U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, take a walk through Zhongnanhai Garden, in Beijing on Friday.
| Photo Credit: ANI

Chinese astronaut Chen Dong, Chen Zhongrui, and Wang Jie meet the press before the upcoming Shenzhou-20 spaceflight mission, at Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre near Jiuquan, Gansu province, China. File
| Photo Credit: Reuters

Nepal Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli on Saturday conveyed to Chinese President Xi Jinping that Lipulekh is Nepali territory, in the first such assertion by a Nepali leader before the Chinese President since 2015. Mr. Oli, who was on a five-day visit to China to participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, also held bilateral talks with Mr. Xi in Tianjin in China on Saturday.

A statement issued by the Embassy of Nepal in Beijing said: “Referring to the recent understanding reached between India and China on border trade through the Lipulekh Pass, Prime Minister Oli stated that the territory belongs to Nepal and that the Government of Nepal has registered its strong objection to the same.”

A recent deal between India and China on August 19, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi to reopen Lipulekh as a bilateral trade route, had sparked widespread opposition in Nepal.

India has historically claimed Lipulekh, along with Limpiyadhura and Kalapani, as its own. However, in 2020, Nepal published a map to lay claim to the territory.

Nepal’s statement has no mention of the Chinese response. A statement regarding the Oli-Xi meeting by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also silent on the matter.

Nepal Foreign Secretary Amrit Bahadur Rai, however, told the media that Mr. Xi, in his response, said: “Lipulekh is a traditional border pass, and an agreement has been made to operate it accordingly. China respects Nepal’s claim, but since the border dispute is a bilateral issue [between India and Nepal], it is something for the two sides to resolve.”

Mr. Xi’s response clearly seems to align with China’s standard policy, as its map released in 2023 also did not acknowledge the new Nepali map — which was viewed in Kathmandu as Beijing’s reluctance to accept Nepal’s claim, or tacit support for India’s traditional claims.

Nepali foreign policy watchers say the development is more likely to complicate the border issue than to resolve it.

Anurag Acharya, Director at Policy Entrepreneurs Inc, a Kathmandu-based think tank, says the visit has now become controversial because the Nepal Embassy in Beijing stated that Mr. Oli, during his meeting with Xi, expressed “strong objection” to the China-India deal to resume trade via the Lipulekh pass.

“This will undoubtedly have consequences for future dialogue between Nepal and India on the disputed territory, and possibly create further tensions in bilateral ties,” Mr. Acharya told The Hindu.

Both Nepal and India have expressed willingness to resolve border issues, but with differing framing.

After the August 19 deal, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the next day: “…the government of Nepal remains committed to resolving the boundary issue between the two countries through diplomatic means, based on historical treaties and agreements, facts, maps and evidence.”

Delhi reacted the same day, saying India remains open to “constructive interaction” with Nepal on the agreed-upon outstanding boundary issues through dialogue and diplomacy. Nepal’s territorial claims, India said, are “neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence.”

Chandra Dev Bhatta, a Kathmandu-based political scientist, says the crux of the problem is how to find the door to dialogue.

“Nepal’s decision to publish the map and incorporate it in the constitution gives Delhi enough room to argue that the door has been closed,” said Mr. Bhatta. “And now, by raising the issue before the highest leadership of China — which says it’s not a party to that dispute — Nepal seems to have complicated the matter further, deliberately or inadvertently.”

Earlier in June, India and China had also agreed to resume the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra via Lipulekh. In 2015, Nepal’s two neighbours had signed an agreement for trade via Lipulekh. The then-government in Kathmandu, led by the Nepali Congress’s Sushil Koirala, had sent diplomatic notes to both Delhi and Beijing. This time too, Kathmandu sent notes to both of its neighbours, according to Foreign Ministry officials. The Ministry, however, has not made any formal announcement in that regard.

Sanjay Upadhya, a U.S.-based Nepali author, said that Mr. Xi reiterated Beijing’s traditional affirmation that China has always supported Nepal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

While preparing the press releases, both sides agreed to omit any reference to an issue that could affect — and even worsen — ties with India, according to him.

“As our Foreign Ministry took a calculated backseat in public, Nepal secured the ‘concession’ to allow its embassy in Beijing to issue a press release mentioning the Lipulekh issue, with our Foreign Secretary elaborating on the discussions between Mr. Oli and Mr. Xi, targeting a Nepali audience,” said Mr. Upadhya, the author of the book Backfire in Nepal: How India Lost the Plot to China.

Shifting sands

Though Mr. Oli was expected to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi in China, it did not materialise. There is growing pressure in Nepal for Mr. Oli to raise the Lipulekh issue just as strongly with the Indian leadership during his upcoming visit to Bodh Gaya.

Mr. Oli is set to visit India but the date has not been finalised yet.

Mr. Oli’s relations with Delhi have not been smooth, largely due to his ultranationalist stance rooted in anti-India sentiment, coupled with a perceived tilt towards the north.

But lately, the sands are shifting. In light of setbacks in the neighbourhood — vis-à-vis Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives — and the United States’ recent harsh tariff moves, New Delhi seems to be making a renewed push for its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy.

The invitation handed over to Mr. Oli personally by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri in Kathmandu was seen as a sign of the importance Delhi attaches to Nepal.

Mr. Oli’s visit to China — his second within a year — happened against this backdrop.

Mr. Acharya says Mr. Oli’s participation in the SCO is a significant development for Nepal, as this is probably the first time a government head has participated in the event.

“This could be good for Nepal’s future aspirations to become an observer and eventually a member state,” he said.

But regarding the boundary issue, Mr. Acharya adds that while Nepal is right to register its objection with the Chinese side, discretion should have been exercised on diplomatically sensitive matters.

“This public statement from the government will only complicate future dialogue with India on boundary disputes and put unnecessary stress on the committee that is tasked with negotiating the issue,” he said.

Oli’s foreign policy balance

The Chinese statement noting that Mr. Oli said “Nepal supports the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilization Initiative proposed by China” has further perplexed some experts. Mr. Oli also attended the Chinese Victory Parade in Beijing on Wednesday. Nepal, currently a dialogue partner, is seeking observer status in the SCO.

Experts say Nepal’s efforts to seek observer status in the SCO, Mr. Oli’s nod to participate in the Beijing Victory Parade, and his support for the GSI create a larger diplomatic picture that suggests a tilt towards China.

According to Mr. Bhatta, Nepal’s diplomacy is on a tightrope — and in such times, the simultaneous nature of such moves could lead to increased concerns from India, the U.S., and other global partners about Nepal’s alignment.

The GSI, proposed by Xi, does not explicitly emphasise military action, but it does contain security components. There are concerns that participation in this could increase Chinese influence in Nepal’s security and political spheres. This could, some say, lead to increased dependency on China, as Nepal may be drawn into long-term commitments — both economically, via the Belt and Road Initiative, and politically, via security agreements.

“The shift in alignment might help Nepal secure economic and security cooperation with the north, but it could backfire if Nepal fails to maintain its traditional balance in regional and global politics,” Mr. Bhatta said.

This raises the question: at a time when Nepal faces immense challenges in navigating shifting dynamics, is raising the border issue with the leadership of a country that has minimal involvement a wise move — or a strategic misjudgment?

“After all, India has physically controlled the Kalapani region and the Lipulekh pass for many decades,” Mr. Acharya said. “And Nepal is in no position to challenge it without engaging [India] diplomatically.”

(Sanjeev Satgainya is a journalist based in Kathmandu.)

China was once nicknamed as the “Kingdom of Bicycles” because of the widespread practice of cycling in this densely populated nation. There was a time when a bicycle was one of the “three rounds” every Chinese house desired, together with a wristwatch and a sewing machine.

However, the country has faced many challenges since it transitioned from bicycles to automobiles and other combustion engines. This shift led to complex problems for the environment, society, and economy. Beijing became known specifically for its poor air quality and a lot of haze.

The fast-growing population, along with high vehicle count and economic expansion, causes this much pressure on Beijing’s ecology.

Despite these obstacles, Beijing has improved its air quality significantly in recent years, serving as a model for other cities, particularly in South Asia, facing comparable problems.

As China emerged as the world’s largest automobile producer and consumer, it grappled with the detrimental impacts of increased oil consumption, but now China’s skies are clearer, and its air quality has drastically improved.

According to the World Economic Forum, the Chinese capital has cut fine particle pollution by 64% and sulphur dioxide by 89% since 2013-now other cities are following its lead.

According to a UN report, Beijing has implemented a “coal-to-gas” policy since 2005 and reduced coal combustion by nearly 11 million tonnes by 2017. High-efficiency terminal treatment facilities were continuously renovated, and ultralow emission standards were enforced during this period.

The prevention and control of vehicle pollution have long been critical tasks in Beijing’s air pollution control. Focusing on new vehicles, in-use vehicles, and fuel quality, Beijing has implemented a series of local emission standards and comprehensive control measures, as well as strengthened traffic management and economic incentives continuously.

Although the number of vehicles increased threefold in Beijing during the last two decades, the total pollutant emissions decreased remarkably.

Are Beijing-Islamabad ties under strain? Last month’s bombing near Karachi airport, which killed two Chinese engineers and wounded a third, may well be a turning point. These bombings, claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), were the latest in a string of attacks on Beijing’s interests in Pakistan, which began in 2016. They have angered China, which has pushed Pakistan to begin formal negotiations for a joint security management system.

Last Monday, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said that Beijing “will continue supporting Pakistan’s counterterrorism effort[s] and socioeconomic development”. Pakistani officials who have direct knowledge of the previously unreported negotiations told Reuters that the Chinese want to bring in their own security, something that Pakistan is not in support of. Beijing has sent Islamabad a written proposal to “allow the dispatch of security agencies and military forces into each other’s territory to assist in counterterrorism missions and conduct joint strikes”.

Pakistan, for its part, was amenable to setting up a joint security management system wherein Chinese officials could attend security meetings. It had also requested Beijing for greater help in improving its intelligence capabilities instead of direct involvement. But, it remains averse to having Chinese security and military forces on its territory.

Why China Is Frustrated

China does not seem to be in the mood to be placated—and not without reason. Two major deadly attacks have occurred this year—one was in October last month in Karachi, and another in March in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The latter attack, on a Chinese envoy, was carried out by affiliates of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and resulted in the deaths of five Chinese nationals working on the Dasu dam project. 

Following the October bombings, the Chinese response was unusually blunt. It has been pushing for a thorough probe and investigation into the attacks as well as for a large-scale counterterrorism operation. The Chinese embassy, strongly condemning the “terrorist attack”, recently requested Pakistan to “thoroughly investigate the attack, severely punish the perpetrators, and take all necessary measures to protect the safety of Chinese citizens, institutions and projects in Pakistan”, and asked “Chinese citizens, enterprises and projects in Pakistan to be vigilant, pay close attention to the security situation, strengthen security measures, and make every effort to take safety precautions”. This is not surprising because these two attacks are certainly not the only ones targeting Chinese interests and personnel in Pakistan. 

The Balochistan Conflict

The roots of these tensions go back to Baloch dissatisfaction. However, the other broad underlying factor is Pakistan’s inability to assimilate all its ethnic groups and provinces into a cohesive national identity, both culturally and economically. The narrative of Pakistani Balochistan follows a familiar trajectory. It has been seen earlier in the history of East Pakistan (which ultimately decided its destiny as Bangladesh), of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and of the Northwest Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The steady depletion of natural resources of these provinces, the dispossession of their populaces, the erosion of local autonomy, negligence towards development, the suppression of ethnic identity and culture, demographic changes and the brutal crushing of any dissent or opposition are all-too-familiar patterns. 

Balochistan is a resource-rich province with natural gas and mineral deposits, including coal, chromites, barytes, sulphur, marble, iron ore, quartzite, uranium, limestone and 95% of the world’s asbestos. Nevertheless, the province continues to languish under neglect, with the Baloch people alleging internal colonisation by Pakistan’s dominant Punjab province. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) continues to press ahead with its demands for secessionism, with Pakistan launching large-scale anti-insurgency operations to crush the agitation. Hundreds of Baloch have lost their lives and many more “disappeared” under these operations.

Why CPEC Has Become A Bone Of Contention

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship programme of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), passes majorly through Balochistan and is meant to bring in all the fruits of development. But the project has added to Baloch anxiety. The CPEC, a network of road, rail, power grid and cable connections, links China’s Xinjiang to the Gwadar Port in Balochistan Province. The Baloch allege dissatisfaction with and exploitation by the CPEC, whereby thousands have been displaced on their own land without adequate compensation or employment opportunities. There are charges of corruption and ambiguity, with many believing that only Pakistani elites and China would benefit from the project. The result has been a string of attacks on Chinese personnel and interests, interrupting the implementation of the CPEC. For instance, in 2018, the BLA attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi. Two years later, it attacked the Pakistan Stock Exchange, where the Chinese are major investors. In 2022, a female Baloch suicide bomber targeted Karachi University, killing three Chinese teachers. Last year, the BLA set six Chinese mobile towers on fire.

These tensions have considerably slowed down the progress of the CPEC, with many projects having been stalled. The Chinese, who have invested almost $64 billion into the corridor, are visibly upset. In 2021, a Pakistan Senate panel expressed concern over the slow progress of the CPEC and the Chinese dissatisfaction, given that around 135 Chinese companies are engaged in the CPEC. The Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad had also complained that Pakistan had “destroyed CPEC”.

A Breakdown Of Ties?

Along with the stalled projects and lost profits, body bags containing the remains of Chinese workers returning to the country have added to China’s frustrations. This has led to pressure on Islamabad to launch a full-blown counterinsurgency operation in Balochistan. It has also contributed to the erosion of confidence and a possible devaluation of bilateral ties with Pakistan. Analysts have pointed out that in the last few joint statements—most notable being the latest one released during the visit of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to China—Pakistan is no longer mentioned as a “highest priority” country for China, a tag that featured in previous joint statements. Also, the idea of extending the CPEC to Afghanistan—mooted during a trilateral meeting in 2023 between then-Pakistani foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang, and acting Afghan foreign minister Malawi Amir Khan Muttaqi—is no longer being discussed.

Pakistan neither wants to engage in another massive counterterrorism operation nor does it want Chinese security forces to guard CPEC projects. Yet, $30 billion of its $126-billion total external foreign debt is owed to China. It is also seeking another $7 billion from the International Monetary Fund. Not a pretty picture: not for Pakistan, not for China, and certainly not for the CPEC.

(Aditi Bhaduri is a journalist and political analyst. She has translated the works of Nicholas Roerich from Russian to English)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

China deployed planes and ships to encircle Taiwan on Monday, in drills Beijing said were aimed at sending a “stern warning” to “separatist” forces on the self-ruled island.

Beijing has not ruled out using force to bring Taiwan under its control and Monday’s drills represent its fourth round of large-scale war games in the past two years.

China’s drills come days after US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Beijing against taking action in response to a speech by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te during the island’s National Day celebrations.

Lai, who took office in May, has been more outspoken than his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen in defending Taiwan’s sovereignty, angering Beijing, which calls him a “separatist”. Taiwan condemned the latest exercises as “irrational and provocative” and said it has dispatched “appropriate forces” in response.

AFP journalists near the Hsinchu air force base, in the north of Taiwan, saw four fighter jets take off on Monday.

The drills, dubbed Joint Sword-2024B, “test the joint operations capabilities of the theater command’s troops”, Beijing said.

They are taking place in “areas to the north, south and east of Taiwan Island,” said Captain Li Xi, spokesman for the Chinese military’s Eastern Theater Command.

The drills are “focusing on subjects of sea-air combat-readiness patrol, blockade on key ports and areas”, Li said.

They also practised an “assault on maritime and ground targets” and “joint seizure of comprehensive superiority”.

China’s coast guard was also dispatched to conduct “inspections” around the island.

A diagram released by the coast guard showed four fleets encircling Taiwan and moving in an anticlockwise direction around the island.

Taiwan said it had detected “convoys” of China coast guard ships “in our northern, southwest and eastern waters”.

China has ramped up military activity around Taiwan in recent years, sending in warplanes and other military aircraft while its ships maintain a near-constant presence around the island’s waters.

Taiwan said Sunday it had detected a Chinese aircraft carrier group to its south in the Bashi Channel, a waterway that separates the island from the Philippines, that appeared to be heading towards the western Pacific.

“In the face of enemy threats, all officers and soldiers of the country are in full readiness,” Taiwan’s defence ministry said Monday.

“We are determined and confident to ensure national defence security.” – ‘Provocations’ – In his speech on Thursday, Lai vowed to “resist annexation” of the island, and insisted Beijing and Taipei were “not subordinate to each other”. China warned after the speech that Lai’s “provocations” would result in “disaster” for the people of Taiwan. Beijing on Monday said the drills were “a legitimate and necessary operation for safeguarding state sovereignty and national unity”. Beijing’s state broadcaster CCTV released a video warning: “the greater the provocation, the tighter the reins”. The current dispute between China and Taiwan dates back to a civil war in which the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek were defeated by Mao Zedong’s communist fighters and fled to Taiwan in 1949. Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party has long defended the sovereignty and democracy of Taiwan, which has its own government, military and currency. Beijing has sought to erase Taipei from the international stage, blocking it from global forums and poaching its diplomatic allies.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

It’s not a thaw yet, but there are certainly signs of some warming in the India-China relationship. Of late, there has been an uptick in dialogue to resolve outstanding issues along two friction points in Eastern Ladakh. At the same time, there is a fresh debate underway within India on economic engagement with China.

 July witnessed two meetings between the Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and China’s top diplomat Wang Yi. The first of these had indicated a softening of tone from Beijing. While eschewing remarks about putting the border issue in the “appropriate position”, Wang called for “properly handling and controlling the situation in the border areas, while actively resuming normal exchanges”. Following the second one, the Chinese statement talked about the need to “work for new progress in consultations on borderaffairs.” Since then, within a month, there have been two meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs. The most recent of these took place last week.

“Agreed To Turn Over A New Leaf”

 The Chinese readout following the conversation was rather positive. It said that both sides had “agreed to work together to turn over a new leaf in the border situation at an early date”. It further added: “The two sides exchanged in-depth views on relevant issues in border areas, further narrowed differences, expanded consensus, and agreed to strengthen dialogue and consultation, accommodate each other’s legitimate concerns, and reach a mutually acceptable solution at an early date.”

The Indian readout was much more contained. It said that “the two sides had a frank, constructive and forward-looking exchange of views on the situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to narrow down the differences and find early resolution of the outstanding issues”. The impact of these meetings on actual resolution of the issues in Depsang and Demchok remains to be seen.

The Question Of Chinese Investments

Meanwhile, the Economic Survey released before the new NDA government’s budget in July indicated that India could be more open to Chinese investments in the future. Investments from China have had to face government scrutiny since the issuance of Press Note 3 in April 2020. The notification was seen as an effort by the government to direct Chinese capital in desirable domains. However, the standoff in Ladakh and the subsequent killing of Indian soldiers during the clashes in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 extinguished any appetite for Chinese investments. That situation seems to be changing now.

Earlier this year, it was reported that since April 2020, the Indian government has approved 124 investment proposals from bordering countries and rejected 201. Around 200 proposals are said to be pending with the government. A large number of these proposals were from China. While the scrutiny under Press Note 3 remains active, there has been some easing.

The MG Motor-JSW Deal

For instance, in March, the long-discussed joint venture between MG Motor India and JSW Group was finally sealed. It entailed Chinese auto giant SAIC Motor divesting a 51% stake.

Subsequently, in May, reports emerged that the government had begun moving on approving Chinese investment proposals with Indian firms on a case-by-case basis. In July, it was reported that the government had notified electronics and automobile manufacturers about plans to establish an inter-ministerial panel to accelerate the approval process for investment proposals from Chinese firms in Indian companies. The assessment would require the proposals to meet certain conditions, such as the significance of investment and technology for enhancing the local manufacturing supply chain, exclusion of Chinese nationals from the management and board of the investee firm and the Indian entity holding a majority stake in any joint venture.

At the same time, reports indicated that the Indian government was looking to fast-track visas for Chinese technicians and engineers, given that delays were hurting Indian industry. Then in late August, the Economic Times reported that the inter-ministerial panel had approved five to six investment proposals involving Chinese entities in the electronics manufacturing sector.

A Good Approach, But Not Without Perils

Being open to Chinese capital and talent, particularly those that aid the development of India’s manufacturing sector and deepen linkages with global value chains, is a pragmatic and prudent approach. It is, in fact, in India’s larger strategic interest to do so. This is not to argue that there isn’t any need for scrutiny. The External Affairs Minister is right to argue, as he did at a public forum last week, that given the current geopolitical scenario and India’s peculiar challenges with China, it is “common sense that investments from China should be scrutinised”. However, this should not be an ad hoc process. It is imperative to establish a new investment review mechanism with clear guidelines, conditions and timelines. This will engender greater predictability for industry, and ensure adequate democratic oversight. Such a process should also entail delineating a narrow set of sub-sectors as critical from a national security perspective and therefore walled off from Chinese entities. This list can evolve dynamically following periodic reviews.

That said, from the perspective of Indian industry, working with Chinese entities and being reliant on Chinese capital is likely to always remain a perilous endeavour. Politics and security have always come first in the India-China dynamic. Events over the past seven years since the Doklam stand-off have only further entrenched this trend. In addition, given the structural fault lines between the two sides, volatility is likely to remain a feature of the India-China relationship. The risks for industry, therefore, are always likely to remain high.

India Must Know What It Wants

Finally, while we are in a moment of policy churn, it is imperative for India’s political elite and strategic affairs community to deliberate on what it is that we desire in our relationship with China. Many have talked about the need for a new modus vivendi. But what are the contours of this new, desirable state of affairs that we wish to arrive at? And what does India need to do to get there? These are questions that need deeper yet urgent reflection, for policy to proceed with purpose and pragmatism rather than being reactive.

(Manoj Kewalramani is the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution.)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

The week gone by has been a busy period for India in the Indo-Pacific. India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, attended the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Laos and the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Japan. Jaishankar’s visit to Laos also featured a bilateral meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, following their last meeting at Astana earlier this year. The context for Jaishankar’s visit was set by India’s enduring pushback against China in key arenas of its interest. Arguably, China remains the pre-eminent concern for India’s national security planners. India’s China challenge is multipronged, with unresolved border conflict along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), as well as Beijing’s expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean. China’s more recent overtures in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea region, have also compelled India’s Quad partners and several Southeast Asian countries to intensify measures to counterbalance Beijing. Thus, the China question was a natural focal point for Jaishankar during both Laos and Japan visits.

China, A Critical Cog In The Quad

At the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting, the four member countries of the grouping released a joint statement which amply addressed their common concerns with regard to China’s belligerent posturing in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad members have long resisted the notion that the formulation of the grouping is directed at countering Beijing, instead emphasising that it seeks to harness the emerging opportunities of collective cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. There is no denying, however, that the China factor is a critical cog in the Quad wheel. The latest joint statement released by the Quad countries evidently suggests that concerns regarding China’s overtures in the Indo-Pacific appear to be taking centre-stage in the thinking of the grouping. The joint statement expressed concerns over the evolving situation in the East and South China Seas, alluding to China’s unilateral actions by use of force and coercion. The statement decried, without naming, Beijing’s use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea attributing it to ‘dangerous manoeuvres’ in the region. 

Jaishankar’s individual remarks about the state of India-China relations have further garnered attention. Upon being questioned about India’s relations with China, Jaishankar unequivocally stated that the bilateral ties between the two neighbours are ‘not doing very well’. This admission appears to present continuity in India’s enduring pushback against China in light of border skirmishes and conflict since 2020. However, in the Indo-Pacific context, a shift appears to be underway in India’s approach towards China. In the past, India’s response to China’s aggressive overtures in the Indo-Pacific had remained relatively subdued. In its stead, Jaishankar’s recent comments at the Quad summit and the joint statement demonstrate India’s willingness to push back against China in the Indo-Pacific context as well. 

An Eye On Distant Seas

The question arises, what explains India’s pushback against China’s unilateral actions in the South China Sea? Even though the South China Sea geography does not fall under India’s primary maritime area of interest, it remains vital for India’s myriad strategic interests, such as the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), energy security, etc. Moreover, India’s sustained advocacy for a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based order at sea, emphasising the need for adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), makes it imperative for New Delhi to respond critically against Chinese attempts to change the status quo in the region.

Within the wider Indo-Pacific, China’s continued attempts to foray into the Indian Ocean region, more recently by way of sending survey and surveillance vessels into the region, have prompted an enduring security dilemma in New Delhi, of People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) imminent launch of carrier task force patrols in the Indian Ocean by 2025. Thus, upping the ante against China in the Indo-Pacific appears to be a logical progression in India’s continued efforts to counter Beijing’s advances in geographies of India’s core interests at sea. 

India’s Message

Notably, Jaishankar has displayed nuance and complex thinking in India’s plans to counter the multipronged challenge that China poses. While on the Indo-Pacific front, India has sought to actively engage in minilateral groupings to counter China, upon being asked if New Delhi would encourage third-party intervention for the resolution of the India-China territorial border conflict along the LAC, Jaishankar reiterated that only bilateral engagement based on ‘mutual respect, mutual interest, and mutual sensitivity’ can restore normalcy.

The message is very clear: New Delhi will not relent in pressing ahead with its pushback against Beijing even as the door is open for China to recalibrate its anti-India positioning.

(Harsh V Pant is Vice President for Studies at ORF. Sayantan Haldar works with the Maritime Initiative at ORF)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author

Watch: How the elderly in China are feeling young again

From dancing to doing pull-ups, more senior citizens in China are heading to parks to keep fit.

According to studies, by 2050, China is projected to be “super-aged”, where the population of people above 65 years is more than 20% of the total population. According to a World Health Organisation study, 31% of adults worldwide did not meet the recommended levels of physical activity

However, experts say that elderly people in China are more physically active than their counterparts in most parts of the world. Across parks of Beijing, groups of elderly people can be seen ‘square dancing’, exercising, or playing different types of games. These parks are spaces not just for exercising but for social interaction as well. 

The reason for more elderly people taking up leisurely physical activities is that their lifestyle and needs are different. Previously, the elderly were more focused on family and looking after grandchildren. But the current lot have more money and free time and they want to do more.

Reporting and visuals: Nikhil M. Babu

Production: Gayatri Menon

Voiceover: Jude Weston

London is known for its open intellectual climate, where no idea is off-limits. But even in this dynamic city – and indeed in Washington too – it’s almost blasphemous to suggest that Russia and the West can be partners, or that the US and China can coexist as global powers. Recently, Nigel Farage, the Reform Party leader in the UK, faced a storm for urging the West to negotiate sensibly with Russia over Ukraine, calling the war a ‘complete stalemate’. People accused him of “echoing Russian propaganda”.

In India, we often hear that we don’t cultivate a society where all ideas are welcome. But let’s hope that suggesting a new chapter of “Hindi-Cheeni bhai-bhai” (India-China brotherhood) isn’t seen as blasphemy. The strong anti-China sentiment after the Galwan Valley clash in 2020 seems to have subsided. We’re buying more Chinese goods now than ever. In 2023, our bilateral trade hit over $136 billion. Hopefully, even those who burnt Chinese products in Gujarat and Delhi following the border skirmishes are more open to the idea now.

Sure, it might sound crazy to suggest that India and China should become trusted partners like the US and India, or Russia and China. But, it’s not entirely out of the question.

Sure, it might sound crazy to suggest that India and China should become trusted partners like the US and India, or Russia and China. But, it’s not entirely out of the question.

Major Geopolitical Shifts

India’s rise to become a global power is unstoppable; even China knows that. Talking to Chinese academics and journalists, you get the sense that they’re open to establishing long-term ties based on mutual respect. They like India, they want more people-to-people interactions, and one of them even wondered recently why India does not try to cast its spell over the dragon through its soft power of Bollywood  

Both countries have the responsibility to lift millions of their combined 2.8 billion people out of poverty. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has pledged to make India a developed country by 2047, which is a huge task. There are challenges, but if India and China team up and leverage each other’s strengths, it could be a major geopolitical shift, with far-reaching implications for global politics. 

Read | Modi-Hasina Should Worry About China, But Not Too Much

The US and its allies might be shocked and deeply concerned by a close India-China partnership. The West has benefited from the rivalry between the two countries as it aligns with their strategy of counterbalancing China’s rise. A partnership between these two Asian giants could undermine the West’s strategic interests in the region. Kishore Mahbubani, former Singaporean ambassador to the UN, has often said that most of Asia would cheer if this were to happen.

So, can India and China find common ground despite tensions over their disputed border? Prof. Mahbubani believes that while the two may never be best friends, they can have a good working relationship. He even says the 21st century belongs to the CIA (China, India, and ASEAN) countries. With US power on the decline, these countries will drive the world’s economic growth.

A Rollercoaster Ride

The idea of India and China being close friends isn’t new. Historically, they’ve acted like quarrelsome neighbours who fight and make up repeatedly. They share a long history of cultural and economic exchange dating back over two millennia. The Silk Road facilitated trade, and Buddhism, which started in India, found a significant following in China. These ancient ties laid a foundation of mutual respect and cultural affinity. During the colonial era, both countries faced subjugation by Western powers, fostering a sense of shared struggle. 

After gaining independence from the British, India faced border issues with China, and they continue to strain their relationship. In the early 1950s, the relationship was marked by camaraderie, epitomised by the slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai“. However, this period of cooperation was short-lived. The border dispute escalated into a full-scale war in 1962, leaving a lasting scar on bilateral relations. The disputed borders, particularly in the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions, remain contentious issues.

The rivalry between the US and China will continue, and India will remain under US pressure in its effort to manage China. However, India’s strategic positioning between the US and China can work to its advantage.

Before the Galwan incident, Prime Minister Narendra Modi naturally leaned towards engaging with China. As Gujarat’s Chief Minister, he made four trips to the country to attract investment. As Prime Minister, he has visited China twice, and President Xi Jinping reciprocated with two visits to India. Both countries have emerged as major global economic powers, engaging in significant economic competition and areas of cooperation within multilateral frameworks like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Strategic Rivalry

Strategically, India and China view each other with suspicion. The latter’s close ties with Pakistan, its infrastructure projects in South Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and its military presence in the Indian Ocean have heightened India’s security concerns.

Conversely, India’s growing partnership with the US and its participation in the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is viewed warily by China. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash exacerbated tensions and highlighted the fragility of the relationship. Despite several rounds of military and diplomatic talks, a comprehensive resolution to the border disputes remains elusive.

Mumbai’s Shanghai Dreams

Many youth in India might not know that not too long ago, India used to compare itself with Pakistan in all spheres. This attitude changed around the turn of the millennium, when the Maharashtra government launched a mega project to revamp Mumbai in 2004, based on the “Vision Mumbai” report by Bombay First, an organisation comprising some of Mumbai’s super-rich stakeholders. The report outlined strategies for transforming Mumbai into “another Shanghai”. While the project to transform Mumbai is still a “work in progress”, it marked the beginning of India’s comparisons with China. Today, China sees India as its great rival, at least in Asia.

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Projections show that the Indian economy will surpass Germany and Japan’s to become the world’s third-largest one by 2027. Currently, however, India’s economy is only 19% the size of China’s, even though it feeds nearly the same number of people. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), India’s nominal GDP in 2023 stood at $3.5 trillion, compared to China’s $18.2 trillion. India’s per capita income was $2,411, while China’s was $12,720. China’s exports last year exceeded $3.38 trillion, while India’s exports were $778 billion.

Collaboration Possibilities

Since China opened its economy in 1978, it has lifted 800 million people out of poverty – a feat that hasn’t been matched by any regime in history. India has also succeeded in reducing poverty significantly. Both nations have many more millions to help. Collaborating in economic development, technology, infrastructure, environmental initiatives, healthcare, cultural exchange, and geopolitical stability can benefit both countries and the world. Overcoming historical tensions and building trust through consistent dialogue will be crucial.

The intense rivalry between the US and China will continue, and India will remain under pressure from the US to stay a reliable partner in its effort to manage China. However, India’s strategic positioning between the US and China can work to its advantage. Ultimately, New Delhi’s strategic interests are best served by a balanced approach that navigates the complex dynamics of US-China relations while advancing its own national objectives. 

India knows that neighbours with shared borders may fight at times, but they can still continue to believe in the ‘love thy neighbour’ dictum.

(Syed Zubair Ahmed is a London-based senior Indian journalist with three decades of experience with the Western media)

Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author