Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s recent visit to Katchatheevu, said to be the first by a head of state, drew attention on both sides of the Palk Strait.

Attired in smart casuals — his trademark double-pocket shirt — the 56-year-old leftist leader, elected to office a year ago, is seen on a naval boat, flanked by Fisheries Minister and Jaffna MP Ramalingam Chandrasekar and other officials. He smiles gently before setting foot on the tiny, uninhabited island, 33 nautical miles off the Jaffna peninsula, on September 1. Seated in the shade of palm trees, Mr. Dissanayakelistens intently while a Naval officer describes the 1.15 sq. km outcrop, pointing to a map.

Also read | Katchatheevu demands thinking outside the box

Walking around briskly with officials in tow, Mr. Dissanayake pays respects at the St. Anthony’s Catholic Shrine, the only permanent structure there, before returning to Jaffna, where at a public meeting earlier that day he pledged to safeguard Sri Lankan territory, resisting any “external force”. The symbolism of the visit, with the accompanying visuals and messaging played well in Sri Lanka, comes days after Tamil actor-politician Vijay’s demand in a political rally that India must retrieve Katchatheevu from Sri Lanka. The government subsequently announced it is also exploring the tourism potential of Katchatheevu, by making it more accessible from nearby Delft island, one of Jaffna’s off-track tourist destinations.

The competing claims made from India [Madras Presidency, specifically] and Ceylon to Katchatheevu date back to the 1920s, during British colonial times. The neighbours settled the matter some five decades later, through two bilateral agreements signed in 1974 and 1976, delineating an International Maritime Boundary Line, whereby Katchatheevu is firmly on the Sri Lankan side. In return, New Delhi got sovereign rights over Wadge Bank, located near Kanniyakumari, known for its rich resources.

Katchatheevu is a barren island, with no drinking water or sanitation. Every March, Sri Lanka waives visa controls to allow fishermen from India to worship along with their Sri Lankan counterparts at the St. Anthony’s festival. Around the annual two-day event, mobile toilets and drinking water booths are put up for pilgrims.

Political calculation

Bizarrely, though, half a century since India gave up its claim to Katchatheevu and recognised Sri Lanka’s sovereignty over it, politicians in India periodically rake up the issue. The political calculation driving the frequent call is the assumption that it could boost voter support if pitched as a solution to the enduring fisheries conflict affecting Tamil Nadu’s fishermen, a sizeable electoral constituency.

The fact that the Congress and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) were in power, respectively at the Centre and in Tamil Nadu, in the 1970s has offered political ammunition to their rivals, especially on the eve of State polls next year. Ahead of general elections last year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi accused the Congress of “callously giving away” the island to Sri Lanka. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar swiftly amplified this by blaming the two BJP rivals for compromising Indian fishermen’s rights in the Palk Strait.

Both Dravidian parties [DMK and Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, or AIADMK], have demanded its retrieval. In 2008, former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu Jayalalithaa, as General Secretary of the AIADMK, petitioned the Supreme Court seeking a declaration that the 1974 and 1976 agreements were unconstitutional. Ahead of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka in April 2025, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution, urging the Union government to take steps to retrieve the Katchatheevu island. Subsequently, Chief Minister M.K. Stalin said the island’s retrieval was “the only permanent solution” to the issues faced by the fishermen in the State.

Everyone calling for the island’s retrieval in India must know well that it is a far-fetched ask from a mostly friendly neighbour. In 2013, the Union government informed the Supreme Court that the question of gaining Katchatheevu from Sri Lanka did not arise, as “no territory belonging to India was ceded nor sovereignty relinquished since the area in question was in dispute and had never been demarcated”. In 2014, then Attorney-General Mukul Rohatgi submitted before the Supreme Court that if India had to retrieve an island belonging to Sri Lanka, “we have to go to war”. The factors that keep the issue alive, despite diplomatic and legal resolution, are chiefly political, and in fact to do with the political economy of a depleting catch in a narrow stretch of water.

Fishermen of south India and northern Sri Lanka rely heavily on the resource-rich Palk Strait. However, with Tamil Nadu fishermen relentlessly resorting to bottom-trawling, a destructive fishing method that scoops out the seabed to maximise the catch and profits, this has severely affected the marine ecosystem. With the catch on the Indian side of the International Maritime Boundary Line diminishing over time, the Tamil Nadu fishing boats ventured into the Sri Lankan side, targeting a heavier net. Daily wage fishermen, working for wealthy boat owners in Tamil Nadu, periodically court arrest by the Sri Lankan Navy — over 230 arrests so far this year— a risk they take to secure their day’s earnings.

Bottom-trawling

Tamil fishermen in northern Sri Lanka, still reeling from the impact of the civil war that ended 16 years ago, contend they have no real chance of rebuilding their destroyed livelihoods, unless their counterparts across the Palk Strait give up bottom-trawling — a practice banned in Sri Lanka.

In bilateral talks with fisher leaders through the years, or petitions to politicians in India and Sri Lanka, all they have been asking their fellow, Tamil-speaking brothers is that they stop the practice. In ministerial level talks between India and Sri Lanka in 2016, New Delhi acknowledged this and agreed to expedite the transition towards ending the practice of bottom trawling “at the earliest”. But the practice continues.

Decades ago, fishermen from both sides used Katchatheevu as a resting point and a spot to dry out their nets. But in recent history, most arrests of Indian fishermen are made well past Katchatheevu, very close to Sri Lanka’s northern shores. Policymakers on the Indian side know where the problem lies. And politicians know that Katchatheevu offers no real solution to it. But unwilling to confront a key electorate with a difficult question, they habitually invoke it to divert attention from their own failure to resolve the festering fisheries conflict.

Published – September 07, 2025 01:41 am IST

Peter Breuer, Senior Mission Chief for Sri Lanka at the IMF speaks during the International Monetary Fund (IMF) press conference in Colombo on November 23, 2024.
| Photo Credit: Reuters

Sri Lanka’s new National Peoples Power (NPP) government, led by the charismatic President, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, entered office in late 2024 at a turning point in the country’s economic history. Following default on its external debt obligations in April 2022, Sri Lanka had experienced its worst post-independence economic crisis in 2022-2023. While the economy is stabilising now, the challenges are far from over. Sri Lanka is on the precipice of both opportunity and risk and it is crucial that the government charts a path that balances growth with debt sustainability.

Sri Lanka’s recent economic outlook offers cause for cautious optimism. Thanks to prudent monetary and financial stability policy by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, a $3 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, and $4 billion of Indian aid, the economy appears to have steadied. A debt restructuring deal of $17.5 billion reached with private bond holders and China has given Sri Lanka the breathing room it desperately needed, while inflows from tourism have accelerated, contributing to the recovery of foreign exchange reserves. In this environment, the new government has inherited a stabilising economy, with the latest World Bank growth forecasts pointing to growth slowing from 4.4% in 2024 to 3.5% in 2025.

Internal challenges

However, there are looming risks that the new government must tackle head-on. One of the most pressing concerns is the significant brain drain involving as many as 3,00,000 people from Sri Lanka in 2024 alone. This wave includes educated IT, banking, marketing, and medical professionals migrating for better job opportunities abroad and a future for their children. This is a serious challenge for business and governance, as the country faces a growing gap in the talent pool needed to propel growth.

At the same time, the new government has a Parliament with little experience. Of the 225 MPs, about 150 are untested first-time representatives, mostly from the NPP, which raises questions about the legislative and technical capacity needed to enact economic reforms. To counteract this, the government must focus on better public sector service delivery, retaining key talent within the state sector, and creating policies that encourage the development of expertise in both governance and public administration. Improved state planning for undertaking market-oriented public policies, digitisation of public services, training MPs in the legislative process and understanding the complexities of economic reforms are the need of the hour. A top quality public policy school to train civil servants and MPs would be an important addition to the university system.

Tourism offers significant potential to boost foreign exchange reserves and spur growth. Over 2 million tourists visited Sri Lanka in 2024, a 38% increase over 2023. However, the government must do more to ensure that tourism is sustainable and benefits communities beyond Colombo. Better marketing of Sri Lanka as a multi-cultural destination, coupled with targeted development of less-visited regions such as the north and east of the country, will help create a more balanced and decentralised tourism industry. Furthermore, supporting small businesses linked to tourism activities and tackling the recent wave of gang-related violence should be a priority.

Fiscal sustainability remains a contentious issue. While revenue has increased, rationalisation of government spending remains high, largely due to the expansive role the state plays in the economy. Despite ruling out privatisation, the government plans to turn around state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through better management. However, some of the larger loss-making SOEs (such as SriLankan Airlines and the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation) should be reconsidered for privatisation or restructuring, as their drain on public funds threatens long-term fiscal stability.

External factors

In addition to internal challenges, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy will be critical. The geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific are set to change dramatically following the re-election of President Donald Trump in the U.S.. India has emerged as a key player in Sri Lanka’s economic future. Given the complex relationship with India, the government must strengthen economic ties with this fast-growing nation, ensuring that Sri Lanka benefits from Indian investments and collaborations. The President must also live up to his promises of non-interference in India’s security concerns, including halting visits from Chinese spy ships that have raised tensions in the region. His visit to India in late 2024 offers a promising foundation for stronger bilateral relations, and the government must now focus on making concrete progress — particularly in B-B links, cross-border energy projects, a digital identity system and the deeper bilateral free trade agreement under negotiation.

Apart from limited fiscal space for social spending, Sri Lanka faces the serious risk of repayments (capital) on its external debt starting in mid-2027 if it is unable to generate sufficient foreign exchange though trade-led growth. Working in partnership with the IMF and World Bank, India should stand ready to help if Sri Lanka falters a second time.

The Sri Lankan government must develop a comprehensive growth plan that addresses both immediate risks and long-term opportunities. Navigating these choppy waters will require pragmatic leadership, bold policy decisions, and a clear vision for Sri Lanka’s future prosperity. The National Budget in February offers an opportunity to make a start.

Ganeshan Wignaraja is a Visiting Senior Fellow, ODI Global, and former executive director of Sri Lanka’s Foreign Ministry think tank

File picture of Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake.
| Photo Credit: PTI

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake will visit China from January 14 to 17, the Cabinet Spokesman announced on Tuesday (January 7, 2025), confirming the Sri Lankan leader’s second state visit abroad, a month after he visited India.

President Dissanayake will be accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment, and Tourism Vijitha Herath, and Minister of Transport, Highways, Ports, and Civil Aviation Bimal Rathnayake, Cabinet spokesman Nalinda Jayatissa told media. Debt treatment and bilateral development cooperation are among key issues expected to be discussed in Beijing.

Also Read | Won’t allow Sri Lankan territory to be used against India: President Dissanayake

Mr. Dissanayake’s visit to China marks his second major bilateral engagement after he rose to the country’s top office in September. In November, his National People’s Power [NPP] coalition swept the polls with an unprecedented two-thirds majority and soon after, Mr. Dissanayake undertook his first state visit abroad to India.

The NPP’s chief constituent, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP or People’s Liberation Front), which Mr. Dissanayake leads, has Marxist-Leninist roots and a history of opposing India, prompting many to describe it as a pro-China party. However, the JVP has sought to refashion itself in the last decade, in a bid to widen its appeal while retaining its traditional base. Further, Mr. Dissanayake and the NPP have pledged to follow a non-aligned foreign policy that prioritises Sri Lanka’s national interests. Regardless of the party in power in Sri Lanka, all past governments have maintained cordial and close ties with China, widely seen by Sri Lankans as a long-term ally, both in bilateral cooperation and at multilateral fora including UN bodies.  

‘Buoyant ties with India’

Meanwhile, addressing Colombo-based media on Tuesday (January 7, 2025), Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha said India opened the year “being extremely positive and buoyant” about its Sri Lanka partnership. President Dissanayake’s recent visit added “renewed vigour” to ties, and deliberations have put the relationship on a “higher plane”, he said. Outlining highlights of the Sri Lankan President’s December visit to India, including ongoing discussions on possible collaboration in the energy sector and connectivity, he said with India’s recent move to convert some of its earlier loans to Sri Lanka into grants, the total grant assistance stood at $ 780 million.    

EDITORIAL | ​More of the same: On the Sri Lankan President’s India visit

Research vessel visit

Asked if India held any further discussion with the Sri Lankan government on Chinese research vessels, after Colombo’s moratorium on foreign research ships expired, and following Mr. Dissanayake’s visit, Mr. Jha said: “We have not had any further discussions.” Pointing to President Dissanayake’s “categorical” statement in India, as well as the NPP’s election manifesto, the Indian High Commissioner said: “We take Sri Lanka for its word… we completely trust Sri Lanka to take the right actions in that regard.”

Following his meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi on December 16, 2024, President Dissanayake had said in a statement to the media in New Delhi: “I assured the Indian leader that Sri Lanka will not permit its territory to be used in any manner inimical to the security of India as well as towards regional stability,” reiterating the NPP’s position. Sri Lanka “attaches great importance to the continuous development and deepening of cooperation with India”, he had said.

New Delhi has remained highly sensitive to the visit of Chinese research vessels that it believes are essentially spy ships and, on multiple occasions, raised concern with Mr. Dissanayake’s predecessor government, prompting Colombo to introduce a moratorium. The Dissanayake government has said it will address the matter diplomatically and take decisions on a case-by-case basis.

Days after he returned from India last month, President Dissanayake met with Qin Boyong, vice-chairperson of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).  Ms. Qin stated that “there are plans to restart maritime research activities, which were temporarily halted for various reasons”, the Presidential Media Division said in a statement then.

Sri Lanka’s President Anura Kumara Dissanayake met with Qin Boyong of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on December 18, 2024. Photo: Special Arrangement

A day after returning from India following a three-day visit, Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake discussed Chinese development partnership, investments and a possible resumption of maritime research with a visiting member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

In a meeting with Qin Boyong, vice-chairperson of the National Committee of the CPPCC, held on Wednesday, Mr. Dissanayake expressed “gratitude to the Chinese government for its support during debt restructuring as well as in the face of the economic crisis”, his office said. Mr. Dissanayake “emphasised the continued need for China’s support in the future,” the Presidential Media Division said in a statement that outlined discussions on unfinished Chinese projects and potential investments.

Ms. Qin stated that there are “plans to restart maritime research activities, which were temporarily halted for various reasons, along with initiating relevant projects”, the President’s office said. The statement assumes significance, with Sri Lanka’s one-year moratorium on research vessels — imposed by Colombo after New Delhi raised concern over Chinese research vessels calling at Sri Lankan ports — expiring soon.

During his recent visit, President Dissanayake said he assured Prime Minister Narendra Modi that “Sri Lanka will not permit its territory to be used in any manner inimical to the security of India as well as towards regional stability”. Briefing the media soon after, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said Mr. Dissanayake’s statement could have a bearing on Sri Lanka’s clearance for foreign vessels. Further, speaking at an event in New Delhi, Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath said the Sri Lankan government had appointed a committee to review the moratorium.  Following his first state visit abroad to India, Mr. Dissanayake is scheduled to travel to Beijing next month.

Image used for representational purpose only.
| Photo Credit: Reuters

The annual saving by slashing the excessive personal security provided to former presidents would be LKR1200 million, parliament was told on Tuesday (December 17, 2024).

The personnel security provided to former Presidents would be slashed from January 1, the government has already announced.

Also read | Political sparring in Sri Lanka over privileges to ex-Presidents

The Public Security Minister Ananda Wijepala on Tuesday said the government’s aim was to ensure the security of the entire country and the decision to cut excessive security (for former Presidents) was in line with the government policy.

“We pledged to the country that we would ensure that those holding high public positions are as same as the rest of the citizens. We wanted to end the culture of big VIP convoys speeding on our roads disregarding traffic rules,” Mr. Wijepala said.

Mr. Wijepala said LKR1,448 million had been spent to provide security during 2024 to ex-Presidents. “This is a burden on the people in these hard times,” Mr. Wijepala said.

The former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s share of expenditure was the highest with LKR710 million for the deployment of over 310 personnel for his personal protection.

“It is not that we have personally targeted the former president Mahinda Rajapaksa,” Mr. Wijepala said adding that new deployments have come from scientific threat assessments done on the security needs of all six of them.

Mr. Wijepala said all would be provided just 60 police personnel each under the new arrangements as recommended by the committee which assessed the issue.

The opposition Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), which Mr. Rajapaksa heads, dubbed the move a political act of vengeance claiming he was still under threat from remnants of the LTTE.

He is largely credited for victory over the LTTE, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, that had run a military campaign for a separate Tamil homeland in the northern and eastern provinces of the island nation for nearly 30 years before its collapse in 2009 after the Sri Lankan Army killed its supreme leader V. Prabhakaran.

Colombo:

Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake will undertake a three-day visit to India from Sunday, his first overseas visit after assuming office.

During his visit, Dissanayake will meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Droupadi Murmu.

He will be accompanied by Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath and Deputy Minister of Finance Anil Jayantha Fernando.

Dissanayaka’s visit to India is expected to further bolster the multi-faceted and mutually beneficial bilateral ties, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said in New Delhi on Friday.

Issues relating to maritime security cooperation are likely to figure in talks during Dissanayaka’s visit, it said.

The December 15-17 visit is Dissanayake’s first overseas visit since being elected the island nation’s president on September 23.

Apart from his meetings with India’s political leadership, Dissanayaka will attend a business event in Delhi to promote investment and commercial linkages between India and Sri Lanka. He is also scheduled to visit Bodh Gaya, a statement from MEA said.

The invitation to visit New Delhi was extended by the External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, who visited Colombo less than a fortnight after Dissanayake’s victory and was the first foreign dignitary to visit the island nation since the National People’s Power (NPP) government came to power.

Dissanayake’s visit was on hold until the completion of the parliamentary election in November when his NPP recorded a historic win, gaining absolute control of the 225-member Parliament.

(This story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)

Sri Lanka President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. File
| Photo Credit: AP

“Sri Lanka’s President Anura Kumara Dissanayake will undertake a two-day visit to India from December 15, in his first overseas visit after assuming office,” it was announced on Tuesday (December 10, 2024).

During his visit, Mr. Dissanayake will meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Droupadi Murmu, Cabinet spokesperson Nalinda Jayathissa told reporters in Colombo.

“He will be accompanied by Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath and Deputy Minister of Finance Anil Jayantha Fernando,” said Jayathissa, also the Minister of Health. The December 15-17 visit is Mr. Dissanayake’s first overseas visit since being elected the island nation’s President in September.

The invitation to visit New Delhi was extended by the External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, who visited Colombo less than a fortnight after Mr. Dissanayake’s victory.

Mr. Jaishankar was the first foreign dignitary to visit Sri Lanka since the National People’s Power (NPP) government led by Mr. Dissanayake came to power on September 23. Mr. Dissanayake’s visit was on hold until the completion of the Parliamentary election in November when his NPP recorded a historic win, gaining absolute control of the 225-member Parliament.

An unprecedented financial crash in 2022 brought months of consumer goods shortages, with inflation peaking at nearly 70% that year. File
| Photo Credit: Reuters

Sri Lanka’s consumer prices fell by 2.1% in November, the highest deflation rate recorded by the economically fragile island nation since 1961, official data showed Saturday (November 30, 2024).

An unprecedented financial crash in 2022 brought months of consumer goods shortages, with inflation peaking at nearly 70% that year.

Since then, a $2.9 billion bailout loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), tax hikes, and other austerity measures have slowly made headway in repairing the island’s economy.

“Headline inflation will remain negative in the next few months, deeper than previously projected, mainly due to larger downward adjustments in energy prices and reductions in volatile food prices,” Sri Lanka’s central bank said in a statement.

The bank said inflation was likely to return to its target level of five percent in the coming months.

Sri Lanka had already seen deflation of 0.8% in October and 0.5% in September.

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who was elected in September, has vowed to maintain the IMF bailout programme negotiated by his predecessor that includes higher taxes and cuts to state spending.

When Anura Kumara Dissanayake was elected President of Sri Lanka in September, and his National People’s Power [NPP] alliance swept the general elections on November 14, most international news headlines stamped the winners as ‘Marxist’.

The tag was hardly positive or even neutral with its connotations of wild-eyed radicalism. The insinuation was that Sri Lanka’s ongoing programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would derail, and economic stability and recovery would be disrupted.

President Dissanayake, through his November 21 policy statement to the new Parliament, that he will take forward the IMF framework and the aligned debt treatment plans — finalised by his predecessor — tried to allay these fears.

President Dissanayake, through his November 21 policy statement to the new Parliament, that the IMF framework and the aligned debt treatment plans with bilateral and private creditors — finalised by his predecessor — will go ahead, tried to allay these fears.

So where does this ‘Marxist label’ on Sri Lanka’s new government come from? The NPP is an eclectic social coalition of some 21 groups, including political parties, youth and women’s organisations, trade unions and civil society networks. But one political party forms its political, if not ideological, core — the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP or People’s Liberation Front).

In fact, it was JVP leader Mr. Dissanayake who created the NPP in 2019 to widen the party’s appeal beyond its traditional cadre base and boost its chances at the polls. His political enterprise, which has now secured a massive victory, has turned a new page in post-colonial Sri Lanka, where politics has been dominated by just two parties and their offshoots, and the five elite families controlling them.

The JVP’s office in Battaramulla, a suburb about 10 km east of Colombo, is located close to parliament, although the party has rarely been close to power in the six decades of its existence. Three large black-and-white portraits of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin adorn the white wall of the main meeting room. Party cadre, regardless of position or prominence, make and serve tea to their guests. Above the reception desk at the entrance is a photograph of the party’s founder and charismatic leader Rohana Wijeweera, an infallible icon for its cadre. His mane, cap, and beard suggest Che Guevara-inspired self-styling.

Wijeweera began what became the JVP in 1965, exactly three decades after Ceylon’s left movement birthed the country’s oldest party, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), consequent to serial fractures within the Left. The LSSP split during the Second World War, leading to the formation of a pro-Moscow Communist Party. The cracks within the CP in the 1960s, triggered by the Sino-Soviet dispute, and internal tensions over the parliamentary road to socialism would, in turn, lead to the formation of the JVP, as a revolutionary party with Marxist-Leninist orientation.

‘Five classes’

Attracted to Maoism in his student days in the Soviet Union, Wijeweera joined the Communist Party (Peking wing – CP) of Sri Lanka in 1964, and became a youth leader. He challenged the party’s leadership, on their interpretation of class politics and revolution, and was subsequently expelled in 1965. His independent faction morphed into the JVP. Wijeweera and his comrades held political lessons for rural Sinhala youth, called the “Five Classes” that analysed Sri Lanka’s social and political order; Indian hegemony; the reformist left and coalition politics; and the parliamentary road to socialism. As part of preparation to achieving their objective of seizing state power, they trained in the use of shotguns and put together explosive devices.

The story of the JVP’s rise in the late 1960s and fall in the next two decades unravels in the backdrop of two major changes in Sri Lanka — President J.R. Jayewardene’s open economic reform in 1977 and the beginning of a full-blown civil war after the 1983, state-sponsored anti-Tamil pogrom that he falsely attributed to Left parties, including the JVP.

The JVP’s first insurrection in 1971 came out of frustration that the left-wing Sirimavo Bandaranaike-led government was not doing enough to meet the aspirations of educated but unemployed young people, and in changing the social, economic and political order inherited from the British. The discourse was anti-imperialist and socialist. The insurgents attacked dozens of police stations, to capture weapons and ammunition.

The second insurrection, from 1987 to 1989, roughly coincided with the party’s embrace of Sinhala-nationalism; its fierce opposition to Tamil self-determination; and to the signing of the India-brokered 1987 Accord aimed at ending the war, with boots-on-the-ground in the form of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). To Tamils in the far north of the island, the JVP appeared as Sinhala chauvinist instead of progressive, although the party never directly engaged in anti-Tamil violence.

In both insurrections, where the JVP took up arms against the state, its representatives, supporters, and dissidents from the Left [in the second insurrection], the state’s counter-insurgency response was many times more lethal, resulting in the death and disappearance of tens of thousands of Sinhala youth. Wijeweera himself was executed while in state custody in 1989.

Somawansa Amarasinghe, the only politburo member to survive the repression of the 1980s, escaped to India and subsequently to Europe. After a few years of underground existence, the surviving cadre resurrected the party, even as the country was increasingly preoccupied with massive human rights violations in the south and the raging war in the north-east. The JVP tentatively contested in the 1994 general election through another party, winning one seat. Within the next few years, the JVP warmed up to the political mainstream, winning more seats in parliament between 2000 and 2004, and four Cabinet-level ministerial portfolios in 2004–05, in a short-lived coalition with the Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga government.

Two splits

The new course of the JVP is defined by two consequential splits, linked to the party’s proximity to Mahinda Rajapaksa who began dominating the political scene from the early 2000s. They were also fuelled by internal differences on the dilution of leftism for “patriotism” (Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism), versus emphasis on Wijeweera’s socialist ideology and the party distancing itself from Mr. Rajapaksa and his pro-war stance.

Since the breakdown of the 2001-03 ceasefire, the JVP unambiguously backed Mr. Rajapaksa’s hawkishness in delivering a political solution to the Tamil question, and the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), with scant regard to Tamil lives. The JVP’s differences with Rajapaksa were more to do with their unease over ‘family-rule’ and his socio-economic policies rather than his militaristic response. However, its parliamentary group leader and reactionary politician Wimal Weerawansa disagreed, and broke away with a quarter of its legislators, forming the Jathika Nidahas Peramuna or National Freedom Front in 2008, that until recently firmly planted itself in the Rajapaksa camp. Four years later a Marxist faction within the residual JVP also split from it, criticising the party’s unconditional support to the Rajapaksa regime on the handling of the war, and its complete surrender to electoral politics. This group led by Kumar Gunaratnam formed the Frontline Socialist Party in 2012, the chief critic of the JVP today, from the left.

In 2014, Mr. Dissanayake was named leader of a party that had to stabilise itself, after shedding both its racist right-wing and its dissenting left-wing. The splits allowed the JVP to refashion itself, blurring its past profiles, and making a reputation for itself inside and outside parliament, as a bold critic of corruption and nepotism, and as an upholder of the rule of law and liberal democratic norms. The party, till date, is wary of clearly defining its position on the unresolved ethnic question. It also evades the language of class politics. In an interview to The Hindu in December 2023, Mr. Dissanayake said: “Labels have always given wrong perceptions. Left politics is not a bad thing, it is a good thing. Some people demonise this. That is why we say we are focussed more on working for the majority of our people, rather than on labels.”