The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 31-September 1, 2026, and the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12-13, 2026, were remarkable. Iran received considerably more attention and support from members of both the groups, far more than anticipated. More consequential, however, was the shift in India’s stance on the United States-Israel war against Iran and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Traditionally, the SCO and BRICS summits have offered the three major powers — Russia, India and China — an opportunity to demonstrate their mutual solidarity. For Russia, it is a platform from which it can signal to the West that it is not isolated and still has powerful allies. The expansion of the SCO and BRICS under China’s leadership showcases its growing power to the West. For India, the SCO and BRICS have been useful for demonstrating its strategic autonomy. India has sought to remain welcome in both western and non-western forums, from the G-7 to the SCO and BRICS.

A surprise pivot

At Bishkek, however, India sprang two surprises. First, it endorsed the Bishkek Declaration, which condemned the attacks on Iran as violations of international law, reaffirmed Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and mourned the killing of its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in U.S.-Israeli air strikes on February 28, 2026.

Although the declaration did not name the U.S. or Israel, its meaning was unmistakable. India reaffirmed its opposition to military strikes on Iran by endorsing the Bishkek Declaration, which condemned the attacks and reiterated support for Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Second, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made an unusually blunt appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin to bring Russia’s seemingly endless war in Ukraine to an end.

India has generally sought to avoid directly condemning the U.S. or Israel for their military actions against Iran, even though Iran, like India, is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. India had previously avoided explicitly accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza, although it had supported UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire and reaffirmed its commitment to Palestinian statehood. Indeed, New Delhi had emphatically declared that it stands with Israel, while often working in multilateral forums to soften language that is critical of Washington and Tel Aviv. But in both the Bishkek and Delhi Declarations, India signed on to very strong criticism of Israel as well as very strong affirmation of Palestinian rights and the two-state solution.

One interpretation of this pivot in policy is that India may have signed on to the declaration to avoid alienating Mr. Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, and thereby jeopardising their attendance at India’s BRICS summit. Without the two leaders, India’s presidency of BRICS this year would have been a complete failure. Since Operation Sindoor (2025), India has faced a growing perception of diplomatic marginalisation. Meanwhile, Pakistan has gained diplomatic prominence through Washington’s selection of Islamabad as a mediator in the conflict with Iran, while several Gulf nations have sought defence agreements with Pakistan. Consequently, India needed a successful and high-profile BRICS summit, which it got.

Contradictory shifts

While there is a shift in India’s policy, New Delhi has not abandoned Washington entirely. Mr. Modi’s public appeal to Mr. Putin to end the endless war in Ukraine can therefore be read as a counter-signal to Washington. Had the message been intended only for Moscow, it could have been conveyed privately. Delivering it publicly suggested that Mr. Modi was also reassuring the West. India may have joined the SCO and BRICS consensus on Iran to secure a successful BRICS summit, but it was now leaning more toward the western position on Ukraine than before.

These apparently contradictory shifts reveal the strain on India’s foreign policy. New Delhi wants to support Israel while condemning attacks on Iran; buy Russian oil while aligning more closely with the West on Ukraine; and remain central to BRICS and the SCO while assuring Washington that it is not part of an anti-American bloc. Multi-alignment is becoming an increasingly difficult exercise in this era of change and turbulence. India’s balancing act is unlikely to sit comfortably with either Moscow or Beijing.

Although Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi did not meet bilaterally at the SCO summit in Bishkek, they held talks on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in New Delhi. The meeting preceded Mr. Xi’s high-profile G2 summit with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington, which was held in September 2026. Neither summit declaration mentioned the war in Ukraine, avoiding criticism of Moscow even as Mr. Modi publicly urged Mr. Putin to end the conflict. India thus endorsed two declarations accommodating Russia’s position without fully embracing it.

From Mr. Putin’s perspective, this was the second time that Mr. Modi had used what might be called ‘jumla’ (performative) diplomacy at Russia’s expense. At Samarkand on September 16, 2022, Mr. Modi told Mr. Putin that “today’s era is not an era of war”. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar subsequently repeated that phrase in western capitals to demonstrate that India’s purchase of discounted Russian oil did not signify political support for Russia’s invasion.

The selectivity of these admonitions is difficult to ignore. Mr. Modi has not used comparable language toward Mr. Netanyahu, even as Israel has attacked several countries and territories across West Asia, many on multiple occasions, and has committed genocide in Gaza. Nor has Mr. Modi publicly directed the same admonition at Mr. Trump following American attacks on Iran. India itself attacked Pakistan during Operation Sindoor. Mr. Putin may therefore conclude that Mr. Modi’s declaration that this is “not an era of war” reflects neither a consistent principle nor a universal opposition to war, but diplomatic messaging designed to reassure the West at Russia’s expense.

Mr. Modi’s latest appeal — that “endless war” must give way to an “end of war” — may reinforce that perception. Would Mr. Modi deliver the same message to Mr. Trump about the increasingly prolonged war with Iran — or to Mr. Netanyahu about his unending campaign of revenge in Gaza? How is Moscow interpreting this double standard?

Where ties with Russia stand

Russia, nevertheless, still needs India, at least for now, as a major purchaser of its oil and military equipment. At the same time, Moscow can see that New Delhi has steadily reduced its dependence on Russian arms by turning increasingly to France, Israel, and the U.S. The relationship remains important to both countries, but it is becoming increasingly transactional — and vulnerable to their diverging strategic priorities.

Russia is now leaning ever more toward its “trusted partner” — China, while Mr. Modi’s performative diplomacy designed to stay in the good books of Washington risks undermining the long enduring Russia-India friendship.

Muqtedar Khan is Professor of International Relations at the University of Delaware and a Senior Non-Resident Fellow of the Middle East Policy Council. He hosts a YouTube show on World Affairs called Khanversations

Published – October 28, 2026 12:16 am IST