External Affairs Minister Jaishankar with Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman, left, in New Delhi, on April 8, 2026.
| Photo Credit: AP

Bangladesh wants to reset ties with India on a fresh footing now that ousted premier Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League party no longer hold power, Humayun Kabir, adviser to BNP Chairman Tarique Rahman, has said, asserting that the two nations should work together for “mutual benefit”.

Mr. Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) on Friday (February 13, 2026) secured a sweeping victory with more than two-thirds majority in the landmark parliamentary elections held on Thursday (February 12, 2026).

​A decisive mandate: On Tarique Rahman, the BNP, the Bangladesh result

In an interview to PTI on Saturday (February 14, 2026), Mr. Kabir stressed that the onus lies on India to recognise the changed political reality in Bangladesh after the BNP’s resounding electoral mandate.

“The change has to come from the mindset in India. Sheikh Hasina and Awami League don’t exist in today’s Bangladesh anymore. The people have given a clear verdict in favour of BNP,” Mr. Kabir said.

Mr. Kabir described Hasina, who fled to India after 2024’s August uprising, as a “terrorist” responsible for the deaths of over 1,500 people.

Mr. Kabir urged the Indian government to ensure that its territory is not used by Hasina or other Awami League figures in ways that could affect stability in Bangladesh.

“India must not be seen as complicit in any activities that undermine Bangladesh’s sovereignty. Once that is addressed, normal diplomatic cooperation can resume. We are neighbours and should work together for mutual benefit,” he added.

India on November 26, 2025, said it is examining a request by Bangladesh’s interim government to extradite Hasina and asserted that it is committed to ensure the best interests of the people of that country.

“We remain committed to the best interests of the people of Bangladesh, including peace, democracy, inclusion and stability in that country and will continue to engage constructively in this regard with all stakeholders,” External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said.

Mr. Kabir highlighted the recent cordial phone call between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Mr. Rahman, where Modi extended an invitation for Mr. Rahman to visit India at a convenient time.

On the timing of such a visit, Mr. Kabir said domestic priorities come first.

“Tarique Rahman will focus on settling the country on a path of prosperity and economic security. Once things stabilise here, he will take up international engagements, including the visit to India.” On Bangladesh’s approach to the growing competition among India, China and the U.S. in South Asia, Mr. Kabir said the new government will pursue balanced relations.

“We will negotiate from a position of strength with a strong mandate from the people. National interest and the well-being of our territory will remain at the centre of our foreign policy,” he said.

“What we want is balanced relations. We’re not going to have relations with one country specific, and we’re not going to have any disclosures on any agreements,” he added.

On minority safety, particularly Hindus, Mr. Kabir dismissed concerns of communal violence in Bangladesh.

“Even during the five days without a government after the August uprising, an unprecedented situation, no one attacked minorities. That shows communal harmony here. The problem doesn’t exist in the way it’s sometimes projected.” India has been expressing concerns over attacks on minorities, especially Hindus, in Bangladesh.

The community has faced a series of attacks, some fatal, after the killing of radical youth leader Sharif Osman Hadi in December.

Mr. Kabir also called for stronger regional cooperation on counter-terrorism, including in intelligence sharing.

“Isolation hinders progress. Elected governments must exchange information and work together to track extremists, terrorists and build confidence.” Mr. Kabir reiterated that a BNP-led government would prioritise peace, prosperity and integrated economic and security cooperation in the region and beyond, positioning Bangladesh as a strategic conduit for broader ties.

Bangladesh has invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi and several other regional leaders to attend the swearing-in ceremony of the country’s next Prime Minister, Tarique Rahman, on February 17, according to a BNP statement on Saturday (February 14, 2026).

Published – February 15, 2026 12:08 pm IST

Supporters cheer near the chairman office of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a day after the national parliamentary election in Dhaka on February 13, 2026.
| Photo Credit: AP

The regime change in Bangladesh following the 2024 uprising not only unsettled its domestic political landscape but also triggered strategic recalibrations across its neighbourhood. For India, the implications are profound. The two countries share not just contiguous territories, common resources, transboundary rivers, and adjacent maritime zones, but also people bound by a shared inheritance of history, language, culture, and practices. This organic interdependence has long been harnessed through amicable bilateral partnerships, most notably during India’s engagement with Bangladesh’s former Awami League administration in the past decade. Their relationship was marked not only by an expanding portfolio of cooperation but also by the ability to navigate long-standing contentious issues without derailing the overall goodwill. Over the past decade, this partnership fostered a sense of near-permanent amicability and created a strong foundation for India’s foreign policy aspirations.

However, the popular uprising in Bangladesh in August 2024, the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, her subsequent shelter in India, and the establishment of an interim government in Dhaka brought this strategic continuity to a sudden halt. Since then, India–Bangladesh relations have witnessed a visible cooling, with implications across multiple sectors of cooperation. Among these, connectivity — a cornerstone of bilateral engagement — has borne the brunt of diplomatic uncertainty. As a foundational sector that enables trade, mobility, people-to-people exchanges, and regional integration, connectivity tends to be the most vulnerable to political tensions. In the current climate, despite undeniable geographic interdependencies, the future of India–Bangladesh connectivity hangs in the balance.

As bilateral goodwill retreats, it becomes critical to analyse the factors that previously compelled both nations to enhance connectivity, and to assess how the current political shifts in Dhaka are now disrupting established frameworks, stalling ongoing initiatives, and injecting strategic hesitations into what was once considered a model of subregional cooperation.

History of partition and reality of geography

When the Indian subcontinent was partitioned, Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) was carved out of its eastern territories, leaving India’s Northeast landlocked. Before partition, trade and commerce of India’s Northeast with the rest of the country used to pass through the territories of what is now Bangladesh. Even after partition, rail and river transit across the erstwhile East Pakistan continued until March 1965, when, as a consequence of the India-Pakistan War, all transit traffic was suspended.

Political differences between the Governments of India and Pakistan overrode the age-old interdependencies, and it was only after East Pakistan became Bangladesh, under a government favourably disposed towards India, that river transit was restored in 1972. Therefore, although geographical proximity creates geopolitical necessities for cooperation among countries, promoting good bilateral ties is ultimately a diplomatic choice and is primarily driven by an alignment of priorities between the governments in consideration. This strategic alignment between India and Bangladesh was most evident in the past decade, in the partnership between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, shaped primarily by four key factors.

Resolution of existing disputes between India and Bangladesh: Although India had played a crucial role in securing Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, the two countries continued to face disputes regarding their maritime and land boundaries. Eventually, the maritime boundary dispute was resolved in 2014 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and in the following year, 2015, the land boundary was settled through a bilateral agreement. The resolution of these long-standing issues left a clean slate for the two governments to cooperate on shared concerns and opportunities.

China’s growing presence in the region: India was acutely aware of China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean Region, especially in its neighbouring countries and oceans, which New Delhi considered to be its primary area of interest. Beijing had already established a strong foothold in Bangladesh through its investments across multiple sectors, including trade, infrastructure development, and defence. India, therefore, realised the need to strengthen its ties with its neighbouring countries to retain its prominence in the region. For Bangladesh, although China offered major infrastructure investment and economic leverage, it also brought risks. Overreliance on China could create long-term debt dependency, and deeper military ties could complicate Bangladesh’s traditionally neutral posture. India provided the perfect alternative to balance this over-dependence.

Political Legacy: Sheikh Hasina had inherited her father, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s, legacy of a favourable disposition towards India, which stemmed from India’s crucial role in Bangladesh’s Liberation War of 1971. Thereafter, Ms. Hasina had taken shelter in India for six years after her father’s assassination in 1975. With her at the helm, the Awami League naturally sought closer ties with New Delhi, especially as it marked a departure from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party government’s overt lean towards Pakistan.

Capitalising interdependence: These factors collectively fostered a strong policy convergence between India and Bangladesh. The alignment was further reinforced by India’s strategic compulsions — particularly its troubled western front with Pakistan — and the foreign policy priorities of the newly elected Indian government in 2014. Following the collapse of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in 2016, New Delhi intensified its focus on its eastern neighbourhood. Under the frameworks of the ‘Act East’ and ‘Neighbourhood First’ policies, Bangladesh emerged as India’s most pivotal eastern partner. Stronger ties with Dhaka bore the promise of improved connectivity for the landlocked Northeast, granting easy access to the Bay of Bengal, which would increase its opportunities for maritime commerce and economic prosperity.

India and Bangladesh share a border of 4,096 km, of which 1,880 km runs along the Northeastern States of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram. India’s Northeast is connected with the rest of the country by a 22-km-wide stretch of land called the Chicken’s Neck, which passes through a hilly terrain with steep roads and multiple hairpin bends. Due to unique geographic positioning, Bangladesh often provides the shortest route for transport between India’s Northeast and the rest of the country. For example, Agartala, the capital of Tripura, is 1,650 km from Kolkata via Shillong and Guwahati, whereas the distance between Agartala and Kolkata via Bangladesh is just about 350 km. Moreover, the distance between important cities of Bangladesh and Northeast India ranges between 20-200 km. A well-connected and fast-developing Northeast would not only boost India’s domestic development but also aid its foreign policy outreach to its other eastern neighbours, namely Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. Strong ties with Bangladesh would also help ensure better cooperation in managing conventional and non-conventional security threats. For example, one of Ms. Hasina’s earliest moves was to eliminate anti-India insurgent groups who had found a haven in Bangladesh.

Better connectivity with New Delhi offered Bangladesh a gateway to broader economic growth as the latter is nearly enclosed by Indian territory, often described as ‘India locked’. Subsequently, India emerged as Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner. India’s investments in Bangladesh’s developmental infrastructure helped the Muslim-majority country improve its economy, and the use of India’s logistical facilities aided Dhaka’s export-driven economy, especially the ready-made garment (RMG) industry.

Under Ms. Hasina, Bangladesh sought to play a more prominent role in regional forums, such as the “Bay of Bengal Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation” (BIMSTEC), aligning with India’s initiatives for sub-regional connectivity and integration. Due to these factors, the inherent interdependence between India and Bangladesh, which had previously been overlooked due to political differences, was leveraged for mutual progress. Consequently, foremost among the areas of cooperation between the two countries was connectivity.

Retracing historical conduits and constructing new channels

Accordingly, over the decade-long partnership between the two countries (from 2014 – until the middle of 2024), a period that came to be known as the “Golden Chapter” or the Shonali Odhyay in India-Bangladesh ties, multiple connectivity initiatives were undertaken and enhanced to capitalise on the interdependencies and reap mutual rewards.

Rail links: Among the latest developments, in 2022, the Mitali Express began operations, running bi-weekly from New Jalpaiguri in northern West Bengal to Dhaka, Bangladesh. This express serves as the third passenger train after the Bandhan Express, running twice a week between Khulna and Kolkata, and the Maitree Express, operating five times a week between Dhaka and Kolkata. These train services provide an affordable and reliable means of transportation between India and Bangladesh, boosting bilateral trade and the tourism industry. The Mitali Express, particularly, provided access for Bangladeshi tourists to favoured Indian destinations such as Darjeeling, Dooars, and Sikkim. In 2023, the Akhaura-Agartala cross-border rail link was launched to reduce the travelling time and distance between India’s Northeast and Kolkata, bypassing the Siliguri Corridor. The track is in place, and freight trials took place in September 2023; however, customs facilities, platforms, and access roads remain unfinished. In February 2025, freight train services between India and Bangladesh resumed after being suspended for about nine months, but passenger services remain stalled indefinitely.

Roadways: India and Bangladesh are connected through multiple road links. Recent among them is the Maitri Setu — a 1.9 km long bridge over the Feni River, joining Sabroom, the southernmost point of Tripura, India, with Ramgarh in Bangladesh. While the Maitri Setu was inaugurated in 2021, the land port at Sabroom was nearing completion in June 2024. Passenger transport was scheduled to start along this route in September 2024, followed by the movement of goods. This would facilitate people’s movement from Cox’s Bazaar or the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Tripura, and aid the transport of goods from Tripura to the Chattogram Port, which lies at a distance of only 80 km from Sabroom. If functional, the Maitri Setu would have created a passage for trade between India’s Northeast and Southeast Asia. Connected with the Akhaura-Agartala rail link, the Maitri Setu would offer multi-modal connectivity to other parts of Bangladesh as well. Its operations, however, remain stalled.

Inland waterways: As road and railway projects are costly and carry environmental impacts, the governments of both countries explored the viable option of utilising the maze of inland waterways connecting the Northeast with Bangladesh to ferry cargo and passengers. Some of the old riverine routes between India and Bangladesh have already been reactivated. Under the India-Bangladesh Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWTT) — first signed in 1972, and last renewed in 2025 with a clause for automatic renewal every five years — the two countries ferry goods using specified waterways passing through both territories. The second Addendum to the PIWTT, signed on May 20, 2020, added five new ports of call and two extended ports of call on both the Indian and Bangladesh sides.

Connectivity through seaports: Post-partition, although India continued to use the Chattogram Port, its access was terminated during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. Since then, it has been keen to regain substantial access to the port as it is logistically more convenient to access from the Northeast compared to the Kolkata Port, which can only be reached via the Siliguri Corridor. For Bangladesh, allowing India access to the Chattogram and Mongla ports via established multimodal channels not only meant more business but also paved the way for transit cargo to reach these ports from landlocked Nepal and Bhutan.

In 2015, India and Bangladesh signed the Agreement on Coastal Shipping, enabling direct regular shipping between ports on India’s east coast and Bangladesh, particularly Chattogram. However, this agreement is limited to the movement of India’s domestic cargo between the Northeast and the rest of India via Chattogram. It can be expanded to facilitate the movement of third-country export-import cargo, especially from and to India’s Northeast. In April 2022, Ms. Hasina offered greater use of the Chattogram Port to India. Currently, India uses the transit and transhipment facilities of the Chattogram Port for the Northeast’s trade. In Mongla, India is financing the upgradation of Mongla Port via a concessional Line of Credit. India secured the operating rights to a terminal in Mongla port in June 2024. It also funded the construction of the Khulna-Mongla Port rail link, connecting the port to the rail network in Khulna. This project aimed to reduce logistical hurdles and cargo transportation costs between West Bengal and the Northeast . However, services have yet to begin on this route.

Connectivity initiatives demand complementarities in governance. However, the regime change in Bangladesh last year and India’s strained ties with the new interim government have had a directly detrimental impact on these connectivity projects. Trade, too, has dwindled.

Impact of the regime change on India-Bangladesh connectivity

The mass uprising in Bangladesh in August 2024, which led to Sheikh Hasina seeking refuge in India and the formation of an interim government in Dhaka, halted the ongoing connectivity projects and the overarching bilateral cooperation. As the year-old interim administration grapples with economic and political instability, its foreign policy reveals a degree of ambivalence toward India amid its ongoing quest for domestic legitimacy. The legal validity of the interim government has been repeatedly questioned due to a 2011 Constitutional Amendment Act that abolished the system of non-party caretaker governments in Bangladesh. Although the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court had recently ‘partially annulled the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution and reinstated the non-partisan, neutral caretaker government system’, legalising the Yunus administration, it remains a non-elected government in a country struggling to revive democracy. The regime’s primary source of popular support is the Anti-discrimination Student Movement, which nominated it to power.

Nationwide student protests that led to the ouster of the former Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, from Bangladesh had a distinct anti-India chord, due to New Delhi’s support for the Awami League administration. Accordingly, upon coming to power, the interim government led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus has been distancing itself from the Awami League’s legacy and affiliations in its search for popular support. Reflecting the same approach in its foreign policy, a distance has also crept into India-Bangladesh relations, with several issues such as Ms. Hasina’s pending extradition from India and numerous reports of attacks on Hindu minorities in Bangladesh deepening the rift. The new interim government’s repeated attempts to pin blame on India for its domestic chaos and its marked attempts to strengthen ties with Pakistan and China without consideration of India’s strategic sensitivities have further significantly undermined the once-flourishing bilateral relationship between the two neighbours.

Thus, trade between India and Bangladesh has reportedly declined since the regime change, with border closures, issues with customs clearances, and increased security surveillance hindering the smooth flow of goods between the two countries. Between April and October 2023, India’s exports to Bangladesh fell by 13.3% and imports dipped by 2.3%. Fly ash exports via the Indo-Bangladesh protocol route through Kolkata port also dropped by 15%-25% during the peak construction season. The bustling Benapole-Petrapole land ports at the India-Bangladesh border, responsible for nearly 30% of bilateral trade, now witness significantly less traffic. The reduced activity has severely impacted border-dependent livelihoods. People-to-people connectivity has also been impaired with the three railway services suspended since July 2024. Bus services and other public transport remain unavailable, and private vehicles have been charging exorbitant rates to cross the land border.

Under such circumstances, New Delhi is recalibrating its connectivity dependence on Bangladesh through diplomatic means.

Showcasing the Northeast’s geographic strength

In late March 2025, Mr. Yunus made a controversial statement on India’s Northeast during his first state visit to Beijing. Addressing the Chinese President Xi Jinping, he remarked, “The seven States of eastern India, known as the Seven Sisters, are a landlocked region. They have no direct access to the ocean. We are the only guardians of the ocean for this entire region. This opens up a huge opportunity. It could become an extension of the Chinese economy — build things, produce things, market things, bring goods to China and export them to the rest of the world.” Mr. Yunus’s statement reflected a disregard for India’s strategic sensitivities. It also showed a lack of understanding about Bangladesh’s geopolitical reality.

While India’s landlocked Northeast can certainly benefit from a more convenient access to the Bay of Bengal via Bangladesh’s ports, it can still access the sea via the Kolkata Port in West Bengal. Indeed, India has the longest coastline in the Bay of Bengal and also owns the operational rights to the Sittwe Port on the Myanmar coastline. Consequently, the assertion that Dhaka is the “Guardian of the Ocean” overstated Bangladesh’s role. It overlooked the broader regional maritime geography, which is a collaborative space for all the Bay littoral countries. Moreover, Bangladesh itself relies on India’s Northeast for its transit trade to Nepal and Bhutan. New Delhi subsequently revoked the transhipment facility that allowed Bangladesh to export goods to third countries via Indian land customs stations, ports, and airports.

Interestingly, although Mr. Yunus’s remark portrayed India’s Northeast as a region of strategic vulnerability, New Delhi did not revoke Dhaka’s transit trade rights through this territory. This has two diplomatic motivations; first, to make the interim government realise the Northeast’s value, as a critical hinterland and transit territory for Bangladesh’s own third country trade, especially in light of the terminated transhipment facilities; and second to showcase India’s commitment towards its bilateral ties with Nepal and Bhutan, and the development of the Bay of Bengal region, at a time when its bilateral ties are strained with Bay littorals- Bangladesh and Myanmar. Cancelling transit facilities would have affected the landlocked Himalayan countries, which rely considerably on Bangladesh’s port for overseas trade.

Alternative routes to connect the Northeast with the Bay of Bengal

In adverse geopolitical conditions, seeking alternatives beyond immediate neighbours becomes imperative. As ties remain strained with Dhaka, New Delhi’s decision to develop the ‘Shillong-Silchar Corridor’ exemplifies such strategic recalibration. On April 30, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved a proposal for the development, maintenance and management of a 166.80 km greenfield high-speed corridor from Mawlyngkhung in Meghalaya to Panchgram in Assam. Beyond improving intra-Northeast connectivity, the corridor holds the strategic potential to link this landlocked region to the Bay of Bengal via Myanmar. This prospect allows New Delhi to circumvent Bangladesh and provide the Northeast with maritime access for overseas trade and connectivity.

For so long, Bangladesh has been considered the most convenient, if not inevitable, transit to link the Northeast with the Bay of Bengal, due to its geographical position and the history of partition. India’s decision to develop the Shillong–Silchar Corridor reflects New Delhi’s intent to reduce its reliance on Bangladesh, given the recent political volatility in Dhaka that has raised concerns about the stability of its investment climate and the new administration’s perceived insensitivity to India’s strategic imperatives. Simultaneously, it opens avenues for enhanced engagement with Myanmar through the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, thereby reinforcing alternative connectivity routes to the Bay of Bengal. In doing so, it challenges the assertion made by Mr. Yunus regarding the Northeast’s dependence on Bangladesh, while advancing India’s efforts to deepen ties with Myanmar — a key partner in its Act East strategy.

Questions for future

There is thus a significant transition from India and Bangladesh capitalising their geographic interdependence to foster connectivity, to New Delhi exploring alternative channels that lie beyond Dhaka to realise its connectivity aspirations. Political will is central to fostering cooperation. The inevitability of geography and being neighbouring countries does not foreshadow favourable bilateral ties. That is always a diplomatic choice. As India and Bangladesh meander into a new landscape of bilateralism, some questions demand attention. Will India and Bangladesh be able to promote a stable neighbourhood without consideration of each other’s strategic sensitivities? How will the strain in ties with Bangladesh affect India’s foreign policy and regional organisations such as BIMSTEC and SAARC? Lastly, how far can an interim government, primarily tasked to ensure a smooth transition to an elected administration, pursue strategic shifts that impact long-standing bilateral ties?

Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF)

A large number of people, under the banner of “July Oyikko” (July Unity), hold a protest march to the Indian High Commission, in Dhaka on December 17, 2025.
| Photo Credit: ANI

“Our decisions will be guided by national interest, sovereign equality, and mutual respect,” Foreign Affairs Advisor Touhid Hossain said. File
| Photo Credit: Reuters

The Chief of Bangladesh’s border guarding force on Thursday appeared to downplay the attacks on minorities in his country that took place after the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government, saying such reports were “exaggerated”.

“Such attacks did not happen. In fact, the Hindus in Bangladesh celebrated Durga puja. The law enforcing agencies have been tasked to ensure the safety of minorities. The clashes were related to politics,” said Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) director general Maj Gen Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman Siddiqui.

A recent report of the UN Human Rights Office had said that “widespread attacks were reported against Hindu homes, businesses, and places of worship, especially in rural and historically tense areas such as Thakurgaon, Lalmonirhat, and Dinajpur, as well as other places such as Sylhet, Khulna, and Rangpur” following the fall of the Hasina government last year.

The report said this destruction was especially prevalent in areas perceived to be sympathetic to the Awami League as Hindus have often been stereotypically associated with this political faction.

BGB DG also said “many new issues” under the common heads were discussed during his high-level talks with an Indian delegation headed by BSF DG Daljit Singh Chawdhary in New Delhi.

This was the first high-level meeting of the two forces after the regime change in Bangladesh in August last year.

BSF Director General Daljit Singh Chawdhary said the objection to border fencing by BGB was discussed. “The India-Bangladesh border is dynamic. Different kinds of issues keep arising. However, our local officers always try to solve them,”  BSF Director General said.

Bangladesh has been persistently opposing the construction of a single-row fence within 150 km of the border pillar at Sabdalpur village in the Malda district of West Bengal.

BGB DG said such construction should be “justified”. “There should be negotiation before constructing anything within 150 yards from the international border. And such construction should have been properly justified. Here, mutual consultation is very much necessary to construct anything within 150 yards from the zero line,” he said.

“Constructions can take place if there is no objection from the other side,” the BGB chief said.

However, both sides have agreed to conduct survey and only after that construction work within 150 yards of International Border would be done.

“We have requested for joint inspection wherever there are issues,” he said.

Both sides agreed to ensure stability of their borders, with both sides agreeing to follow non-lethal policy.

“We took up the point of attack on Indian nationals and BSF personnel on the International Border by BGB. At times, taking advantage of the night cover, some miscreants try to breach the fence and enter our territory. Though we very strictly adhere to protocol of not using unnecessary lethal force but, in self-defence, as the last resort, we exercise that power with full restraint. During this meeting, we urged BGB to ensure the border remains secure so that such incidents do not happen,” BSF DG Daljit Chaudhary told reporters.

The main focus of discussions was also Indian Insurgent groups operating in Bangladesh.

“Location of camps and movement of armed miscreants inside India was also on agenda,” said an official, adding that both sides agreed to undertake combined efforts and increase number of coordinated patrols especially during late hours of nights to early morning in vulnerable areas, along with educating border population regarding the sanctity of the International Border.

DG BGB Siddiqui said there was no discussion on reworking the India-Bangladesh border treaty which was agreed upon in 1975.”This was not in purview of this meeting,” he said.

The two forces also agreed to hold the next DG-level conference in Dhaka next year.

Bangladesh on Sunday (January 5, 2024) cancelled the visit by a delegation of its judicial officials to India. In a circular, the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs said the officials who were scheduled to attend a training programme in Bhopal between February 10 and 20 has been cancelled. The cancellation is being interpreted as a hint that Bangladesh will reconsider some of the agreements and MoUs that were signed during the Hasina era as the training of judicial officials was part of one such bilateral MoU.

According to state-owned news agency UNB, 50 officials were granted permission on 30 December 30, 2024, to attend the training module in Bhopal. The nominated officials were chosen from a list of Assistant Judges, Senior Assistant Judges, Joint District and Sessions Judges, Additional District and Sessions Judges, District and Sessions Judges and other serving officials.

Also Read | India, Bangladesh announce reciprocal release of fishermen in each other’s custody

The letter of approval had mentioned that the training module was being financed by the Government of India and that the Government of Bangladesh was not expected to finance the training module. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had visited India during April 7-10, 2017, when the two sides had signed twenty-two agreements. The MoU between the National Judicial Academy, India and the Supreme Court of Bangladesh on Training and Capacity Building Programme for Bangladeshi Judicial Officers in India was one of these MoUs.

Under this MoU judicial training for the officials of Bangladesh judiciary were expected to be imparted in the National Judicial Academy in Bhopal as part of the building of capacity and expertise of the judiciary of Bangladesh. The development in the backdrop of continued deadlock between Dhaka and New Delhi over the presence of deposed PM Sheikh Hasina on Indian territory.

Also Read | Bangladesh Army chief calls for national consensus, ‘political government’, tones down anti-India rhetoric

Bangladesh has been seeking extradition of Ms. Hasina as dozens of cases have been filed against her by the victims of police crackdown of July-August 2024. India has acknowledged that Dhaka has sent a note verbale seeking extradition of Ms. Hasina but has not conveyed what it plans to do regarding the request from Bangladesh. Since coming to power, the interim government has been saying that it will review and if necessary cancel some of the agreements that Ms. Hasina had signed with India.

New Delhi:

India and Bangladesh on Thursday announced that they will kick-start a process of reciprocal repatriation of fishermen in each other’s custody, a move that came amid strain in their bilateral ties.

Shortly after Bangladesh said it will hand over 95 Indian fishermen to Indian authorities on January 5, India said it will release 90 Bangladeshi fishermen on the same day.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said mutual exchange of fishermen and their vessels has been worked out keeping in mind the primarily humanitarian and livelihood concerns of the fishing communities on both sides.

“In recent months, several Indian fishermen have been arrested by Bangladesh authorities when they happened to inadvertently cross the International Maritime Boundary Line and entered Bangladesh waters,” it said.

The MEA said several Bangladesh fishermen have also been apprehended by Indian authorities in similar circumstances.

“Earlier today, 95 Indian fishermen were handed over by Bangladesh authorities to the Bangladesh Coast Guard for handing over to the Indian Coast Guard on January 5,” it said in a statement.

“On the same day, 90 Bangladesh fishermen will also be released in a mutual release and repatriation operation that will be concluded at sea between the respective Coast Guard authorities,” it added.

The MEA said India attaches the “highest importance” to the safety, security and welfare of Indian fishermen.

“To this end, it has worked assiduously to secure the release of our fishermen from Bangladesh custody,” it said.

The relations between India and Bangladesh came under strain after the interim government headed by Muhammad Yunus came to power.

India has been expressing concerns over attacks on minorities, especially Hindus, in that country.

The ties further nosedived last month after the interim government sent a diplomatic note to New Delhi seeking extradition of deposed prime minister Sheikh Hasina from India.

Hasina has been living in India after fleeing Bangladesh in August in the face of massive anti-government protests.

On the fishermen issue, the Bangladesh foreign ministry said the reciprocal repatriation of 95 Indian fishermen detained in Bangladesh and 90 Bangladeshi fishermen in India has begun on Thursday.

“Bangladesh Coast Guard has initiated the process of handing over 95 Indian fishermen/crew members to the Indian Coast Guard and receiving 90 Bangladeshi fishermen/crew members,” it said in a statement.

“Furthermore, two Bangladeshi fishing vessels detained in India and six Indian fishing boats detained in Bangladesh will also be exchanged between the two Coast Guards,” it added.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

Sajeeb Wazed Joy, son of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheik Hasina, is an IT entrepreneur based in the U.S. and has been an ICT adviser in Ms. Hasina’s government. File
| Photo Credit: Reuters

Sajeeb Wazed, son of deposed Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has accused the Muhammad Yunus led interim government of “weaponising the judiciary” for carrying out a “political witch hunt” against the Awami League leadership.

Mr. Wazed’s allegations, as a long post on X, came two days after the interim government on Monday (December 25, 2024) said it has sent a diplomatic note to New Delhi seeking Ms. Hasina’s extradition from India.

Ms. Hasina (77) has been living in India since August 5 when she fled Bangladesh following a massive student-led protest that toppled her Awami League’s (AL) 16-year regime.

Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) has issued arrest warrants for Ms. Hasina and several former Cabinet Ministers, advisers, and military and civil officials for “crimes against humanity and genocide.”

“The judges and prosecutors appointed by unelected Yunus led regime to conduct farcical trial process through International Crimes Tribunal makes it a political witch hunt that forsakes justice and marks another ongoing onslaught to persecute Awami League leadership,” Mr. Wazed said in his post on Tuesday (December 24, 2024).

An IT entrepreneur, Mr. Wazed is based in the U.S. and has been an ICT adviser in Ms. Hasina’s government.

“The kangaroo tribunal and subsequent request for extradition comes while hundreds of leaders and activists are extrajudicially killed, framing of outrageous murder charges, illegal incarceration of thousands by law enforcement and violent attacks including looting vandalism and arson going on with impunity everyday fuelled by denial of the regime,” he added.

On Monday (December 23, 2024), India confirmed receiving the ‘note verbale’ or diplomatic communication from the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi but refrained from commenting on it.

Under the provisions of the India-Bangladesh extradition treaty, extradition may be refused if the offence is one of a “political character.”

Bangladesh’s de facto Foreign Minister Touhid Hossain said Dhaka wants Ms. Hasina back to face the judicial process.

Mr. Wazed further accused that the chief prosecutor of ICT Tribunal Tajul Islam appointed by Mr. Yunus regime on December 22, despite proven records of defending war criminals, “reportedly spread deliberate disinformation campaign” against Ms. Hasina by claiming that Interpol issued red notice against her, and termed it as “a desperate bid to extradite her and hold farcical trial to serve the interest of Dr. Yunus.”

“But the very prosecutor later altered his statement following media exposure of the outright lie and now officially sent a request to India for the extradition,” Ms. Hasina’s son said.

“We reiterate our position that every single incident of human rights violation between July and August needs to be investigated in a free and fair manner but the Yunus led regime weaponised the judiciary, and we express no confidence in the justice system,” he alleged.

Last month, in an address to the nation on the completion of 100 days of the interim government, Mr. Yunus said Bangladesh will seek Ms. Hasina’s extradition. “We must ensure justice in every killing… We will also ask India to send back fallen autocrat Sheikh Hasina,” he had said then.

Mr. Yunus, who assumed office on August 8, claimed that about 1,500 people, including students and workers, were killed while 19,931 others were wounded during the protest against the Ms. Hasina government.

India has expressed concern as there have been a spate of attacks on minorities including on the Hindu community in Bangladesh in the last few months.

In recent weeks, Ms. Hasina has accused the Mr. Yunus-led interim government of perpetrating “genocide” and failing to protect minorities, especially Hindus, since her ouster.

Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited Dhaka two weeks back during which he conveyed to the Bangladeshi side India’s concerns, especially those related to the safety and welfare of minorities.