“Whatever they’re alleging in regards to Iran’s nuclear programme, Iran’s ballistic missiles, and the number of casualties during January’s unrest, is simply the repetition of ‘big lies’,” Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei said.
| Photo Credit: AFP

As world leaders gathered in Munich, Germany, for Europe’s top annual security conference, placating, pleasing, and managing US President Donald Trump stood as a top agenda. Trump’s phone call to Russia’s Vladimir Putin, US Vice-President J.D. Vance’s disruptive speech challenging Europe, and, by association, the very nature of trans-Atlantic alliances, and demands to end the Ukraine conflict, has led to a mad rush to host such a process, in the Gulf. The question that perhaps comes immediately to mind, even though the conflict in Gaza remains a major global flashpoint, is, why?

The Meeting Between Rubio And Lavrov

Russia and the US are preparing to start initial consultations on Ukraine following an ice-breaking meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh. For Saudi Arabia and its powerful heir-apparent, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, this is a moment of both regional and global reckoning. Gulf powers in the Middle East have now been for a while re-positioning and re-posturing their geopolitics. This process started much before Trump’s return to the White House—arguably, prior to even the Russian war against Ukraine. The roots of this shift lie in two main realities. First, a change in the construct of global power contestation, that is, a bi-polar competition between the US and China and a demand for multipolarity by a host of middle powers looking to secure their own interests and not get caught in the Washington-Beijing dynamics. The second reality relates to a general idea of the US becoming increasingly unwilling to mobilise militarily power to protect its allies.

Reconsidering America’s Role

Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are evaluating the very fundamentals of the decades-long American hegemony, which has provided security blankets in the region. This also provides them with an opportunity to build their own geopolitical repertoire as middle powers with their own agency, instead of being viewed as client states, a tag that has plagued many of them for decades. The UAE as well has thrown its hat into the ring, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy landed in Abu Dhabi, mere hours after both Russia and the US eluded to excluding Kyiv from talks regarding Ukraine’s own future (Zelenskyy later cancelled a planned visit to Saudi). While this position by the Trump administration delivered tremors across European capitals, it has also played into an increasingly constrained space between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for regional influence. And peace diplomacy, or mediation, is the flavour of the day.

However, the proverbial gold-rush to host Ukraine talks has more solid foundations in regional competition than an international one. For long, Oman has been the state that has consistently pitched itself as the main mediator, playing the role of ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’, where Muscat seemingly prioritises neutrality and offers a common ground for warring parties, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthi militia, or even the US and Iran, to talk.

The Qatar Question

Saudi Arabia and the UAE installed a blockade against Qatar between 2017 and 2021 for what they saw as Doha not aligning and punching above its weight, and, more specifically, for its support for Political Islam. But the Qatari leadership had another trick up its sleeve to ratchet its power quotient. In February 2020, under Trump’s first tenure, the Taliban in Afghanistan and the US signed a historic agreement for the latter’s exit from a two-decade long war in the country. Doha hosted the political office for the Taliban, and managed Kabul, to deliver this outcome to a president who, more than anything else, adores deals. This “success” gained Qatar the title of becoming America’s first and preferred ‘major non-NATO ally’ in the region. Today, Qatar also hosts America’s largest military base in the Middle East. For others, such as the UAE, the meteoric rise of Qatar’s influence in Washington was seen as a challenge. Within Abu Dhabi, questions were raised with Emirati diplomats in the US on why the Taliban’s office was not hosted in either Abu Dhabi or Dubai.

Saudi And UAE Have Bigger Goals

For Saudi Arabia, despite its functional relations with Russia and China alike, a security relationship with the US remains paramount. The same strategic aim is consistent for the UAE as well, one of the few Arab states that normalised relations with Israel as part of the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords and which continues to have functional relations with Iran. Despite continuing pressures on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to help deliver lasting solutions to the Israel-Palestine crisis and the Israel-Hamas war, both have broader, long-term aims with regard to their positions as poles-of-power within a multipolar framework. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi share this world view with the likes of India, but American power projection is infinitely more critical to political structures in the Middle East. This is truer today after the experience of the Arab Spring, and, more recently, the collapse of the Bashar Al Assad regime in Syria at the hands of a self-styled ‘lapsed’ jihadist group, the Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS).

Is This The Future Of Mediation?

The Saudis are not stopping just at giving space to the US and Russia to debate Ukraine. As per reports, Riyadh is also open to hosting talks between Iran and the US over the former’s nuclear programme. The Saudi-Iran détente was achieved in March 2023 with the help of China, the main competitor to the US, and a state that has unreservedly supported Arab positions in Gaza. Beijing, meanwhile, also remains open to mediating and helping to bridge political gaps across the region. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visits to the region have been welcomed with gusto by Saudi Arabia and the UAE alike, both as a function of being the world’s second-largest economic power and using this position to hedge risk with Western partners. The future of mediation between the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi-Doha trifecta is a cat and mouse game within the Arab construct. External powers such as the US, Russia, and China, are part of the utility kit. This push for one-upmanship will have a tremendous impact on regional politics where in the coming years economic and political competition is only expected to increase.

(Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

If talks go well, the death machines will fall silent in West Asia, or at least Gaza, on Sunday. The US and Qatar have reportedly brokered a deal between Israel and Hamas to end the war.

It’s been a long wait for the misery to end. The killings began on October 7, 2023, when Hamas fighters from Gaza attacked Israel on a Jewish holiday. They went about indiscriminately shooting and kidnapping unsuspecting civilians and some soldiers. The worst attack was on a music festival where hundreds of young Israelis were partying. All of it streamed live by the attackers’ body-mounted cameras. By the time Israeli forces took out the last gunmen, the body count had topped 1,200. Over 250 hostages were carried across to Gaza to be stashed away in a subterranean maze where they remained undiscovered even after the whole house was burnt down.

Perhaps the most dramatic and horrific cross-border assault on any country since the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, it triggered such a display of overwhelming force that it left the world aghast. The shockwaves have left the regional map perceptibly different. It has riven apart communities and split institutions. The scars run so deep that they will not heal in a very long time. It has also laid bare the remarkable pragmatism bordering on chutzpah of the Arab nations.

Reduced To Rubble 

According to multiple reports, nearly 46,000 Gazans, a substantial number of them women and children, have perished in the 15-month war. Most of Gaza has been flattened and rendered uninhabitable. Israel is estimated to have demolished over 1,61,600 homes and damaged 1,94,000 other civil structures. More than 1.9 million of the 2.2 million Gazans have become refugees, most of them corralled into a tiny corner in the north of the Strip. More than 1,000 medical facilities have been destroyed; Rafah does not have a single hospital. The economic loss is estimated at $37 billion. 

Hamas was decapitated when its political leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, where he had gone to attend the inauguration ceremony for Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Its director of war, Yahya Sinwar, was killed in Gaza last year, just after the first anniversary of the Hamas attack. A video of a dying Sinwar defiantly throwing a piece of wood at an Israeli military drone indicated that Hamas would not back down despite the carnage. By the end of 2024, Israel had spent over $67 billion on war. It had cost the United States nearly $23 billion until September 2024. Yet, about a hundred Israelis remain hostages somewhere in the ruins, or, more likely, under the ground. 

The Deal

So, what is the new acceptable middle ground in the new deal that the failed talks since the first successful one in November of 2023 could not find? After all, the original objective of the war—freeing hostages—was not achieved. Not only that, Israel will release over 1,000 Palestinians, including those arrested after October 7 and presumably Hamas fighters, in a prisoner exchange. That means while thousands of innocent Gazans, including women and children, paid for the Hamas attack with their lives, its fighters may yet return, alive, prison-hardened, and ready to fight another day. 

On December 20, 2024, American journalist Seymour Hersh—famous for blowing the lid off a cover-up of a massacre of the villagers of My Lai in Vietnam by US troops in the 1960s—wrote that an Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal was in the works. The contours of the just-announced deal are nearly identical to that in his report.  One crucial piece of information, which was not in the deal made public but available in Hersh’s Israeli source-based account, was the role of Saudi Arabia and the quid pro quos. Hersh wrote that as per the deal—reportedly made possible after incoming US President Donald Trump shook his fist at the belligerent Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—the US would extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia if Iran gets hold of a nuke. In return, Saudi will fund the reconstruction of Gaza, look away when Israeli warplanes raid Syria, and allow its once-arch rival access to an airfield inside its territory. 

When Iran hit Israel with a barrage of missiles after it assassinated Hezbollah leader Nasrallah and killed scores of others in a “pager attack”, Tel Aviv had to precisely plan its retaliation because of the distance its fighter planes would have had to cover to reach targets deep inside enemy territory. Those targets would be minutes away if the planes were to launch from Saudi Arabia, however. So, the Israeli hostages, who have now spent over 460 days in captivity, paid the price for Tel Aviv to have a closer shot at Iran. 

The Aftermath

Almost all conflicts in West Asia in the past over 50 years somehow link back to the Palestine issue and a still-pending two-state solution. Palestine-trained activists and revolutionaries helped overthrow the Shah in Iran in 1979. That regime has since helped create multiple armed groups in the region, including Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthis.  

While the Saudi aspect—if it exists—of the ceasefire deal may eventually be revealed, it is clear that the US and major powers in the Gulf have decided to militarily ring-fence Iran. While the regime change in Syria with tacit support from Turkey has broken the Iran-Russia supply-and-support link, Israel has crushed Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel, the US and the UK have jointly carried out air raids on the Yemen-based Houthis, another Iran-backed group, whose attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea have disrupted global trade. What would be next? A regime change in Iran? Perhaps that will be property tycoon-turned-diplomat Steve Witkoff’s next assignment. 

(Dinesh Narayanan is a Delhi-based journalist and author of ‘The RSS And The Making Of The Deep Nation’.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

If talks go well, the death machines will fall silent in West Asia, or at least Gaza, on Sunday. The US and Qatar have reportedly brokered a deal between Israel and Hamas to end the war.

It’s been a long wait for the misery to end. The killings began on October 7, 2023, when Hamas militants from Gaza attacked Israel on a Jewish holiday. They went about indiscriminately shooting and kidnapping unsuspecting civilians and some soldiers. The worst attack was on a music festival where hundreds of young Israelis were partying. All of it streamed live by the attackers’ body-mounted cameras. By the time Israeli forces took out the last gunmen, the body count had topped 1,200. Over 250 hostages were carried across to Gaza to be stashed away in a subterranean maze where they remained undiscovered even after the whole house was burnt down.

Perhaps the most dramatic and horrific cross-border assault on any country since the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, it triggered such a display of overwhelming force that it left the world aghast. The shockwaves have left the regional map perceptibly different. It has riven apart communities and split institutions. The scars run so deep that they will not heal in a very long time. It has also laid bare the remarkable pragmatism bordering on chutzpah of the Arab nations.

Reduced To Rubble 

According to multiple reports, nearly 46,000 Gazans, a substantial number of them women and children, have perished in the 15-month war. Most of Gaza has been flattened and rendered uninhabitable. Israel is estimated to have demolished over 1,61,600 homes and damaged 1,94,000 other civil structures. More than 1.9 million of the 2.2 million Gazans have become refugees, most of them corralled into a tiny corner in the north of the Strip. More than 1,000 medical facilities have been destroyed; Rafah does not have a single hospital. The economic loss is estimated at $37 billion. 

Hamas was decapitated when its political leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, where he had gone to attend the inauguration ceremony for Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Its director of war, Yahya Sinwar, was killed in Gaza last year, just after the first anniversary of the Hamas attack. A video of a dying Sinwar defiantly throwing a piece of wood at an Israeli military drone indicated that Hamas would not back down despite the carnage. By the end of 2024, Israel had spent over $67 billion on war. It had cost the United States nearly $23 billion until September 2024. Yet, about a hundred Israelis remain hostages somewhere in the ruins, or, more likely, under the ground. 

The Deal

So, what is the new acceptable middle ground in the new deal that the failed talks since the first successful one in November of 2023 could not find? After all, the original objective of the war—freeing hostages—was not achieved. Not only that, Israel will release over 1,000 Palestinians, including those arrested after October 7 and presumably Hamas fighters, in a prisoner exchange. That means while thousands of innocent Gazans, including women and children, paid for the Hamas attack with their lives, its fighters may yet return, alive, prison-hardened, and ready to fight another day. 

On December 20, 2024, American journalist Seymour Hersh—famous for blowing the lid off a cover-up of a massacre of the villagers of My Lai in Vietnam by US troops in the 1960s—wrote that an Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal was in the works. The contours of the just-announced deal are nearly identical to that in his report.  One crucial piece of information, which was not in the deal made public but available in Hersh’s Israeli source-based account, was the role of Saudi Arabia and the quid pro quos. Hersh wrote that as per the deal—reportedly made possible after incoming US President Donald Trump shook his fist at the belligerent Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—the US would extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia if Iran gets hold of a nuke. In return, Saudi will fund the reconstruction of Gaza, look away when Israeli warplanes raid Syria, and allow its once-arch rival access to an airfield inside its territory. 

When Iran hit Israel with a barrage of missiles after it assassinated Hezbollah leader Nasrallah and killed scores of others in a “pager attack”, Tel Aviv had to precisely plan its retaliation because of the distance its fighter planes would have had to cover to reach targets deep inside enemy territory. Those targets would be minutes away if the planes were to launch from Saudi Arabia, however. So, the Israeli hostages, who have now spent over 460 days in captivity, paid the price for Tel Aviv to have a closer shot at Iran. 

The Aftermath

Almost all conflicts in West Asia in the past over 50 years somehow link back to the Palestine issue and a still-pending two-state solution. Palestine-trained activists and revolutionaries helped overthrow the Shah in Iran in 1979. That regime has since helped create multiple armed groups in the region, including Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthis.  

While the Saudi aspect—if it exists—of the ceasefire deal may eventually be revealed, it is clear that the US and major powers in the Gulf have decided to militarily ring-fence Iran. While the regime change in Syria with tacit support from Turkey has broken the Iran-Russia supply-and-support link, Israel has crushed Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel, the US and the UK have jointly carried out air raids on the Yemen-based Houthis, another Iran-backed group, whose attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea have disrupted global trade. What would be next? A regime change in Iran? Perhaps that will be property tycoon-turned-diplomat Steve Witkoff’s next assignment. 

(Dinesh Narayanan is a Delhi-based journalist and author of ‘The RSS And The Making Of The Deep Nation’.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

(The following is an excerpt from Stanly Johny’s ‘Original Sin: Israel, Palestine and the Revenge of Old West Asia’, being published with the permission of HarperCollins India. Based on his multiple reporting visits to the region and dozens of interviews, Johny traces the roots of the Israel-Palestine conflict.)

After the Hamas attack, Israel launched a devastating bombing campaign on Gaza. “Israel is at war,” declared Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, vowing to take “mighty vengeance” against Hamas. Israel stated that it had the right to respond to Hamas’s terror attack. The world stood by Israel. The United States offered full support. President Joe Biden, who travelled to Israel and met with Netanyahu and his Cabinet members, said, “I don’t believe you have to be a Jew to be a Zionist, and I am a Zionist.”

Netanyahu set two goals for the IDF. “Crush Hamas” and release the hostages. The IDF carried out air strikes across Gaza for weeks, before launching a full-scale invasion, first in the north, and then expanding to the whole of the enclave. In the initial stage, more than 1 million people in northern Gaza were ordered by the IDF to leave their homes within 24 hours. Gaza City in northern Gaza, the largest city in the enclave, was turned into a pile of rubble within weeks.

(The cover of Original Sin. Courtesy: HarperCollins India)

The use of disproportionate force against the enemy is a well-known Israeli method (the Dahiya doctrine). Dahiya in Lebanon was a stronghold of Hezbollah, the Shia militia. In the 2006 war with Hezbollah, Israel carried out widespread bombing of Dahiya, flattening the town. In October 2008, while warning Hezbollah amid tensions in northern Israel, General Gadi Eisenkot, then head of the Army’s Northern Division, said Israel would use “disproportionate force” to destroy Lebanese villages from where Hezbollah was firing rockets. “What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on… From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases,” said Gen. Eisenkot, who later became Israel’s Chief of General Staff and then a minister in Netanyahu’s Cabinet. Post-7 October, the IDF followed the same tactics in Gaza.

In April 2024, I met an Israeli journalist, who calls himself a right-winger, in Jerusalem. We had an open discussion about the war and Israel’s objectives at a restaurant in the Old City. 

‘This War Has A Cost’

The effects of the war were visible everywhere. When I was in Jerusalem the last time, the flea market near Jaffa Street was so crowded that I found it difficult to walk in between traders and shoppers. This time, it looked like a ghost street, with only a few shops being open. Restaurants were mostly empty. A tour guide I had met on my previous trip told me the war took a huge hit on the economy. At the Church of Holy Sepulchre, the fourth-century church that is considered the holiest place of worship in Christianity, there was hardly anyone besides our group when we visited the place in the evening. The journalist told me that like every war, “this one also has a cost. And Israelis are bearing it”.

He said 7 October changed everything. Things can’t just go back to the 7 October status quo, he said. I raised the issue of collective punishment of Gazans. The journalist, a kippah-wearing, bearded man in his early forties, said there was a debate on whether the people of Gaza were culpable in the whole disaster or not.

“In what sense?” I asked him. “They voted for Hamas,” he said.

“So are you saying that they should be punished as a whole?” 

“No, that’s not what I am saying. Hamas is part of Gaza’s society. You look at their charter. They are committed to the destruction of Israel. And they were still voted to power.”

“But in that case Likud’s founding charter also lays claims to the land between the River and the Sea,” I said. “And Likud has been in power in Israel for how many years!” 

“You can’t compare a legitimate ruling political party with a terrorist entity,” he said.

He then told me he didn’t agree with the military tactics the IDF is using in Gaza. By that time, almost all of Gaza’s population had been displaced. People in the north and central Gaza had been pushed to the Rafah border in the south. There was a growing international demand to let Gazans return to their homes in the north. “Everybody says people in Gaza should be allowed to return to Gaza City and Khan Younis. But where will they go? There is not a single building standing in northern Gaza. The whole city has been brought to the ground,” he said.

“Isn’t this mindless vengeance? Does this help Israel meet its long-term strategic objectives?” I asked him.

“I don’t know. I don’t even know if there’s a strategy,” he replied. 

‘The War Will Be Long’

Two days later, at a Committee Room in the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, I met Boaz Bismuth, a Member of the Knesset (MK) from Netanyahu’s Likud Party. I asked him if he saw an end to the war. Six months into the war, Israel had not met any of its declared objectives. “The war will be long. At least one year. We are making progress. We will meet our objectives,” said the MK.

Bismuth, a bespectacled, clean-shaven, tall man with dark hair, wore a dark blue suit and tie. He seemed to be in a hurry, but was careful with the words he used. “I was also a journalist,” he said, probably recalling his stint as the editor of Israel Hayom, a Hebrew language daily. In 2022, he joined Likud and became an MK. Ever since the 7 October attack happened, Bismuth has taken a hardline position on the war, calling for erasing Hamas. “The cruel and monstrous people from Gaza took an active part in the pogrom in the Israeli settlements, in the systematic murder of Jews and the shedding of their blood, in the kidnapping of children, old people, and mothers, and in tying up babies and burning them alive!” he wrote on X (formerly Twitter), on October 16. “One mustn’t pity the cruel, there is no place for any humanitarian gesture—the memory of Amalek must be erased!” he added, referring to the biblical enemy nation of the Israelites.

“We have two objectives,” Bismuth told me in the Knesset committee room. “One is to bring back the hostages. And the other is to eliminate Hamas.” While asked about the mounting civilian casualties in Gaza, he said, “I am not at war against civilians. I am at war against Hamas. People in Gaza elected Hamas. Still, I am not at war against them.”

For Bismuth, sustainable peace is possible in the region only if Hamas is defeated. “If we lose the war, we lose the idea of peace. If I lose, I lose everything. So, I am not going to lose it,” he said, adding that other countries, including India, should support Israel in this war instead of attacking the way Israel is conducting the war. “Every country that respects itself should call Hamas what it is—a terrorist entity.”

‘We Are Aware Of The Dangers’

This was the politician’s view of the war. Later in the day, I went to the Israeli Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, where, inside a meeting room, I met Michel Ronen, a senior diplomat who headed the Bureau of Southeast Asia at the ministry. I asked him about the diplomatic fallout of the war. By that time, much of the global opinion had turned against Israel. There were cracks in Israel’s relationship with the US, its biggest backer, which was becoming increasingly impatient with the mounting civilian casualties in Gaza. “We are working to make sure that the political and international legitimacy stays for our military operations. We are aware of the dangers. We lost international support for our military operation in 1973. The UN demanded a ceasefire in three weeks. But this time, we see more flexibility,” the ambassador told me.

When I met him, Qatar and Egypt, with the blessings of the United States, were already mediating ceasefire talks between Israel and Egypt. Cairo hosted the talks. I asked the ambassador about the military goals Israel had set and the role of diplomacy in the midst of the ongoing war. “We are not looking at a victory formula. We want hostages back. That’s what our urgent priority is,” he said.

But will a hostage deal lead to a permanent ceasefire in Gaza? Hamas, which struck a limited deal with Israel in November and released some 100 hostages in return for a week-long ceasefire, later demanded a permanent ceasefire for another hostage deal. “I cannot guarantee what would happen after a deal. There could be a ceasefire or there could be more attacks,” said Ambassador Ronen.

I asked him about the larger Palestine question. He gave the standard reply: Israel will continue working with its partners for peace.

“Ambassador, as a diplomat, do you still believe a two-state solution is possible?” I asked him, before wrapping up our conversation.

“Some here call the two-state solution a two-state illusion,” came his quick reply.

(Disclaimer: The author and publisher of the book are solely responsible for the contents of the book or any excerpt derived therefrom. NDTV shall not be responsible or liable for any claims arising from the contents of the book including any claims of defamation, infringement of intellectual property rights or any other right of any third party or of law. Paragraph breaks and subheadings have been added by NDTV for readers’ ease.)

Picture this: the current interim government in Syria, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), gives way to an elected government. Under this fledgling democratic setup, a phoenix-like Syria rises from the ashes of its long, bloody civil war. Millions of Syrian refugees and internally displaced people are returning home joyously; investors are trickling in; broken infrastructure is being rebuilt; signs of productivity and employment are breathing life into an economy that had been on life support for years under the misrule of former dictator-President Bashar al-Assad.

Not ideal. But certainly a dream start in a collective effort to rebuild Syria. This could be the best case scenario for Syria in the near future.

Now, consider the flip side: the HTS-led rebels, having accomplished their main mission of ousting the Assad regime, begin to implode. Factions within HTS are suddenly in a cutthroat race to outdo each other in chaos and infighting. Meanwhile, the Syrian National Army (SNA) (the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (the US-backed Kurdish-led alliance), aren’t just holding ground, they are flexing their muscles and making power grabs for Damascus. Russian military bases remain firmly planted along the coast, Israeli forces patrol the southern fringes, US troops stick to their northeast corner and Turkey remains a strong influence and a key player. Not to be outdone, Iran is busy trying to rebuild its covert web of influence.

This, I am afraid, could possibly be Syria’s worst-case scenario in the coming months and years. 

A Game Of Chess

As 2024 draws to a close, a year that has been nothing short of seismic for West Asia, Syria stands at a crossroads—a precarious, nail-biting threshold where the future is frustratingly unpredictable.

The collapse of the Assad dynasty’s 54-year authoritarian rule has sparked a glimmer of hope for millions of long-suffering Syrians. But it’s also thrown them headfirst into uncharted waters.

If you look closely, Syria appears to be a giant geopolitical chessboard, with too many players hovering over the pieces, waiting to see who dares make the first move. For now, it’s all guesswork and a high-stakes game of wait-and-watch.

But amid Syria’s turmoil, HTS, once the al-Nusra Front, has swapped its militant garb for Western-style suits as its leader, Abu al-Jolani—who now prefers to call himself by his real name Ahmed al-Sharaa—attempts a political makeover. Western powers, while still labelling HTS a terrorist group, are taking a wait and see approach. They have laid down the terms: protect minorities, ensure a peaceful transition and maybe earn relief from sanctions. But skepticism lingers.

Turkey continues its game of geopolitical chess, backing the Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which it accuses of being a PKK front. Ankara insists the PKK, a long-time thorn in its side, be disarmed. Meanwhile, the US and UK champion the SDF cause for its role in thrashing the Islamic State terrorists. — while all the while trying to mollify Turkey’s security concerns. HTS, for its part, plays the diplomat, subtly supporting “freedom” for SDF areas while trying to keep the PKK card out of play.

The fall of Assad is a hard punch to Iran’s “axis of resistance,” slicing through its supply line to Hezbollah in Lebanon and unravelling a carefully knit network of proxies. Israel, never one to miss an opportunity, has stepped up its airstrikes—nearly 500 so far—on Syrian targets while expressing its intention to expand settlements in the Golan Heights. If anyone thought Assad’s departure would calm the waters, Israel’s actions suggest otherwise.

As for the Islamic State, rumours of its demise were premature. The Americans, who once boasted of defeating it forever, now acknowledge that the group is making a comeback, with attacks in Syria doubling in 2024. 

The US, with its 900 boots on Syrian ground, is keeping a wary eye while managing detention camps teeming with Islamic State fighters and their families—a breeding ground for trouble.

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council’s 2015 resolution to work on a new Syrian constitution and elections remains unfinished business. So, watch out, as in this theatre of chaos, the script is still being written—an act that will continue even after we enter 2025—with far too many authors vying to write its final chapter.

High-Stakes Drama

West Asia has long been synonymous with power plays, ideological tussles and resource-driven strategies. The region remains a playground for US military might, still calling the shots. In 2024, brinkmanship hit new heights, with the Israel-Iran face-off narrowly avoiding a full-scale regional war.

The year also witnessed relentless violence between Israel and Hamas, with Hezbollah adding fuel to the fire. Over 45,000 Palestinians have been killed, and nearly 90% of Gaza’s population has been left homeless. On November 21, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant, accusing them of war crimes during the Israel-Hamas war—an unprecedented move against the leader of a major Western ally.

Many analysts believe Prime Minister Netanyahu’s expansionist policies and hardline stance have sparked global outrage, yet Arab support for Palestine remains inconsistent, limited to fiery rhetoric rather than meaningful action. The conflict continues to derail efforts to normalise relations between Israel and Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia under the Abraham Accords which was initiated by Donald Trump in his first term.

Fragile Peace, Lingering Rivalries

The much-lauded 2023 China-brokered rapprochement between arch-rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia is already showing cracks. In 2024, their simmering rivalries have resurfaced, with Syria at the heart of the dispute. Iran is pressuring Syria’s interim government to honour a reported $30 billion bilateral assistance deal—not so much for the cash, but to keep its foothold in a post-Assad Syria. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s attention remains divided between Yemen’s quagmire and its ‘Vision 2030’ ambitions. This fragile peace risks unravelling under unresolved tensions. Proxy conflicts in Yemen and Iraq could continue to simmer or boil over, potentially reigniting destabilising confrontations or paving the way for genuine regional integration.

US Retreat And Regional Power Shifts

Many Western analysts believe that the Biden administration’s pivot to checkmating China has left West Asia playing a game of geopolitical musical chairs. Turkey is flexing its muscles as a mediator and powerbroker, while the UAE expands its influence through savvy economic deals and security initiatives. Russia, despite internal struggles, clings on to its strategic edge with military bases in Syria. A diminished US presence creates opportunities for regional powers to step up but also risks heightening competition. As Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia vie for dominance, West Asia’s future looks more unpredictable.

Beyond Oil

OPEC production cuts in 2024 reinforced the region’s dependence on crude, even as some member nations look to diversify. Saudi Arabia’s NEOM megacity and green energy projects symbolise ambitions for a post-oil future. Success in diversification could stabilise the region, but failure would leave many nations vulnerable to socio-economic upheaval in a world moving beyond oil.

A Powerbroker In Waiting

Turkey seems to be in pole position to spearhead Syria’s reconstruction and play a significant role in stabilising West Asia. With its embassy in Damascus reopening after 12 years, Ankara is signalling its intent to play a pivotal role in Syria’s recovery from civil war and economic devastation. In the long run, Turkey’s influence is likely to grow as it navigates this complex rebuilding effort.

For Turkey and the European Union, the stakes are high. The promise of a stable Syria isn’t just about altruism; it’s a strategic necessity. During her visit to Ankara on December 17, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced an additional $1 billion in funding to Turkey for refugee support—a timely acknowledgement of Turkey’s heavy lifting. Hosting around 3.5 million Syrian refugees, Turkey has shouldered the brunt of the crisis, while the EU has absorbed over 1.5 million refugees since the conflict began in 2011.

If Turkey can balance its role as both a regional power and a bridge to the West, it could turn this moment into a diplomatic and humanitarian win. This will also have a stabilising influence in the entire West Asian countries. 

Trump Factor 

West Asia in 2024 stands at a crossroads. While the region faces numerous challenges—from political instability to economic dependence on oil —there are also opportunities for transformation. Whether 2025 becomes a year of renewal or regression depends on the choices made by regional and global actors alike. The Trump factor is going to have a significant say in how the new year and beyond will pan out for West Asia. So far, very mixed signals have come from the incoming Trump administration about the extent of its plans to be actively involved in the region. Until that is clear I believe no regional player will be willing to take any decisive step just yet.

But as the curtain falls on 2024, one thing is clear, West Asia will remain a region whose dynamics will continue to shape the world for years to come.

(Syed Zubair Ahmed is a London-based senior Indian journalist with three decades of experience with the Western media)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

As the year concluded, Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed it off with a historic visit to Kuwait, the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to the country in 43 years. He was awarded ‘The Order of Mubarak Al Kabeer’ by the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al Sabah, which he accepted on behalf of 1.4 billion Indians. The two nations elevated their ties to a ‘strategic partnership’ with a focus on diverse areas including politics, trade, investments, energy, defense, security, health, education technology, cultural, and people-to-people ties. This visit further reinforced India’s substantive outreach to the Middle East where the Modi government has been to fundamentally reconfigure both India’s presence and engagements. At a time when the Middle East is riven with various fault lines and sits on the precipice of a region-wide war, New Delhi’s ability to maintain close ties with all the key stakeholders – the Gulf Arab states, Israel and Iran – speaks volumes about India’s diplomatic success.

This year also saw India and China finally managing to get out of the logjam ushered in by the 2020 Galwan crisis and China’s aggression. It has been a significant diplomatic victory for New Delhi to get Beijing to acknowledge that it was because of Chinese actions that the relationship got derailed. Since 2020, India’s position has been clear and categorical, that unless the status quo ante is restored along the LAC, there is no likelihood of the bilateral ties going back to normal. Where the Indian military continued to hold the line along the border, Indian diplomacy continued to stick to the nation’s red lines, which ultimately led China to reorient its posture.

In October, China and India reached an agreement on patrolling a stretch of their long-disputed shared border. The deal brought an end, for the time being, to a four-year standoff in the high mountains of the Himalayas that had severely strained ties between the two countries. It also allowed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping to meet in Russia and hold talks for the first time in five years. In 2020, a bloody confrontation in the Galwan Valley left dozens of soldiers dead and led to the suspension of diplomatic ties to bilateral relations between the two Asian giants entering into a state of deep freeze. The Indian public fumed at the Chinese aggression, and Modi’s government cancelled direct flights between the countries and banned the social media app TikTok, among other measures meant to punish China. There is now a possibility of a reset and a return to normal ties.

But China and India have no desirable “normal” status quo to return to. Challenges abound in the bilateral relationship, and China’s ambitions continue to circumscribe India’s ability to act at the regional and global levels. Many flash points remain along the border and could be reactivated at any time by Xi’s aggressive regime. Although Modi has tried harder than his predecessors to hold a strong line against Chinese expansionism, India’s economy remains hugely dependent on China. Even as India’s exports to China have dropped somewhat in the last five years, its imports from China have ballooned. It is this challenge of dependence on the Chinese economy that India will have to manage effectively if it wants the present trend in ties to continue.

The two powers that are going to play a pivotal role in helping India manage China are the US and Russia. India has been effective in cultivating partnerships with both even as they don’t see eye to eye with each other, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This year saw India-US ties continuing to maintain an upward trajectory despite differences over developments in India’s neighbourhood and allegations of Indian security agents being involved in an attempted assassination plot against a Sikh separatist leader. With the election of Donald Trump to the White House, it is expected that convergence of mutual interests will continue to drive the trajectory of ties.

With Russia, the relationship has been galvanised with Modi making Moscow his first port of call after his third consecutive win in the parliamentary elections. And India’s posture of maintaining equidistance between Russia and Ukraine and calling for political negotiations has paid dividends as the West and Russia get ready to conclude the active phase of the war under a Trump Administration that is not keen at all on prolonging the war. If Trump manages to end the Ukraine war and by doing so manages to drive a wedge between China and Russia, New Delhi will face a much more favourable external environment.

It is in the neighbourhood that India got perhaps its biggest shock of the year when Sheikh Hasina had to leave Bangladesh in August after weeks of student-led protests that were met with violence. It was indeed expected that after Hasina, there would be turbulence in Delhi-Dhaka ties given the partnership that India had crafted with Hasina. The anti-India rhetoric emanating from key stakeholders in the interim administration has vitiated the atmosphere for productive governmental engagement even as incidents of violence against Hindus as well as attacks on temples in the last few months have jeopardised the strong societal connect between the two nations. India’s task is cut out as it seeks to preserve its ties with its close ally in South Asia. If India-Bangladesh ties saw instability, then India’s ties with other regional players like the Maldives and Sri Lanka stabilised.

This year, India’s global profile grew as New Delhi sought to amplify both its own voice as well as the voice of the Global South in the international order. For most nations, India today is an important partner to be courted and for India, the world is truly becoming its oyster. New Delhi will have to continue to work on enhancing its global profile at a time when there are enormous opportunities to be tapped into.

(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

As the year concluded, Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed it off with a historic visit to Kuwait, the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to the country in 43 years. He was awarded ‘The Order of Mubarak Al Kabeer’ by the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al Sabah, which he accepted on behalf of 1.4 billion Indians. The two nations elevated their ties to a ‘strategic partnership’ with a focus on diverse areas including politics, trade, investments, energy, defense, security, health, education technology, cultural, and people-to-people ties. This visit further reinforced India’s substantive outreach to the Middle East where the Modi government has been to fundamentally reconfigure both India’s presence and engagements. At a time when the Middle East is riven with various fault lines and sits on the precipice of a region-wide war, New Delhi’s ability to maintain close ties with all the key stakeholders – the Gulf Arab states, Israel and Iran – speaks volumes about India’s diplomatic success.

This year also saw India and China finally managing to get out of the logjam ushered in by the 2020 Galwan crisis and China’s aggression. It has been a significant diplomatic victory for New Delhi to get Beijing to acknowledge that it was because of Chinese actions that the relationship got derailed. Since 2020, India’s position has been clear and categorical, that unless the status quo ante is restored along the LAC, there is no likelihood of the bilateral ties going back to normal. Where the Indian military continued to hold the line along the border, Indian diplomacy continued to stick to the nation’s red lines, which ultimately led China to reorient its posture.

In October, China and India reached an agreement on patrolling a stretch of their long-disputed shared border. The deal brought an end, for the time being, to a four-year standoff in the high mountains of the Himalayas that had severely strained ties between the two countries. It also allowed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping to meet in Russia and hold talks for the first time in five years. In 2020, a bloody confrontation in the Galwan Valley left dozens of soldiers dead and led to the suspension of diplomatic ties to bilateral relations between the two Asian giants entering into a state of deep freeze. The Indian public fumed at the Chinese aggression, and Modi’s government cancelled direct flights between the countries and banned the social media app TikTok, among other measures meant to punish China. There is now a possibility of a reset and a return to normal ties.

But China and India have no desirable “normal” status quo to return to. Challenges abound in the bilateral relationship, and China’s ambitions continue to circumscribe India’s ability to act at the regional and global levels. Many flash points remain along the border and could be reactivated at any time by Xi’s aggressive regime. Although Modi has tried harder than his predecessors to hold a strong line against Chinese expansionism, India’s economy remains hugely dependent on China. Even as India’s exports to China have dropped somewhat in the last five years, its imports from China have ballooned. It is this challenge of dependence on the Chinese economy that India will have to manage effectively if it wants the present trend in ties to continue.

The two powers that are going to play a pivotal role in helping India manage China are the US and Russia. India has been effective in cultivating partnerships with both even as they don’t see eye to eye with each other, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This year saw India-US ties continuing to maintain an upward trajectory despite differences over developments in India’s neighbourhood and allegations of Indian security agents being involved in an attempted assassination plot against a Sikh separatist leader. With the election of Donald Trump to the White House, it is expected that convergence of mutual interests will continue to drive the trajectory of ties.

With Russia, the relationship has been galvanised with Modi making Moscow his first port of call after his third consecutive win in the parliamentary elections. And India’s posture of maintaining equidistance between Russia and Ukraine and calling for political negotiations has paid dividends as the West and Russia get ready to conclude the active phase of the war under a Trump Administration that is not keen at all on prolonging the war. If Trump manages to end the Ukraine war and by doing so manages to drive a wedge between China and Russia, New Delhi will face a much more favourable external environment.

It is in the neighbourhood that India got perhaps its biggest shock of the year when Sheikh Hasina had to leave Bangladesh in August after weeks of student-led protests that were met with violence. It was indeed expected that after Hasina, there would be turbulence in Delhi-Dhaka ties given the partnership that India had crafted with Hasina. The anti-India rhetoric emanating from key stakeholders in the interim administration has vitiated the atmosphere for productive governmental engagement even as incidents of violence against Hindus as well as attacks on temples in the last few months have jeopardised the strong societal connect between the two nations. India’s task is cut out as it seeks to preserve its ties with its close ally in South Asia. If India-Bangladesh ties saw instability, then India’s ties with other regional players like the Maldives and Sri Lanka stabilised.

This year, India’s global profile grew as New Delhi sought to amplify both its own voice as well as the voice of the Global South in the international order. For most nations, India today is an important partner to be courted and for India, the world is truly becoming its oyster. New Delhi will have to continue to work on enhancing its global profile at a time when there are enormous opportunities to be tapped into.

(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Few could have foreseen Bashar al-Assad’s dramatic ouster as 2024 drew to a close. For years, Syria’s battle lines had been frozen under a fragile ceasefire brokered by Russia and Turkey in 2020. Yet, Assad’s downfall—after his family’s iron grip over Syria for over five decades—has shaken the region to its core. Lina Khatib of London-based think tank, Chatham House, writing in Foreign Policy, likened it to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, calling it “an earthquake in the regional order”.

The reasons for Assad’s collapse are as much about Syria as they are about its ophthalmologist ex-president’s patrons—Russia, bogged down in Ukraine, had neither the resources nor the resolve to back Assad, and Iran’s proxies across the region were severely weakened by Israeli air strikes. Sensing the moment, rebel forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group with roots in Al-Qaeda, mounted a ferocious offensive. Assad’s army, battered by years of corruption, desertions and low morale, folded in the face of the HTS’s blitz. Predictably, Western powers have swooped in to shape Syria’s political future and are now vying to influence the makeup of the next government.

From the relative calm of India or from the peaceful Western European capitals, it’s tempting to ask: why is the Arab world perpetually at war with itself? Why does it spawn so many extremist groups? Why has it been trapped in cycles of violence and instability for decades? To answer these questions, we must look beyond the modern era, all the way back to the 11th century. But for now, let’s stay within the last century to understand how history has shaped the region’s current turmoil.

The Lawrence Syndrome

Years ago, I watched Lawrence of Arabia, a sweeping tale of West Asia’s chaos around the years 1916-17. Hollywood, as we know, isn’t big on sequels. But looking at the current mess in the region, I would certainly say, no, shout, that it’s high time for a sequel to Lawrence of Arabia.

The iconic 1962 film serves as a powerful metaphor for the ongoing struggles in West Asia. The themes of betrayal, tribalism and Western manipulation in the film echo the realities of modern conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya. Set during World War I, the film offers a stark window into the forces that set the stage for the region’s instability. The movie depicts T.E. Lawrence, played by Peter O’Toole, as a British officer cobbling together a front consisting of diverse groups of Arab tribes to fight against the Ottoman Empire, which had governed much of the Arab world for centuries. The British officer on behalf of his government promised the Arabs full independence in return for their support.

However, as history shows, that promise was nothing more than deception. After the war, the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed between Britain and France, carved the region into British and French colonial spheres of influence, betraying the Arabs and ignoring their aspirations for self-determination. This betrayal was not just a diplomatic slight—it planted the seeds of mistrust that continue to shape Arab-Western relations to this day.

The arbitrary borders drawn by colonial powers, with no regard for the region’s ethnic, tribal or religious complexities, created fragile states that were prone to fracture. Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen are glaring examples of this legacy: nations artificially built by outsiders, now disintegrating as factions fight for power in structures never designed to hold.

Fragile Tribal Alliances

Memorable but controversial views about the Arabs uttered in Lawrence of Arabia are believed by many in the West even today: “So long as the Arabs fight tribe against tribe, so long will they be a little people, a silly people—greedy, barbarous, and cruel, as you are.” In the film, Lawrence struggles to unite the disparate Arab tribes against the Ottomans. This reflects the tribalism and factionalism that continue to plague the region. In Libya, for instance, the fall of Muammar Gaddafi exposed deep tribal rivalries, leading to a prolonged civil war. Similarly, in Yemen, the conflict is partly driven by tribal and sectarian divisions, exacerbated by foreign intervention.

It’s All About Oil

“There is nothing in the desert, and no man needs nothing,” said Lawrence in the film. But things dramatically changed in the region with the discovery of vast oil reserves. From “nothing”, the region’s desert became resource-rich. Oil turned deserts into global battlegrounds, amplifying foreign intervention. Another Hollywood movie, Syriana, depicts how mega Western energy companies played kingmakers in the region. Greed led to corruption and manipulation. In our times, the US and its allies have often supported local leaders or factions in ways that serve their strategic interests, only to abandon them later. For instance, the US first supported Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, but later overthrew him in 2003. In Syria, Western powers have backed various rebel groups, some of which later turned into destabilising forces.

Oil, the region’s most valuable resource, has been both a blessing and a curse. Oil drew intense interest from Western powers, who sought to control these resources to fuel their economies. The oil-rich Gulf states, while benefiting economically, became heavily reliant on Western security guarantees, leaving them vulnerable to foreign influence. The 1953 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-led coup in Iran, which overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh after he nationalised the oil industry, is a case in point. Similarly, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, justified on dubious grounds, dismantled state institutions and unleashed a wave of sectarian violence that continues to plague the country.

Israel and Modern Wars

The Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which Britain supported the establishment of a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine, added to the tensions. This commitment conflicted with promises made to Arab leaders by the colonial powers, which had assured support for an independent Arab state in exchange for their rebellion against the Ottomans. The betrayal left deep scars, fuelling resentment that persists to this day. The establishment of Israel following the Holocaust and the UN partition plan displaced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, leading to the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Subsequent wars (1956, 1967, 1973), the Palestinian refugee crisis and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian tensions continue to define the region’s volatility. For many Arab nations, Israel became a symbol of Western-backed injustice and territorial loss.

The Death Of Pan-Arabism

Despite turmoil and crises, or perhaps because of them, Pan-Arabism emerged as a movement to unite the warring Arab world under a shared identity, overcoming tribal and sectarian divisions. Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser was the movement’s most towering figure. Unfortunately for ordinary Arab people, internal rivalries, ideological differences and external meddling stymied the movement.

The United States and its allies, wary of the socialist underpinnings of Pan-Arabism, actively worked to undermine it. For instance, the CIA was reportedly involved in orchestrating coups and supporting conservative monarchies to counter Nasser’s influence. By the 1970s, Pan-Arabism had largely faded, replaced by fragmented nationalisms and chaos.

Hope, Then Disillusionment

The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings briefly raised hopes for democratic change. However, the movements’ outcomes varied widely, with some states descending into chaos. In Syria, peaceful protests against President Bashar al-Assad devolved into a brutal civil war, drawing in regional and international players. The US, Russia, Iran, Turkey and others have all backed different factions, turning Syria into a proxy battlefield. Libya, too, saw its long-time leader Gaddafi overthrown with NATO’s help, only to descend into a protracted conflict among rival factions. Meanwhile, countries like Egypt saw a return to authoritarianism, dashing hopes for meaningful reform.

Echoes Of The Crusades

The Crusades, launched between the 11th and 13th centuries, were actually military campaigns by European Christian powers to reclaim Jerusalem and the Holy Land from Muslim control. Salah ad-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, commonly known in the West as Saladin, defeated the Christian army of crusaders at the Battle of Hattin in 1187, which led to the recapture of Jerusalem. Ironically, Saladin hailed from a Kurdish family (non-Arabs in West Asia) but became a hero of the Arabs after the victory. The first sultan of both Egypt and Syria is today hero-worshipped in Muslim societies, particularly in the Arab world, for inflicting a crushing defeat on the European forces. He remains a celebrated figure of resistance, unity, and Islamic valour. His victory symbolises an ability to push back against Western incursions—a legacy still invoked today in discussions of imperialism, foreign intervention and the need for regional unity. Today, Islamist movements and Arab nationalists have, at times, likened Western intervention in the Middle East—such as the US-led invasion of Iraq or European colonial rule—to a “new crusade”, a continuation of Western aggression under different banners.

West Asia is in chaos. Visiting Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq is considered unsafe. It remains a patchwork of conflict zones, authoritarian regimes and fragile states. Over six million Syrians are refugees living in neighbouring countries, and over seven million are internally displaced. Yemen’s civil war, orchestrated by Saudi-Iran rivalry, has created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. On top of the crises in Iraq and Syria, their people have to grapple with the threat of ISIS. Lebanon’s economy is in free fall, exacerbating social and political tensions. Even Israel’s economy has ground to a halt due to relentless wars in the last 14 months.

The US and its Western allies remain deeply involved in the region, whether through military presence, arms sales, supporting one extremist organisation or another, or through diplomatic manoeuvres. Unfortunately apart from Turkey, no other emerging power or BRICS nations are showing any interest in shaping the region’s future, even though they know they might be eventually affected by the ongoing crisis.

(Syed Zubair Ahmed is a London-based senior Indian journalist with three decades of experience with the Western media)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

On December 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit vendor, set himself on fire to protest against local officials having confiscated his stall. His act ignited the flames of a pan-Arab anti-establishment mass uprising that came to be called the ‘Arab Spring’. On the eve of the 14th anniversary of that incident and in the backdrop of last fortnight’s coup in Syria—the Arab Spring’s longest-running and bloodiest manifestation—an analysis of this rare phenomenon is called for. 

Tunisia To Egypt To Libya, The All-Encompassing Revolution

In the past 14 years, the Arab Spring has jolted several Arab countries, although its net impact remains contentious. Bouazizi’s self-immolation spurred mass demonstrations in Tunisia, toppling, within a month, the autocratic President in power for 23 years. Egypt followed shortly thereafter: the mass demonstrations centred on Cairo’s Tahrir Square forced President Mubarak to leave after 18 days despite having tried all sorts of deflections to stay in power. He was in power for 32 years and was replaced by the Supreme Military Council, which eventually gave way to the country’s first democratically held elections. The Muslim Brotherhood government lasted only a few months and was overthrown by the Army, which continues to wield power even now.

Col Muammar Qadhafi, President for 42 years of oil-rich Libya, also faced anti-government protests from mid-February 2011, which soon morphed into an armed insurrection based in the eastern coastal city of Benghazi. A UN Security Council Resolution authorising “all necessary measures” to protect civilians was weaponised by 27 Western and Middle Eastern powers to launch intensive airstrikes against the pro-Qadhafi forces. This tilted the balance against the government forces and eventually led to President Qadhafi being killed in combat on October 20. Even after massive bloodletting since, the civil war has continued and the country is still split, with a government each in Tripoli and Benghazi. Libya was the first case of foreign interests being strongly involved in influencing the outcome of the Arab Spring; it was not to be the last.

The protests in Bahrain that began in February 2011 were partly spurred by a Shia majority population chafing under a Sunni monarchy. These were initially aimed at achieving greater political freedom and respect for human rights, but the repression by authorities pushed them in that direction. The fellow monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council were alarmed by the perceived involvement of Iran and Hezbollah in disrupting the smallest Gulf state and intervened militarily to quell the protests. Saudi Arabia and the UAE sought to nip similar protests and reform movements in the bud with strongarm tactics.

Civil Wars In Syria And Yemen

Arab Spring protests in Syria and Yemen, two ethnically diverse and politically frozen republics under dynastic rules, unlocked long-suppressed popular sub-national aspirations. The confrontation did not remain peaceful for long, each morphing into a bitter civil war that brought in neighbouring and global powers resulting in counterproductive outcomes. In Syria, a country of 23 million, 13 years of civil war caused the deaths of nearly half a million people, displacement of nearly 15 million both internally and externally, and destruction put at half a trillion dollars. Yemen continued to be split into the al-Houthis-run north and the UN-recognised coalition in the south—both joined at the hip by disease and malnutrition.

Despite the complicated precedents, the second wave of Arab Spring unfurled 2018 onwards in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq. While all of them had reforms as their leitmotif, the demands were more local and focused: in Algeria, “Herak” agitation was aimed at thwarting President Bouteflika, in power for 19 years, seeking a fresh term despite his physical incapacity. The Sudanese agitated against the 32 years of corrupt and violent rule of a military dictator. Iraqi and Lebanese youth wanted to bring down Muhasasa Taifiyeh, a system of sectarian power-sharing. While this wave of Arab Springers did partially achieve their immediate objectives, all of them are still mired in their respective crises.

Apart from these two waves, the Arab Spring touched almost all parts of the Arab World—from Western Sahara to Jordan and Kuwait.

A New Genre Of Dissent

It is important not to over-contextualise the Arab Spring. Even before 2011, the Arab world had similar protest movements, most prominent among these being the bread riots in Egypt and Algeria as well as the Palestinian Intefadah from the mid-1980s onwards. However, two decades later, the Arab Spring was a new dissent genre—being wild-fired by the spread of satellite television and social media leap-frogging over the state controls. Secondly, such protests also took place in other non-Arab but Islamic countries such as Iran (Hijab Protests), Pakistan (Imran Khan detention) and recently in Bangladesh (Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster), with mixed results. Even Israel, a regional exception, has had recurring mass protests against government attempts to curb judicial powers and to bring Israeli hostages home from Hamas captivity.

The foregone helps us to identify the root causes of the Arab Spring. Among them, the most widely felt reason could be a sense of ‘Hogra‘, a Maghrebi Arabic word roughly equivalent to the powerful’s contempt for a commoner; it could be expanded to envelope oppressive governance, personality cults and pretentious demagogy quite common in the Middle East. When coupled with stagnant, non-inclusive and non-representative polity, it manifests the Nasser-era paradigm of the ruled-adulating-the-benign-dictator that got increasingly out of place with the ethos of urbanised, better-educated and more aspirational modern Arab societies. The demographic reasons came next: the youth bulging to the working age found few worthwhile jobs within the country and faced shrinking opportunities for employment and migration abroad due to the global recession and low oil prices. These frustrations were aggravated by corruption and the skewed wealth distribution. Lastly, the average citizen was far younger than the long-ruling gerontocrats causing political disconnect and alienation. The boiling cauldron of public angst suddenly and conveniently cascaded into the Arab Spring. The top echelons’ recourse to police terror and/or palliatives was insufficient to contain the outpouring, and the shiny but brittle state cracked under pressure.

Why The Revolution Failed

It’s logical to ask why, despite initial success, the Arab Spring almost universally failed to reform the system. There are several reasons to be cited for this letdown.

Firstly, the Arab Spring movements were initially largely spontaneous without any leadership or agenda. Their initial aim was limited to a change at the top. Once that was achieved, they had little clue and unity on how to put in a better structure replacement as all of the Arab world governance models were flawed. Secondly, the long oppressive rule had meant that there was no credible “loyal opposition”—and the void was filled by either the Islamists (who often ran a mosque-based clandestine network) or the military.

Thirdly, foreign interventions often muddied the waters: they dithered between propping up the status quo or backing the democratic aspirations. The Western Powers, quite possessive about this eco-strategic region, also played their games, particularly in oil-rich countries.

Fourthly, the whirling anarchy often beckoned Islamic terrorism to hijack the agenda—as al-Qaeda and Islamic State did. Last, but not least, the national borders straddling ethnic and tribal groups also cross-pollinated the Arab Spring. The result was often a free-for-all, in which the most organised and committed side often won the day.

Whither The Arab World?

On the Arab Spring’s 14th anniversary, it is natural to ask if the Arab world is any better today and what its long-term impact is going to be. As of now, the most tangible takeaway from the Arab Spring is that a lasting socio-political transformation cannot be stillborn—it needs to evolve organically. One can also venture to suggest that the Arab Spring experience has no clear victors so far—at least the masses who are not only duped politically but also materially worse off. For instance, during the first decade of the Arab Spring to 2021, the nominal per capita income of an average Syrian declined by 86%, from $2971 to $421. So, although the al-Assad regime is finally gone 13 years after Arab Springers first demanded its ouster, the epic death and destruction make it a pyrrhic victory. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the succeeding Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led Salafi Sunni coalition would be an improvement.

All that one can safely say at this stage about the impact of the Arab Spring phenomenon is that it has shown a harsh mirror to the various stakeholders and made them aware of the limits of their respective powers. While one wishes that this awareness helps them to shift socio-political dynamics towards greater moderation and mutual accommodation, evidence on the ground suggests such hope may remain an ever-receding desert mirage.

(The author is a retired Indian Ambassador who learnt the Arabic language in Damascus. He currently heads Eco-Diplomacy and Strategies, a Delhi-based consultancy.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author