Latvia’s Foreign Minister Baiba Braže, speaks with the media as she arrives for a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers at the European Council building in Brussels on May 11, 2026.
| Photo Credit: AP

It’s a new phase in the Ukraine war as the Trump administration moves to hold talks with Russia without the presence of Ukraine or Europe. The Saudis will be in the mediating role, and the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, Trump’s Middle East special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, all will be part of this enterprise, which might end up upending American policy of the last three years. It’s a spectacular shift in Washington, and Europe is left scrambling for a response.

Though Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has said that Ukraine would “never accept deals made behind our backs without our involvement”, it’s not readily evident what options he has at this juncture when the US seems more than ready to walk away from European security. Zelenskyy’s call for the creation of an “army of Europe” came after US Vice-President JD Vance underlined the Trump administration’s perspective that Europe must “step up in a big way to provide for its own defence”. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth also made it clear that European nations must provide the “overwhelming” share of funding for Ukraine. More interestingly, he also said that it was “unrealistic” to expect Ukraine to return to its pre-2014 borders, and downplayed the prospect of Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

A ‘Once In A Generation’ Moment

Though it was expected that the Trump presidency will bring its own set of challenges for Europe, there seems to be a complete rethink on the parameters of the US-Europe partnership. In response, European leaders are in Paris trying to hammer out a response to what UK leader Keir Starmer has described as a “once in a generation” moment for national security. Starmer himself has suggested that he is ready to place UK peacekeeping troops in Ukraine “to contribute to security guarantees to Ukraine”. Germany is also offering to do the same, but it might be too late in the game.

After investing three years of resources as well as diplomatic and military capital in trying to fend off Russian territorial advances, along with the US standing as an ally, the shift in the tone and tenor of American support might be disconcerting. For many in Europe, the danger might be that in the name of peace, Trump would strike a deal with Putin, putting Europe at a perpetual disadvantage. That the long-term costs of short-term political expediency will be borne by Europe is the fear that is now shaping European response.

When Vance warned his audience at the Munich Security Conference that they should fear neither Moscow nor Beijing but European leadership itself, he went further than many in Europe had anticipated. His argument, that “shutting down” unorthodox viewpoints is the “most surefire way to destroy democracy”, and his calling upon European leaders to “embrace what your people tell you”, was aimed more at putting mainstream European political leadership in their place rather than trying to find a common ground with allies to tackle regional and global challenges.

Shifting Priorities

For the Trump administration, Europe and its security are no longer the priority that many in the continent would like to believe. For the US, the centre of gravity of global politics has been gradually shifting to the Indo-Pacific, and Trump’s policies are perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of this understanding. In his first term as President, Trump consistently challenged long-standing alliances, most notably NATO, questioning its relevance and urging European nations to increase their defence spending. His “America First” policy emphasised a transactional view of international relations, where the US would support Europe only if its allies contributed more to shared defence and economic goals. In his second term, Trump seems even more willing to shake the foundations of America’s partnership with Europe.

But Europe has been very slow in responding to these changing realities. Now, the task before its leaders is to ensure that their ability to shape the US-Europe partnership remains in place to some extent. In Paris, Europe will have to ensure that it comes to an agreement to spend and do more for its own defence. It will also have to see how it can provide for the security of Ukraine after a ceasefire. The blunt rhetoric emanating from Washington and a sense of unpredictability being ushered in due to Trump’s outreach to Putin has left European leaders uncertain about the future of transatlantic relations.

As Trump disrupts the global order, one of the first casualties seems to be Europe, which is now left wondering about the future of its own security. 

(Harsh V. Pant is Vice President for Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

In July 2024, the EU sourced close to 15% of its crude oil from the U.S
| Photo Credit: Peter Boer

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump threatened to impose tariffs on many countries if they do not fulfil certain conditions. In November last year, he said he would impose sweeping tariffs on imports from Canada, China, and Mexico if these countries failed to stem illegal border crossings into the U.S. and the trafficking of drugs — in particular Fentanyl, which is a deadly opioid.

He has also threatened the European Union (EU) with tariffs, as the U.S. runs a trade deficit with the bloc. This means that its imports from the EU are higher than its exports.

Data show that the U.S. had a trade deficit of more than $208.7 billion with the EU at the end of 2023, second only to China with which it had a trade deficit of $279.4 billion. The third on the list is Mexico (trade deficit of $152.4 billion). With Canada, the U.S. had a trade deficit of $67.9 billion. 

Chart 1 shows the U.S.’s trade deficit with select countries at the end of 2023. The other countries which have been threatened with tariffs are also part of the list of countries with which the U.S. runs the highest trade deficits.

It is debatable whether imposition of tariffs is the most efficient way of dealing with this. In 2023, the U.S. imported €40.7 billion worth of motor cars and vehicles from the EU. This was the second biggest commodity in terms of value, from the bloc. If there are higher tariffs on the import of European cars, these cars would become more expensive. This would benefit U.S. car manufacturers.

At the same time, consumers in the U.S. have been importing cheaper goods from countries such as China. They imported over $35 billion worth of smartphones in 2023 from China. If the higher tariffs proposed by Mr. Trump come into force, consumers will need to look for alternatives. This means that they will spend more on these products.

This means manufacturers will benefit, but not consumers.

Mr. Trump’s solution to bridge the EU’s trade deficit with the U.S. is also questionable: he has asked the bloc to buy more oil and gas from the U.S. By the end of 2023, the EU had sourced close to 43% of its Liquefied Natural Gas needs from the U.S. Just three years before that, in 2020, the EU had sourced below 20% from the U.S. (Chart 2).

Chart 2 | The chart shows EU’s imports of liquefied natural gas from US and Russia

This means that the EU’s dependency on the U.S. had more than doubled in just three years. This was because sanctions were imposed on Russia after it invaded Ukraine. Thus, import of gas from Russia had to be cut, which benefited the U.S.

In July 2024, the EU sourced close to 15% of its crude oil from the U.S. compared to just 8% in July 2020. In the same period, crude oil imports from Russia were reduced from 23% to 2% (Chart 3).

Chart 3 | The chart shows EU’s crude oil imports from US and Russia

So, the question is, why is Mr. Trump threatening the EU when the bloc’s dependency on the U.S. for oil and gas is already increasing at a rapid pace?

The U.S. exported 31.8% of its crude oil production in 2023 compared to just 18.7% five years prior. It exported 16% of its natural gas production in 2023 compared to 9.6% five years prior (Chart 4).

Chart 4 | The chart shows U.S.’s exports of crude oil and natural gas as a share of production

Are producers in the U.S. equipped to sustainably increase production if the export share increases further, given that the U.S. is also the biggest consumer of oil and natural gas domestically?

Finally, of all the top 10 oil refineries (in terms of processing capacity) that operate in Europe, most are owned by private players (Chart 5).

Chart 5 | The chart shows the largest crude oil refineries in Europe by capacity (in thousand barrels per day)

While Mr. Trump’s tirade is directed against the governments in Europe, will the bloc be able to convince the private refineries, whose best interest is to choose the cheapest and most viable oil, to get supply from the U.S.?

Source: The data for the charts were sourced from Eurostat, U.S. Energy Information Administration, and the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce

sambavi.p@thehindu.co.in

vignesh.r@thehindu.co.in

Continental Europe is home to four microstates with populations of between 30,000 and 80,000 people: Andorra, on the border between France and Spain; Liechtenstein, nestled between Switzerland and Austria; Monaco, which sits on the French Riviera; and San Marino, which is surrounded by northern Italy.

These states have existed since the medieval period and their tiny size has enabled them to develop and maintain singular constitutional arrangements. They have all developed original solutions to the problems of state architecture, many of which survive today.

All four of these microstates participate in the Council of Europe (Europe’s human rights organisation) and have therefore had to modernise to meet international standards of governance. This includes the independence of the judiciary.

However, all four have also implemented these reforms without altering their institutional identity. Their commitment to preserving their distinctiveness from other countries prevents wider reform to their institutions. For them, the protection of national tradition and identity is a form of self-preservation rather than a mere expression of ideology.

The distinctiveness of the four microstates lies in the survival of institutional arrangements that can no longer to be found practically anywhere else in the world. In the principalities of Liechtenstein and Monaco, for example, the monarchy still has a central role in the constitution.

Unlike in most European states with a monarchy, in Liechtenstein and Monaco, the royal head of state continues to exercise meaningful power. Andorra and San Marino, meanwhile, operate under a dual head of state arrangement. They effectively have two monarchs.

Institutional arrangements in these principalities has been shaped by their diminutive size, both in terms of territory and population, and their geographical location. And these arrangements have survived since the middle ages because they have become their identity. While national tradition is an ideological debate in other nations, in these, preserving the past is a survival mechanism.

Liechtenstein and Monaco

Liechtenstein and Monaco are constitutional monarchies of the kind that offer substantial power to the royal family. Everything is organised around a prince, who exercises the executive power. Contemporary monarchies in the western legal tradition generally have a ceremonial king or queen but the executive power is held by an elected government. Liechtenstein and Monaco have maintained their historical organisation of government, centred on a very powerful monarch.

Although his powers are not unlimited, in Monaco, the prince is not even accountable to the parliament for the powers he does hold. Liechtenstein’s prince enjoys even more powers, including the right to appoint half of the members of the constitutional court.

However, the prince of Liechtenstein’s sovereign power is held in partnership with the people of Liechtenstein. The institutional architecture is built as to allow a system of checks and balances between the prince and the people.

Since a 2003 constitutional amendment, for example, the people can table a motion of no-confidence in the prince if more than 1,500 citizens are in agreement to do so, which triggers a referendum on confidence in him. The same number of citizens can mount an initiative to abolish the monarchy entirely, should they choose to do so.

Andorra and San Marino

The principality of Andorra should more properly be called co-principality, because of its co-princes arrangement. One of the princes is the bishop of Urgell – from Catalonia – and the other is the president of the French Republic (and previously the French king or emperor). So another Andorran peculiarity is that neither of the princes are Andorran nationals.

Following a 1993 reform that established a fully fledged constitution, neither prince holds sovereign power. Their present constitutional role is almost entirely ceremonial. However, concerns remain over the fact that they are not nationals of the state and that the heads of state are selected neither by the Andorran people nor by their representatives. The historical reason for a foreign head of state is the geographical location of Andorra – wedged between Catalonia and France. Allowing itself to be put under this double sovereignty was a guarantee of survival.

San Marino also has a two-headed state but both leaders, called the Captains Regent, are Sammarinese nationals. They are elected by the Grand and General Council (the Sammarinese legislative body) and their distinctive trait is that they serve only a six-month term of office.

The reason for such a short tenure is that San Marino has a population of just under 34,000 people. Everyone knows everyone else, which is a situation that can be detrimental to the independence of elective offices.

Captains Regent can’t shore up enough power in their short time in office to be able to overthrow the republic. The Captains Regent were first established in 1243, shortly before a number of Italian republics were overthrown by wealthy families. One of the reasons why San Marino has been able to survive is because it has prevented one family from being more powerful than the others for centuries.

Microstates are, therefore, not like Europe’s regular-sized states. They have distinctive institutional architectures – and often for understandable reasons.

(Author: Elisa Bertolini, Associate Professor of Comparative Public Law, Bocconi University)

(Disclosure Statement: Elisa Bertolini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment)

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
 

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

Scientists have warned that a “more contagious” variant of Covid-19, dubbed XEC, is spreading more rapidly across Europe and could soon become the dominant strain. According to the BBC, the new variant was first identified in Germany in June, and since then, the XEC variant has emerged in the UK, US, Denmark and several other countries. Experts have said that the new variant, a sublineage of the omicron variant, has some new mutations that might help it spread this autumn, although vaccines should still help prevent severe cases. 

The XEC variant is a hybrid of the earlier omicron subvariants KS.1.1 and KP.3.3, which is currently dominant in Europe. So far, 500 samples from 27 countries, including Poland, Norway, Luxembourg, Ukraine, Portugal and China, have been found to contain XEC, The Independent reported. Experts point to strong growth of the variant in Denmark, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands.

Professor Francois Balloux, Director of the Genetics Institute at University College London, told BBC that although XEC has a “slight transmission advantage” over other recent Covid variants, vaccines should still offer good protection. But he also added that XEC may become the dominant subvariant over the winter. 

Also Read | “Wear Proper Undergarments”: Delta Airlines’ New Memo For Flight Attendants

Director of the Scripps Research Translational Institute, in California, Eric Topol said XEC is “just getting started”. “And that’s going to take many weeks, a couple months, before it really takes hold and starts to cause a wave,” he said. 

“XEC is definitely taking charge. That does appear to be the next variant. But it’s months off from getting into high levels,” said Mr Topol. 

Symptoms of XEC Covid

The symptoms of the XEC variant are similar to those of previous Covid variants, including fever, sore throat, cough, loss of sense of smell, loss of appetite, and body aches. 

But since it is still only a sub-family of the same omicron lineage, experts say keeping up to date with vaccines and booster shots would offer sufficient protection against severe illness and hospitalisation.

Separately, the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has also advised people to practise good hygiene and take steps for cleaner air.

Moreover, researchers have called for monitoring the XEC more closely to better understand its symptoms. 

Copenhagen:

Condom use among sexually active teens has declined significantly in Europe over the past decade, with rates of unprotected sex “worryingly high”, the World Health Organization said Thursday.

“This is putting young people at significant risk of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and unplanned pregnancies,” WHO Europe said in a statement.

Data from a survey of more than 242,000 15-year-olds across 42 of the 53 countries that make up the WHO European region, which includes Central Asia, showed that the proportion of sexually active teenage boys who used a condom the last time they had sex fell from 70 percent in 2014 to 61 percent in 2022.

The figure for girls who said a condom had been used the last time they had sex fell from 63 to 57 percent.

Almost a third of adolescents said they used neither a condom nor a contraceptive pill the last time they had intercourse, largely unchanged from 2018.

Use of contraceptive pills also remained relatively stable between 2014 and 2022, with 26 percent of 15-year-olds reporting that they or their partner had used it the last time they had sex.

The report also showed that teens from low-income families were more likely to not use a condom or a pill, with 33 percent reporting using neither during their last intercourse, compared to 25 percent from more affluent families.

“Age-appropriate comprehensive sexuality education remains neglected in many countries, and where it is available, it has increasingly come under attack in recent years on the false premise that it encourages sexual behaviour,” WHO Europe director Hans Kluge said in a statement.

“The truth is that equipping young persons with the right knowledge at the right time leads to optimal health outcomes linked to responsible behaviour and choices,” he said.

The WHO said that in addition to higher rates of STIs and unplanned pregnancies, inadequate sexuality education also leads to increased healthcare costs and disrupted education and career paths for young people.

“We are reaping the bitter fruit of these reactionary efforts, with worse to come unless governments, health authorities, the education sector and other essential stakeholders truly recognise the root causes of the current situation and take steps to rectify it,” it said.

The agency urged policymakers, educators and healthcare providers to invest in comprehensive sexuality education, improve access to sexual health services, promote dialogue and better train educators.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

The Russia-Ukraine war started exactly two years ago. The very next day, on February 25, 2022, India abstained from voting on a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council. In the course of the ongoing war, New Delhi has been abstaining from taking clear sides, much to the chagrin of establishments in both the European Union and the United States. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Ukraine, after a much-publicised visit to Moscow in July, in maintaining with India’s stated position of strategic neutrality, questions are being asked in global capitals about India’s motivations. This is the first time an Indian prime minister has visited an independent Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union. 

There have been enough domestic discussions on India’s purported role in world peace and other grand enterprise. Let’s bring realism back into the game now.

Decoupling From West Is Not An Option

Domestic chatter aside, what the Western world – the US, EU, UK nexus – thinks about India’s stand on the Russia-Ukraine conflict does, indeed, matter to India. No matter what the virulently nationalist ecosystem clamours for, decoupling from the West is not an option for India. It is not merely about diplomatic grandstanding. Since 2014, PM Modi has been making diplomatic and cultural gestures to bolster India-EU relations. There have been increased levels of engagement to secure crucial strategic and economic partnerships between India and the EU member states. While India’s relationship with Ukraine may not have been headline-making historically, its implications have not been any less significant. That explains why India has consistently decried Russian aggression against Ukraine.

With his visit to Kyiv, PM Modi may be revealing India’s growing transactions with the EU member states for its defence and strategic needs. After all, the Russian manpower and machines have put up a dismal performance in the current theatre. It’s high time Indian generals stopped defending the Russian infrastructure just because they, too, are dependent on it and must swear by its fierceness. India has options for its defence and modernisation needs and must use them. After all, what use are partnerships like the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) that the EU set up with India in April 2022?

Exports From Russia Are Dwindling

It needs to be brought back into the picture that India’s arms procurement from Russia saw a significant drop in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The trend has been continuing, and as per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s latest reports, Russian exports to India have sharply declined from 76% in 2009–2013 to 36% in 2019-2024. While India remains the Russian arms industry’s biggest market, it’s also shopping from elsewhere, and that cart is getting bigger. A war-stressed Moscow is unlikely to meet New Delhi’s growing defence needs owing to the latter’s neighbourhood concerns.  

Au contraire, other countries are pushing their catalogues for New Delhi to browse. The French are coming hot and sexy with their Rafael jets and a “defence industrial roadmap” to jointly design and develop mechanical infrastructure. India and France have joined hands in building submarines, combat aircraft engines, and multi-role helicopters. Ukraine, accounting for 11% of India’s total defence imports, too, is an important partner. India is also deepening defence and security ties with countries like South Korea, South Africa and Poland. It is no coincidence that PM Modi made a pit stop in Poland before heading to Ukraine.

A Wise Move By India

By maintaining its stance of strategic neutrality, India is securing self-interest-driven allies in Europe and Asia without the overlordship of the US. It is a wise move on India’s part in keeping with the ever-looming shadow of China in the neighbourhood.  The US has exhibited reluctance to share crucial defence technology with India despite promises and agreements, like the one between General Electric and Indian partners for technology to power the new fleet of fighter jets. India knows better than to rely on the US, a country that holds its military-industrial complex dearer than any ideological principle. 

It is clear that India—while being on “the side of peace”—is keeping its national interests above everything else. Mykhailo Podolyak, a presidential adviser in Ukraine, acknowledges that India “really has a certain influence” over Russia. It is this reputation that India aims to, ought to capitalise on in its attempt to emerge as a dependable global negotiator. Only those who have power can negotiate, the rest only nudge. 

The timing for Modi’s Ukraine visit is almost perfect. India is not expected to use a magic wand to bring Moscow and Kyiv to the negotiating table. The military situation remains hot. Even minor dialling down of fighting, if at all, will be enough for India’s influence optics. No significant developments in the region can be expected till the US elects its next president. Till the US gets its house in order and views its NATO obligations afresh, the window is open for India to pedal hard towards its strategic goals—choosing realism over idealism and empty talk. 

(Nishtha Gautam is a Delhi-based author and academic.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

The Russia-Ukraine war started exactly two years ago. The very next day, on February 25, 2022, India abstained from voting on a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council. In the course of the ongoing war, New Delhi has been abstaining from taking clear sides, much to the chagrin of establishments in both the European Union and the United States. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Ukraine, after a much-publicised visit to Moscow in July, in maintaining with India’s stated position of strategic neutrality, questions are being asked in global capitals about India’s motivations. This is the first time an Indian prime minister has visited an independent Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union. 

There have been enough domestic discussions on India’s purported role in world peace and other grand enterprise. Let’s bring realism back into the game now.

Decoupling From West Is Not An Option

Domestic chatter aside, what the Western world – the US, EU, UK nexus – thinks about India’s stand on the Russia-Ukraine conflict does, indeed, matter to India. No matter what the virulently nationalist ecosystem clamours for, decoupling from the West is not an option for India. It is not merely about diplomatic grandstanding. Since 2014, PM Modi has been making diplomatic and cultural gestures to bolster India-EU relations. There have been increased levels of engagement to secure crucial strategic and economic partnerships between India and the EU member states. While India’s relationship with Ukraine may not have been headline-making historically, its implications have not been any less significant. That explains why India has consistently decried Russian aggression against Ukraine.

With his visit to Kyiv, PM Modi may be revealing India’s growing transactions with the EU member states for its defence and strategic needs. After all, the Russian manpower and machines have put up a dismal performance in the current theatre. It’s high time Indian generals stopped defending the Russian infrastructure just because they, too, are dependent on it and must swear by its fierceness. India has options for its defence and modernisation needs and must use them. After all, what use are partnerships like the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) that the EU set up with India in April 2022?

Exports From Russia Are Dwindling

It needs to be brought back into the picture that India’s arms procurement from Russia saw a significant drop in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The trend has been continuing, and as per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s latest reports, Russian exports to India have sharply declined from 76% in 2009–2013 to 36% in 2019-2024. While India remains the Russian arms industry’s biggest market, it’s also shopping from elsewhere, and that cart is getting bigger. A war-stressed Moscow is unlikely to meet New Delhi’s growing defence needs owing to the latter’s neighbourhood concerns.  

Au contraire, other countries are pushing their catalogues for New Delhi to browse. The French are coming hot and sexy with their Rafael jets and a “defence industrial roadmap” to jointly design and develop mechanical infrastructure. India and France have joined hands in building submarines, combat aircraft engines, and multi-role helicopters. Ukraine, accounting for 11% of India’s total defence imports, too, is an important partner. India is also deepening defence and security ties with countries like South Korea, South Africa and Poland. It is no coincidence that PM Modi made a pit stop in Poland before heading to Ukraine.

A Wise Move By India

By maintaining its stance of strategic neutrality, India is securing self-interest-driven allies in Europe and Asia without the overlordship of the US. It is a wise move on India’s part in keeping with the ever-looming shadow of China in the neighbourhood.  The US has exhibited reluctance to share crucial defence technology with India despite promises and agreements, like the one between General Electric and Indian partners for technology to power the new fleet of fighter jets. India knows better than to rely on the US, a country that holds its military-industrial complex dearer than any ideological principle. 

It is clear that India—while being on “the side of peace”—is keeping its national interests above everything else. Mykhailo Podolyak, a presidential adviser in Ukraine, acknowledges that India “really has a certain influence” over Russia. It is this reputation that India aims to, ought to capitalise on in its attempt to emerge as a dependable global negotiator. Only those who have power can negotiate, the rest only nudge. 

The timing for Modi’s Ukraine visit is almost perfect. India is not expected to use a magic wand to bring Moscow and Kyiv to the negotiating table. The military situation remains hot. Even minor dialling down of fighting, if at all, will be enough for India’s influence optics. No significant developments in the region can be expected till the US elects its next president. Till the US gets its house in order and views its NATO obligations afresh, the window is open for India to pedal hard towards its strategic goals—choosing realism over idealism and empty talk. 

(Nishtha Gautam is a Delhi-based author and academic.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be in Poland and Ukraine this week. Both visits are historic in their own ways: for Poland, this will be the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister in 45 years, while for Ukraine, Modi’s will be the first-ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister. Where Modi has talked about India and Poland’s “mutual commitment to democracy and pluralism” reinforcing the bilateral relationship, he has expressed “hope for an early return of peace and stability” in Ukraine. 

Often, China and India are put in the same bracket when it comes to their response to the Ukraine war. But Modi’s visit to the country, which follows his much-controversial trip to Russia last month, is why the world shouldn’t compare them. 

India Is More Than Just A Mediator In Europe

Modi’s visit to Russia last month raised a lot of eyebrows as it was also his first visit abroad in his third term. There is now talk of India becoming a potential peacemaker in the Russia-Ukraine war. But that is missing the woods for the trees. Modi will be in Ukraine to underline that New Delhi’s position on the war remains consistent. Despite close ties with Russia and its decision not to publicly call out Russia as an aggressor, New Delhi has always maintained that the sanctity of territorial integrity and sovereignty remains inviolable in international affairs, and that dialogue and diplomacy is the only way to a sustainable outcome.

Unlike China, Modi publicly told Putin during his visit to Moscow that this was not the era of war, and expressed pain at the death of children after a lethal strike by Russia on Kyiv’s main hospital for children. At that time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had denounced Modi for visiting Russia, calling the trip a “devastating blow to peace efforts”. But New Delhi has continued to maintain its ties with both Moscow and Kyiv throughout the course of the war over the last two and a half years, steadfast in its belief that both sides should be engaged if a lasting solution is to be found. 

A Renewed Vision For Europe

Europe is facing a moment of reckoning with growing internal challenges, a widening regional divide, a war that shows no signs of ending, a rising China, calls for isolationism in the US, and a fracturing of the post-Cold War security arrangement. The end of the Ukraine war will perhaps lay the foundations of a new security order in Europe, but that end is nowhere in sight as both sides search for favourable battlefield realities that they can potentially leverage at the negotiating table. It is at this critical juncture that Europe has started looking at India as a key partner.

And New Delhi has reciprocated. India now views Europe as central to its developmental and strategic priorities. This is borne by the extraordinary diplomatic investment the Modi government has made in imparting momentum to its ties with Europe. What has been an evolving feature of this outreach is India’s attempts to engage with different sub-regions of Europe, allowing New Delhi to focus on their core strengths. It is Central Europe that is now the focus, with Modi visiting Austria last month followed by Poland and Ukraine now. The region has developed its own unique voice on European matters, and especially after the Russian invasion, it has been critical in shaping the larger European response to regional and global issues.

Why Poland Matters To New Delhi

As for Modi’s visit to Poland, it is among the fastest-growing economies in Europe and has been vocal about its strategic aspirations to see Europe emerge as a key geopolitical actor on the global stage. Warsaw’s role will also be critical in shaping the European security architecture once the embers of war in Ukraine cool down. Its location makes it a hub of connectivity across Europe, and India enjoys a lot of goodwill. If India is to move beyond France, Germany and the UK in its European imagination, then building strong economic ties with Poland will be critical. Modi’s visit should lay the foundation for a long-term sustainable partnership with Warsaw.

It is in New Delhi’s interest that a sustainable security architecture takes shape in Europe as European stability is critical for a globally engaged India with critical equities in that geography. New Delhi won’t be playing the mediator. Its eyes are on the larger horizon, where India’s emergence as a credible partner of Europe is seen as important for ensuring that its own developmental and strategic priorities remain insulated from wider disruption. 

(Harsh V Pant is Vice-President for Studies at ORF)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Sperm donated in the UK is being exported to other countries and can be used to create large numbers of children across the world, violating a strict 10-family limit that applies in the UK, experts warned. According to The Guardian, while a single donor can be used to create no more than 10 families in UK fertility clinics, there are no restrictions on sperm or eggs from the country being sent abroad. This legal loophole is being exploited in what appears to be an industrial-level practice. It also raises the prospect of some donor-conceived children navigating relationships with dozens of biological half-siblings across Europe and beyond. 

Amidst this, experts are calling on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) to tighten restrictions. “If you believe that it’s necessary to enforce the 10-family limit in the modern world then logically that should apply wherever the sperm are from,” said Prof Jackson Kirkman-Brown, chair of the Association for Reproductive and Clinical Scientists (ARCS), per The Guardian. “There is data showing that some of the children who find the really big families struggle with that,” he added. 

Separately, speaking to the outlet, Prof Lucy Frith, of the University of Manchester, who is researching donor-conceived experiences, said that making contact with biological half-siblings is often viewed positively. However, she added that “when numbers of siblings began to grow [it] felt unmanageable to have contact and relationships with a growing and indeterminate number of people.” 

“There are no hard and fast figures of when the number becomes ‘too much’ and this depends on individuals, but generally over 10 was felt to be a large group,” she said. 

“Once you’ve frozen sperm it doesn’t get any older,” said Mr Kirkman-Brown. This means that a donor sperm could continue to be used for years or decades. “You can end up with donor siblings older than your parents, which is not somewhere we’ve been yet,” he added.

Donations are “presented to donors as a beautiful gift to help someone create a family, not as, ‘We’re going to maximise the number of births from your gametes and make as much money as we can from that,'” said Prof Nicky Hudson, a medical sociologist at De Montford University. 

The rule for enforcing the 10-family limit across licensed clinics is controlled by HEFA. According to the regulatory body, 10 is the number people feel comfortable with in terms of the number of potential donor-conceived children, half-siblings and families that might be created. 

“As the HFEA has no remit over donation outside of HFEA licensed clinics, there would be no monitoring of how many times a donor is used in these circumstances,” said Rachel Cutting, director of compliance and information at the HFEA.

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Experts are now asking HEFA to crack down. “The HFEA is limited by its statutory duties, but it could stipulate that it will only import gametes that meet the UK limit (10 families), outside the UK,” said Lucy Frith. 

“The HFEA’s position that this is outside its remit is not good enough,” said Sarah Norcross, director of the fertility charity Progress Educational Trust. “I’m not against there being more than 10 families if some are outside the UK, but 75, which some of these banks have alighted on, is a heck of a lot of relatives. Even if they say we can’t control the number of families abroad, they could insist that the number is made available to the recipient,” she added. 

Notably, according to The Guardian, the United Kingdom was an importer of sperm till five years ago, mainly from the US and Denmark. But between 2019 and 2021, the UK exported 7,542 straws of sperm. Additionally, the world’s largest sperm and egg bank Cryos opened a unit in Manchester this April.

“The European Sperm Bank, which accounted for 90% of exports, applies a worldwide limit of 75 families a donor and estimates that its donors help on average 25 families,” the report said. 

“The idea of a dad to loads of children already exists in our cultural imagination. We don’t have that for women,” noted Prof Nicky Hudson, adding that it’s not an idea encouraged by women. One of them told her it “felt like human trafficking”.