s second-largest economic power and using this position to hedge risk with Western partners. The future of mediation between the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi-Doha trifecta is a cat and mouse game within the Arab construct. External powers such as the US, Russia, and China, are part of the utility kit. This push for one-upmanship will have a tremendous impact on regional politics where in the coming years economic and political competition is only expected to increase.

(Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Jerusalem:

Israel is set to release 183 prisoners on Saturday in the fourth hostage-prisoner exchange under the Gaza ceasefire deal, a Palestinian advocacy group said, more than doubling the previous reported figure.

“The updated number of prisoners to be released tomorrow is 183,” said Palestinian Prisoners’ Club spokeswoman Amani Sarahneh on Friday, after previously announcing that 90 prisoners would be released from Israeli jails.

The advocacy group published two separate lists of names due for release on Saturday. The first comprised 72 prisoners arrested before Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack on Israel.

A second list of inmates to be freed contained 111 names of Gazans detained after the attack that sparked the war in the Palestinian territory.

Since the truce took effect on January 19, Gaza militants have released 15 hostages after holding them in captivity for over 15 months.

The three hostages to be freed Saturday are Yarden Bibas, Keith Siegel, who also holds US citizenship, and Ofer Kalderon, who also has French nationality, according to the Hostages and Missing Families Forum campaign group.

Since the ceasefire began, Israel has freed hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, many of them women and minors.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

US President Donald Trump’s suggestion that Jordan and Egypt should take more Palestinians from Gaza, shattered by 15 months of war, is seen raising concerns among the enclave’s inhabitants as well as its neighbours.

The proposal is likely to heighten fears among Gaza’s 2.3 million Palestinians of being driven out of the coastal strip, and stoke concern in Arab states which have long been worried about the destabilising impact any such exodus would have.

WHAT IS BEHIND THE CONCERNS?

Palestinians have long been haunted by what they call the “Nakba”, or catastrophe, when 700,000 of them were dispossessed from their homes when Israel was created in 1948.

Many were driven out or fled to neighbouring Arab states, including to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, where many of them or their descendants still live in refugee camps. Some went to Gaza. Israel disputes the account that they were forced out.

The latest conflict since has seen an unprecedented Israeli bombardment and land offensive in Gaza, devastating urban areas. Palestinians and UN officials say there are no longer any safe areas in Gaza to seek shelter.

Most Gazans have already been displaced several times during Israel’s offensive, launched after Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack on Israel that killed 1,200 people, according to Israeli tallies.

More than 47,000 people have been killed in Gaza since then, according to Palestinian health officials.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED DURING THIS CONFLICT?

Before Israel launched its offensive, it told Palestinians in north Gaza to move to what it said were safe areas in the south. As the offensive expanded, Israel told them to head further south towards Rafah.

According to UN estimates, up to 85% of the 2.3 million people in Gaza – one of the most densely populated areas of the world – have already been displaced from their homes.

COULD A MAJOR DISPLACEMENT HAPPEN IN THIS CONFLICT?

Many Palestinians in Gaza have said they would not leave even if they could because they fear it might lead to another permanent displacement in a repeat of 1948. Egypt, meanwhile, has kept the border firmly closed except to let a few thousand foreigners, dual nationals and a handful of others leave Gaza.

Egypt and other Arab nations strongly oppose any attempt to push Palestinians over the border.

Yet, the scale of this conflict eclipses other Gaza crises or flare-ups in past decades, and the humanitarian disaster deepens for Palestinians by the day.

WHAT ARE ARAB, WESTERN STATES AND THE U.N. SAYING?

From the earliest days of the conflict, Arab governments, particularly Egypt and Jordan, said Palestinians must not be driven from land where they want to make a future state, which would include the West Bank and Gaza.

Like Palestinians, they fear any mass movement across the border would further undermine prospects for a “two-state solution” – the idea of creating a state of Palestine next to Israel – and leave Arab nations dealing with the consequences.

Top UN officials have added their voices to concerns about a mass displacement. UN aid chief Martin Griffiths said last February it was an “illusion” to think people in Gaza could evacuate to a safe place.

WHAT HAVE ISRAEL’S GOVERNMENT AND ITS POLITICIANS SAID?

Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said on February 16, 2024 Israel had no plans to deport Palestinians from Gaza. Israel would coordinate with Egypt on Palestinian refugees and find a way to not harm Egypt’s interests, Katz added.

However, comments by some in the government have stoked Palestinian and Arab fears of a new Nakba.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich called on December 31, 2023 for Palestinian residents of Gaza to leave the besieged enclave. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir said the war presented an “opportunity to concentrate on encouraging the migration of the residents of Gaza.”

After Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said on December 10, 2023 that Israel’s offensive was “a systematic effort to empty Gaza of its people,” Israeli government spokesperson Eylon Levy called those comments “outrageous and false accusations.”

(This story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)

After nearly 480 days of intense fighting and bombardment, resulting in the deaths of over 46,000 Palestinian civilians in Gaza, a ceasefire deal has finally been reached. Though long in the making, previous efforts repeatedly fell short of achieving finality.

This agreement, however, remains fragile, with no guarantees that it will be implemented fully in both letter and spirit. The trigger for the Gaza conflict, as well as the related hostilities in Lebanon, was the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack carried out by Hamas near the Israel-Gaza border. This heinous act of brutality sought to refocus international attention on the Palestinian issue, which Hamas perceived as sidelined by various international agreements, including the Abraham Accords.

Wrong On Both Sides

Much like Anwar Sadat’s surprise cross-Suez attack that initiated the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, Hamas’ actions involved the mass killing of innocents and the taking of hostages. These acts provoked a massive Israeli response, including the mobilisation of 3,50,000 troops, large-scale destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure, and the deaths of countless civilians. It is essential to underscore the criminal nature of both actions, which disregarded the principle of proportionality—a fundamental concept guiding the conduct of warfare to minimise harm to civilians while resolving conflicts.

The ceasefire agreement has been brokered by Qatar, the United States and Egypt as part of a three-phase plan. A joint follow-up mechanism involving these nations will monitor progress to ensure the deal is upheld. The key conditions of the agreement are as follows:

• Phase 1: This phase will last 42 days. Hamas will release 33 hostages, including women, children, and individuals over 50 years old. In return, Israel will release 32 Palestinian prisoners for each hostage, begin withdrawing from certain areas, and facilitate a significant increase in humanitarian aid to Gaza. Additionally, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) will withdraw from densely populated areas, allowing internally displaced people to return to their homes.
• Phase 2: Hamas will release the remaining male hostages, and Israel will complete its withdrawal from Gaza.
• Phase 3: This phase will include the return of deceased hostages and the initiation of Gaza’s reconstruction, with significant contributions expected from the Arab world.

The IDF will gradually withdraw from Gaza towards a buffer zone in the east. Additionally, the IDF will vacate the Netzarim corridor and gradually withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border. While the agreement contains several other provisions, its significance lies in the challenges of implementation, the obstacles that may arise, and the enablers required to ensure success.

Pressing Questions

The most critical factor is overcoming the trust deficit after such an extended period of violence. Given its weakened state, Hamas may be inclined to adhere to the deal. However, questions remain:

Will Israel believe it missed the opportunity to eliminate Hamas entirely? This could tempt Israel to resume operations after a period of relative calm.

Will Israel withdraw completely at the designated time and revert to the status quo ante?
This scenario appears unlikely in a security-conscious Israel. Politically, the dominant narrative prioritising security may lead to both practical and impractical measures that risk reigniting tensions.
Will IDF stick to the agreement?

The success of the deal depends significantly on the entry of humanitarian aid, construction materials, and resources for restoring civilian life. Before the war, the IDF appeared lax in addressing the ambiguous nature of its adversaries, inadvertently allowing materials to be used in constructing Hamas’ 150-kilometre tunnel defence system. This network posed a significant challenge for the IDF to neutralise during the conflict. Will the IDF adhere to the letter of the agreement, or will it complicate the process, creating obstacles for humanitarian assistance to enter Gaza? Aid agencies and UN personnel will require considerable patience and persistence to ensure effective implementation.

IDF’s Dual Identity

The IDF cannot afford to permit military supplies to enter Gaza as Hamas remains active. It has not been fully defeated militarily, straddling the line between a conventional force and a terrorist organisation—a dual identity that continues to frustrate the IDF.

At times, military ego can overshadow even the most disciplined armed forces. Currently, Israel, the IDF, and its veteran leadership, driven by a desire to restore their reputation, may heighten the risk of stand-offs with Hamas.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is expected to play a key role in administering the Gaza Strip. It is tasked with addressing the humanitarian crisis, rebuilding infrastructure, and overseeing security in collaboration with Egypt. However, the history of confrontation between the PA and Hamas presents challenges. Under new or interim Hamas leadership, the PA must navigate a delicate balance to maintain stability.

Iran’s potential role in fostering peace remains significant, despite its military weakening alongside Hamas. It has partially lost its ability to engage in proxy wars across the Middle East due to the diminished capability of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah, as well as its reduced influence in the Levant. At this time, with its capabilities compromised, Iran may avoid drawing the focused attention of the US and Israel. However, this does not preclude its efforts to maintain control over proxy groups throughout the region. Iran may prefer covert actions to support Hamas, though such moves risk derailing the ceasefire entirely.

Uncertainty Reigns

The sustained involvement of Qatar and Egypt will be critical, as the US alone cannot manage this situation effectively. A peacekeeping force with a clear and well-defined mandate may become necessary. The United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF), currently active in Israel’s Golan Heights, could potentially expand its role to include temporary monitoring. India, already contributing to UNDOF, might participate in such an initiative.

Much remains uncertain, particularly with the return of a Trump administration to power in the US. For now, unpredictability continues to define the situation.

(The writer is a Member of the National Disaster Management Authority, Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir, and Former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author