The world in 2024 stood at a crossroads, with global fault lines deepening and crises multiplying. Wars in Europe and the Middle East upended the global order, disrupting energy markets and food security, while cascading challenges rippled through every region. The Indo-Pacific remained a theatre of contention, with China’s aggressive manoeuvres destabilising the South China Sea and its borders with India. In Europe, the conflict in Ukraine continued to strain global energy supplies and exacerbated inflation. The Middle East witnessed escalating tensions with the Israel-Hamas conflict, which drew in international actors and deepened divides across the region. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s internal strife and Bangladesh’s political unrest threatened regional equilibrium, highlighting the fragility of South Asia’s neighbourhood. These crises coupled with the persistent threat of climate change and rising inequality underscored the interconnectedness of global challenges and the urgent need for coordinated responses.

In this fraught environment, India’s foreign policy demonstrated remarkable clarity and resilience. Balancing strategic autonomy with global engagement, India ensured its interests were safeguarded even as it contributed to stability beyond its borders. Its economic strategies, such as diversifying energy imports and fostering renewable energy partnerships, underscored a pragmatic approach to securing energy independence amidst global volatility.

Trump’s Return

Major elections in 2024 added layers of geopolitical uncertainty. The return of Donald Trump as US President brought shifts in Washington’s foreign policy priorities. A powerful Trump presidency represents both opportunities and challenges for India. While his stated focus is on ending the two major conflicts, countering China and deepening ties with like-minded democracies aligns with India’s goals, potential shifts in trade policies and his transactional approach to alliances could require India to navigate complexities with caution and tact. Furthermore, Trump’s stricter immigration policies, such as changes to H-1B visa regulations and family-based immigration programmes, could significantly impact Indian professionals and the diaspora. Nonetheless, the bipartisan consensus on strengthening India-US relations remains intact and as the world’s two largest democracies, the partnership continues to evolve as a cornerstone of stability in an increasingly polarised world. India’s diplomatic agility will be essential in navigating these dynamics.

India’s remarkable legacy in the G20 under its Presidency is being carried forward by the successive presidencies of Brazil and South Africa. The continuation of India’s policies rooted in human-centric globalisation and working for the global common good have enhanced its foreign policy imprint on the global stage. The concept of Vishwa Mitra (Friend to the World) reflects India’s commitment to collaboration for global well-being and sustainable development. From its leadership in the G20 to its vaccine diplomacy, its advocacy for equitable access to digital public goods to its role as a first responder in times of need, India exemplifies the principles of inclusivity and shared progress.

Under PM Modi’s leadership, India has positioned itself as a partner for addressing global challenges, fostering mutual respect and advancing a vision of a peaceful and equitable world order. His commitment to achieving peace through diplomacy and dialogue was borne out by his visits to Russia and Ukraine in this endeavour.

Enhancing Defence

At the same time, the global conflicts of 2024 underscored the urgent need for robust defence capabilities. With global military spending at unprecedented levels, India’s defence budget of $81 billion signals its commitment to national security. Amid rising tensions, India’s focus on self-reliance, in critical sectors like defence manufacturing and emerging technologies, demonstrates its ability to innovate while meeting strategic needs.

Regionally, India has had to deal with unprecedented challenges arising out of economic turmoil and great power rivalry in our immediate region. In Sri Lanka and the Maldives, it extended financial and technical support to stabilise economies, while calibrated diplomacy ensured continued engagement with Bangladesh. To safeguard its core interests in Bangladesh amidst its political unrest, India needs more proactive engagement with all stakeholders in the country. The Israel-Hamas conflict further tested India’s diplomatic balance as it safeguarded its diaspora, provided humanitarian aid and called for peaceful resolutions.

Strategic Autonomy Is Key

As 2025 approaches, India must continue leveraging its strengths while addressing emerging challenges. India’s policy of pragmatic strategic autonomy will be crucial in navigating multilateral platforms and addressing the complexities of emerging geopolitics. Significantly upping our strategic ties with the US is an opportunity afforded by Trump’s unprecedented win. Engaging with trusted partners and those not so trusted, alike, is necessary if we are to secure our larger interests.

Geopolitically, tactfully managing China’s assertiveness and ensuring regional stability will demand sustained engagement with Quad partners and in multilateral forums like BRICS and the SCO. Any rapprochement with China would need to be calibrated on peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

India’s foreign policy will also need to continue to follow its ‘neighbourhood first’ approach. Managing relations with our immediate neighbours will not only secure our vital national interests but allow us to deal with our major interlocutors more effectively. Extending PM Modi’s most vision of ‘sabka saath, sabka vikas‘ in our immediate neighbourhood will ensure ‘sabka vishwas’.

On the global stage, India can further leverage its G20 legacy to champion the concerns of the Global South, particularly in debt relief and climate financing. India must continue its support for Africa and countries in the developing world, including by extending critical assistance in areas such as infrastructure development, healthcare and renewable energy. Expanding digital public infrastructure as a global public good will not only elevate India’s technological leadership but also foster inclusivity. Energy security will be critical in 2025, and India must continue to diversify its energy sources and accelerate its clean energy transition.

(Harsh Vardhan Shringla is a former Foreign Secretary of India and Ambassador to USA, Bangladesh and Thailand.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

As the year concluded, Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed it off with a historic visit to Kuwait, the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to the country in 43 years. He was awarded ‘The Order of Mubarak Al Kabeer’ by the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al Sabah, which he accepted on behalf of 1.4 billion Indians. The two nations elevated their ties to a ‘strategic partnership’ with a focus on diverse areas including politics, trade, investments, energy, defense, security, health, education technology, cultural, and people-to-people ties. This visit further reinforced India’s substantive outreach to the Middle East where the Modi government has been to fundamentally reconfigure both India’s presence and engagements. At a time when the Middle East is riven with various fault lines and sits on the precipice of a region-wide war, New Delhi’s ability to maintain close ties with all the key stakeholders – the Gulf Arab states, Israel and Iran – speaks volumes about India’s diplomatic success.

This year also saw India and China finally managing to get out of the logjam ushered in by the 2020 Galwan crisis and China’s aggression. It has been a significant diplomatic victory for New Delhi to get Beijing to acknowledge that it was because of Chinese actions that the relationship got derailed. Since 2020, India’s position has been clear and categorical, that unless the status quo ante is restored along the LAC, there is no likelihood of the bilateral ties going back to normal. Where the Indian military continued to hold the line along the border, Indian diplomacy continued to stick to the nation’s red lines, which ultimately led China to reorient its posture.

In October, China and India reached an agreement on patrolling a stretch of their long-disputed shared border. The deal brought an end, for the time being, to a four-year standoff in the high mountains of the Himalayas that had severely strained ties between the two countries. It also allowed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping to meet in Russia and hold talks for the first time in five years. In 2020, a bloody confrontation in the Galwan Valley left dozens of soldiers dead and led to the suspension of diplomatic ties to bilateral relations between the two Asian giants entering into a state of deep freeze. The Indian public fumed at the Chinese aggression, and Modi’s government cancelled direct flights between the countries and banned the social media app TikTok, among other measures meant to punish China. There is now a possibility of a reset and a return to normal ties.

But China and India have no desirable “normal” status quo to return to. Challenges abound in the bilateral relationship, and China’s ambitions continue to circumscribe India’s ability to act at the regional and global levels. Many flash points remain along the border and could be reactivated at any time by Xi’s aggressive regime. Although Modi has tried harder than his predecessors to hold a strong line against Chinese expansionism, India’s economy remains hugely dependent on China. Even as India’s exports to China have dropped somewhat in the last five years, its imports from China have ballooned. It is this challenge of dependence on the Chinese economy that India will have to manage effectively if it wants the present trend in ties to continue.

The two powers that are going to play a pivotal role in helping India manage China are the US and Russia. India has been effective in cultivating partnerships with both even as they don’t see eye to eye with each other, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This year saw India-US ties continuing to maintain an upward trajectory despite differences over developments in India’s neighbourhood and allegations of Indian security agents being involved in an attempted assassination plot against a Sikh separatist leader. With the election of Donald Trump to the White House, it is expected that convergence of mutual interests will continue to drive the trajectory of ties.

With Russia, the relationship has been galvanised with Modi making Moscow his first port of call after his third consecutive win in the parliamentary elections. And India’s posture of maintaining equidistance between Russia and Ukraine and calling for political negotiations has paid dividends as the West and Russia get ready to conclude the active phase of the war under a Trump Administration that is not keen at all on prolonging the war. If Trump manages to end the Ukraine war and by doing so manages to drive a wedge between China and Russia, New Delhi will face a much more favourable external environment.

It is in the neighbourhood that India got perhaps its biggest shock of the year when Sheikh Hasina had to leave Bangladesh in August after weeks of student-led protests that were met with violence. It was indeed expected that after Hasina, there would be turbulence in Delhi-Dhaka ties given the partnership that India had crafted with Hasina. The anti-India rhetoric emanating from key stakeholders in the interim administration has vitiated the atmosphere for productive governmental engagement even as incidents of violence against Hindus as well as attacks on temples in the last few months have jeopardised the strong societal connect between the two nations. India’s task is cut out as it seeks to preserve its ties with its close ally in South Asia. If India-Bangladesh ties saw instability, then India’s ties with other regional players like the Maldives and Sri Lanka stabilised.

This year, India’s global profile grew as New Delhi sought to amplify both its own voice as well as the voice of the Global South in the international order. For most nations, India today is an important partner to be courted and for India, the world is truly becoming its oyster. New Delhi will have to continue to work on enhancing its global profile at a time when there are enormous opportunities to be tapped into.

(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

As the year concluded, Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed it off with a historic visit to Kuwait, the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to the country in 43 years. He was awarded ‘The Order of Mubarak Al Kabeer’ by the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al Sabah, which he accepted on behalf of 1.4 billion Indians. The two nations elevated their ties to a ‘strategic partnership’ with a focus on diverse areas including politics, trade, investments, energy, defense, security, health, education technology, cultural, and people-to-people ties. This visit further reinforced India’s substantive outreach to the Middle East where the Modi government has been to fundamentally reconfigure both India’s presence and engagements. At a time when the Middle East is riven with various fault lines and sits on the precipice of a region-wide war, New Delhi’s ability to maintain close ties with all the key stakeholders – the Gulf Arab states, Israel and Iran – speaks volumes about India’s diplomatic success.

This year also saw India and China finally managing to get out of the logjam ushered in by the 2020 Galwan crisis and China’s aggression. It has been a significant diplomatic victory for New Delhi to get Beijing to acknowledge that it was because of Chinese actions that the relationship got derailed. Since 2020, India’s position has been clear and categorical, that unless the status quo ante is restored along the LAC, there is no likelihood of the bilateral ties going back to normal. Where the Indian military continued to hold the line along the border, Indian diplomacy continued to stick to the nation’s red lines, which ultimately led China to reorient its posture.

In October, China and India reached an agreement on patrolling a stretch of their long-disputed shared border. The deal brought an end, for the time being, to a four-year standoff in the high mountains of the Himalayas that had severely strained ties between the two countries. It also allowed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping to meet in Russia and hold talks for the first time in five years. In 2020, a bloody confrontation in the Galwan Valley left dozens of soldiers dead and led to the suspension of diplomatic ties to bilateral relations between the two Asian giants entering into a state of deep freeze. The Indian public fumed at the Chinese aggression, and Modi’s government cancelled direct flights between the countries and banned the social media app TikTok, among other measures meant to punish China. There is now a possibility of a reset and a return to normal ties.

But China and India have no desirable “normal” status quo to return to. Challenges abound in the bilateral relationship, and China’s ambitions continue to circumscribe India’s ability to act at the regional and global levels. Many flash points remain along the border and could be reactivated at any time by Xi’s aggressive regime. Although Modi has tried harder than his predecessors to hold a strong line against Chinese expansionism, India’s economy remains hugely dependent on China. Even as India’s exports to China have dropped somewhat in the last five years, its imports from China have ballooned. It is this challenge of dependence on the Chinese economy that India will have to manage effectively if it wants the present trend in ties to continue.

The two powers that are going to play a pivotal role in helping India manage China are the US and Russia. India has been effective in cultivating partnerships with both even as they don’t see eye to eye with each other, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This year saw India-US ties continuing to maintain an upward trajectory despite differences over developments in India’s neighbourhood and allegations of Indian security agents being involved in an attempted assassination plot against a Sikh separatist leader. With the election of Donald Trump to the White House, it is expected that convergence of mutual interests will continue to drive the trajectory of ties.

With Russia, the relationship has been galvanised with Modi making Moscow his first port of call after his third consecutive win in the parliamentary elections. And India’s posture of maintaining equidistance between Russia and Ukraine and calling for political negotiations has paid dividends as the West and Russia get ready to conclude the active phase of the war under a Trump Administration that is not keen at all on prolonging the war. If Trump manages to end the Ukraine war and by doing so manages to drive a wedge between China and Russia, New Delhi will face a much more favourable external environment.

It is in the neighbourhood that India got perhaps its biggest shock of the year when Sheikh Hasina had to leave Bangladesh in August after weeks of student-led protests that were met with violence. It was indeed expected that after Hasina, there would be turbulence in Delhi-Dhaka ties given the partnership that India had crafted with Hasina. The anti-India rhetoric emanating from key stakeholders in the interim administration has vitiated the atmosphere for productive governmental engagement even as incidents of violence against Hindus as well as attacks on temples in the last few months have jeopardised the strong societal connect between the two nations. India’s task is cut out as it seeks to preserve its ties with its close ally in South Asia. If India-Bangladesh ties saw instability, then India’s ties with other regional players like the Maldives and Sri Lanka stabilised.

This year, India’s global profile grew as New Delhi sought to amplify both its own voice as well as the voice of the Global South in the international order. For most nations, India today is an important partner to be courted and for India, the world is truly becoming its oyster. New Delhi will have to continue to work on enhancing its global profile at a time when there are enormous opportunities to be tapped into.

(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

As India steps into its third term under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration, Southeast Asia has emerged as a central focus of its foreign policy. The region plays a crucial role in the Indo-Pacific theatre and has become pivotal to India’s strategic, economic, and diplomatic interests.

Recent high-level engagements, such as Modi’s visit to Singapore and Brunei in early September, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar’s articulation of India’s stance on the South China Sea, and the visits of Vietnamese and Malaysian Prime Ministers to India, signal a continuity in the strategic significance of Southeast Asia to India’s foreign policy vision.

‘Look East’ To ‘Act East’

The central government’s “Act East Policy,” an evolution from the previous “Look East Policy,” signifies a more proactive engagement with Southeast Asian nations. Under Modi, this policy has become a cornerstone of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which promotes a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based order.

The region’s strategic importance is underscored by its geographical proximity to India and its role as a gateway to the South China Sea, a vital maritime corridor for global trade. Southeast Asia is a crucial part of the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical framework, and India’s growing relationship with the region is seen as a counterbalance to China’s expanding and often predatory influence. In Modi 3.0, India aims to solidify its position as a reliable partner in the Indo-Pacific region, with Southeast Asia being a crucial element of this strategy.

New Delhi has placed particular emphasis on fostering closer ties with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member states. Trade between India and ASEAN has grown steadily in recent years, with bilateral trade exceeding $100 billion in 2023. In addition to economic cooperation, India’s strategic interests in the region have also deepened.

Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam

In Singapore, Modi’s talks with newly elected Prime Minister Lawrence Wong resulted in substantive agreements, particularly in the semiconductor sector in addition to health, skilling, and digital security. The “India-Singapore Semiconductor Ecosystem Partnership” inked during the visit, aims to facilitate the entry of Singaporean companies into India. This partnership is integral to New Delhi’s ambitions to become a global semiconductor hub, leveraging complementary strengths to build resilience in the global chip supply chain. Parallelly, Modi’s visit to Brunei, a strategically located nation in the South China Sea, marked a key moment in India’s Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific vision. It was the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister and coincided with the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

In Modi 3.0, Vietnam has emerged as one of India’s most important Southeast Asian partners. The two countries share concerns over China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, where both India and Vietnam have vested interests in oil exploration and freedom of navigation. Discussions on defence cooperation, trade, and energy security marked the visit of Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính to India. Vietnam is a linchpin in India’s Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific strategy, strengthening their naval ties and defence collaboration. India and Vietnam have signed several agreements on defence, maritime security, and energy and economic cooperation. Both countries are committed to upholding international law in the South China Sea, further aligning their strategic interests. The bilateral relationship has also expanded into renewable energy, IT, and infrastructure development, with India playing a significant role in Vietnam’s development plans.

Resetting Ties With Malaysia

Similarly, the visit of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to India highlighted a much-needed reset in bilateral ties following a dip in relations before 2022. Malaysia’s importance to India stems from its strategic location along vital maritime routes in the Indo-Pacific and its role as a significant trading partner. During Anwar’s visit, the two leaders discussed enhancing economic cooperation, particularly in technology, renewable energy, and digital connectivity. Malaysia’s support for India’s Act East Policy and its role in ASEAN make it a valuable partner for India as it seeks to expand its presence in Southeast Asia.

The South China Sea Question

Finally, India’s position on the South China Sea has evolved significantly over the years, shifting from a cautious, neutral stance to one that has now clearly articulated its support for the Philippines’ sovereign maritime territorial claims, freedom of navigation and maritime resource exploitation, in line with international law. This aligns India with Southeast Asian nations against unilateral actions by China, while also serving India’s strategic interests by ensuring freedom of navigation and bolstering regional security. India’s nuanced stance, informed by its own territorial tensions with China on its northern land border, underscores its intent to deter unilateral and unlawful advances.

Modi 3.0 marks a significant evolution in India’s engagement with Southeast Asia, driven by geopolitical imperatives and economic interests. The Modi administration has steadily deepened the extent and scope of its ties with Southeast Asian countries, and his third consecutive tenure in office looks poised to build on the gains of the last ten years. 

(Harsh V. Pant is Vice President – Studies and Foreign Policy, at Observer Research Foundation, and Professor of International Relations at King’s College London. Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow – Indo-Pacific, at Observer Research Foundation.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Wellington, New Zealand:

China insisted Thursday it did not pose a threat to New Zealand’s national security after the country’s spy service singled out Beijing-backed groups as a “complex intelligence concern”.

New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service levelled unusually candid criticisms at China in its annual threat report, released this week, saying ongoing foreign interference efforts were “complex and deceptive”.

China’s embassy in New Zealand hit back on Thursday, branding such claims “entirely baseless” and “a figment of imagination or sheer fabrication”.

“There is no competition to speak of between the two countries, and China is not a threat to New Zealand,” an embassy spokesperson said in a statement. 

Beijing was accused of infiltrating local groups, replacing authentic community views with those approved by the ruling party. 

In one example, a Chinese-language community news outlet was accused of regurgitating government talking points. 

“The report’s blatant attempts to discredit the Chinese diaspora and students are nothing but an effort to sow discord, create fear, and foster division,” replied China’s embassy spokesperson. 

“This is highly irresponsible, reckless, and deeply unfair to the Chinese community.” 

China’s embassy suggested external forces — likely a veiled reference to the United States — had been meddling to undermine relations between the trading partners. 

New Zealand’s centre-right government has shifted the country’s foreign policy closer to traditional Western allies such as the US. 

This has come with an increased willingness to speak out against China. 

In March, Wellington said a Chinese state-sponsored group was behind a 2021 malicious cyber attack that infiltrated sensitive government computer systems. 

China remains New Zealand’s biggest trading partner — exporting dairy, meat and wood products that exceeded NZ$21.39 billion (US$13.2 billion), according to the most recent official data. 

New Zealand Prime Minister Christoper Luxon has warned that although China was “a country of undoubted influence”, different values mean “there are issues on which we cannot and will not agree”.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

Watch: What’s strategic autonomy and why is it important for India?

In this episode of Realpolitik, Stanly Johny explores the complexities of India’s foreign policy and its balancing act between the U.S. and Russia.

Since independence, all Indian governments have adhered to strategic autonomy in various forms—non-alignment, multi-alignment, multi-engagement, or multi-directional foreign policy.

Today, the global order is changing, and while the United States remains the world’s most powerful country the world order is no longer unipolar. China, already the world’s second-largest economy, is rising as a strong competitor to America’s global primacy. Russia is challenging Western security architecture in Europe militarily.

Script & Presentation: Stanly Johny

Videography: Thamodharan B

Production: Shikha Kumari

Ahead of the 2-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a barrage of European Foreign Ministers are in Delhi for the annual Raisina Dialogue. Is Ukraine in danger of losing land annexed by Russia permanently? And has the needle of Indian Foreign policy moved at all since 2022?

We get you the picture that emerged at the Ministry of External Affairs’ annual Raisina Dialogue – where 15 of 21 Foreign Ministers gathered were from Europe – and made a strong pitch for India to support Ukraine and to reconsider oil and arms purchases from Russia.

In an interview to German paper Handelsblatt this week Mr. Jaishankar had defended India’s position, saying “Russia has never harmed India’s interests”.

Two years into the Ukraine war – that originally was expected to have been much shorter- here are the 5 things you need to know

Two years after the Russia announced its special operations in Ukraine- If by March 2022 Russia had occupied about 20% of Ukrainian territory, by 2024 it still controls about 17% of it. By the end of the year, estimates say Russia will have spent $132 billion, and lost more than $300 bn due to financial sanctions by the west. But its sales of oil are nearly back to pre-war levels due to countries like China, India and Brazil. 

Ukraine has borne the brunt of the war- tens of thousands dead, more than 14 million displaced, of which 6 million are now refugees living in 11 countries. Cities, infrastructure destroyed, and a constant pressure on its arms and military resources. According to the Ukrainian Dy FM- Ukraine has already suffered $500 bn in losses. It is now applying for membership to the European Union-NATO membership may more complicated

The 2 years of war have shown many faultlines in the west as different countries Debate over funding the war. The US, heading into an uncertain election is seeing pushback in Congress, European countries have seen a more unified voice, but many in Europe are not yet increasing their Defence budgets to the 2% required for Ukraine. One obvious outcome : Finland and Sweden have now joined NATO. There’s also no question that Israel’s bombardment of Gaza has brought new schisms, and also exposed some of the double speak of these countries on civilian deaths.

A similar kind of contested unity in the Global South- that largely disapproves of Russia’s actions, but doesn’t agree with the unilateral sanctions imposed on Russia, or the narrative that holds only Russia responsible. At the G20 summit in India last year, the final joint statement did not criticize Russia for the war in any way. And despite western discomfort, 5 new members joined BRICS this year- incl UAE, KSA, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia.

Is there a UN or multilateral way forward? Russia has ruled out pulling its troops out of entrenched positions- however, at Ukraine’s request, Switzerland is planning a peace Conference in the coming months, and has asked all countries including India to attend, with an eye on possible mediators

Speaking to a US journalist Tucker Carlson last week, here’s what Russian president Putin had said: “Why would we attack Poland? We have simply no interest in Poland, Latvia or any other countries- this is just threat-mongering.”

India’s position

Russia ties – no shift on abstentions at the UN. An increase in Oil procurement so Russia accounts from 30-40% of Oil imports as opposed to less than a percent pre-war. Military Hardware procurement has flagged- due to Russia capacity and payment issues, but bilateral trade is rising. On a political level, PM hasn’t gone to Moscow for 2 years now but EAM Jaishankar did visit in December, and PM Modi is expected to go for the BRICS summit in Moscow in October. Meanwhile no response to the death of Opposition leader Alexei Navalny, despite the chorus of protest from the west.

With Ukraine, New Delhi has been more conservative- while it has provided about 100 tonnes of aid like medicines, water tanks, tents etc, it has not agreed to infrastructural aid Ukraine has requested. No visits by ministers to Kiev, PM Modi met Zelensky in Japan but didn’t invite him to the G20 summit

However, despite this stand, India’s ties with the US and Europe have not been affected, while a few Indian companies have been sanctioned, there is no let up in bilateral engagement from the west, especially Europe- Raisina dialogue being a case in point. And this is seen as a major success for the government

Worldview Take

Two years into the war in Ukraine, Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine that form a buffer zone on its western flank seem impossible to reverse, but so is the damage to its reputation. The US and Europe’s double standards on the killing of civilians, bombardment of hospitals and schools in Ukraine vs Gaza has made its position unsellable to the rest of the world. In all of this, India’s position has delivered its diplomacy a tactical if not a principled win. Pleasing all sides in a war is more difficult in the long run, however.

Indian-American Republican presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy has called for stronger relationships with India, South Korea and Japan to reduce U.S.’ economic dependence on China and Taiwan.

Mr. Ramaswamy, 38, whose poll numbers have surged following the maiden Republican presidential primary debate last week, spelt out his plans and foreign policy views on August 29.

He attacked another Indian-American Republican presidential candidate Nikki Haley, who had slammed him for his inexperience on foreign policy issues.

“We will enter a stronger partnership with India that involves an Indian commitment to close the Malacca Strait in the event of a near-term conflict with Taiwan, and enter stronger partnerships with other allies including South Korea and Japan to reduce our economic dependence on China and Taiwan,” Mr. Ramaswamy said.

The entrepreneur-turned-politician said he favours strategic clarity and advocated that the U.S. must defend Taiwan vigorously until America achieves semiconductor independence, then resume the posture of strategic ambiguity when the stakes are lower for the U.S..

“The American way of life depends on leading-edge semiconductors manufactured in Taiwan, and we can’t risk China gaining near-total leverage over the entire U.S. economy,” he said.

“By saying that we will defend Taiwan, the U.S. can strongly deter China from blockading or invading the island in the near term. Meantime, Taiwan should more than double its own military expenditures to a more rational level of 4% to 5% of its gross domestic product,” he said.

He said the U.S. should rapidly arm and train Taiwan with Anti-Access/Area Denial weapons while running at least one Destroyer warship through the Taiwan Strait each week.

The U.S. should also fortify its own homeland defence, which is at present dangerously vulnerable to major conflicts with China, he said, adding this includes improving nuclear, super electromagnetic pulse, cyber and space defence capabilities.

His campaign said that Mr. Ramaswamy is the only U.S. Presidential candidate to date who has clearly stated that the U.S. will defend Taiwan.

“I am the only Presidential candidate willing to state what is necessary: we will defend Taiwan. The U.S. currently doesn’t even recognise Taiwan as a nation. Democrats and Republicans both unquestioningly endorse the ‘one China’ policy and embrace “strategic ambiguity” toward the island,” Mr. Ramaswamy said.

Hitting out at Ms. Haley, Mr. Ramaswamy’s campaign in a statement said that in a desperate attempt to raise funds for her languishing establishment campaign, the former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. was intentionally lying about Mr. Ramaswamy.

Ms. Haley has blasted Mr. Ramaswamy for not backing U.S. allies.

According to his campaign, Ms. Haley flatly lied on Fox News that “Mr. Ramaswamy said he would abandon Israel, those were his words” and that “he wants to go and stop funding Israel”. “This is false,” his campaign asserted in a late-night statement.

“We challenge the failing Ms. Haley campaign and any media outlet to find a single instance where Ramaswamy utters that he would not support Israel. They will not – because Ramaswamy never said it. Instead, they continue to recycle blatantly false headlines that they manufactured,” the statement said.

Mr. Ramaswamy said that if Israel ever gets to the point that it no longer needs U.S. financial support, that would be a mark of achievement – but that the U.S. will never cut off aid to Israel until Israel says they are ready for it, his campaign said.

It all started about a week ago when Ms. Haley at the debate stage accused Mr. Ramaswamy of not having any foreign policy experience.

Since then the Ohio-based Indian-American has been attacked both by the media and his political opponents for his inexperience on foreign policy.

On Tuesday, Mr. Ramaswamy used the ‘Namrata Randhawa’ name of Nikki Ms. Haley on his website.

“I’m not going to get involved in these childish name games. It’s pretty pathetic. First of all, I was born with Nikki on my birth certificate. I was raised as Nikki. I married a Ms. Haley. And so that is what my name is.

“So he can say or misspell or do whatever he wants, but he can’t step away from the fact that, he’s the one that said he was going to abandon Israel,” Ms. Haley told Fox News in response.

“Those were his words. Now he’s wanting to walk it back. And the reality is, you have to understand the importance of our allies and those relationships. We can never be so narcissistic to think that we don’t need friends,” she said.

It is not that Israel needs America. America needs Israel too, Ms. Haley said.

“Israel faces genocidal threats from Hamas, from Hezbollah, from Iran, from Syria. You need a president that understands that that understands that Israel is the front line of defence when it comes to us dealing with Islamic terrorism in Iran,” she claimed.

“And he just doesn’t get it. So, look, I mean, I think you can tell a lot about the kind of leader someone will be based on how they run their campaign. And he’s doing that all on his own,” Ms. Haley said.

Later in the night, Mr. Ramaswamy’s campaign issued a statement against Ms. Haley.

“We wish Ambassador Haley and her family well in their future careers in the private sector, noting that they rapidly generated an impressive fortune as military contractors following her short-lived stint as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,” the campaign said.

Mr. Ramaswamy said the U.S. relationship with Israel is a model example of how international relationships should work.

Israel spends a greater percentage of its own GDP on defence than any major nation. 70% of the aid the U.S. provides to Israel must be spent in the U.S., and by 2028 the mandate is 100%. This is consistent with ‘America-First’ foreign policy objectives, he said.

“By the end of my first term, our relationship with Israel will be stronger than it has ever been. I will consummate Abraham Accords 2.0 by the end of 2025, adding Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Indonesia to the pact. We will work with Israel to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon that advances U.S. interests,” Mr. Ramaswamy said.

“I won’t end our aid to Israel until the day when Israel tells the U.S. they are ready for it. That’s what true friends do: they speak honestly and openly to one another. I will speak to Bibi and invite him to the White House, something that President Biden is shamefully frightened to do,” he said.