Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, left, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, centre, and U.S. Ambassador to India Sergio Gor after their meeting in Washington, D.C., on April 9, 2026. Photo credit: X/@USAmbIndia

Slamming the U.S. government’s new $100,000 H-1B visa fee as a “poorly thought through policy”, U.S. Democrat lawmaker Ami Bera said that both the U.S. Congress and American officials had been caught by surprise by the decision announced on Friday (September 19, 2025) by U.S. President Donald Trump.

Mr. Bera, who is part of a five-member U.S. Congressional delegation invited by the Ministry of External Affairs for a week-long visit to Delhi and Mumbai, said he would discuss the issue during the visit, and relay some of the concerns expressed to Washington. During the visit, the delegation will meet with MEA and Commerce Ministry officials as well as business and industry leaders.

The U.S. Congressional delegation’s visit to India comes just as External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Commerce and Industries Minister Piyush Goyal head to the U.S. this week for talks with their counterparts on repairing the relationship and concluding trade negotiations that had been suspended for weeks.

Speaking to The Hindu, Mr. Bera expressed the hope that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would also travel to the U.S. and meet with Mr. Trump directly to take ties forward. However, MEA officials did not confirm any such travel by Mr. Modi. Mr. Bera added that, in Washington, “all indications” were that Mr. Trump intends to travel to India for the Quad Leader’s Summit later this year. 

‘May have opposite effect’

“I think this was a poorly thought through policy… Much lower fees of $1,000 to $4,000 were much more appropriate,” Mr. Bera said, when asked about the executive order passed by Mr. Trump that imposes a $100,000 fee per H-1B visa on U.S. companies that use it to hire non-Americans. About 71% of H-1B visas are granted to Indians at present, and they are likely to be the worst hit by the rule.

“I think this is going to hurt American tech companies, and in fact, it may have the opposite effect — instead of creating American jobs, a tech company might say, ‘Let me just expand my presence in Hyderabad or Bangalore’, said Mr. Bera, an Indian-American politician who has represented the 6^th Congressional District in California since 2013, and is a member of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Strained ties

The invitation to the delegation led by Mr. Bera is part of the Modi government’s outreach to American lawmakers amidst a number of setbacks to the India-U.S. relationship. Over the past few months, ties have been strained in several spheres, from Mr. Trump’s decision to impose 50% tariffs on Indian goods, including penalties on India’s import of Russian oil and threats of 100% on all BRICS members; his repeated claim that he mediated the India-Pakistan ceasefire, that India denied; the U.S.’s treatment of Indian deportees; its crackdown on visas issued, and cancellation of student visas; as well as the latest round of sanctions planned for those engaged in Iran’s Chabahar port project.

In addition, U.S. Congressmen close to the U.S. President have introduced a number of legislations, proposing “500% tariffs” on all countries that buy Russian oil and engage with it economically, and the India Shrimp Act, which proposes to levy 10% to 40% more tariffs on Indian shrimp exports to the U.S. 

“Certainly in the 12 years that I’ve been in Congress, this is probably a low point,” Mr. Bera acknowledged, but insisted that members of the U.S. Congress all “recognise the importance of the India relationship”.

Racism in the MAGA-verse

Expressing surprise at the downturn in ties, he said that both lawmakers and industry leaders should “step up” and speak to the U.S. President regarding their concerns about policies like the H-1B visa fee that are hurting the relationship. Much of the blame lies with Mr. Trump’s advisors, such as White House Trade Counsellor Peter Navarro and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who had not served in the administration before, he suggested, noting that the administration has already needed to roll back some of the measures announced on Friday.

In addition, Mr. Bera pointed to racism in the “MAGA-verse” or amongst Trump supporters, but said that this did not pertain to most Americans.

“I don’t know that it’s just targeted against Indian Americans, because you see it in targeting of other ethnic minorities as well. In the long term 21st Century, we all desire for our children, our grandchildren, peace and prosperity. I would say all of us see India as a major part of this strategy,” he added. 

Published – September 21, 2025 09:50 pm IST

What are your thoughts from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to China to attend the SCO summit? Can we say India and China are now settling into a “new normal” despite persisting differences?

I think we are still quite far from reaching a new normal in our relations with China. Yes, it is true that both sides have signalled an intention to move forward. We have certainly taken some initial steps, which are important but probably more symbolic than substantive, to bring about a thaw like resuming airlinks, Kailash-Manasarovar yatra, liberalising the visa regime, etc. However, we still need to address larger issues like trade imbalance, market access to Indian goods and services, de-escalation and early harvest issues on the border, construction of their largest dam on their side of the Brahmaputra near the Indian border, etc.

Moreover, the Chinese have become active again in our neighbourhood. For example, their critical support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor and their attempt to encircle India through our neighbours either physically or through groupings are all manifestations of this. In addition, we now have to deal with China both a neighbour as well as the No.2 power. For the first time, we have a superpower sharing a border with us. All this is changing the complexion of our relationship with China. The old template is not enough to deal with China in both these avatars. So, lot more needs to be done to restore trust before we can reach a new normal in our relations. As of now, our relations with China are highly securitised, which constrains progress to this new normal.

Some argue that global disruptions since Donald Trump came to power have nudged India and China closer. Do you see U.S. tariffs and trade policies shaping India’s approach to China, or it is part of a policy taken independent of U.S. pressure tactics?

While it is true that President Trump has disrupted the trajectory of India-U.S. relations, I doubt that the U.S. tariffs nudged us closer to China in any substantive way, since it was becoming clear to both India and China that the four-year stand-off at the border was becoming counterproductive for both. Consequently, we have stepped back a bit in October 2024 and worked on the first tranche of some symbolic steps. However, what we have done in Tianjin is to show the U.S. that we have options, we can manage our differences with China and should not be taken for granted. But how serious these options are is debatable given the more systemic problems we are currently facing with China as I mentioned earlier. That said, while countering China where necessary, we should also find common cause where possible. Neither country is doing enough to find synergy in regional, plurilateral or global issues.

Watch | ‘Old templates won’t work with China’: T.S. Tirumurti on India-China ties

That takes us to the U.S.-India ties, which now face turbulence — 50% tariffs, frictions on trade and repeated public criticisms from U.S, etc. How do you read these developments?

The U.S. has to decide first where they see India fit into their scheme of things. Secondly, they will have to make sure that our relations are not episodic by which I mean that every episode cannot subject our relations to trial by fire. You will also notice that the countries which have capitulated to the U.S. tariff threats and agreed to one-sided deals are the closest allies of the U.S. like the European Union, Japan, South Korea, etc. They paid that price not for the trade deal but for keeping their alliance alive. Without it, they are rudderless in the so-called liberal world order. The challenge to that order is real since, for the first time, it is coming from within – from the U.S. However, when the U.S. tried the same tactics with non-allies like India, it is not working out well. That’s because we are keen to preserve our relations with the U.S., but not at any cost.

Further, naming and shaming doesn’t work well with our leadership, as we saw when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi walked out on President Nixon. The way the U.S. cosied up to Pakistan after Operation Sindoor has muddied the waters even more. Levying punitive tariffs for buying Russian oil has brought in a completely extraneous geopolitical element into the trade issue. The U.S. is also asking the EU and G7 to levy 100% tariffs on India and China. We are also waiting to see how the U.S.-China deal impacts the Indo-Pacific and, of course, our geopolitical interests. This will in turn impact QUAD and so on. I am convinced both countries see value in our partnership and that’s why the trade negotiations are resuming. With the U.S. asking NATO countries to stop buying Russian oil, maybe the Damocles sword over us on punitive tariffs will finally lift.

The tensions in Indo-U.S. relations also bring India’s ties with Russia under the spotlight. With no end in sight for the Ukraine war, Indian position comes under great criticism from the U.S. How do you assess India’s Ukraine policy?

I am convinced that we took the right decision in 2022 to abstain on the U.N. Security Council resolutions on Ukraine and call for a return to diplomacy where the legitimate interests of all parties are addressed. But what I have been consistently arguing for, including in my writings, is that India should play a more active role on the Ukraine front, at the very least as a tactical move to deflect criticism.

This does not mean mediation but to remain actively engaged, especially when we knew that the West has been upset with us. I had pointed out to the active role India played in the Korean war in U.N. Security Council between 1951 and 1952, in recognition of which we were made Chair of Neutral Nations Repatriation Committee after the armistice. Operation Sindoor shows us that if we seek greater engagement of our partners with our conflicts and issues, we need to engage more with their conflicts and issues, especially when geopolitics is determining economic and technological outcomes. When I see the current parleys between India and the EU, France, Russia, the U.S., etc, I only wish we had done this earlier.

West Asia is another flashpoint. India, unlike most other Global South members, has avoided strong criticism of Israel over Gaza, but joined SCO and BRICS members in condemning Israel’s attacks in Iran. What explains these positions?

I am not sure whether Global South has really been vocal or impactful on the Gaza war. Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have remained on the sidelines of Gaza war. Their larger interest was to remove the threat of Iran and its proxies from the region, which Israel largely accomplished. The Gulf countries also want to normalise relations with Israel after signing of the Abraham accords with U.S. help. You have seen how they rolled the red carpet out for President Trump without exerting pressure on him to stop the Gaza war. India saw all this as a vindication of its pro-Israeli tilt given our close bilateral relations with Israel. However, with the devastation happening in Gaza and the rapid deterioration in the West Bank, our position is becoming untenable. While we may not want to get ahead of Gulf and the Arab world on the Palestine issue, we have big interests in that region though our interests may not necessarily coincide with theirs. Let us hope that our recent more balanced articulation translates into a more active engagement by India in West Asia.

Critics say India’s policy of “strategic autonomy” is under strain amid U.S.–China rivalry and the Ukraine war. Do you believe strategic autonomy still works for India, or does it require redefinition?

Strategic autonomy has worked for India so far from the time of PM Nehru’s non-alignment, where we refused to join either of the two Cold War blocs – led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, right till today’s multi-alignment, where we engage with both the big powers – the U.S. and China. It has given us the space for independent decision-making. Just imagine if we had been an “ally” of the U.S. or China now, we would have been struggling in their clasp. Further, strategic autonomy for a big power like us is the path to emerge as a potential pole in an emerging multipolar world. It is also about leadership – showing the world that there is another path other than joining one of the two camps, just as our non-aligned stand did for the developing world then.

How do you look at the shifts in the global order? What guiding principles should shape India’s foreign policy in such uncertain times?

There are certainly serious disruptions to the global order. On the one hand, forces are tearing each other apart in conflicts and violating international law with impunity. On the other hand, global challenges like climate change, energy security, pandemics, AI and digital issues, cyber threats, etc. are forcing the same countries to cooperate and work together. That’s the irony. At which point these two forces meet will determine the trajectory of the global order. Also, let us not get too nostalgic about a world order which we neither shaped nor did it really help us even if we learnt to use it to our advantage despite all odds. An example is our rise as a nuclear power, where every conceivable hurdle was put in front of us at every point, including sanctions, and we still managed to overcome all that and emerge as a nuclear power.

We were never for status quo and always called for meaningful reform whether in UN Security Council or other 1945 architecture linked institutions like World Bank, IMF or WTO. Looking ahead, I can only say that as a rising power, we need to be proactive. We have been second to none to contribute to the global commons like vaccine maitri during COVID-19 or to combat climate change, etc. However, the world expects us to play a bigger role in conflicts and geopolitics. No more can we just put our head down, mind our own business and expect to become the third largest economy or Viksit Bharat by 2047. That template is broken. We need to get our geopolitics right.

The story so far: On August 6, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a whopping 25% penalty tariff on Indian goods for India’s import of Russian oil. This was on top of the 25% reciprocal tariffs announced on July 31 after Indian and U.S. negotiators failed to reach a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

Also Read | ‘Not until we get it resolved’: Trump indicates pause in trade talks over Russian oil imports

How has India responded to the tariffs?

India has so far not announced any overt action against the U.S. for its tariffs. The 25% reciprocal tariffs went into effect on August 7, and the impact will unfold in the upcoming weeks. Already, reports suggest garment exporters are facing trouble with U.S. importers suspending orders, given that U.S. tariffs on Asian competitors in Vietnam, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are much lower. Mr. Trump’s penalty tariffs, meanwhile, will go into effect on August 27, and New Delhi is hopeful that there will be some change in position.

As a result, India’s response has been carried in three statements. On August 4, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) issued a release criticising both the U.S. and the European Union for “targeting” India over Russian oil imports, pointing out that they both continue to trade with Russia. While the U.S. procures critical minerals, chemicals and nuclear trade components, the EU countries continue to buy oil and LNG from Russia. On August 6, the MEA called the U.S. actions “extremely unfortunate” and “unfair, unjustified and unreasonable”, vowing to protect India’s national interests. On August 7, Prime Minister Modi said that he was ready to pay a price “personally” to protect the interests of India’s farmers, fishermen and livestock, and dairy keepers. This was an indication that India-U.S. trade talks had broken down over market access to the agricultural sector. Between giving in on market access or giving up Russian oil, India appears to be facing two ‘impossible’ choices.

Also Read | Modi, Putin discuss Ukraine amid Trump tariff row

Can the tariffs be stopped?

Mr. Trump has announced that he will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 15 in Alaska, which incidentally will be the first Putin trip to the U.S. since 2015 when he travelled to the UN for a summit. According to reports, Mr. Putin has offered to stop the war in exchange for keeping territories the Russian forces control, but it is unclear if this would be acceptable to Ukraine and European countries. If there is a deal, India may receive a roll back of the Russian oil penalties, and the MEA issued a statement Saturday welcoming and “endorsing” plans for the Trump-Putin Summit. In his executive order of August 6, Mr. Trump has given himself “modification authority”, if Russia were to “take significant steps” to end the Ukraine war and security threats to the U.S.

In addition, a U.S. team of FTA negotiators are scheduled to visit Delhi on August 25. If India makes certain concessions on trade and market access, a mini-trade deal could go a long way in reducing the U.S. tariffs.

How much Russian oil does India procure?

Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, India imported very little oil from Russia. Ural oil, considered “heavy” crude and priced too high as Russia had European buyers, consisted only 1% of India’s basket of sellers. After the EU began to sanction Russia, and committed to zeroing out all energy purchases from Russia, the price of Ural dropped, and India, as well as China and others, began to pick up more Russian oil.

By May 2023, India was importing two million plus barrels of Russian crude per day (bpd), making up between 35-40% of India’s basket. Russia has been its largest supplier since. However, India-Russia energy ties go beyond this trade. After the Modi-Putin summit in Sochi in May 2018, and Mr. Putin’s visit to India for the annual summit that year, the India-Russia joint statement recorded investments of over $5 billion by an Indian consortium of PSUs in Vankorneft and Taas-Yuryakh Neftegazodobycha in Russia. Russian oil major Rosneft picked up a 49% stake in Essar Oil for $12.9 billion. The new entity was renamed Nayara Energy, and it included Essar’s Vadinar refinery in Gujarat — 49% stake went to a consortium, and Essar retained 2%. Vadinar refinery, along with other private refiners like Reliance, began to reprocess Russian oil and export it to other countries over the next few years. Mr. Trump called this, “selling it on the open markets for big profits”. None of this violated any sanctions, and despite requests from Western countries, the government continued to purchase oil from Russia, saving India about $13 billion by 2024 and a further $3.8 billion in 2025, according to estimates by the ICRA.

Experts say it will be difficult for the government to give in to U.S. pressure this time, economically as well as politically and diplomatically. The Indian government would lose face domestically, and risk damaging ties with an all-important friend, Russia. For the moment, Kpler reports that the price of Ural has dropped after demand has reduced from Indian companies, but experts say it is unlikely to completely stop Russian imports, even as India broadens its non-Russian intake through the U.S., Iraq, Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Also Read | MEA’s latest statement indicates India may change tack to face U.S. tariffs, E.U. sanctions over Russian oil

What happened with oil imports from Iran?

India’s refusal to stop importing Russian oil was a shift from 2018, when Mr. Trump had demanded India’s compliance in “zeroing out” oil from Iran and Venezuela. After initially maintaining that India would not bow to such diktats, the government caved in by May 2019, and stopped all its direct oil purchases from both Iran and Venezuela, incurring heavy losses, as the oil was both “sweet” for its refineries and priced competitively.

What does this mean for foreign policy?

Since 1999, after the U.S. placed sanctions on India for nuclear tests, Delhi and Washington have worked tirelessly to change relations between them. They have built trust for a quarter of a century through a civil nuclear deal, military and defence cooperation, counter-terror cooperation, technology partnerships and the Quad grouping in the Indo-Pacific. Experts in both countries say that besides hurting Indian trade, Mr. Trump’s actions will damage the India-U.S. relationship in several other areas. At the same time, Delhi’s moves to shore up strategic autonomy and independence are significant. National Security Adviser Ajit Doval travelled to Moscow last week to prepare for Mr. Putin’s visit to India, and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar is expected to follow later in the month.

Mr. Modi will travel to Japan and then to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit and a bilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping, on his first such visit since the 2020 LAC (Line of Actual Control) military clashes. Moreover, Delhi is due to host the Quad summit this November, and much will depend on whether Mr. Modi and Mr. Trump can restore ties by then.

Published – August 10, 2025 03:35 am IST

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Donald Lu. Photo: state.gov

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Donald Lu will be in India and Bangladesh for the September 10 -16 period, the U.S. State Department announced. Mr Lu will be in India for the U.S. – India “2+2” foreign and defence ministry intersessional dialogue.

A top U.S. Defence Department officer for Indo Pacific strategy, Jedidiah P. Royal, will represent the Department of Defence at the talks in New Delhi. The sixth annual 2+2 dialogue is expected to be held in Washington DC this year, led by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on the Indian side and their counterparts, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin on the U.S. side.

“The [ Intersessional ] Dialogue will identify opportunities to enhance the U.S.-India bilateral partnership, including defense cooperation, and expand U.S.-India collaboration in the Indo-Pacific and beyond,” the State Department said. The talks also come ten days before Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the U.S. for a summit level meeting of the Quad (a groupd comprised of India, the U.S., Australia and Japan), hosted by U.S. President Joe Biden in Delware and the “Summit of the Future” organised by the United Nations.

In Bangladesh, Mr Lu will join an economic dialogue with the interim government of Bangladesh, reportedly on September 14 and 15. This is being led by the U.S. Treasury Department but will include delegates from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development and the office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The aim is to discuss U.S. support to Bangladesh’s economic growth, development and financial stability, the State Department said in a statement.

The U.S. visit to Bangladesh represents a change in tone from its relationship with the administration of former Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, who has been in exile in India since August. Ms Hasina had blamed the U.S. for playing a role in ousting her. The State Department had denied having any role in the events.