Rabi Lamichhane was a television personality until a few years ago, known for his confrontational talk show Sidha Kura Janata Sang (Direct talk with the people), in which he frequently criticised politicians and highlighted public grievances.

Buoyed by his popularity, he launched a political experiment. In June 2022, he founded the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP). He strategically included “Swatantra”, meaning “independent”, in the name to signal that the party was distinct from the established parties. The elections were just six months away.

When Nepal went to the polls in November that year, the RSP surprised everyone — it finished fourth. A key challenge for the RSP, however, was that despite being the fourth-largest party and enjoying public support, few saw it as a formidable force capable of challenging established parties. First, it lacked a clear ideology. Second, the party was synonymous with “Rabi” or “Ghanti” — the bell, the party’s election symbol.

Many viewed its rise with scepticism, saying it was a fleeting success driven by public frustration with Nepal’s old guard — Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and CPN (Maoist Centre). Mr. Lamichhane’s controversial moves as Minister — the RSP had joined the government twice between 2022 and 2024 — and his brushes with the law dented the party’s image. He has been in and out of jail multiple times over charges of embezzling cooperative funds.

As it evolved, the party worked on its ideological clarity and now calls itself a pluralistic democratic party that espouses a liberal economy with social justice — centrist liberal in short. The party’s views on the current federal structure remain unclear, with multiple leaders making different public statements about the form of governance. In July 2024, when the two biggest parties — the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML — joined hands to form a government, the RSP was pushed into a meek opposition.

Last September’s Gen Z protests, which the RSP supported, did further damage. Some influential leaders deserted the party. Mr. Lamichhane faced allegations of escaping jail during the chaos on September 9, the second day of the protests. He, however, turned himself in. The protests, which claimed 77 lives — including 19 in police firing — toppled the K.P. Sharma Oli government, triggering election.

Anti-corruption mood

The RSP, which was almost on the verge of implosion, suddenly became the beneficiary of the protests against corruption and misrule — what the party claims as its own agenda — with public anger directed mostly against the Nepali Congress and the UML. In late December, then Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah, known as Balen, joined the RSP as the party’s prime ministerial candidate.

In the run-up to the March 5 election, the RSP saw growing public support — many calling it a ‘Balen effect’. The party, once synonymous with ‘Rabi’, became synonymous with either ‘Balen’ or ‘Ghanti’, resonating with a larger electorate, beyond party lines.

The four-year-old party, once criticised for lacking an ideology, has dealt a major blow to the established parties in the March 5 election. The RSP is set to secure a majority of 138 seats, with trends suggesting it could even reach a two-thirds majority of 184 in the 275-member House. As of now, the party has won 57 seats under the first-past-the-post system and is leading in 64 out of 165 constituencies. It is ahead under the proportional representation system, in which 110 members are elected, securing a 53% vote share.

Balen is set to defeat Mr. Oli by a huge margin. Gagan Thapa of the Nepali Congress is set to suffer a loss in Sarlahi-4, a constituency in the Madhesh plains, at the hands of an old Congress member now running on RSP ticket.

Chandan Goopta, a data analyst following the polls in Madhesh, says this time the election was about Balen versus the rest. “It’s not Gagan vs Amaresh Singh [the RSP candidate], it’s Gagan vs Balen,” he said. “It’s the same for all constituencies [in Madhesh].”

Swarnim Wagle, an economist and former vice-chair of Nepal’s National Planning Commission who left the Nepali Congress to join the RSP three years ago, told The Hindu in March 2023 that the RSP was “a movement in the making”.

“Come next elections, we will emerge as a major political force,” he said then.

The “next elections” came two years ahead of schedule. And the RSP surpassed everyone’s expectations.

Published – March 08, 2026 01:00 am IST

Nepal is voting on Thursday (March 5, 2026) in its first election since last September’s Gen Z protests that toppled the K.P. Sharma Oli government and led to the dissolution of the House of Representatives.

The sudden eruption of the movement — marked by the unprecedented participation of thousands of young people — and the killing of 19 youth in police firing left the country in shock. The international community, too, was caught off guard. In total, 77 people lost their lives during the two days of protests, making it one of the most violent episodes in Nepal’s recent political history.

After Mr. Oli of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) resigned, an interim government was installed — a move some say breached constitutional boundaries. The March 5 election, hence, is expected to restore constitutional order and bring the democratic process back on track. Yet uncertainty persists over who will ultimately lead the next government.

With a clear majority for any single party highly unlikely, analysts predict a return to a hung Parliament and coalition politics — hallmarks of Nepali democracy in recent years.

“A fractured Parliament, probably the most likely scenario, means that coalition negotiations will play a key role in shaping what comes next,” said Sanjay Upadhya, a U.S.-based Nepali author of the book Nepal and the Geostrategic Rivalry between China and India. “The journey ahead is twofold. Not only do parties need to find common ground, but they also have to manage differences within their ranks.”

Dependence on India

Nepal’s economic dependence on India remains substantial, with more than two-thirds of its trade conducted with its southern neighbour. The two countries share an approximately 1,800-km-long porous border, which citizens of either country can cross without a visa or passport.

New Delhi is not merely a development partner; it has historically exercised considerable influence in Nepal’s political processes — whether in the 1950s, the 1990s, or during Nepal’s transition from monarchy to republic. Though Delhi has appeared relatively hands-off since the Gen Z protests, it consistently pushed for elections on the announced date and extended logistical support.

Frequent changes of government in Kathmandu, with familiar faces rotating in power roughly every nine months, have complicated Delhi’s engagement in the last decade or so. Analysts argue that India’s expectation of political stability in Nepal is therefore understandable.

Following episodes of instability in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, democratic derailment in Nepal is not something India would welcome. Regional stability is central to Delhi’s broader strategic interests amid rapid geopolitical flux, particularly at a time when India seeks to project itself as a leading voice of the Global South.

Security concerns, including terrorism and cross-border crime, remain significant, given the open border.

India’s stated position has been to “work with the government of the day in Kathmandu.” Yet it has not gone unnoticed that Mr. Oli’s ultranationalist rhetoric and his perceived tilt towards China had, at times, strained ties with Delhi. Analysts suggest India may quietly prefer a non-Left dispensation in Kathmandu.

Such a government could be led either by the Nepali Congress, which shares historical and institutional ties with India, or by the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), a relatively new political force experiencing a groundswell this election. The RSP’s equations with Delhi remain unclear, and the past provocative positioning of its prime ministerial candidate, Balendra Shah, has raised concerns in diplomatic circles.

Meanwhile, Nepali Congress president Gagan Thapa, though popular, remains untested at the executive level.

Geopolitical balance

In November, the outgoing Chinese ambassador Chen Song reaffirmed China’s commitment to supporting Nepal for the successful completion of the March 5 vote.

China has steadily expanded its footprint in Nepal in recent years. While it traditionally preferred quiet diplomacy, its engagement became more visibly assertive after Nepal’s communist forces united in 2018 under Mr. Oli to form a powerful Left alliance — a bloc that later imploded in 2021. Beijing’s efforts to keep Nepal’s communist parties united were widely noted.

The United States has also expressed confidence in a peaceful electoral process and indicated its readiness to work with the next government.

As China has deepened its strategic presence in Nepal through infrastructure financing and connectivity initiatives under the Belt and Road Initiative, Washington’s concerns have grown.

In 2022, debate over the Millennium Challenge Corporation compact — a $500 million U.S. grant for Nepal — triggered sharp exchanges between Washington and Beijing, with the latter describing the American initiative as a “Pandora’s box.”

The road ahead

The outcome of Thursday’s vote is expected to shape not only domestic power equations but also Nepal’s external balancing act in an increasingly polarised regional environment.

“All three countries publicly view the election as a step toward peace and stability in Nepal. India would probably welcome a coalition between the RSP and the Congress,” said Mr. Upadhya. “While recognising the advantage this could give Washington, Delhi would see such a coalition as focused on preventing any Nepali shift toward China.”

As far as Beijing is concerned, according to Mr. Upadhya, it is likely worried about a possible decrease in the communist vote share, seeing it as advantageous to Washington and New Delhi.

“The United States is keen to see whether — and to what extent — Nepal might reduce its dependence on China,” he said.

Published – March 04, 2026 11:31 pm IST

Polling officers set up a polling station at a school, ahead of the general election, in Damak, Jhapa district, Nepal, on March 4, 2026.
| Photo Credit: Reuters

From promising to increase the size of the economy to NRs 10 trillion (about $77 billion) and raising per capita income to $2,500-3,000, to creating more than one million jobs a year and tripling or even quadrupling electricity generation, Nepali parties have promised the moon as Nepal is set to vote in a landmark election on March 5.

Parties have already unveiled their manifestos and are now on campaign trails, pledging not only development but also an end to corruption and good governance — the rallying cry of the Gen Z protests of September last year, which necessitated the election.

Analysts, however, are cautious. While they are sceptical of the parties’ overambitious plans, they point to the risk of this election turning into another regular vote that may not offer solutions to some core political problems plaguing Nepal.

Tara Nath Dahal, a civic rights activist and campaigner for open government, says a hung Parliament is almost certain, which could revive the same revolving-door politics, albeit with new actors and faces.

“None of the parties seems to have paid attention to crucial Bills, including those related to media and social media, that need to be passed,” Mr. Dahal said. “It’s strange that parties have forgotten that the Gen Z protests had their roots in the then-government’s move to ban social media platforms.”

More than 60 parties and over 3,000 candidates are in the fray for the 275-member House of Representatives, which is composed of 165 directly elected members and 110 elected under the proportional representation system.

Nepal’s tech-savvy youth took to the streets on September 8-9 last year, triggered by the then-K.P. Sharma Oli government’s abrupt decision to ban at least 26 social media platforms.

They demonstrated against entrenched corruption, years of misrule, nepotism, and cronyism, and demanded change.

A total of 77 people lost their lives in the two-day protest, with 19 killed in police gunfire on the first day.

Mr. Oli resigned on September 9. An interim government, led by Sushila Karki, was formed on September 12; it dissolved the House and called for snap polls on March 5.

Nepal’s leader says post-uprising polls on track

Tall promises

Campaigns are now in full swing. Some analysts say the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) is experiencing a groundswell. The RSP is a relatively new party, born just six months before the 2022 elections, and it has promised to expand the economy to $100 billion, raise per capita income to more than $3,000, and create 1.2 million jobs.

The Nepali Congress, a divided house since the January tumult in the party, is contesting the election under new leadership. The party has promised an economy of $79.9 billion, per capita income of $2,500, and 1.5 lakh jobs each year for five years.

Mr. Oli’s Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) in its manifesto has said the economy would be expanded to $69.4 billion in five years and then doubled to $138.8 billion in ten years.

Ujyalo Nepal Party, a new political force led by Kulman Ghising, a former technocrat credited with ending Nepal’s years-long power outages, is aiming for 12,000 MW of electricity production by 2030 and 25,000 MW by 2035.

Analysts say that given the context of the current economy, with Nepal’s nominal GDP at roughly $45.5 billion, per capita GDP around $1,535, one in five persons unemployed, and the country’s current power generation at 3,878 MW, almost all parties have made tall claims without providing any concrete plans — or a clear resource management model.

Mr. Dahal says what’s absurd is that none of the parties have talked about how they are going to institutionalise the demands of the Gen Z movement.

Editorial | Generational rage: On the upheaval in Nepal

Incomplete manifestos

“Every party is talking about development and ending corruption. But development is a political process; corruption has its roots in the system and culture,” he said. “Political commitment and the will to achieve those are missing from their manifestos.”

Most of the parties have made the September protests their reference point, stopping short of acknowledging their demands. The Nepali Congress, though, has explicitly referenced and incorporated the Gen-Z uprising but has also centred its manifesto on the economy and development.

Parties this time have given different names to their core documents, with some calling it a commitment paper and others calling it a citizen contract or a promise document.

Regardless, what Nepali society is looking for is change, says Dr. Pramod Jaiswal, Research Director at Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement, a Kathmandu-based thinktank.

“It will be wrong to assume that post-election this country will be on the path of development at once,” he said. “What we can expect is we will definitely see some change in the Nepali political landscape.”

According to him, a new force, which could be the RSP, is likely to alter the traditional composition in Parliament or may even get a chance to lead the government.

“If so, it will be under pressure not to repeat the mistakes of the old parties,” he said. “That may bring some change.”

No matter what parties have pledged, even if their promises are realistic, achieving those goals is not going to be easy unless a party secures a majority and leads the government for five years.

In a country where structural constraints have long stymied development efforts, the promises will have to be traded off when coalition practices repeat, says Mr. Dahal.

“So, these manifestos hardly mean anything,” he added. “This election is most likely to return us to the same coalition fragility.”

Published – February 28, 2026 10:53 pm IST

The region has seen three uprisings in recent years — Sri Lanka in 2022, Bangladesh in 2024, and Nepal last year. When you look back, what was most striking? 

The most obvious take away was the depth of discontent that has existed in all of these countries. While some say it is all social media — social media certainly played a significant role — it is the economic drivers that we must pay more attention to.  

In Sri Lanka you had an outright economic crisis that was in many ways more than the political discontent. It was economic desperation that was driving so many people out onto the streets. In Bangladesh, the focus was on the authoritarianism and the brutality of the Sheikh Hasina regime. But if you remember in the lead up to these uprisings in both Bangladesh and Nepal, cost of living was a big question that kept coming up. 

The fixation on politics in the near-term is because it is easier to make sense of, especially when there is an election. The economic dynamics evolve over a longer term. The frustration with corruption was such a universal theme. 

In Sri Lanka, the presidential and general elections were held [after the uprising] and we saw a pretty thorough sweeping out of the old political order and the first real opportunity at governance for the JVP [Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna]. I remember conversations back home in Kathmandu, where when [the uprisings in] Sri Lanka and then Bangladesh happened, on a few occasions I heard people saying “we have the same problems, our turn will come too”, and it did, very shockingly and violently. 

Both Bangladesh and Nepal are going to the polls. What does the political landscape look like now? 

With the elections, it is now the consolidation phase. The question is how much of an overhaul are we likely to see. In Bangladesh, was the uprising against the entire old order or much more against the Awami League? The BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] is the front runner, the favourite in the election right now, which is not a complete root-and-stem overhaul of the system. The BNP has its own, very problematic history. The BNP’s record shows many of the same sins that the Awami League was castigated for. 

The big question in Bangladesh now is what is the BNP? With Khaleda Zia’s passing, there is a generational shift and [emerging] dynamics within the party, including over exactly how the new leadership takes shape. So what kind of BNP are we likely to get and what is the BNP now going to stand for? 

There are fears within Bangladesh of a return to some of the old ways. The security apparatus that Hasina inherited and built up remains largely intact. The students-led party [National Citizen Party], born out of the July revolution, has tied up with the Jamaat [Jamaat-e-Islami], which some people saw coming, but a lot of people were surprised and shocked. Women leaders, who were at the forefront of the July revolution, are asking if this party is really going to represent the spirit of what they came out onto the streets for. The Jamaat is making statements that it will not throttle women’s rights. Given its record, that needs to be taken with a big grain of salt. 

What about Nepal? The old actors are still in the fray, isn’t it? 

In Nepal, it is that process of reconsolidation. It is fair to predict that the old parties, the traditional three for us in recent times, the Nepali Congress, the UML [Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist)], and also the Maoists, will take a beating at the polls. 

Even within each of those parties, there has been a process of trying to reinvent themselves, certainly within the UML and the Congress. Voters are trying to understand what kind of party each of them will emerge as. 

The frustration and the memory of the revolt remain very fresh. We have seen some consolidation among the newer political forces. Especially now, the two newer faces of Nepali politics, Rabi Lamichhane and Balen Shah, have come together under a single party structure. That in itself has its own contradictions and clashes, and we will have to wait and see how long it lasts. There is a very good chance that we see a very scattered mandate in Nepal. Compared to Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, Nepal is more unpredictable because of the sheer number of little parties. 

India is avowedly pursuing a ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy. How would you evaluate that? 

A realistic assessment of ‘Neighbourhood First’ from the time the slogan was launched is that it has been little more than a slogan. Whatever efforts there have been out of New Delhi, they have largely failed because overall New Delhi’s relationships and ties with its neighbours are not better than they were back then [2014]. In many cases, they are severely worse. Bangladesh is a stark example. Anti-India sentiment has become an increasing part of the political landscape in the Maldives and in Nepal. 

There is a process underway of the subordination of New Delhi’s regional interests to the domestic needs of the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party], rather than the bilateral interests or regional interests. For New Delhi, the greater metric of success right now is perhaps whether the complexities of the region can be saffronised in a way that becomes palatable to the domestic audience. The BJP does have a lot of domestic electoral and political gain to harvest from pushing this narrative on Bangladesh, as much as that narrative is deeply injurious to Bangladesh-India ties. 

The amount of damage that does to India’s standing and goodwill towards India cannot be overstated. Indian aid in the wake of the economic crisis or the natural disaster in Sri Lanka, for instance, is enormously to India’s credit. In Nepal, too, we are in India’s debt after the earthquake. And yet you have all these positives in the balance sheet, and you have this massive negative that very often wipes out a lot of the positives. We must also ask where is India trading the most? India’s biggest trade partner in terms of materials being imported is China and yet you have New Delhi coming to Kathmandu or Dhaka and putting pressure on the governments there to throttle trade with China. The hypocrisy of that is noticed and known, and it counts as a massive negative in that balance sheet of bilateral and multilateral regional ties with India.  

Where does that leave regional cooperation? 

Things are in many ways quite bleak politically for any kind of South Asian regionalism. That is not the ultimate goal to pursue. The ultimate goal for each of our countries to pursue independently is the well-being of their own citizens. The logical course of that will lead to and will pass through greater regional integration simply because of the economic logic. With that frame in mind, it is tragic the way that politics is standing in the way of that. For all its regional and global ambitions, India is not taking a hard enough look at the extent to which its domestic politics is poisoning the well regionally and beyond. 

Illustration: Sreejith R. Kumar

Charge d’Affaires of the Embassy of India, Kathmandu, Rakesh Pandey, hands over the first tranche of election-related assistance from India to the Minister for Home Affairs of Nepal, Om Prakash Aryal, during a ceremony organised at the Ministry of Home Affairs, in Kathmandu on Tuesday.
| Photo Credit: ANI

A woman scans her biometric data while registering her name on the voter list ahead of the House of Representatives election scheduled for March 5, 2026. File
| Photo Credit: AP

Newly-elected Prime Minister of Nepal’s interim government Sushila Karki (C) arrives at the prime minister’s office in Kathmandu. File
| Photo Credit: AFP