Five years after staging a military coup that overturned the 2020 election results and imprisoned elected leaders, including National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint, Myanmar’s junta is now attempting to legitimise its rule through elections. The poll has been denounced as a sham by the international community, with the regime’s allies — Russia, Belarus and neighbouring China — sending observers to lend it credibility.

The first phase of the poll was held on December 28, 2025, with the remaining two scheduled for early and late January. However, these polls cover only about half of Myanmar’s territory, with the rest beyond the junta’s reach due to the ongoing civil war involving the NLD-led National Unity Government’s Bamar-dominated People’s Defence Forces and ethnic armed organisations across the country.

In results that were a foregone conclusion, the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) claimed victory in nearly 80% of contested seats. The USDP fielded over 1,000 candidates, far exceeding its closest rivals’ tallies. Meanwhile, the NLD, which won landslide victories in 2015 and 2020, was deregistered along with 40 other parties. Collectively, they had won 90% of legislative seats in 2020.

Aiding the USDP’s dominance was the junta’s introduction of a proportional representation system, replacing the first-past-the-post method that had delivered the NLD’s sweeping victories. This allows the USDP to secure seats even with minimal popular support, over and above the 25% of parliamentary seats reserved for military appointees under the 2008 Constitution. In sum, this was almost a repeat of the controlled 2010 elections, but with the deck stacked even more heavily in the junta’s favour.

The USDP’s origins lie in the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), established by Senior General Than Shwe in September 1993, just months after the regime convened a National Convention to draft Myanmar’s future constitution. Than Shwe, who ruled Myanmar from 1992 to 2011, had come to power after the junta negated the NLD’s triumph in multi-party elections in 1990. Officially a social organisation aimed at “national development” and “ethnic amity”, the USDA was, in reality, designed to be the military’s civilian arm. Its vice-chairman and general secretary were retired military officers, but the post of chairman was kept empty so as not to create a parallel leader beyond the Senior General, according to a former USDP insider Ye Htut. The USDA also functioned as an organisation that conducted and promoted business under the junta’s patronage.

In 2010, following the institution of a new constitution in 2008, the USDA transformed into the USDP just before elections that would bring a quasi-civilian government to power. Ex-general Thein Sein was elected president in polls boycotted by the NLD and widely derided as rigged. In genuinely contested elections in 2015 and 2020, however, the USDP suffered humiliating defeats, losing even in its stronghold of the national capital, Naypyitaw.

Strategic instrument

In a way, the USDP is a successor to the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) that ruled Myanmar under a one-party dictatorship led by Ne Win following a military coup in 1962. The BSPP was inseparable from the state and collapsed in 1988 following the popular 8888 uprisingthat brought down the dictatorship. The military seized power again through a coup, and ruled until 2011 with Than Shwe as leader.

The USDP, in contrast to the BSPP, functions as a strategic instrument within a multi-party system while the military retains ultimate power through constitutional guarantees. If the USDP loses, the military doesn’t collapse; it simply uses other mechanisms to maintain control, as demonstrated by the 2021 coup. Also, unlike the BSPP’s “secular” and “socialist” pretensions, the USDP seeks legitimacy in an ideological blend of Bamar and Buddhist nationalism, by aligning with radical monastic groups like MaBaTha against perceived foreign and minority threats.

The USDP’s current leader is U Khin Yi, a former senior military officer and police chief who also served as immigration minister in Thein Sein’s government. Khin Yi conducted a series of pro-military rallies before the February 2021 coup, following the junta’s false claim that the NLD’s victory was due to fraud. The rallies and the violence that followed provided the pretext for the military’s seizure of absolute power.

The party’s candidate list for the current election is packed with generals and former ministers, including former defence minister Mya Tun Oo and Prime Minister Nyo Saw. The USDP now appears to be a vehicle to transition junta leader Min Aung Hlaing into a civilian presidency, providing a legal veneer to end the state of emergency declared after the coup.

Close to five years since the February 2021 coup that overturned the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy’s (NLD) landslide electoral victory in the 2020 elections, Myanmar’s military junta, also known as Tatmadaw, is now conducting a three-phase controlled election. The first phase of the “election” was held on December 28 under tight security and saw sparse turnout. Subsequent phases are scheduled for January 11 and 25.

The NLD, whose exiles lead the National Unity Government that oversees Bamar-identity dominated militias called the Peoples’ Defence Forces and is fighting the junta across several parts of the country, was among 40 parties — which accounted for 90% of the seats won in 2020 — that have been barred from contesting. Others include the Arakan National Party in Rakhine and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy. The junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), packed with former junta officials and active-duty officers contesting as civilians, has deployed the largest number of contestants taking on what is considered just token Opposition.

The junta’s strategy is to repeat what it accomplished in 2010 when it installed its generals as civilian rulers to run a government elected in a similarly restricted election. But the difference now is that this election is occurring amid a brutal civil war, where the junta has bombed its own civilian population and hostilities have resulted in thousands of deaths. Min Aung Hlaing’s men have bare control over just about half the country. In at least 65 townships — close to a third of the total — elections are not being held, with the civil war still raging in many rural outposts. Yet the junta has gone ahead with these controlled polls to win some legitimacy with the international community.

Between 2010 and 2020, the reformist general Thein Sein had allowed for gradual inclusion of leading democratic forces in the polity — leading to international recognition and increased trade and investments — before Min Aung Hlaing pulled the plug through the 2021 coup, resulting in international isolation except for support from Russia, Belarus and a hedging China. Under the 2008 Constitution, the military automatically holds 25% of all parliamentary seats, and with the USDP set to retain a dominant position through proportional representation, the Tatmadaw seeks to control the legislature and provide a legal framework for ending the emergency declared since the coup. This, it believes, will help deepen engagement with partners such as China and Russia.

Recent military advances have also encouraged the junta down this path. In late 2023, a rebel alliance of three ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) — the Three Brotherhood Alliance — forced the junta’s withdrawal from northern Shan State and Rakhine State, adding to blows from other long-term insurgent EAOs such as the Kachins, Karens and Karennis, aided by the PDFs’ guerrilla warfare. The TBA’s advances came with tacit approval from Beijing, frustrated by the junta’s inaction on scam centres near the China border that had caused massive losses to Chinese citizens. But once those scam centres were targeted, China pivoted — pressuring at least two TBA groups to sign ceasefires and surrender townships gained in Shan State, closing border trading routes to enforce compliance while stabilising the junta to protect its geo-economic interests. One TBA member, the Arakan Army, has continued operations in Rakhine State, which shares no border with China, gaining significant territory except urban centres like Sittwe.

On the day of polling, junta jets and artillery attacked residential areas of Budalin township in Sagaing Region; the previous day, nine civilians died in similar attacks in Khin-U township. Besides Russian-supplied jets, the junta now deploys Chinese-made drones and motorised paragliders to attack rebel forces and civilians alike for area dominance. This brutality is unsurprising — Min Aung Hlaing faces ongoing proceedings before both the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, the latter probing genocide against the Rohingya.

The sparse turnout suggests the junta remains deeply unpopular, and the continuing civil war guarantees instability. Yet the resistance’s lack of a centralised structure uniting Bamar guerrillas with EAOs under NUG command, combined with a shifting geopolitical landscape, suggests the junta will maintain its resilience. Besides Russian, Chinese and Belarusian support, Washington’s stance has grown ambivalent under the Trump administration — U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem said last month that Myanmar was progressing towards “free and fair elections” and the Treasury recently lifted sanctions on firms close to the junta leadership, fuelling concerns that rare earth minerals may be trumping democracy promotion. The overall result is strategic stalemate, with over 20 million people requiring humanitarian assistance and no end to the suffering in sight.