A week before the tanks and armoured personnel carriers rolled into Hyderabad, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made it clear on the floor of the Constituent Assembly: “India could never agree to Hyderabad having independent relations with any other power for that would endanger her own security. Historically, Hyderabad has at no time been independent. Practically, in the circumstances of today, it cannot be independent.” The message on September 7, 1948 was a much stronger message than the earlier missives.

Weeks earlier, on June 4, 1948, Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel in Dehradun wrote to Nehru. “I feel and feel very keenly that we should do nothing in Hyderabad whether in regard to its internal constitutional problems or in regard to its accession, which we cannot justify in all good conscience to the world and to our own people.”

This was the good cop-bad cop routine the two statesmen of India followed as the war in Kashmir turned into a diplomatic and security quagmire. The two Indian leaders were worried about how it will look if they used strongarm tactics to bring in line the recalcitrant Nizam Mir Osman Ali Khan and his band of advisors and hatchet-men.

The Nizam’s government allegedly gave a $48,000, i.e. ₹20 lakhs a year deal to the United Press of America to broadcast Hyderabad version of news to the world. The Nizam’s government also financed films that were shot in Hyderabad to show peaceful life in the State. 

In contrast, India resorted to diplomacy and letter-writing. In the run-up to the Operation Polo or Police Action, Patel was in touch with British diplomats as well. One of whom, Arthur Henderson, the Secretary of State for Air, UK wrote on June 26, 1948: “I still hope that it will be possible for a satisfactory agreement to be reached, both with regard to Kashmir and Hyderabad. Whatever form of political set-up there may be, both Pakistan and India have everything to gain by friendly co-operation and good neighbourliness. Hyderabad also will have much to gain by closer co-operation with India.” 

The diplomacy wore thin. Patel was furious when it didn’t help. “Our attempt at a settlement, which so often came near to success, ended unfortunately in failure. There are forces at work which are determined not to allow any agreement to be reached between Hyderabad and the Indian Union, and which have progressively gained strength in Hyderabad and seem now completely to control the Government of the State.”

He was responding to a mail sent by Nehru on May 27, 1948 which said: “I feel that it would be of tremendous advantage to us if we could satisfactorily settle with Hyderabad and make it innocuous by bringing it effectively under our control.” 

The diplomatic pretence worked so well that the CIA spooks in their weekly Intelligence summary on May 26, 1948, did not expect the Indian action in the middle of September: “India is not likely to take overt action to end Hyderabad’s independence before the ‘standstill agreement’ between India and Hyderabad expires on 15 November.” 

This was not to be. Between September 13 morning and September 17 afternoon of 1948, India was in effective control of Hyderabad state. A State that existed continuously from 1724. 

Even seasoned diplomats were surprised by the quick turn of events that was like a sea tide that subsided normally. Sir Walter Monckton, who advised the Nizam on the negotiations with the Indian government wrote to Patel. “I want to tell you how relieved I am that the action which you were eventually driven to take did not result in large-scale communal troubles. I know how anxious you were not to take the action at all, and how hard you struggled to avoid it. I honestly believe that moderate world opinion shared your view rather than the other.”