Ukraine is, again, under pressure from two neighbouring EU members — Hungary and Slovakia. While Hungary has threatened to block a €90-billion EU loan for the war-torn country, Slovakia has warned it would halt emergency electricity supplies. At the core of both tensions lies the Druzhba pipeline, one of the longest pipelines connecting Russia to various parts of Eastern and Central Europe.
The flows from the Druzhba pipeline were halted last month, with Ukraine reasoning that a Russian drone attack had damaged the infrastructure. However, Hungary and Slovakia allege that Ukraine is deliberately delaying the pipeline’s resumption for political reasons.
But why are Hungary and Slovakia still heavily reliant on Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline, especially when the EU has been trying to reduce its dependence on Russia?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the energy crisis that followed in Europe revealed the bloc’s high levels of dependence on Russian fuels. In the Versailles Declaration of March 2022, EU leaders agreed to phase out dependence on Russian gas, oil and coal. They agreed to the REPowerEU plan to implement a variety of measures, including boosting renewable investments, reducing demand for gas and finding alternative sources.
In the following months, however, exceptional temporary derogations (exemptions) were provided to Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia and Bulgaria, allowing them to import Russian oil. This was supposed to give landlocked states like Hungary and Slovakia additional time to reduce reliance on Russian energy.
Almost four years later, Hungary and Slovakia remain the only EU countries that are heavily reliant on Russian oil. But this reliance stems more from political and economic reasons.
Energy or politics?
A recent report by the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) argued that Hungary’s continued imports of Russian oil are a political choice and not a necessity. The report, titled ‘Cutting the Chord’, concluded, “Despite full access to alternative supply routes and refineries capable of processing non-Russian crude, Hungary has deepened its dependence on Russian oil, turning a temporary EU exemption into a permanent loophole in the sanctions regime”.
This is also evident from their trade statistics. Data from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air show that Russian crude accounted for 87% of Hungary and Slovakia’s crude oil imports in 2024. This is much higher than in the pre-war years. This not only means that they failed to diversify, as they were supposed to under the exemption. Instead, the dependence has made Russia its largest supplier.
Hungarian PM Viktor Orban, ahead of a visit to Moscow in November last year, stated that the trip was intended to “ensure Hungary’s energy supply is secured for the winter and the following year at an affordable price”.
But Russia is not their only option to ensure supply security and affordable fuel prices.
Firstly, both Hungary and Slovakia have alternative pipelines that transport non-Russian crude. The Adria pipeline supplies non-Russian crude oil to Hungary directly and to Slovakia through an interconnection where the Adria feeds into the southern part of the Druzhba pipeline. This pipeline, operated by the state-owned Croatian company JANAF, has a transport capacity of 14.4 million tonnes per year. Reports state that this is more than enough to meet Slovakia and Hungary’s domestic demand. Further, Hungary also has the option to revive the Odesa-Brody pipeline with increased investments to transport oil from global supplies via the Black Sea.
The alternatives are not only available but feasible too. The CSD noted that the MOL group, Hungary’s largest oil company and one of the last major buyers of Russian crude in Europe, has already operated without Russian supply during disruptions to the Druzhba pipeline in 2019.
Secondly, Hungary claims that ending russian oil would lead to higher fuel prices. The CSD’s report highlighted that Bulgaria, which terminated its derogation in 2024, transitioned away from Russian oil without price shocks. Moreover, Hungary’s purchase of Russian oil at discounted prices did not translate into lower fuel prices for consumers.
This is not the first time that the supply via the Druzhba pipeline emerged as a bone of contention.
In August last year, when Russia and Ukraine stepped up attacks on each other’s energy infrastructure, a Ukrainian strike on a facility had suspended supplies to Hungary and Slovakia.
Strategic divide
Infrastructure and economic reasons aside, Hungary and Slovakia’s continued dependence on Russia stems from their cordial ties with Mr. Putin and their choices in pursuing them.
Only two months ago, in November, Mr. Orban defied the EU by promising the Russian President that energy supplies from Russia formed the basis of Hungary’s energy supply and would remain so in the future. Previously, he had vetoed a €50-billion financial aid package that Ukraine had desperately needed in December 2023. Mr. Orban is also scaling up the Ukraine war as a part of his election campaign, claiming that his opponents would drag the country into the war in Ukraine.
Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico, in October 2023, halted military aid to Ukraine and stated that the EU should change from being an arms supplier to becoming a peacemaker.
While Hungary and Slovakia remain coupled in Russian trade, the EU has slowly moved away from Russia.
The EU has managed to progressively phase out its dependence on Russian gas, oil, and coal imports to some extent. For instance, Russia was the largest supplier of petroleum oils to the EU in early 2021. As of Q3 2025, Russia’s share fell to just 1%. Russia was replaced with other partners like the U.S. and Norway.
Russia accounted for 48% of the EU’s imports of natural gas in the gaseous state in the pre-war period. This declined to 15% in Q3 of 2025. With an increasing share, Norway emerged as the bloc’s largest supplier of natural gas in its gaseous state. However, Russia remained the bloc’s second-largest supplier of liquefied natural gas even in Q3 2025, despite its share in imports decreasing to 15% in Q3 2025. This is also because LNG imports were not fully sanctioned by the EU in the same way as oil and coal. The plan to reduce its dependence on liquefied gas was legally updated in its roadmap only last year.
The Druzhba pipeline is only the tip of the iceberg. The latest tensions reflect a much larger issue — the political and economic hurdles in the EU’s roadmap to secure energy independence from Russia.
Published – February 26, 2026 04:06 pm IST
