Rejecting the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC) remarks regarding Jammu and Kashmir and Delhi’s actions against terror infrastructure in Pakistan, India said the group is “unable to distinguish between the victim and perpetrator”.

Lok Sabha MP from West Tripura Biplab Kumar Deb delivered India’s national statement at the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee on ‘Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’ on Tuesday (October 6, 2026).

Mr. Deb is part of a visiting delegation of 15 MPs, who arrived at the United Nations for their UN familiarisation week.

Also Read | India categorically rejects OIC Contact Group’s remarks on Kashmir

The MPs will have diverse engagements in the UN during the visit.

In his remarks, the former Tripura Chief Minister responded strongly to the OIC statement that had made references to Jammu and Kashmir.

“I also address now the statement delivered by the chair of the OIC on India’s focused and measured actions against terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, from where terrorist attacks against India were planned and directed,” Mr. Deb said.

He said it is “regrettable that those delivering the statement” are “unable to separate fact from fiction and distinguish between victim and perpetrator”.

Asserting that India retains the right to defend its people against cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan, Mr. Deb said there will be consequences for indulging in terrorism.

He also rejected OIC’s “unwarranted reference” to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

“The OIC chair would do better to focus on Pakistan’s illegal occupation, especially in Rawalakot, where wanton killings, brutal violence and the denial of basic rights to the people living there are so visible. Such willful blindness only speaks of bigotry and intolerance,” he said.

The Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) region has been witnessing protests for several months over 12 contentious refugee seats, triggering a crackdown by security forces and allegations of rigging in the recently held elections to the so-called legislative assembly.

Saudi Arabia had delivered the statement on behalf of the OIC at the UNGA Sixth Committee that deals with legal issues.

The OIC referred to the “military escalation in Southeast Asia” and “unjustified strikes” carried “on multiple locations in Pakistan”. It did not mention India.

Also Read | India calls Pakistan a ‘Frankenstein state’ at U.N.; accuses it of supporting terrorism

In May last year, India launched Operation Sindoor targeting terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, in retaliation for the dastardly April 22 terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam, in which 26 civilians, mostly tourists, were killed.

The attack was perpetrated by The Resistance Front, a proxy of Pakistan-based terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba

The OIC statement also referred to the UN Security Council resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir.

Mr. Deb said India understands from “bitter experience” that the threat of terrorism is not theoretical but is a “persistent and daily reality”.

“For decades, our people have suffered from cross-border terrorism,” Mr. Deb said, adding that the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in April last year again demonstrated the devastating human cost of terrorism.

“The Pahalgam terror attack was a calculated assault on our sovereignty, planned and executed by networks that continue to enjoy state patronage, safe havens, and material and logistical support from across our western border,” he said.

Mr. Deb underlined that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including cross-border terrorism, remains one of the gravest threats to humanity, with implications for international peace and security, economic progress, democratic order and human rights.

“It attacks the most fundamental human right of every human being – the right to life. Terrorism is antithetical to the values of the UN. There can be no justification whatsoever for deliberately targeting civilians. There is no distinction between good and bad terrorism,” Mr. Deb said.

He referred to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s comment that India considers even a single attack as one too many and even a single life lost as one too many, emphasising that Delhi considers terrorist attacks to be attacks against humanity.

He noted that terrorist organisations are increasingly exploiting emerging technologies for recruitment, radicalisation, propaganda, operational planning and terrorist financing.

“Their anonymity, global reach and speed enable them to evade law enforcement and increasingly target vulnerable youth,” he said.

Also Read | Pakistan living in ‘la la land’, says India at U.N. Human Rights Council in response to Islamabad’s J&K claims

India pointed to “a key gap” that remains in global counterterrorism efforts — the absence of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), despite a draft circulated by India in 1996.

“India reiterates that an early conclusion of the CCIT would strengthen the international legal framework to comprehensively counter terrorism,” he said.

He told the UN Committee that the New Delhi Declaration, adopted at the BRICS Leaders’ Summit last month, not only strongly condemned the terrorist attack in Pahalgam but also condemned any acts of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable.

Published – October 07, 2026 12:08 pm IST

In 2006, while conducting fieldwork in Muzaffarabad in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake, I stayed with a local family after driving from Islamabad via Abbottabad, through a landscape of shattered houses and tent settlements. One morning, among the volunteers, I noticed a middle-aged man moving slowly on crutches. We eventually sat down together over tea, and I learnt that he had been attacked by activists associated with a rival student movement that would later become central to my understanding of the politics of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK).

In 1994, Pervaiz Shraf Magrey lost his leg in a violent encounter with members of the Jamaat-e-Tulba. His group, the Jammu and Kashmir National Student Federation (JKNSF), was challenging Jamaat-e-Tulba’s practice of letting Hizbul Mujahideen militants stay in the hostels of university. For those of us with decades-long familiarity with the nuances and actors of the conflict on the ground on both sides of the Line of Control, it was not difficult to recognise that Jamaat-e-Tulba was the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami.

Hizbul Mujahideen had acquired considerable prominence on the Indian side of Line of Control around the same time as it increasingly displaced the “pro-independence” Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) as the dominant militant organisation. Unlike the JKLF, Hizbul Mujahideen was explicitly pro-Pakistan and advocated the accession of J&K to Pakistan. It also operated with the backing of Jamaat-e-Islami.

Encounters such as these reinforced an enduring lesson: the region cannot be understood through distant observation alone. Its politics are layered, shaped by history, memory, and generations of political mobilisation.

PoK protests, a contrasting narrative

The recent protests in PoK, which unfolded around the 80th anniversary of the Independence of India and Pakistan, have generated sharply contrasting narratives on either side of the border. Within Pakistan, sections of the ruling establishment portrayed the protesters as acting at India’s behest. Meanwhile, outside Pakistan, the protests have frequently been interpreted as confirmation that it is the first major revolt of the region against the Pakistani state.

Both narratives are convenient for their respective audiences, but neither adequately explains what is unfolding on the ground, as complex realities cannot be explained in binaries. There is little doubt that some of the issues being discussed are legacies of Partition. But they have also acquired their own trajectories, shaped by the region’s distinct political, social and historical experiences since 1947.

Approaches that view PoK solely through the prism of India-Pakistan rivalry inevitably miss this complexity. Understanding PoK therefore requires sustained engagement with its evolving political, social and historical dynamics.

The immediate trigger for this latest round of violence appears to have been the killing in June of Shahzeb Habib, a JAAC activist who was travelling with the organisation’s core leader Umar Nazir Kashmiri. Their vehicle was intercepted near Barmang Bridge in Rawalakot, after which an exchange of fire took place. While authorities said armed occupants opened fire first, JAAC supporters disputed the account and alleged that Habib was killed by security-force fire and that Kashmiri was also wounded. The episode illustrates, once again, the limits and ultimately the failure of relying on coercive tactics to suppress political dissent.

In my earlier three detailed pieces on the region for this publication, I have tried to provide a more grounded reading, rather than viewing developments solely through the prism of the India-Pakistan rivalry. While I have outlined the litany of grievances expressed across the region during the protests and traced their historical background, many of these experiences are familiar to other post-colonial states. Questions of political representation, economic distribution, constitutional ambiguity and regional identity have accumulated over decades. Yet an important question remains insufficiently explored – a question I have been asked repeatedly: what explains the mobilisation itself, and why have protesters chosen central PoK as the principal site of protest?

How the movement is sustaining for months

Coming to the first question: why have these grievances, which have existed for years, now acquired the organisational capacity and popular resonance to sustain a movement for months? Who constitutes its cadre, what networks connect its leadership to ordinary citizens, and why have protesters continued to remain in the arena despite arrests, repression and the disruption of communications? The answers suggest that the present mobilisation cannot be understood merely as a reaction to inflation, electricity prices or the immediate political crisis.

The Pakistani establishment has dismissed these protests as being backed by external forces, implicitly pointing to India’s involvement. Some of the same communities that have historically been portrayed as susceptible to Indian influence have also provided substantial manpower to Pakistan’s own security institutions. This makes it difficult to explain the mobilisation simply as an externally sponsored movement.

There is a historical dimension to this mobilisation. The present movement has organisational roots going back several years, with the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee emerging in 2023 as an umbrella platform bringing together traders, civil-society groups, activists and other constituencies. Its demands have subsequently expanded from immediate economic concerns to questions of political representation, governance and the relationship between the region and the Pakistani state. The recurrence of mobilisation in 2024, 2025 and 2026 indicates the gradual construction of an organisational infrastructure rather than a series of disconnected protests.

This historical continuity matters. A protest movement becomes difficult to suppress when grievances are embedded in pre-existing social networks, when local leadership has legitimacy independent of established political parties, and when successive confrontations with the state reinforce rather than diminish collective identity. The striking feature of the present moment, therefore, is not simply the scale of the grievances but the emergence of a political constituency capable of repeatedly converting those grievances into collective action.

That is perhaps the more important story of the current unrest: not merely why people are angry, but how anger has acquired organisation, memory and staying power. The protests need to be located within the longer history of political mobilisation in the region, including the evolution of civil-society networks, the role of traders and local communities, the weakness of conventional party politics, and the unresolved question of political representation. Only then can we understand why a movement that began around economic demands has acquired a much broader political character.

JKNSF: Growing strong since 1967

With the exception of a few figures, namely the traders, the protests were driven largely by a younger generation of activists associated with the Jammu and Kashmir National Students Federation (JKNSF), an organisation that has long unsettled the Pakistani establishment because of its ideological orientation and advocacy of an independent Jammu and Kashmir.

In the Pakistani context, when a group invokes the term “national” or “nationalist,” it can imply a prioritisation of ethnic and linguistic identities over the foundational identity of Islam shared by South Asian Muslims that underpinned the creation of Pakistan. This is often viewed negatively by the Pakistani state, which has historically regarded ethnic or regional nationalism as a potential challenge to the country’s overarching national identity rooted in Islam.

The origins of the JKNSF date back to the early 1960s. Following the partition of the princely state in 1947, student politics in PoK had largely remained dormant. In 1962, a group of pro-independence student activists began touring colleges across PoK to encourage political participation in shaping the future of Jammu and Kashmir. Their efforts culminated in the formation of the JKNSF, whose first convention was held in 1964.

Several pioneers of the movement later entered mainstream politics. One notable example was Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, who eventually became Prime Minister of PAJK in 1990. Ironically, his son, Faisal Mumtaz Rathore, is now presiding over a government as outgoing Prime Minister confronting protests that have resulted in dozens of deaths. This highlights both the historical continuity and the contradictions within PAJK’s political elite.

From its inception, the JKNSF claims that they drew inspiration from socialist and progressive ideas. It viewed the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir as a distinct political entity. The federation also developed close links with progressive student organisations in Pakistan that challenged the political status quo. Many of the individuals active in today’s protests belong to families that participated in earlier waves of mobilisation, illustrating how political activism has often passed from one generation to the next.

The federation’s history is marked by repeated confrontation with the authorities. One of its earliest major agitations occurred in 1967, when students protested against PoK President Abdul Hameed Khan during his proposed visit to the Mirpur College convocation. The state responded with arrests under sedition charges. Several activists were imprisoned for extended periods; Mirpur-born Sabir Ansari, for instance, reportedly spent more than a year in jail. Provisions ordinarily invoked against enemy agents were applied to student activists, reflecting the degree to which the state viewed organised nationalist politics as a security challenge. Now his son Sabar Ansari is now one of the leaders of the current agitation and reports confirm that his family has again faced the crackdown in Mirpur.

The JKNSF also played an important role in the anti-Mangla Dam movement during the 1960s, when many residents opposed displacement and inadequate compensation arising from the construction of the dam on the Jhelum River. Parallel organisations emerged in Pakistan itself, where large numbers of students from PoK were studying. The Jammu and Kashmir Students Organisation, established in Lahore in 1962, sought to mobilise support among progressive and left-leaning Pakistani students for the cause of an independent Jammu and Kashmir. Students from PoK subsequently participated in Pakistan’s wider democratic movements, including the campaign against General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime during the 1980s.

The JKNSF’s influence gradually came under challenge with the rise of the Jamaat-e-Tulaba. Rivalry between the two organisations frequently spilled onto university campuses, where clashes became a recurring feature of student politics. The balance shifted further during General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule, when independent student unions were banned across Pakistan and PoK. Although the restrictions affected all organisations, the Jamaat-e-Tulaba retained a significant organisational advantage through the institutional, ideological, and financial support of its parent party in Pakistan.

The recent protests therefore did not emerge in a political vacuum. They brought to the surface longstanding grievances, as I’ve outlined in earlier pieces, that have persisted within sections of PoK society for decades. More significantly, they demonstrated that the organisational backbone of much of the mobilisation continues to come from student networks whose political lineage stretches back more than 60 years. Any serious assessment of current developments must therefore examine not only the immediate triggers of the protests but also the historical traditions of political activism that continue to shape the region.

One of the prominent faces of this agitation and its subsequent repression was Sardar Osama Jameel, a PhD scholar at Islamabad-based Quaid-i-Azam University and a prominent JKNSF activist. He died on July 27–28, 2026, after reportedly being shot during protests and security-force crackdowns in Rawalakot. His sloganeering, rooted in progressive political tradition, points to another important dimension of the mobilisation: the presence of a politically conscious student movement with a longer ideological and historical lineage. His participation also suggests that the agitation cannot be understood solely as a response to immediate economic grievances; it draws upon an older tradition of progressive, anti-establishment politics in the region.

A lesser-known aspect of the agitation has been the support it received from various parts of Pakistan. Protesters of PoK origin in several Pakistani cities expressed solidarity with the movement, while 88 of them were arrested and charged under terrorism-related provisions. This wider support is significant because it suggests that the agitation cannot simply be dismissed as a geographically confined or externally sponsored movement.

PoK elections reaffirmed institutional flaws

In this light, the 2026 electoral process in PoK has merely reaffirmed the institutional flaws of the territory’s political system, validating many of the grievances that have fuelled the protest movement. While there were allegations of rigging, mainly raised by the PPP, there was a turnout of 46% in the first phase and 53% in the second phase. The JAAC leadership stopped short of calling for an electoral boycott, but neither did it encourage local residents to participate in the electoral process.

Across the three phases of the election, the ruling PML-N has emerged as the largest beneficiary, securing at least 25 of the 38 seats for which results have so far been announced, much as the party in power in Islamabad has historically tended to perform well in PoK elections. The contrast with 2021 is instructive. Then, the ruling PTI won 26 of the 45 general seats, followed by PPP with 11 and PML-N with six. The third phase, held in Bagh and Haveli, however, has also underscored the unsettled and contested nature of the 2026 process. PPP won LA-17 Bagh-IV, while an independent candidate captured LA-14 Bagh-I; the results in LA-15 and LA-16 remain unresolved, with the Election Commission ordering re-polling at 23 polling stations on August 15. Seven further constituencies in Poonch and Sudhnoti have also been postponed because of the ongoing protests.

The election also produced a striking generational and political turnover: three former Prime Ministers, including Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan, who heads the regional party with a long history, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, were defeated, underscoring the extent to which established political figures and traditional parties have lost their electoral hold. On 19 July 1947, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference passed a resolution in Srinagar advocating the State’s accession to Pakistan. This contrasted sharply with the position of Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference, which had rejected the Muslim League’s politics and was politically aligned with the Congress.

The 12 refugee constituencies remain a particularly contentious feature of the electoral system and of the current agitation. Reserved for people who migrated from the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 and now live elsewhere in Pakistan, these seats, six for Jammu and six for the Kashmir Valley, give voters outside PoK a significant role in determining its government. In 2026, PML-N won 10 refugee seats, while PPP secured 2 seats overall in the currently declared results. Given that the 12 refugee seats constitute nearly 26% of the 45-member elected seats in the Assembly, their political weight is disproportionate to their direct connection with the territory they help govern.

The 2026 election has merely reinforced the protesters’ assertion that retaining these seats in their present form is a negation of democratic representation. The disconnect was particularly visible during the polling for the refugee constituencies on August 2. Although these 12 seats together had nearly 439,000 registered voters, their electorates are scattered across Pakistan, with some individual constituencies representing only a few thousand voters. In LA-43 (Valley-IV), for instance, there were just 3,346 registered voters, while LA-44 (Valley-V), covering refugees in Rawalpindi and Islamabad, had 3,754. LA-39 (Jammu-VI), the largest of these constituencies, had only 20,807 registered voters. The limited participation in these constituencies further exposed the anomaly: legislators elected by small and geographically dispersed electorates, many of whom live hundreds of kilometres outside PoK, can nevertheless exercise the same legislative power as representatives elected by tens of thousands of voters actually living in the territory. This is precisely the democratic contradiction at the heart of the protesters’ objection and not the representation of refugees as such, but the continued use of a non-territorial electoral arrangement to determine the government of a territory whose residents themselves have no say in those constituencies. The fact that the determining composition of the Assembly remains dependent on refugee constituencies only reinforces the broader perception of an electoral system whose institutional design is part of the political grievances being expressed within PoK itself.

These developments have yet again reaffirmed that they are a part of a continuing trend of institutional deceit and falsified claims about the region’s status as an “independent country”. Practically, its political status does not even equal other provinces of Pakistan.

Why are the protests happening in central PoK?

The second question is why central PoK, and particularly hilly Rawalakot, has emerged as one of the main sites of protest. Rawalakot lies within the former Poonch estate, a region with a long history of rebellion against the Maharaja, including the 1955 uprising against the Pakistani state, but it is also an important recruitment ground for Pakistan’s armed forces and has produced several senior military officers. This creates a striking historical paradox: a region that has contributed substantially to Pakistan’s security establishment has also repeatedly been a centre of political dissent.

The social composition of the recent protests reinforces this paradox. One of those reportedly killed during the recent protests was the father of serving Pakistani Air Force officers, while another person killed in firing by security personnel was the son of a former member of the Pakistani army. These connections complicate any simple portrayal of the protests as externally driven. They suggest instead that dissent is emerging from communities deeply intertwined with Pakistan’s own military and security institutions.

The recent protests also offer broader lessons that extend well beyond Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Across many post-colonial states and developing countries, the political and administrative periphery is often viewed primarily through a security lens rather than as a source of political knowledge and lived experience. As a result, policies are frequently framed in distant capitals with limited appreciation of local realities. The knowledge systems that evolve within peripheral societies deserve greater recognition and accommodation in policymaking. Capitals inevitably become centres of political and bureaucratic power, but they can also develop insulated narratives that overlook the complexities of the regions they govern. This disconnect often delays policy correction and deepens mistrust.

The fact that the epicentre of the protests, including this latest round, has been in central PoK suggests that some of the structural advantages Pakistan enjoyed in this area, as compared to other parts of PoK, have not translated into enduring political legitimacy.

Protesters from other parts of the region have also flocked to the area, turning it into a focal point for mobilisation. One reason may be its geography: the hilly terrain and forested terrain provide protesters with a degree of natural protection and make it more difficult for security personnel deployed from Rawalpindi to exercise effective control. But geography alone does not explain the repeated emergence of central PAJK as the protest site; the area’s strong local networks, martial tradition and history of resisting any real or perceived repression, have also played an important role.

In 1947, geographical contiguity with Islamabad and the relative ease with which Pakistani forces could access the area were only two of several factors that shaped the emergence of PoK. The extensive wartime recruitment of men from north-western British India, including what is today the central part of PoK and northern Pakistani Punjab, particularly the area culturally known as the Pothohar belt, into the British Indian Army created a substantial pool of trained military manpower.

Many served in the European and other theatres during the Second World War on behalf of the Brits, leaving behind considerable military experience that would later shape the region’s political and armed mobilisation. This manpower had also got demobilised after the war. This was one of the key reasons that local forces were able to mobilise quickly and stage an armed rebellion against the Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947.

An eyewitness to the tumultuous era of 1947 and an authority on J&K, late Balraj Puri, a Padma Bhushan awardee, records on page seven of his best-selling book Kashmir: Towards Insurgency that the initial discontent in Poonch centred on “some local demands like the rehabilitation of 60,000 demobilised soldiers of the British army belonging to the area.”

According to Puri, as these issues became intertwined with wider political and communal tensions, “the agitation turned communal.” He writes that the state army was deployed to suppress the unrest, but soldiers refused to fire on demonstrators with whom they shared religious and ethnic ties. Some subsequently deserted the army, and, in Puri’s account, the agitation developed into an armed revolt. He further attributes the revolt’s growing strength to “ammunition and other types of assistance from across the border.”

Puri also identifies a longer historical dimension to the 1947 unrest. He argues that the revolt drew on local sentiments of patriotism in Poonch, which, in his view, had been offended when the territory was brought under the direct control of the Jammu Durbar in 1936, following what he describes as a decision of the British courts. Until then, Poonch had retained a distinct status under the descendants of ruler Gulab Singh’s brother for about a century. Gulab Singh was the founder and first ruler of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which he established in 1846 under the Treaty of Amritsar.

Thus, in Puri’s interpretation, the 1947 upheaval in Poonch was shaped not only by the immediate grievances of demobilised soldiers and the subsequent communalisation of the agitation, but also by longer-standing local political and historical sentiments. Like other princely states or estates of British India, Poonch maintained properties outside the jagir, including the Poonch House in Rawalpindi, which was built by Raja Moti Singh in the late nineteenth century as a rest house for the rulers of Poonch. A historic building known as Poonch House also exists in Lahore, although its institutional history appears to be distinct from that of the Rawalpindi residence.

Following the lapse of British paramountcy in August, the princely ruler initially sought to maintain the State’s independence and entered into a standstill arrangement with Pakistan, while also proposing similar arrangements with India. The State had therefore not acceded to either dominion when the rebellion and subsequent tribal invasion began in October. The Maharaja subsequently sought military assistance from India and signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, after which India accepted the accession and deployed troops to defend the State. By then, however, large parts of J&K, what is today PoK, had already slipped from the control of the princely government.

Many of those who had served in the British Indian Army possessed both the organisational capacity and political networks necessary to mobilise men, organise resistance and subsequently shape the institutional structures of the territory. Some of the caste and community groups in this area, particularly the Sudhans, have a deeply internalised sense of community pride, honour and justice, reinforced over generations by the martial identity associated with communities that the British classified as “martial races” in British India after the 1857 uprising.

The historical significance of these areas helps explain why their representatives were subsequently given a prominent role in PoK’s political architecture. This area also provided much of the political and military leadership of the region during the early phase of the conflict and became the principal interlocutor in establishing the emerging relationship between the territory and Pakistan. Leaders such as Sardar Ibrahim Khan and Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan emerged from this area and played a central role in the mobilisation and political consolidation of the territory. Initially, however, the region’s political executive was more urban and politically cosmopolitan, represented by figures such as Dogri or Punjabi-speaking Ghulam Abbas, who had migrated from the plains of J&K and had emerged as an important Muslim political leader in the wider Jammu and Kashmir region. His background and political standing also enabled him to enjoy the patronage of the Pakistani state. His followers, who were the migrants from the plains of J&K, were mostly concentrated in Pakistani Punjab and not PoK. Over time, leadership shifted increasingly towards those rooted in the areas where the armed mobilisation had taken place, reflecting the military and political weight that these areas had acquired during the events of 1947. This was further cemented by the Sudhan uprising of 1955–56. Centred in the Sudhan heartland, it reflected grievances over the Pakistani state’s interference in local affairs, the sidelining of Sardar Ibrahim Khan, the absence of representative institutions and demands for greater autonomy. In short, the present dispute over the refugees’ seats has historical roots in the region’s politics apart from other factors.

The part of Poonch that later became central PoK, as noted earlier, had already been one of the principal recruiting grounds for the British Indian Army, a military tradition that continued after Partition with recruitment into Pakistan’s armed forces. Even today, in parts of central PoK, it is common to find families with three successive generations having served in the Pakistani armed forces, including in senior positions. These deep military and social linkages gave Pakistan an advantage that few other parts of PAJK enjoyed. Shared service, institutional ties, and sustained interaction with the Pakistani state might have been expected to strengthen political integration. The Pakistani state’s continuing difficulty in accommodating the overall region’s political and economic aspirations is, in that sense, particularly revealing and points towards a failure of a hard state approach.

A predominantly coercive approach has not resolved underlying political questions; instead, it has contributed to alienation and, in many cases, intergenerational resentment towards Islamabad. Allegations that protests are orchestrated by foreign powers are frequently deployed in official discourse, yet such explanations often obscure the structural grievances that have accumulated over decades. The recent protests have brought these unresolved tensions to the surface. The current phase of protest may eventually be contained through coercive measures, but the scars are likely to endure. Political memories often outlive the events themselves, passing from one generation to the next.

Magrey had told me that none of those responsible for attacking him had ever been arrested or prosecuted because, in his view, members of extremist militant organisations enjoyed official patronage in PAJK and Pakistan at the time. Whether or not one accepts every aspect of his account, it reflects a strand of local memory that has endured across generations and illustrates how lived experiences can diverge sharply from official narratives. It is these accumulated memories, as much as contemporary grievances, that continue to shape political attitudes in the region.

The saga around PoK, which has drawn international attention now, offers a broader lesson for post-colonial entities: coercion cannot substitute for political accommodation. The anger had been building for years before erupting. Apart from being a victim of Pakistan’s enduring obsession with internationalising J&K, which has led it to instrumentalise the region for its foreign policy and portray it as “Azad” (independent), when it clearly is not, the experience of PAJK illustrates these broader dynamics.

A hard state response may suppress unrest temporarily, but its effectiveness diminishes when underlying grievances remain unaddressed. Bureaucratic paternalism and elite perspectives formed in distant capitals must give way to a genuine willingness to learn from those who have experienced these realities firsthand. For post-colonial states facing similar tensions between central authority and peripheral regions, the lesson is clear, though each case has its own historical, legal and political specificities: unless deeper political questions are addressed through meaningful political accommodation, unrest may be contained temporarily, but the grievances sustaining it are unlikely to disappear.

(Luv Puri has authored two books on Jammu and Kashmir namely Uncovered Face of Militancy and Across the Line of Control, the latter published by Columbia University Press based on field-work in the region.)

A woman votes during the second phase of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) Legislative Assembly elections at a polling station in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, August 2, 2026.
| Photo Credit: Reuters

In an article published on July 28, the NYT reports deaths and violence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir after local elections. The article referred to Mirpur, a city in PoK, as “Pakistani Kashmir.” Photo: Screenshot from the NYT website.

In January 2006, I stayed at Kashmir House in Islamabad’s posh F-5 Sector, a neighbourhood of broad avenues framed by hills, a rare sight for a South Asian capital. Having spent much of my college life at Delhi University visiting Kashmir House in Chanakyapuri, I could not help but notice the contrast. In New Delhi, the compound was lined with ageing Ambassador cars, while in Islamabad the political elite showcased their clout with fleets of Pajeros, SUVs that were still a rarity in South Asia at the time. When I remarked on this to one of my hosts, a young journalist from Bagh, situated in central Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and based in Islamabad, he quipped that it was the “Pajero culture” that ruled the region, a telling reflection of the elitism that has long defined its politics.

For decades, the Pakistani state has diplomatically showcased Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to the world as if it were a separate country, complete with its own constitution, a Prime Minister as Chief Executive, and a President as constitutional head. In actual practice, the diverse political unit of Jammu and Kashmir that came together because of a confluence of many factors in the 19^th century, has propounded many myths. One such myth relates to PoK, a sliver of the undivided princely state that has been controlled by Pakistan since 1947, which has often escaped popular discussion. Pakistan refers to this area as “Azad Jammu and Kashmir”, meaning independent Jammu and Kashmir. Its legislative assembly has the power to elect its prime minister and president. At international fora, the nomenclature of executive positions and a separate Constitution are presented as evidence by Pakistan that the region is an independent entity. However, the reality is a lot different.

Global spotlight on the territory

Yet, the recent violent developments in the region have once again turned the global spotlight on the territory, underscoring the failure of a political structure devoid of accountability and transparency to the local people. According to independent sources, at least eleven protesters and three policemen have been killed in days of clashes, even as the government urges demonstrators to return to dialogue. There is communication blackout in the region. The protests are being spearheaded by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC), which has mobilised around demands for ending special allowances to government officials and securing subsidised electricity and wheat, as provided in other parts of Pakistan. The JKJAAC leadership accuses authorities of reneging on promises. Its leaders draw members from traders, transporters, lawyers, students, and other grassroots groups. Formally established around September 2023, it emerged as a cross-regional platform to channel extensive public discontent over economic misgovernance, inequities, and the concentration of power in elite circles. JKJAAC’s demands fall broadly into two interlinked categories: immediate economic relief and structural/constitutional reforms.

The JKJAAC has called for immediate economic relief in the form of subsidised electricity and wheat prices, on a par with other regions of Pakistan. It also demands the removal of elite perks and privileges for Ministers and bureaucrats, alongside free and equitable access to education and health care. Longer-term reforms include judicial and governance restructuring as well as improved infrastructure, including the establishment of an airport. Beyond economic relief, the JKJAAC has also pressed for structural reforms, including the abolition of 12 reserved “refugee seats” in the PoK Legislative Assembly, widely viewed as a tool of Islamabad’s control. It also calls for a reduction in the size of the executive, the rollback of elite perks and bureaucratic privileges, and guarantees that local communities benefit from PoK’s hydropower and natural resources. Finally, the movement seeks the elimination of quota-based allocations that disadvantage the region’s residents.

In the recent violent protests, JKJAAC leaders claim that at least 11 protesters have been killed and more than 200 injured; “all suffering gunshot wounds.” These claims, however, have been denied by the authorities, who insist that their offers to meet the demands have been ignored. Officials claim that about 90% of the demands were accepted during talks, including electricity and local government reforms, and withdrawal of protest cases. Rejecting this, JKJAAC leader Syed Hafeez Hamdani, in a written statement, asserted: “The claim that our demands have been accepted is contrary to the facts… If our demands had been accepted, we would have had no reason to keep protesting.” In reality, the protests are not merely about local grievances; they reflect the deeper structural control exercised by Islamabad through constitutional provisions that have long shaped the uneasy relationship between Islamabad and Muzaffarabad since 1947. This layered history, with all its nuances, is often reduced to a simplistic binary. As a result, any critique of the system is too readily dismissed as “India-sponsored.”

Political demand for abolition of refugee seats

At the heart of the current stalemate is the political demand for the abolition of refugee seats. The Prime Minister of PoK Chaudhry Anwar ul Haq has openly acknowledged that “there is a deadlock on the seats of the refugees, which cannot end in the context of the Kashmir movement.” To understand why these seats have become such a flashpoint, the issue must be examined through a historical and constitutional lens. The PoK Constitution reserves 12 of the 45 elected “general” Assembly seats for those who migrated from the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 and later settled across Pakistan. In practice, however, these constituencies represent Pakistani citizens with little connection to PoK’s daily realities. Strikingly, nine of these 12 seats are located not in PoK at all but across Punjab, while the remaining three are in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and Sindh. This arrangement has provided Islamabad with a direct and often decisive lever of influence over the Assembly and, by extension, PoK’s political landscape.

The larger demographic picture behind this allocation and distribution of the 12 seats is that refugees who arrived from Kashmir and Jammu, two culturally, ethnically and linguistically distinct provincial units, have been allotted six seats each. However, on the ground, this allocation and their distribution has resulted in an absurdity in terms of representation as in 1947, migration from the Kashmir valley was minimal.

Reportedly, in the 2021 election, 3,73,652 [3.73 lakh] were registered in the six constituencies representing the refugees from Jammu, whereas only 29,804 (just 7%) were registered in the six constituencies representing the refugees from Kashmir valley. In 1947, approximately 80% of migrants from the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir settled in Pakistani Punjab, not PoK. Several factors contributed to this phenomenon. Most migration occurred from the Jammu plains, geographically closer to the Sialkot district and culturally similar to the Punjab province. Compared to PoK, Punjab offered more economic opportunities for migrant communities.

Economist Mehboob-ul-Haq, the creator of the acclaimed Human Development Index, universally accepted as a better alternative to Gross Domestic Product as the measure of a nation’s prosperity, was a Jammu migrant. Pakistan’s famed female singer, Malika Pukhraj, who migrated to Lahore during the 1947 riots, was born in the Hamirpur Sidhar village near Akhnoor in Jammu. In fact, the bulk of Muslim migration was from the Dogri and Punjabi speaking Jammu plains of Jammu province. Even before 1947, a substantial portion of the population living on the Jammu plains, Muslims as well as Hindus, was tied to neighbouring parts of Punjab province, now in Pakistan, because of family, trade, education and employment. The geography played its part as from Jammu city, the winter capital of Jammu and Kashmir, major Pakistani cities such as Sialkot and Lahore, the capital of Pakistani Punjab, are less than one hour and less than two hours away respectively. In contrast, the distance between the summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar, Lahore is at least 10 to 12 hours away.

As mentioned earlier, equal seats, six each, have been allocated for refugees coming from Kashmir province and Jammu province respectively, the two culturally, ethnically and linguistically distinct provincial units of Jammu and Kashmir. However, on the ground, it results in absurdity in terms of representation. The data of the 2006 Assembly elections reveal that there were 5,46,031 registered voters for the six seats for Jammu whereas there were only 35,256 voters for the six seats reserved for the Kashmir province refugees. Although the number of seats is the same, the number of voters from the Kashmir province was only 0.06% of the total migrant vote bank. Even within the six seats for the Jammu province, the strength of the constituencies is uneven: LA5 and LA6 in Rawalpindi had 5,000 and 1,50,000 voters respectively. Holding elections for these refugee constituencies has little practical representational and legislative relevance as the descendants of the 1947 migrants are socially and economically well-integrated in Pakistan, particularly Pakistani Punjab.

Past trends and experience demonstrate that the party ruling in Islamabad is able to corner the majority of refugee seats, giving the party ruling Islamabad the advantage in government formation in Muzaffarabad, the capital of PoK.

In 1975, Zulfikar Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) brought down the Muslim Conference government on the strength of these seats. In 1990, the Muslim Conference won all 12 refugee seats and Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister, boasted that his government had “gifted” these seats to Muslim Conference founder and leader, Sardar Qayoom. The pattern replicated in the 2021 PoK election. The PTI won 75% of the refugee seats, compared to 48% of seats in the remaining 33 elected seats within PoK. In December 2007, Sultan Mehmood Chaudhry, presently President of PoK and a jat from Mirpur, had demanded abolition of the 12 seats reserved in the Assembly for “Kashmiris” settled in other parts of Pakistan. He had alleged that the “ruling parties in Pakistan always manipulate elections for these seats. The holding of elections for Jammu and Kashmir migrants in various parts of Pakistan merely serves as an instrument to benefit the ruling party in Islamabad. More important, it perpetuates a selective pan-Pakistan societal narrative on Jammu and Kashmir that consequently limits the scope and ability of the Pakistani State to approach the Kashmir issue and the broader India-Pakistan peace process with realism.

The protesters’ demand to end elitism gains added urgency in a system where institutional frameworks enable elite capture of key appointments and decision-making. The Islamabad based PoK Council has long held authority, formal or informal, over high-stakes appointments, especially in the judiciary, bureaucracy, and constitutional bodies. It has influence over the selection of the Chief Election Commissioner (who is appointed by the PoK President on the advice of the Chairman of the Council). More broadly, the Council has historically had say in appointments of judges to the High Court and Supreme Court of PoK, often via advice or consultation roles vis-à-vis the President and the federal government. In addition, it has wielded control over bureaucratic postings within the Council Secretariat itself, such as deputy secretaries, section officers, and drawing and disbursing officers—appointments that critics argue have often bypassed the jurisdiction of the PoK government and been driven by favoritism.

Beyond appointments, the Council’s reach historically extended to administrative oversight and control of departments, fiscal management, and legislative subjects: taxation, natural resources, tourism, infrastructure, and major development schemes have been subject to Council jurisdiction under its legislative list of 52 subjects. While the 13th Amendment of the PoK constitution in 2018 sought to strip many of these powers and devolve them to the PoK Assembly or to Islamabad directly, the structural role of the Council in appointments and oversight remains controversial and contested.

PoK often been sidelined

In this setup, the PoK Legislative Assembly, which is elected, has often been sidelined. Even though it is supposed to make laws on state subjects (especially those not reserved for the federal side), it lacks comparable powers over appointments, major administrative decisions, or control over constitutional bodies. The Assembly does not appoint judges or constitutional commissioners; those remain under the Council’s domain (or under advice of the Council). Thus, in practice, while the Assembly may debate or influence policy in its domain, the real levers of power, from who leads the Election Commission to who occupies senior judicial or bureaucratic posts, often lie beyond its reach. This structural disparity intensifies the protesters’ critique: even democratic institutions such as the Assembly can exist in a hollowed form, while elite executives entrenched in the Council and federal apparatus maintain decisive control.

The PoK council, though presented as a joint administrative mechanism, has functioned largely as an instrument of control rather than self-governance. Its composition itself reflects this imbalance: the Prime Minister of Pakistan serves as its Chairman, with the PoK President as Vice-Chairman, but the majority of members are appointed by Islamabad.

Out of its 11 members, six are nominated directly by the Government of Pakistan, while only five are elected by the PoK Legislative Assembly. This structure ensures that decisive influence rests with Pakistan’s federal authorities, allowing them to steer legislative, financial, and administrative matters in the territory. Instead of empowering local representatives, the Council has curtailed the authority of the elected PoK Assembly, keeping key subjects such as natural resources, taxation, and important appointments under the watchful eye of Islamabad. In effect, the body underscores the reality that PoK’s political autonomy is limited, with the Council serving as a tool through which the federal government manages and contains the region.

It is important to highlight the substance of the protests haven’t crossed or challenged the institutional redlines of Pakistani state on PoK or its broader official stance on Jammu and Kashmir. For instance, the broader constitutional and procedural contours within which elections to the PoK Assembly had been previously held demolish the myth that the region is an independent entity as Pakistan claims. There are bigger constitutional provisions that contest Pakistan’s official and diplomatic claims, such as Article 257 of Pakistani constitution, which says, “When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and the State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.”

On the contrary, Part 2 of Section 7 of the 1974 PoK Constitution says that “no person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the state’s accession to Pakistan.” Section 5(2)(vii) of the PoK Legislative Assembly Election Ordinance, 1970, says a person will be disqualified for propagating any opinion or action in any manner prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan, and that the ideology of the state’s accession to Pakistan or the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. Nobody is allowed to participate in the PoK Legislative Assembly election without signing an affidavit pledging allegiance to Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.

In several polls, several parties such as the All Parties Nationalist Alliance (APNA), espousing an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir, were not allowed to participate because they refused to sign such an affidavit. Islamabad has the power to dismiss any PoK government. Article 53 of the PoK Constitution gives the federal government the power to dismiss an elected government in PoK. This provision is part of the emergency provisions of the Pakistani Constitution. Therefore, the federal government enjoys the same emergency powers over PoK as it does over any other province of Pakistan. During the rule of Pakistan’s first military leader, Ayub Khan, the president of PoK, K. Khurshid, a rare Kashmiri-speaking leader in the region and private secretary to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first governor-general of Pakistan, was forced to resign by a mid-level police official and later jailed when he started espousing his views in public, which were in opposition to Pakistani official stance on J&K.

There is no doubt that protests have long punctuated the political history of PoK. One such early episode took place in the Sandunti area of Bagh, commonly remembered as the Sudhans rebellion in the central PoK. The Sudhans, a prominent clan in the region, rose up in the early post-Partition years against what they saw as exclusion from power and heavy-handed interference by Islamabad. Though localised, the rebellion highlighted simmering resentment over unequal representation, economic neglect, and the imposition of authority from outside the region. Later, in the 1960s, Mirpur witnessed large-scale protests against the construction of the Mangla Dam, which displaced nearly 81,000 people and set in motion another cycle of grievances. Their migration has a layered history: the first wave came a century ago, when men from Mirpur and nearby areas found employment as seamen in Britain, while the second wave followed the Mangla Dam displacements. Migration has since continued unabated, supported by strong familial connections, and today the diaspora is widespread. After the outbreak of militancy in the Kashmir Valley in 1989, militants in the valley also relied on the Mirpuri diaspora for material support. That is why the political aspirations of this community are not uniform.

That is why one needs to be realistic and more attuned to the ground which are manifested in geographical, military, sociological and historical realities. It would be misleading to interpret these protests as evidence that PoK is inclined to align with India in the future. The reasons for the present Line of Control lie in deeper ethnic, geographic, and historical dynamics. The political realities in PoK in 1947 were very different from those of the Kashmir Valley, where Sheikh Abdullah’s popularity and his opposition to the two-nation theory determined the course of history. The region has a different ethnic and linguistic base as compared to Kashmir valley, and is culturally, ethnically and linguistically, more close to adjoining parts of Pakistani Punjab such as Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Jhelum or even Sialkot districts. There are familial and caste ties between the two areas.

In central PoK, local Muslims, many of them ex-servicemen of British Army, rose in rebellion against Maharaja Hari Singh, for a host of reasons, a development soon reinforced by the tribal invasion launched from the then North-West Frontier Province. Unlike in the Kashmir Valley, this combination led to the rapid collapse of the Maharaja’s forces and immediate de facto control of the area by the Pakistani army. Also, the area of PoK is geographically adjacent to the main cities of Pakistan, Islamabad and Lahore. It takes eight hours to travel the direct route between Mirpur and Muzaffarabad within PoK, whereas passing through Islamabad cuts the travelling time by half. This is explained by the geography of the hilly region of PoK. At the same time, there is no doubt that there had been frequent protests against the Pakistani ruling leadership. In the face of these facts, with a renewed attention on the region and as documented in my book on the region, a binary narrative should make way for a more nuanced and granular understanding of the facts relating to the region which are grounded in the prevailing socio-political realities of the region, including a complicated constitutional relationship with Pakistan, geographic realities, history and a diverse set of aspirations of the PoK diaspora.

The “Pajero culture” I observed in Islamabad nearly two-decades ago was not merely about symbols of wealth. It reflected a deeper elite order that has long shaped politics in PoK. The current protests are not an aberration but a direct outgrowth of this entrenched system, where privileges, refugee seats, and constitutional constraints have ensured Islamabad’s dominance at the expense of local accountability. What is unfolding today is, therefore, less about isolated economic grievances and more about a struggle against a political culture that has denied ordinary people in PoK a meaningful say in their own future. At the same time, however, one should be careful not to read too much into these developments; the realities remain more complex, rooted in local governance failures and the peculiar constitutional relationship with Islamabad.

(Luv Puri has authored two books on Jammu and Kashmir namely Uncovered Face of Militancy and Across the Line of Control, the latter published by Columbia University Press, which was based on field work in the region.)

Terming protesters in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) as “enemies” like India, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has said there will be no dialogue with them, even as the death toll due to clashes between demonstrators and security personnel rose to 20 on Wednesday (July 29, 2026).

At least 20 activists of the banned Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) have been killed and dozens injured in clashes with law enforcement personnel in PoK since Monday (July 27, 2026), the organisation said.

Law enforcement authorities, however, disputed the death toll and accused protesters of opening fire on security personnel.

“There will be no dialogue with the protesters. I bracket them with India. I put them in the same category as India and consider them as enemies of Pakistan,” Mr. Asif told reporters on Tuesday (July 28, 2026).

Separately, the Prime Minister’s Adviser Rana Sanaullah told reporters that the JAAC held a meeting with him and presented its 38 demands.

Alleging that the protesters want to seize Muzaffarabad and Mirpur through force, Mr. Sanaullah claimed that they were currently engaged in an “India-like attack”. He claimed that no one was killed in clashes between the law enforcement personnel and protesters.

Meanwhile, shops and markets in Mirpur remained closed on Wednesday (July 28, 2026), BBC Urdu reported.

In the first phase of elections on Monday (July 27, 202^) held in 13 seats to the so-called legislative assembly of PoK, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) secured nine seats. The second and third phases of the remaining 32 seats will be held on August 2 and 10, respectively.

It is a direct contest between the two in PoK because former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf has boycotted the polls.

The first phase of the election was marred by violence and massive rigging allegations. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which is in coalition with PML-N at the Centre, alleged that the PML-N was gifted the majority of seats in the polls through massive rigging.

The JAAC has been holding a series of protests in PoK since last month over 12 contentious seats of the so-called regional legislative assembly. It alleges that the establishment manoeuvres these seats to install a prime minister of its choosing.

India on Tuesday (July 28, 2026) described the elections as an attempt by Pakistan to camouflage its illegal occupation and hide its “grave” human rights violations in the region.

“India’s position on this matter has been clear, consistent, and well known. The entire Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh, including the areas currently under Pakistan’s illegal and forcible occupation, are integral and inalienable parts of India,” External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said in Delhi.

“As we have stated earlier, the ongoing mass protests in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir are the direct consequences of Pakistan’s economic exploitation, its denial of the people’s fundamental rights, and its administrative oppression,” he said.

JAAC claims on killings

The JAAC, which held a long march from Rawalakot towards the regional capital Muzaffarabad on Monday (July 27, 2026), claimed that its activists were killed when law-enforcement personnel opened fire on participants of the march. The party’s claim could not be independently verified.

JAAC core committee member Abid Shaheen told BBC that around a dozen activists had been killed and more than 20 wounded during clashes on Monday (July 27, 2026).

Another committee member, Imtiaz Aslam, said those killed included Usman Nazir, younger brother of JAAC founding member Umar Nazir. Mr. Shaheen claimed the bodies had been taken to a medical camp near Drek, where the JAAC has been staging a sit-in for one-and-a-half months.

The JAAC also denied that its marchers were armed, saying they carried only sticks. The claim was rejected by PoK police chief Captain (retd.) Liaquat Ali Malik, who alleged that protesters possessed modern weapons and were targeting security personnel.

Captain (retd.) Malik said the reported deaths could not be verified until bodies were recovered, officially recorded or brought to hospitals for post-mortem examinations.

The JAAC began protests and a long march across PoK on June 9. Before Monday’s violence, 40 people had reportedly been killed during the unrest, including 34 protesters and six police and paramilitary personnel.

The government had opened negotiations with the JAAC to end the protests before the legislative assembly elections, but the talks have so far failed to yield a settlement.

The authorities have suspended internet services in the region. Besides, there has been a complete media ban in Pakistan on the coverage of the JAAC protest.

There are 53 seats in the so-called PoK Legislative Assembly — 45 are directly elected, while eight are reserved for women, technocrats and clerics.

Published – July 29, 2026 05:11 pm IST

Supporters of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) gather during a week-long protest in Rawalakot, in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir on June 24, 2026, following the group’s ban under anti-terrorism laws by local authorities.
| Photo Credit: AFP

The story so far:

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) is again in the throes of civilian unrest as protests for economic justice and equitable political representation rage across the region. The Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), which called for the protests, has since been banned by the regional government, for “engaging in terrorism”.

What is the JAAC and why did it call for protests?

The JAAC, an umbrella organisation of various civil society groups, trade bodies, students organisations and socio-religious groups based in PoK, was formed in 2023, out of protests against rising electricity tariffs and inflation. They brought out a 38-point Charter of Demands which included access to subsidised wheat flour, fair electricity pricing based on hydropower generation costs from the local Mangla dam, and the abolishment of the reservation of 12 seats for refugees in PoK’s Legislative Assembly.

While the JAAC was given assurances regarding electricity tariffs, their “non-fulfillment” led to wider protests. In May 2024, the JAAC called for a march to Muzaffarabad over their demands, which led to the police arresting around 70 members of the organisation. Outrage against the arrests resulted in clashes between civilians and the police, leaving at least four dead and hundreds injured. In the wake of this violence, Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif approved the grant of a $86.25 million subsidy programme.

In October 2025, protests again emerged due to a breakdown of talks between officials and the JAAC. The ensuing violence killed at least 10 people. The government then agreed to some demands which included providing compensation for those killed in the violence, releasing funds for the implementation of health cards, and issuing a grant of PKR 10 billion for the improvement of the electricity system.

While it was also decided that a high-powered committee comprising legal and constitutional experts would deliberate on the issue of members of the PoK Assembly, the central question remained unaddressed.

How did the situation escalate?

Elections to the regional government of PoK have been scheduled for July 27. The JAAC announced that they would take out a protest march to Muzaffarabad, calling for an end to the reservation of the 12 refugee seats, on June 9 — the same day on which the filing of nominations for the elections was to begin.

In an effort to nip the march in the bud, the regional authorities banned the JAAC under a 2014 anti-terrorism law and placed a bounty for its most prominent leaders. They said the organisation had acted in a manner “prejudicial to peace and security” of the state. This led to widespread protests in various cities, particularly Mirpur, Rawalakot and Muzaffarabad, with police personnel clashing with civilian protesters.

On June 8, at least 11 people, including four police officers, were killed and dozens injured when regional authorities opened fire on activists and protesters gathered in Rawalakot for the funeral of a local trade activist who had been killed during an earlier protest.

While the proscribed JAAC has called for strikes, leaving life paralysed in the streets of Muzaffarabad, many parts of the region continue to witness violent clashes, with reports indicating that the death toll has crossed 30.

Regional authorities have deployed paramilitary troops in the region to restore law and order and have also issued a strict travel advisory urging visitors to avoid travelling to the region. Reports also say that Internet in the region has been severely restricted.

Why has the reservation of refugees become a flashpoint?

The political question regarding the 12 reserved refugee seats is at the heart of the protests. The regional Assembly of the PoK has a total of 53 seats. Of these, 45 seats are directly elected by the public (33 are elected by the general public while 12 seats are reserved for refugees). The remaining eight seats are reserved (five for women, one for a technocrat, one for a religious scholar and one is a diaspora seat) and are filled via nominations after the general elections.

The 12 reserved seats are for communities who migrated to Pakistan from Jammu and Kashmir during Partition. Over the years, these groups have integrated into Pakistani cities and polity. In fact, most of these 12 seats have often been won by political parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party or the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. As the journalist Luv Puri writes, “…the 12 refugee seats account for around 4.36 lakh registered voters, while the remaining 33 directly elected seats in PoK have around 33 lakh voters. In effect, one refugee vote cast from Pakistan carries electoral weight far greater than that of a voter residing in PoK”.

Pakistan maintains that PoK, or what it calls ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’, is an independent region with its own polity and that Pakistan supports its right to self-determination. At the same time, candidates who are elected to the regional Parliament have to sign loyalty oaths supporting the “cause of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan”. This has led to questions regarding the undue influence of Islamabad in the regional politics of PoK.

In a further setback to such regional demands, on June 7, the Supreme Court of PoK observed that the 12 legislative seats reserved for refugees are constitutionally protected and cannot be abolished through administrative or executive measures; only a constitutional amendment can fulfil the demand to abolish refugee representation.

How have the Indian and Pakistani governments reacted?

On June 9, India asked the international community to hold Pakistan responsible for the civilian killings and human rights abuses in PoK. “There are reports of severe police brutality in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir in which several protesters have been killed and many injured. We hope the international community will hold Pakistan accountable for its misdeeds and abuses,” said Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal during a press briefing. National Conference president Farooq Abdullah condemned the violence and demanded a probe by the United Nations into the incidents of atrocities.

Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson Tahir Andrabi dismissed India’s statements “in their entirety” and went on to state that “it is untenable” for a country like India which has “consistently denied the people of Jammu and Kashmir their right to self-determination to claim concerns over the rights of Kashmiris.”

The unrest has also generated global outrage. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International stated that the regional administration’s sweeping crackdown on protests is a continuation of the “alarming deterioration of human rights in the region”.

On June 6, a group of nearly 30 British parliamentarians, in a letter to the U.K. Foreign Office, raised concerns over reports of communication disruptions, arrests, and “escalating tensions” in the PoK. They urged the British government to engage proactively and use diplomatic channels to encourage a peaceful de-escalation in the region.

Published – June 14, 2026 02:12 am IST

A deserted view of a street during a shutter-down strike called by the banned Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), an alliance of civil society groups, in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, on June 9, 2026.
| Photo Credit: Reuters

Police officials patrol an area amid the ongoing violence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir after violent clashes in Muzaffarabad, PoK on June 9, 2026.
| Photo Credit: PTI