During the last two weeks, Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan worsened with border clashes. Though the two have reached an agreement in Doha, Pakistan believes that the primary problem between the two countries is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), with the Afghan Taliban giving safe haven to the group.
Extent of the conflict
Pakistan’s primary challenge with respect to the TTP is the high level of violence and terrorism in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. According to media reports referring to data sourced from think tanks and Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), 2024 had the worst violence in the last decade. More than 1,600 people were killed last year; around 680 of them security personnel. There were more than 59,770 military operations in 2024, during which around 900 militants were killed. While the two provinces — KP and Balochistan — together witnessed 94% of the casualties in 2024, the former, where the TTP has a significant presence accounted for 63%. Thus, there has been a steady increase in violence since 2021, especially in KP, after a decline during 2016-20. Data published by Pakistan’s Centre for Research and Security Studies and the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies runs contrary to the once-held general Pakistani belief, that once the U.S. leaves Afghanistan, militancy will decline. Taliban’s return to Kabul has not brought peace to Pakistan’s tribal regions.
Then there are the demands of the TTP. The Pakistan Taliban wants the demerger of tribal regions from the rest of the KP province; removal of security forces; and the imposition of Shariah law. The TTP seeks to rule the tribal areas — the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that the British created. In 2018, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML-N) government, through the 25th constitutional amendment, removed FATA’s special status and merged it with KP, thereby providing representation of the FATA in the provincial Assembly and allowing the jurisdiction of the courts in the region. The TTP wants to undo the above and impose its writ.
Provincial issues
There are complex issues plaguing the KP region. First is its colonial legacy and the federal writ in the tribal regions. The British found it useful to create a buffer region between its India empire and Afghanistan, and thus created the FATA and used the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) to administer the seven tribal areas separately. Independent Pakistan followed this British policy for the next seven decades, and never imposed its writ. It was directly administered by Islamabad and Rawalpindi (mainly by the latter); and democratic institutions and administrations were not allowed in these seven tribal regions, as it suited Pakistan’s myopic approach of controlling Kabul.
Second is the civil-military imbalance in Pakistan, and the country’s search for strategic depth in Afghanistan. During the two external invasions of Afghanistan (by the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the U.S. in 2000s and 2010s) and internal Afghan instability (during the 1990s), the Establishment (Pakistan military) saw the tribal region as a strategic board to pursue its interests in Kabul. With such an aim in mind, the presence of political parties, local administration, provincial elections and representation in the KP (then the North-West Frontier Province) provincial assembly, and access to courts by the FATA were seen as a liability for Pakistan’s pursuit of strategic depth. However, the above vacuum provided space for the TTP’s emergence. While political and military establishments see the TTP as a post-2001 development, it ignores the inherent reasons which allowed the TTP to thrive. That is, while Pakistan’s primary accusation that the Afghan Taliban has a TTP connection is a valid point, what Pakistan ignores is how such a connection came about.
Third is the rise of the Afghan Taliban and the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan. The TTP came into existence in the tribal regions, especially in two areas — the Mehsud and Wazir led North and South Waziristan — when the Afghan Taliban along with the al-Qaeda moved into the tribal region when the U.S. invaded Afghanistan. Both wanted safe havens and local support to fight against the U.S.-led forces across the Durand Line. The TTP came into existence to provide that support. Pakistan’s political and military establishments were aware of the link, and even tried to make multiple deals with the TTP and its different factions between 2005 and 2015.
The Afghan Taliban found an ally in the TTP, and some TTP factions even fought along with the Afghan Taliban. The Establishment in Pakistan was aware of this linkage and wanted to believe that they would remain focused west of the Durand Line. There was even a naïve belief, that once the U.S. leaves, the Afghan Taliban would severe its links with the TTP. However, that was not the case as data proves. After the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, the Afghan Taliban did not give up on the TTP, and there has been a multi-fold increase in violence within Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban, despite global pressure, did not give up the relationship with al-Qaeda either. Expecting it to give up the TTP now is a tough call. Besides, Afghan Taliban sees the Daesh (ISIS) as the primary threat inside Afghanistan. There have been reports of TTP splinter groups joining the Daesh; for Kabul that would be a bigger internal threat.
Fourth is the lack of a consistent approach towards the TTP by Pakistan. The first serious TTP debate in Pakistan came only in December 2014, after the attack on the Army Public School (APS) at Peshawar, that killed more than 150, mostly students. Before this, the TTP’s attacks were primarily concentrated in the tribal region, which the Establishment dealt with through a series of military operations and peace deals. However, after the APS attack in December 2014, Pakistan announced a “National Action Plan” that included a policy shift in addressing the militant threat. It included political, military and institutional measures such as reforming religious seminaries, creating institutions and military course to deal with terrorism and extremism. But within a few years, there was again a U-turn, from the military resolve to crush the TTP to engaging with it. During 2020-22, there were dialogues, ceasefires and extensions. It was during this phase that Pakistan expected the Taliban to force the TTP to disarm.
While the Establishment blamed the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) for talking to the TTP, the initial response of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) during 2022, led by the PML-N and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) also focused on the same. Moreover, the PPP-PML government would not have negotiated with the TTP without the Establishment’s approval.
The fifth issue is the missing social/political players in the tribal regions, where the TTP has a presence. Pakistan has failed to encourage alternative political players in the tribal areas that could collect and express the local sentiments, especially the youth. In fact, the state has suppressed all alternate options. The existing religious political parties in the region are the two factions of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) which have monopolised the political space. However, both represent only the old guard, while the tribal youth are looking for new narratives. The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) could have become a primary social and political party representing the new generation, especially in Waziristan, where the TTP has its base. PTM leaders such as Manzoor Pashteen, Ali Wazir, and Mohsin Dawar are from Waziristan; and some of them were elected to Parliament. Instead of promoting the PTM, Pakistan decided to ban it.
Sixth, blaming the TTP threat on Afghanistan and India. There is a national consensus in Pakistan that the TTP problem persists because of external support from the Taliban and India. Creating a new term — Fitna-al-Khwarij — for the TTP highlights this new narrative that Pakistan wants to build. Calling the TTP as outsiders, and referring to them as being supported by external actors (India and the Afghan Taliban) is to shift the blame for its internal failures.
Internal fault
Pakistan has a serious problem especially in the tribal regions that are undergoing a social and demographic transformation. Pursuing the tribal region with strategies of the 1980s would not yield the desired results. As the support to the PTM would reveal, the tribal region is looking for new players. The old religious political parties are becoming irrelevant. Political parties and organisations like the PTI and the PTM can occupy that space; unfortunately, both are out of favour with the Establishment.
Blaming the Afghan Taliban for the TTP and carrying out attacks inside Afghanistan would be counterproductive. Pakistan should know more about the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan nation. Unilateral military actions from the east of the Durand Line since the British days, have never yielded the desired political results.
Pushing the Afghan refugees back; unilateral closer of border points; and blaming Afghanistan for the TTP problem would only alienate the Afghan nation. For Pakistan, that would be a bigger threat, than what the TTP is today.
D. Suba Chandran is professor and dean at the school of conflict and security studies at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS).
Published – October 23, 2025 08:30 am IST
